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Foundation for the Development of International 
Law in Asia (dila)
dila was established in 1989, at a time when its prime movers believed that 
economic and political developments in Asia had reached the stage at which 
they would welcome and benefit substantially from a mechanism to promote 
and facilitate exchanges among Asian international law scholars that had 
failed to develop during the colonial era.
The Foundation was established to promote: (a) the study of and analysis of 
topics and issues in the field of international law, in particular from an Asian 
perspective; (b) the study of, and the dissemination of knowledge of interna-
tional law in Asia; and (c) contacts and co-operation between persons and in-
stitutions actively dealing with questions of international law relating to Asia.
The Foundation is concerned with reporting and analyzing developments 
in the field of international law relating to the region, and not primarily with 
efforts to distinguish particular attitudes, policies or practices as predominate-
ly or essentially “Asian”. If they are shown to exist, it would be an interesting 
by-product of the Foundation’s essential function, which is to bring about an 
exchange of views in the expectation that the process would reveal areas of 
common interest and concern among the states of Asia, and even more impor-
tantly, demonstrate that those areas of interest and concern are, in fact, shared 
by the international community as a whole.
<UN>
The Asian Yearbook of International Law
Launched in 1991, the Asian Yearbook of International Law is a major inter-
nationally-refereed yearbook dedicated to international legal issues as seen 
 primarily from an Asian perspective. It is published by Brill under the auspices 
of the Foundation for the Development of International Law (dila).
When it was launched, the Yearbook was the first publication of its kind, 
edited by a team of leading international law scholars from across Asia. It pro-
vides a forum for the publication of articles in the field of international law 
and other Asian international legal topics. The objects of the Yearbook are two-
fold. First, to promote research, study and writing in the field of international 
law in Asia; and second, to provide an intellectual platform for the discussion 
and dissemination of Asian views and practices on contemporary internation-
al legal issues.
Each volume of the Yearbook contains articles and shorter notes, a section 
on State Practice, an overview of the Asian states’ participation in multilateral 
treaties and succinct analysis of recent international legal developments in 
Asia, as well as book reviews. We believe this publication to be of importance 
and use to anyone working on international law and in Asian studies.
In keeping with dila’s commitment to encourage scholarship in interna-
tional law as well as to disseminate such scholarship, its Governing Board de-
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The 2016 edition (Volume 22) of the Asian Yearbook of International Law is 
a special volume whose main articles focus on the peaceful uses of the East 
Asian seas and is followed by notes and commentaries; legal materials includ-
ing a listing of the participation of Asian states in multilateral treaties and a 
description of the state practice of Asian states in the field of international 
law; a literature section featuring a book review and a bibliographic survey of 
materials dealing with international law in Asia; and finally a summary of the 
activities undertaken by the Foundation for the Development of International 
Law in Asia in 2016.
I Main Articles
As noted by Keyuan Zou, Harris Professor of International Law at Lancashire 
Law School and Special Issue Editor for this volume of the Yearbook, the main 
articles of Volume 22 concern the peaceful uses of East Asian seas and were 
chosen from the papers that were presented at two international conferences 
held in Hangzhou, China in 2012 and 2013, sponsored by the Centre for Ocean 
Law and Governance of Zhejiang University.
Part I of the main articles focuses upon “Maintaining Maritime Peace and 
the Law of the Sea” and begins with Masahiro Miyoshi’s article on “Peaceful 
Use of the Sea and the Rule of Law”. Professor Miyoshi, who is Professor Emeri-
tus of International Law at Aichi University and a former General Editor of the 
Yearbook, asserts that the governing principle for state conduct in their rela-
tions with other states should be the rule of law. He then contextualizes the 
principle in relation to particular law of the sea matters and sovereignty dis-
putes in East Asia and concludes by noting that despite states’ desires to have 
control over the dispute settlement process and preferring arbitration over the 
International Court of Justice, a lesson can be learned from the Anglo-French 
Continental Shelf Arbitration of 1977.
Next, Yann-huei Song, Research Fellow, Institute of European and Ameri-
can Studies, Academia Sinica (Taipei, Taiwan) looks at “Peaceful Proposals and 
Maritime Cooperation between Mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan in the 
East China Sea: Progress Made and Challenges Ahead”. Dr. Song discusses the 
advances and setbacks that have occurred in relation to proposals and agree-
ments on maritime cooperation between China, Japan, and Taiwan in the 
East China Sea between 1997 and 2013. Given this experience of the parties, 
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he  believes that maritime cooperation between China, Japan, and Taiwan is 
possible in the areas of conservation and management of fisheries resources as 
well as exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in the East China 
Sea along with management of the dispute over the Diaoyutai/Diaoyu/Sen-
kaku Island group. For this to happen, he notes that there must be political 
willingness among the leaders of these countries so that the area becomes “a 
sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.”
Part I concludes with Yen-Chiang Chang’s examination of “The South China 
Sea Disputes: An Opportunity for the Cross Taiwan Strait Relationship”. After 
reviewing the claims of mainland China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Brunei, and Indonesia, Dr. Chang opines that there is a strong legal basis for 
mainland China to claim sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and sov-
ereign rights over the surrounding waters. He recognizes that while it would be 
preferable to set aside the disputes over the South China Sea and emphasize 
joint development, such a focus would be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, 
given the opportunities for joint development, he suggests promoting coop-
eration between mainland China and Taiwan in resource development of the 
South China Sea, while at the same time, both sides could put pressure on 
Southeast Asian states to promote cooperation and negotiations among the 
relevant state parties.
Part II looks at “Peaceful Uses of Marine Resources” and begins with Kuan-
Hsiung Wang’s analysis of important aspects of fishery resources in “Man-
agement of Fishery Resources: A Starting Point towards Cooperation in the 
East China Sea”. Professor Wang, from the Graduate Institute of Political 
Science, National Taiwan Normal University, looks at the possibility of cre-
ating a mechanism for fisheries management in the East China Sea to man-
age and conserve the important fisheries resources in the area. He reviews 
the legal landscape for such a possibility and notes that a successful effort in 
this regard might spill over into other aspects of the disputes over the South 
China Sea.
Next, Robert Beckman, Head of the Ocean Law and Policy programme and 
former Director of the Centre for International Law at the National  University 
of Singapore, and Leonardo Bernard, Ph.D. Candidate, ANCORS, University 
of Wollongong, Australia, provide their analysis in “Framework for the Joint 
 Development of Hydrocarbon Resources”. They note that the EEZ regime cre-
ated by UNCLOS prompted states to maximize their maritime zones to be 
able to secure offshore hydrocarbon resources. Their article examines the in-
ternational obligations in relation to hydrocarbon resources and they assert 
that states must cooperate with each other in the management of resources 
<UN>
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in overlapping claim areas, either through Joint Development Arrangements 
( JDA) or other forms of provisional arrangements pending resolution of the 
maritime boundaries. They go on to examine the legal framework for and dis-
cuss various models for JDAs noting that creation of JDAs are difficult given 
the political nature of the underlying issues.
David M. Ong, Professor of International and Environmental Law at Not-
tingham Law School, follows with “The International Legal Obligations of 
States in Disputed Maritime Jurisdiction Zones and Prospects for Co-operative 
Arrangements in the East China Sea Region”. Professor Ong analyzes the in-
ternational rights and obligations of the states in the East China Sea region, 
namely China, Japan, and South Korea, specifically under the UNCLOS as well 
as general international law. Within that context, he specifically looks at the 
procedural obligations of notification, information, consultation and envi-
ronmental impact assessment and observes the practice of China, Japan, and 
South Korea with respect to cooperation and joint development in the region.
Jianwei Li and Pingping Chen of the National Institute for South China Sea 
Studies conclude Part II with “Joint Development in the South China Sea: Is 
the Time Ripe?” They also examine JDAs and their potential application in 
the South China Sea area. After explaining the significance of JDAs from the 
perspective of international law, they look specifically at its application in the 
South China Sea and how each of the relevant states in the region approach 
JDAs and JDAs that have been established for resources straddling boundar-
ies, for resources in overlapping sea areas, and attempts to establish JDAs. 
They note that all claimant states involved in the South China Sea disputes 
have experienced JDAs and assert that China must play a major role in the 
search for conflict management measures, including JDA, before there is a final 
resolution to the disputes in the South China Sea.
Part III focuses on “Promotion of Marine Scientific Research for Peace”. 
Keyuan Zou begins this section with “Peaceful Use of the Sea and Military In-
telligence Gathering in the EEZ”. Professor Zou notes that the tolerance of mili-
tary activities under international law does not mean that such activities can 
be conducted in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a state without any reg-
ulation. He acknowledges that while military activities conducted in the high 
seas are open to all, he observes that the EEZ is different from the high seas 
in that it is an area under national jurisdiction. With respect to military intel-
ligence gathering and military hydrographic survey in the EEZ of another state, 
he points out that this continues to be a controversial issue in international law 
and is hotly contested between China and the United States. Given the signifi-
cant controversy of these issues, he suggests that a future review conference of 
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uncLOS Convention should provide clarification as to the legality of military 
activities, including military intelligence gathering and military hydrographic 
surveying in a foreign EEZ.
In the next article, “Marine Data Collection: US Perspectives”, Captain J. 
Ashley Roach, who was attorney adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser, 
US Department of State, explains the various data collection activities in the 
marine environment and reviews the applicable legal regimes that govern 
such activities. He explains that surveys, operational oceanography, explora-
tion and exploitation, and monitoring and environmental assessment are 
not marine scientific research (MSR) regulated by UNCLOS, but are subject 
to separate legal regimes. He observes that the means of data collection are 
often the same, and may appear indistinguishable from MSR. He points out 
that the data collected may be the same or different and that the parameters 
collected, their intended use, and the detailed controls on foreign MSR in the 
EEZ distinguish MSR from surveys, operational oceanography, exploration and 
exploitation of resources, and monitoring and environmental assessment. 
He argues that proposals that would require all forms of marine data collec-
tion be under coastal state jurisdiction would deprive the world of the ben-
efits of free and open access to data that enhance safety and environmental 
protection.
Hong Chang follows with “Voluntary Observing Ship and Marine Scientific 
Research under the Law of the Sea”. Dr. Chang examines the legal status of the 
Voluntary Observing Ships (VOS) scheme which is an aspect of the Joint Tech-
nical Commission for Oceanography and Marine Meteorology. The data that is 
collected through VOS is used for the preparation of forecasts and warnings to 
help route ships and avoid severe weather conditions, to monitor the state of 
the oceans, for climatological data banks serving many purposes, and to build 
long-term records to monitor changes in the climate of the earth. Dr. Chang 
examines VOS in light of the principles established by UNCLOS and discusses 
the complexities that arise in light of considering what is marine scientific 
research.
Finally, Part IV of the main articles addresses “Peaceful Means for Maritime 
Dispute Resolution” and starts with Anne Hsiu-An Hsiao of the Institute of 
International Relations, National Chengchi University, discussing “Unilateral 
Actions and the Rule of Law in Maritime Boundary Disputes”. Dr. Hsiao notes 
that there is a gap in scholarly treatment on the issue of how international law 
and the law of the sea regulate a state’s unilateral conduct with respect to mari-
time disputes. Her article attempts to preliminarily fill in this gap in examining 
unilateral actions in maritime boundary disputes and explores their possible 
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conceptual natures under international law. She notes that while international 
law and the law of the sea regime do not prohibit all unilateral actions in mari-
time boundary disputes, they are subject to existing principles and rules of 
international law, such as good faith, prohibition of the threat or use of force, 
and peaceful settlement of disputes.
Lastly, Erik Franckx, Professor of Law at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, follows 
with “Search and Rescue as an Enabler to Stimulate Cooperation in Areas of 
Tension”. Professor Franckx discusses how cooperation in the area of search 
and rescue is able to contribute to overall cooperation between the pertinent 
state parties in the East China Sea, an area that is prone to tension and dis-
putes. He examines the international legal framework governing search and 
rescue and how this is applied specifically to the East China Sea while also 
looking at examples from other regions. He observes that while search and res-
cue cooperation is not generally well suited in regions such as the East China 
Sea, where maritime areas are disputed between the coastal states, this is not 
a fatality as illustrated by the recently concluded search and rescue agreement 
in the Arctic, an area of high tension where much of the maritime boundaries 
have yet to be fixed in a definitive manner. Professor Franckx sees this as an 
opportunity for cooperation in the East China Sea.
II Notes and Commentaries
The main articles are followed by notes and commentaries that analyze the 
state practice of Asian countries in more depth. Matthias Vanhullebusch, As-
sociate Professor at the KoGuan Law School of the Shanghai Jiao Tong Univer-
sity, provides his analysis of “China’s Air Defence Identification Zone: Towards 
Crystallization of a New International Custom”. Following, Arie Afriansyah of 
Universitas Indonesia examines “Indonesia’s Practice in Combatting Illegal 
Fishing: 2015–2016”.
III Legal Materials
From its inception, the Yearbook has been committed to providing scholars, 
practitioners, and students of international law with a report on Asian state 
practice as its  contribution to provide an understanding of how Asian states act 
within the international system and how international law is applied in their 
domestic legal systems. The Yearbook does this in two ways. First, it records 
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the  participation of Asian states in multilateral treaties; and second, it reports 
on the state  practice of Asian states. A number of diligent scholars have pro-
vided the Yearbook with reports on the 2016 state practice of their respective 
countries.
1 Participation in Multilateral Treaties
Karin Arts of the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam in The Hague, The Netherlands, has compiled and edited the par-
ticipation of Asian states in multilateral treaties for the 2016 calendar year.
2 State Practice of Asian States in the Field of International Law
The State Practice section is intended to offer readers of the Yearbook an out-
line and summary of the activities undertaken by Asian states that have a direct 
bearing on international law. The national correspondents, listed in the table 
of contents, have undertaken the responsibility to report on the state practice 
of their respective countries during the 2016 calendar year. Their submissions 
describe how these states are applying international law in their domestic legal 
systems and in their foreign relations.
IV Literature
1 Book Review
For this edition of the Yearbook, Sangmin Shim, Assistant Professor of Interna-
tional Law at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, gives his review of Ma-
rine Pollution Contingency Planning: State Practice in Asia-Pacific States edited 
by Anastasia Telesetsky, Warwick Gullett, and Seokwoo Lee, published by Brill 
Nijhoff in 2018.
2 Bibliographic Survey
Dr. Lowell Bautista of the University of Wollongong School of Law and of the 
Board of Editors has prepared the bibliography for 2016 which provides infor-
mation on books, articles, notes, and other materials dealing with internation-
al law in Asia.
V DILA Activities
The 2016 edition of the Yearbook concludes with a report on the activities un-
dertaken by DILA in 2016, namely the annual DILA International Conference 
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and DILA Academy and Workshop that was held on November 4–7, 2016 on 







Peaceful Uses of East Asian Seas: An Editorial Note
The East Asian seas, from north to south geographically, include the Sea of Ja-
pan (East Sea), the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. All 
of these seas share the same characteristic in that they are defined as semi-en-
closed under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).1 
The bordering countries include Brunei, Cambodia, China (including Taiwan), 
Indonesia, Japan, the two Koreas, Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam. Natural resources are abundant in these seas and serve 
the peoples around them. On the other hand, aside from accompanying natu-
ral resources, there are also many pending maritime disputes which are typi-
cally illustrated by the South China Sea.
In order to maintain peaceful uses of these seas, there should be a maritime 
legal order which is supported by rules and institutions based on international 
law. The current such order in the world has been mainly established by and 
maintained under the LOSC, which is commonly regarded as the constitution 
of oceans and has incorporated almost all previously existing conventional 
and customary rules and norms concerning the oceans. Pursuant to the pro-
visions of the LOSC, a coastal state has the right to establish maritime zones 
under its jurisdiction: internal waters inside the baselines which are used to 
measure the extent of the territorial sea and other jurisdictional waters; the 
territorial sea of 12 nautical miles (nm); the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 
200 nm; and the continental shelf of 200 nm (or up to 350 nm in some cases), 
outward from the baselines. Within these maritime zones, a coastal state is en-
titled to enjoy either sovereignty or sovereign rights and to exercise its jurisdic-
tion and enforce its laws and regulations in accordance with international law. 
All 16 East Asian countries except Cambodia and North Korea have acceded 
to the LOSC. In order to implement the LOSC, these countries have adopted 
relevant domestic laws and regulations for the management of maritime zones 
and maritime activities within their jurisdiction.2
1 According to Article 122 of the LOSC, “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means “a gulf, basin or 
sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow 
outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones 
of two or more coastal States.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 ILM 
(1982) 1261. The Convention was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 and came into ef-
fect on 16 November 1994. As of April 2018, there were 168 Contracting Parties to it, including 
one international organization.
2 For details on these laws, see Division for Marine Affairs and the Law of the Sea, available at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/asia.htm.
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The LOSC provides that oceans and seas should be used for peaceful pur-
poses, and any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations 
shall be prohibited.3 This special issue is designed to examine how and to what 
extent the international law of the sea plays a role in promoting and maintain-
ing peace in East Asia seas. It divides the following sections for discussions: 
maintaining maritime peace and the law of the sea; peaceful uses of marine 
resources; promotion of marine scientific research for peace; and peaceful 
means for maritime dispute resolution. It is strongly believed that as long as 
international law, including customary law and the LOSC, can be well observed 
by the states in East Asia, peace and regional stability can be maintained and 
orderly cooperation and development can be promoted in East Asian seas.
Finally, it is specially acknowledged that the articles contained in this spe-
cial issue are selected from the two international symposia sponsored by the 
Centre for Ocean Law and Governance of Zhejiang University, China and held 
in Hangzhou in 2012 and 2013, respectively. This Editor also expresses his own 
gratitude to all the contributors to this special issue and to the Editors-in-
Chief, Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee, for their kindness to accommodate the 
selected contributions for the Asian Yearbook of International Law.
Keyuan Zou
Special Issue Editor
3 See Art. 301 of the LOSC.
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Peaceful Use of the Sea and the Rule of Law
Miyoshi Masahiro
i Introduction
It is a truism to say that the rule of law should prevail in international rela-
tions. The rule of law implies “the subordination of all authorities, legislative, 
executive, judicial, and other to certain principles which would generally be 
accepted as characteristic of law, such as the ideas of the fundamental prin-
ciples of justice, moral principles, fairness and due process.”1 Consequently, 
political or policy considerations in favour of national interests without heed 
to their legal implications are outside the realm of law. The rule of law is easy 
to say, but not necessarily easy to materialise in the actual world where vari-
ous national interests and cultural-historical backgrounds tend to collide with 
each other. Despite some uncertainty of its concept, however, the rule of law 
should be the governing principle for the conduct of States in their mutual 
relations.
1 Importance of Peaceful Use of Sea Resources
Article 88 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter, 
“unclos”) provides: “The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.” 
Naturally, this does not automatically apply to all sea areas but, in view of its 
clear intent, may be applicable mutatis mutandis to the exclusive economic 
zone (hereinafter, “eez”) where non-coastal States may have a share in the liv-
ing resources on the basis of specific arrangements with the coastal State.2 The 
living resources are absolutely necessary for everyday life of the populations 
in the coastal State. But “[w]here the coastal State does not have the capacity 
to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall … give other States access to the 
surplus of the allowable catch ….”3 Full benefits from the resources may be en-
sured by peaceful means of exploitation. Should there be disagreement among 
the neighbouring coastal States as to an effective use of the resources, it could 
lead on to an abusive use by some impudent States to the exclusion of  others – 
a state of lawlessness. Protecting fishing vessels by some  accompanying 
 warships from possible coast guard interventions of the coastal State, as was 
1 David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law 1093 (1980).
2 See unclos, Article 62.
3 unclos, Article 62, para. 2.
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occasionally evidenced in the South China Sea, is by no means a peaceful act. 
That aggressive State is taking advantage of the non-existence of a legal ar-
rangement for fishing in the sea area in question.
To take Japan’s fishing arrangements, for example, it has a fishing agree-
ment of 1998 with South Korea4 in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea and 
another of 1997 with China5 in the East China Sea. Both are naturally results 
of political compromise and have some defects respectively. Even with some 
such defective aspects, they are workable arrangements. The most recent fish-
eries arrangement in the East China Sea is that of 10 April 2013 with Taiwan,6 
which responds to the daily needs of fishermen from Taiwan who used to fish 
in the waters near the Senkaku Islands but have been virtually excluded from 
those waters over the past few decades.
With respect to non-living resources, however, the basic legal order in which 
Japan is placed is not complete. It has two continental shelf agreements of 1974 
with South Korea7 but no eez agreement yet. The matter is much worse in its 
relations with China: it has no basic agreement on the continental shelf nor 
on the eez. All it has in this regard is a broad arrangement by means of a brief 
press release of 2008 for joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea.8 
This has yet to be completed by further implementing  arrangements, but no 
 effective results have since been achieved. It is a matter of regret that no clear 
4 The Japan-South Korea Fisheries Agreement (entered into force 22 January 1999).
5 The Japan-China Fisheries Agreement (entered into force 1 June 2000). For a brief introduc-
tory analysis of this agreement, together with the Japan-South Korea agreement, see, for ex-
ample, Masahiro Miyoshi, New Japan-China Fisheries Agreement: An Evaluation from the Point 
of View of Dispute Settlement, 41 The Japanese Annual of International Law 30–43 
(1998).
6 Japan Business Press, available at http://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/37570.
7 For the text of the two agreements of 30 January 1974, see, for example, Jonathan I. Char-
ney and Lewis M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 
Volume 1 1063–1068, 1073–1089 (1993).
8 On 18 June 2008, the Governments of Japan and China issued a brief joint press release on 
“Co-operation between Japan and China in the East China Sea,” composed of two instru-
ments of understanding. For a brief description of this joint press release, see, for example, 
Masahiro Miyoshi, Japan’s Arrangements with South Korea and China for the Development of 
Oil and Gas in the East China Sea: A Memorandum, an abridged version of a paper filed with 
the Centre for the Sea and Maritime Law of the Faculty of Law of the National University of 
Hanoi, Vietnam, and presented as a discussion paper at the Roundtable, Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation and Possibilities of Joint Development in East and Southeast Asia, co-sponsored 
by The Aichi University Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for the Sea and Mari-
time Law of the Faculty of Law of the National University of Hanoi, Vietnam, held on Kuru-
mamichi, Nagoya, Campus of Aichi University on 29 November 2008, and reproduced in the 
134 Journal of International Affairs  114–120 (2009).
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response has been forthcoming from the Chinese side over the past five years 
to repeated Japanese calls for a re-start of negotiations for implementation.
2 Military Expansionist Trends
With its growing economy over the past decade, China is showing a move to 
increase its advances into the western Pacific sea areas. It has been claiming 
advances beyond the “First Island Chain” and into the “Second Island Chain” in 
the Northwest Pacific and a tongue-shaped or U-shaped dash line in the South 
China Sea.9 Thus, it has created a concern among the States in this region, par-
ticularly because it is viewed as an expansionist move backed by the Navy of 
the People’s Liberation Army. As it is linked to territorial claims to some is-
lands, islets and other smaller insular formations, the move is being viewed as 
not only resource-oriented but also territorial expansionist. The widely shared 
concern has been recently reinforced by the Chinese Government’s official 
proclamation that China will resolutely defend its sovereignty over the islands 
and islets as its “core interest.”10
Whether the attempt to advance into the western Pacific is an alleged “core 
interest” is a matter for China. But it has undeniable repercussions on the 
States in this part of the world, and consequently is unacceptable to them in 
its alleged form. In other words, a mere proclamation of “core interest” does 
not entitle the claimant to its claimed territory under international law. It in-
volves a great number of islands, islets and smaller insular formations which 
have large surrounding areas of the sea where there are good fishery grounds 
and potential hydrocarbon and other mineral resources. The other States in 
this region have overlapping claims to those islands, islets or smaller insular 
formations and long-time interests in the surrounding seas, and seem to be 
perplexed in the face of the recent Chinese moves. To make the matter worse, 
such moves for maritime advances are backed by the military.11 It is even sus-
pected that the military is taking the initiative in those advances. If this is so, 
9 For a discussion of the “U-shaped line,” see, for example, Masahiro Miyoshi, China’s 
‘U-Shaped Line’ Claim in the South China Sea: Any Validity Under International Law?, 43 
Ocean Development and International Law, 1–17 (2012).
10 See the public announcement by the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, at 
the press conference on 26 April 2013, reported in The Japan Times, 28 April 2013, at 2, 
which says the announcement was made for the first time that the Senkaku Islands is 
regarded as a “core interest” just as Taiwan, Tibet, and the restive Xinjiang Uyghur Au-
tonomous Region are.
11 See, for example, the recent Scarborough Shoal incident between China and the Philip-
pines, and the earlier conflict between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands.
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the concern of the neighbouring States is more serious because such advances 
into the sea could also create a security threat to those States.
If the naval units of the People’s Liberation Army are actively involved in 
the Chinese advances into the western Pacific, those States in the region which 
think themselves threatened thereby would respond by building up their mili-
tary forces. This could lead on to a vicious circle of military build-ups in this 
region. Every State concerned is well advised to refrain from more such mili-
tary activism and make sincere efforts to come to terms with each other for 
effective utilisation of the rich sea resources.
ii History and International Law
When it comes to the basis of claim to sovereignty over an island or islet, or 
any other smaller insular formation for that matter, it is well known that China 
rests its claim on history or long-term assertion of sovereignty. As it has a very 
long history as a sovereign State, China would have abundant old documents 
and maps depicting the islands or islets concerned as its possessions over-
seas. But it is doubted whether history is everything or silences any otherwise 
grounded argument on territorial sovereignty.
1 Discovery as an Historical Ground for Title to Territory
Take, for example, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu in Chinese) problem. China 
has repeatedly asserted that its ancient historical documents depict those is-
lands as belonging to China.12 It can be inferred from such depictions that it 
may have been the Chinese who sighted the islands first. If territorial sover-
eignty can be proved by such depictions alone, the Chinese assertions would 
be clearly correct. Discovery can have a legal effect, as indeed it used to have in 
the mediaeval years, but in the modern times it can only have a limited effect 
of inchoate title unless perfected within a reasonable time by effective occupa-
tion.13 However, such historical documents presented by China do not provide 
12 See, for example, Tianying Wu, An Examination of the Title to the Diaoyu 
Islands before the Sino-Japanese War: Disproof of Messrs. Okuhara 
Toshio and Others (Japanese translation by Mizuno Akira) 31–48 (1998).
13 Perhaps the first step to show the will for appropriation, animus occupandi, is such sym-
bolic acts as to display the national flag and arms. See, for example, the Award of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration, dated 4 April 1928, in the Island of Palmas case, 2 Reports 
of International Arbitral Awards 857 (1928). See also, C.H.M. Waldock, Disputed 
Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25 British Year Book of Interna-
tional Law 323 (1948).
9Peaceful Use of the Sea and the Rule of Law
<UN>
the evidence that China has established effective control14 over the disputed 
islands over the past hundreds of years. By effective control is meant a continu-
ous and peaceful display of State authority or sovereignty without protest from 
foreign States. It means the animus occupandi, the clear intention to possess 
the territory, and the effectiveness of claims to sovereignty. The rationale of 
this requirement is that any territorial possession of a State in a remote place 
may be adversely occupied by another State before it is known to the original 
possessor State.
2 The Legal Basis of Title to Territory
While the main rules of modern international law, including those governing 
the acquisition of territory, are said to have been established in the late 19th 
century, the Island of Palmas arbitration of 1928 between the Netherlands and 
the United States wound up the law of acquisition of territory.15 As to whether 
a mere sighting or discovery is sufficient to constitute a title, the Award states:
[D]iscovery alone, without any subsequent act, cannot at the present time 
suffice to prove sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (or Miangas)….16
14 Here the term “effective control” is used, instead of “effective occupation” which is the 
normal term for the establishment of sovereignty, because it is commonly used to mean a 
continued state of “effective occupation.”
15 The Island of Palmas arbitration, by the sole arbitrator Max Huber of Switzerland, before 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration has been esteemed among international lawyers as 
an authoritative exposition of the law of acquisition of title to territory. See, for example, 
Hazel Fox, Arbitration, in David Davies Memorial Institute of International 
Studies, International Disputes: The Legal Aspects 109 (1972), where the au-
thor says: “… the award in the Island of Palmas case, 1928, was the most outstanding con-
tribution to international jurisprudence.”
16 The Island of Palmas Award, 2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 846 
(1928). As early as 1609 when his Mare Liberum was published under a pseudonym, 
Grotius wrote:
To discover a thing is not only to capture it with the eyes but to take possession  thereof 
…. The act of discovery is sufficient to give a clear title of sovereignty only when it is 
accomplished by actual possession. (Emphasis added)
Hugo Grotius, Mare Liberum 11 (1916), as quoted in Waldock, op. cit., at 322. 
Likewise  Goebel had this to say about the instruction of Charles V of Spain to his Ambas-
sador in 1523 in the dispute with Portugal over the Molucca Islands:
Although Mollucco had been discovered by ships of the King of Portugal, it could not 
on this account … be said that Mollucco had been found by him; for it was evident that 
to ‘find’ required possession, and that which was not taken or possessed could not be 
said to be found although seen or discovered.
Goebel, Struggle for the Falkland Islands 96 (1927), as quoted in Waldock, 
op. cit., at 322–323.
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[A]ccording to the view that has prevailed at any rate since the 19th 
century, an inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a rea-
sonable  period by the effective occupation of the region claimed to be 
discovered.17 (Emphasis added)
The Award further states on the weakness of an inchoate title of discovery:
But even admitting that the Spanish title still existed as inchoate in 1898 
and must be considered as included in the cession under Article iii of the 
Treaty of Paris, an inchoate title could not prevail over the continuous and 
peaceful display of authority by another State; for such display may prevail 
even over a prior, definitive title put forward by another State.18 (Emphasis 
added)
The logic of these findings has been followed in the subsequent judicial deci-
sions on territorial sovereignty, for example, the Clipperton Island (1931), East-
ern Greenland (1933) and Minquiers et Ecrehos (1953) cases.19 The decisive test 
of a State’s title in the modern law, according to Waldock, is not having the 
17 The Island of Palmas case, 2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 846 
(1928).
18 Ibid.
19 The Sentence du 28 janvier 1931 in the Affaire de l’Île de Clipperton states:
… même en admettant que la découverte ait été faite par des sujets espagnols, il faud-
rait, pour que la thèse du Mexique fut fondée, prouver que l’Espagne, non seulement 
avait le droit, en tant qu’État, d’incorporer l’île à ses possessions, mais encore l’avait 
effectivement exercé.
2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1109 (1933). The judgement of 5 
April 1933 of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Legal Status of Eastern 
Greenland case says:
[A] claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such as a treaty of 
cession but merely upon continued display of authority, involves two elements each 
of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some 
actual exercise or display of such authority.
pcij, Series A/B 53, at 27–28. The judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 
Minquiers et Ecrehos case of 1953 has this to say:
What is of decisive importance … is not indirect presumptions deduced from events 
in the Middle Ages, but the evidence which relates directly to the possession of the 
Ecrehos and Miquiers groups.
icj Reports 1953, at 53. Waldock extensively discusses the constituent factors of the 
exercise or display of sovereignty based on the three cases of Island of Palmas, Eastern 
Greenland, and Clipperton Island, saying that it must be (a) peaceful, (b) actual, (c) suf-
ficient to confer a valid title to sovereignty, and (d) continuous. Waldock, op. cit., at 
334–337.
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territory at its apparent disposition but the exercise of the functions of a State in 
a manner appropriate to the circumstances of the territory and to the extent 
necessary to fulfil the obligations of a State under international law.20
Thus, a mere discovery, even if it is duly recorded, cannot in itself consti-
tute a title to sovereignty unless it is perfected within a reasonable period of 
time by effective occupation of the target territory. In the case of the Senkaku 
 Islands, the Japanese Government had made a series of careful research to 
make sure that they were not under effective control of any State before it for-
mally incorporated them into the Japanese territory at a Cabinet meeting in 
1895.21 Technically, it did so as a matter of occupation, rather than prescription, 
under international law because they were terra nullius.22 It was a lawful ac-
quisition of title requiring no passage of time. Had the acquisition been a case 
of prescription, it should have been the acquisition of title to the islands by a 
long-continued and undisturbed possession.23
3 Inter-temporal Law
In this connection, some words would be in order about the concept and role 
of inter-temporal law. The act of incorporating the Senkaku Islands into the 
Japanese territory in 1895 was lawful at the time of the act under inter-temporal 
law. If one criticises its legality today, one does so under international law of 
20 Waldock, op.cit., at 324–325.
21 An episode shows how carefully the Japanese Government treated the sovereignty prob-
lem of the Senkaku Islands before it formally incorporated them in the Japanese territory. 
In 1894, when Koga Tatsushiroh applied to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture for a loan 
of some Senkaku Islands to implement his plan of developing them after some ten years of 
exploration for feathers, guano and marine products, the Okinawa Governor turned down 
his application on the ground that the islands were not formally appropriated by any State 
yet. Subsequently, in August 1896, a year and a half after the Cabinet decision to incorpo-
rate the islands into Okinawa in 1895, his request was approved by the Interior Minister for 
a 30-year loan free of charge. Toshio Okuhara, Senkaku Islands and Japan’s Ownership of 
Them: A Historical Review of their Incorporation into the Japanese Territory” (in Japanese), 
234 Japan and the World Magazine 21–37 (1979).
22 The reader is referred to a very careful study of the Senkaku Islands problem by Shigeyoshi 
Ozaki, Professor Emeritus of international law, Tsukuba University, Japan. His most recent 
paper, Territorial Issues on the East China Sea: A Japanese Position (this is an erroneous title 
of the paper adopted by the editor to conform to the title of the Chinese counterpart’s pa-
per), 3(1) Journal of East Asia and International Law 151–174 (2010), is a handy 
abridged English version of his full-scale study based on his thorough-going research 
over the past thirty years or so. Besides discussing the international law issues involved, it 
scrupulously refutes the alleged historical basis of China’s claimed title by examining the 
maps and the names of the islands. Ibid., at 155–164.
23 See R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Title to Territory in International 
Law 20, 23 (1963).
MIYOSHI 12
<UN>
today. That is not the correct application of the law. As the Island of Palmas 
Award said,
Both Parties are also agreed that a juridical act must be appreciated in the 
light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the 
time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.24 (Empha-
sis added)
Viewed from this statement of the Award, China’s criticism of the Japanese 
incorporation of 1895 has been made in the light of “the law in force at the 
time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.” That is against 
inter-temporal law.
The basis of inter-temporal law is that law evolves in the course of time. The 
law of the Middle Ages, for example, does not necessarily hold true in the mod-
ern years. Thus, the law of acquisition of title to territory has changed since the 
Middle Ages or early modern times. If, therefore, the Senkaku Islands had been 
discovered and so recorded in some historical documents in the early years of 
the Ming Dynasty, they could have been rightfully claimed to be Chinese terri-
tory under the international law of that time.25 But the law of territorial acqui-
sition underwent changes through the ages of Spanish-Portuguese territorial 
expansions and other European States’ scrambles for territory on the African 
continent during the 17th to 19th centuries, requiring the effective occupation 
and control of the claimed territory. The Island of Palmas Award states:
It is admitted by both sides that international law underwent profound 
modifications between the end of the Middle-Ages and the end of the 19th 
century, as regards the rights of discovery and acquisition of uninhabited 
regions or regions inhabited by savages or semi-civilised peoples.26 (Em-
phasis added)
24 2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 845 (1928).
25 An early arbitral award in the Netherlands-Venezuela Island of Aves case, dated 30 June 
1865, recognised the validity of discovery as the basis of title to territory. H. La Fon-
taine, Pasicrisie Internationale 1794–1900: Histoire documentaire des 
Arbitrages internationaux 152–153 (1997); 28 Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards 119–123 (French translation of the Award) (1817). But this is an iso-
lated early case recognising discovery as the basis of title, and was soon overturned by the 
practice of States which placed more emphasis on effective occupation, as did the Island 
of Palmas Award in 1928.
26 2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 845 (1928).
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4 Effective Occupation (or Control)
The factor of effective occupation (or control) has been confirmed as the de-
cisive factor in the acquisition of title in the subsequent international judi-
cial decisions, including the Clipperton Island, Eastern Greenland, Minquiers 
et Ecrehos cases among others.27 This logic has further been reconfirmed, in 
terms of  effectivités, in more recent territorial cases before the International 
Court of Justice (hereinafter “icj”) and arbitral tribunals, including the  Burkina 
Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute (1986), Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute (1994), Eritrea/ 
Yemen Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (First Stage, 1998)  cases.28 
In the still more recent territorial dispute cases before the icj, the parties have 
abundantly pleaded effectivités, and the Court has duly responded by discuss-
ing effectivités.29 Thus State practice, as well as the jurisprudence of the icj and 
arbitral tribunals, shows the critical importance of effective control as an indi-
cation of animus occupandi.30 Consequently, it is safe now to say that  discovery 
27 See note 19 and accompanying text.
28 See, for example, the Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute case of 1986, icj Reports 1986, 
at 564, para. 18 and 620, para. 124. See also, the Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute case of 1994, 
icj Reports 1994, at 22, para. 44; at 43 (Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen); at 61, 
para. 40; 89, para. 128 (Separate Opinion of Ajibola); and 98–100 (Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge ad hoc Sette-Camara). Likewise, the Arbitral Award in the Eritrea/Yemen Territorial 
Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute case (First Stage) of 1998 discusses effectivités in detail. 
22 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 268–291, paras. 239–361 (1994).
29 For more subsequent cases discussing effectivités, see the Indonesia/Malasia Sovereignty 
over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan case, icj Reports 2002; the Benin/Niger Frontier Dis-
pute case, icj Reports 2005; the Nicaragua/Honduras Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
case, icj Reports 2007; the Malaysia/Singapore Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau 
Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge case, icj Reports 2008; the Nicaragua/Co-
lombia Territorial and Maritime Dispute case, icj Reports 2012; the Burkina Faso/Niger 
Frontier Dispute case, icj Reports 2013.
30 However, it is worth noting that effectivités is not unrestricted but subject to “the critical 
date.” See, for example, the Indonesia/Malaysia Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan case, icj Reports 2002, at 682, para. 135, where the icj said:
[The Court] cannot take into consideration acts having taken place after the date on 
which the dispute between the Parties crystallized unless such acts are a normal con-
tinuation of prior acts and are not undertaken for the purpose of improving the legal 
position of the Party which relies on them.
See also the Nicaragua/Honduras Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the Caribbean Sea 
case, icj Reports 2007, at 698, para. 117, where the Court states:
Thus a critical date will be the dividing line after which the Parties’ acts become ir-
relevant for the purpose of assessing the value of effectivités.
Furthermore the Nicaragua/Colombia Territorial and Maritime Dispute in the Caribbean 
Sea case states: 
[T]he date upon which the dispute crystallized is of significance. Its significance lies 
in distinguishing between those acts à titre de souverain occurring prior to the date 
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alone, unless perfected by effective occupation and control within a reason-
able period of time, cannot constitute a title to territory in international law 
of today.
5 Protest and Acquiescence in the Acquisition of Title to Territory
Another important point which must not be overlooked in this connection is 
the complete lack of protest on the part of China at the time of the Japanese 
incorporation of the islands into its territory in 1895 and thereafter over a pe-
riod of three-quarters of a century, until the late 1960s when all of a sudden it 
began to claim territorial sovereignty over the islands. It is extremely difficult 
to understand why China kept silence over such a long period of time if it con-
sidered the islands as its “core interest.” Or did it not consider them a “core 
interest” in those days and did it begin to consider them a “core interest” in the 
late 1960s or more recently? Such a failure to protest during the three-quarters 
of a century, during which there were various chances to lodge protests,31 is un-
derstood under international law to amount to acquiescence in the Japanese 
act of incorporation, and therefore China would now seem to be estopped from 
claiming a title to sovereignty over those islands.32
As Judge Ajibola says in his separate opinion in the Libya/Chad Territori-
al Dispute case of 1994, “There are many awards of international tribunals … 
supporting the principles of estoppel or acquiescence in the sense of silence 
or absence of protest.” He thus refers to the Alaska Boundary arbitration of 
1903, the Delagore Bay arbitration of 1875, the Guatemala/Honduras Boundary 
when the dispute crystallized, which should be taken into consideration for the pur-
pose of establishing or ascertaining sovereignty, and those acts occurring after that 
date,
‘which are in general meaningless for that purpose, having been carried out by a 
State which, already having claims to assert in a legal dispute, could have taken 
those actions strictly with the aim of buttressing those claims’ (Territorial and Mar-
itime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v 
Honduras), Judgment, icj Reports 2007 (ii), at 697–698, para. 117).
icj Reports 2012, at 29, para. 67. Subject to the critical date, however, effective control is 
of crucial importance in its own right in the acquisition of title to territory.
31 It would have been known to the Chinese authorities that Koga Tatsushiroh was doing 
his business on a couple of Senkaku Islands since 1896 into the 1930s. Had they not had 
any knowledge of his business, they were to blame for their lack of diligence if they had 
thought the islands belonged to them.
32 For more detailed discussions on protest and acquiescence in international law, see 
 Masahiro Miyoshi, Some Thoughts on Protest and Acquiescence in the Acquisition of Title 
to Territory: Implications for Territorial Claims in the East Asian Seas, a paper presented at 
the International Seminar on Geographical Features in the East Asian Seas and the Law of 
the Sea, Taipei, Taiwan, 20–21 September 2012.
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 arbitration of 1933, the Grisbadarna arbitration of 1909 before he comes to the 
Island of Palmas case.33
6 Policy and Law
There would have been a change of policy on the part of China in its position 
on the Senkaku Islands34 as a result of the reported discovery of oil and gas 
fields in the sea areas around them by the scientific group which conducted 
seismic surveys there under the auspices of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (hereinafter “ecafe”) in 1968.35 But if 
33 icj Reports 1994, at 81, paras. 108–109. For the Alaska Boundary arbitration of 1903, the 
Guatemala/Honduras Boundary arbitration of 1933, and the Grisbadarna arbitration of 
1909, see 15 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 2 and 11, respectively. 
For the Delagore Bay arbitration of 1875, see 66 British and Foreign State Papers 
(1874–1875).
34 Before its first-ever expression of opposition to the joint Japan-Korea-Taiwan moves to-
wards the exploitation of the reported offshore oil and gas in the East China Sea in the 
Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) on 4 December 1970, China had failed, at least on two ear-
lier occasions, to raise its claim to territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. In 1953 a 
news article appeared in the Renmin Ribao, suggesting China thought that those islands 
belong to Japan, because the article states, using the Japanese names for those islands:
The Ryukyu Islands are scattered to the North-West of our Taiwan and to the South-
West of Kyushu, Japan, including the seven island groups of Senkaku Islands,  Sakishima 
Islands, Daito Islands, Okinawa Islands, Ohshima Islands, Tokara Island, and Ohsumi 
Islands…. (Emphasis added.) 
This author’s translation from the original Chinese text in Renmin Ribao, 8 January 
1953, at 4. This is a part of the report that has nothing to do with the ownership of the 
Senkaku Islands, and therefore should be an honest admission of Japanese sovereignty 
over those islands. Again in 1958 when China made a declaration of an administrative 
nature on the breadth of its territorial sea, it left out the Diaoyu islets among the islands 
that belong to it. The relevant part of this declaration states:
… Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Tungsha Islands, the 
Hshisha Islands, the Chungsha Islands, the Nansha Islands and all other islands be-
longing to China ….
The Declaration of 4 September 1958, para. 1, Peking Review, 9 September 1958, at 1. 
Should the Senkaku Islands be claimed to be included in “all other islands belonging 
to China,” such an interpretation, though grammatically understandable, would rather 
weaken than strengthen China’s position because the failure specifically to mention the 
name of Diaoyu implied no or little such interest of it in Diaoyu as it asserts today.
35 The group of scientists conducted the seismic surveys as part of the activities of the Com-
mittee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore 
Areas (hereinafter “ccop”), then under the management of the ecafe. The ccop pub-
lished a report on the seismic surveys in May 1969, which created a stir among the coastal 
States in this region by its concluding remarks: “A high probability exists that the conti-
nental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in 
the world.” ccop 2 Technical Bulletin 41 (1969).
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China realised the potential of oil and gas and decided to explore for it, it was 
a matter of policy decision, and not a matter of law. Law and policy must not 
be mixed up. However strongly China may assert that the islands are a “core 
interest” to it, it is at most a new policy consideration and cannot necessarily 
affect the law. In a word, such an assertion of policy has no opposabilité under 
international law. If China alleges that a change of policy entails a change in 
the law, it would be tantamount to saying: “Macht ist Recht.”
iii Dispute Settlement – Multilateralism vs. Bilateralism
So far as the settlement of disputes is concerned, China has been known to 
have propensity for direct negotiations with its opponent or opponents. In re-
spect of the insular disputes in the South China Sea, there has arisen the ques-
tion of whether they are to be settled in a multilateral framework or through 
bilateral negotiations.
As early as 1976 the five original members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (hereinafter “asean”) – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand – agreed to settle disputes among themselves through 
friendly negotiations.36 In 1997 China joined with the asean States in making a 
joint statement on resolving disputes in the South China Sea “through friendly 
consultations and negotiations in accordance with universally recognised in-
ternational law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”37 
This important joint statement was endorsed in the 2002 Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which provides inter alia:
4. The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdic-
tional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of 
force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states 
directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognised principles 
of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea;
5. The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of ac-
tivities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and 
36 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 24 February 1976, Article 13, 1025 
United Nations Treaty Series 316 (1976). (Emphasis added)
37 The 1997 Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member 
States of asean and the President of the People’s Republic of China of 16 December 1997, 
para. 8. (Emphasis added)
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stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on 
the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and 
to handle their differences in a constructive manner.38 (Emphasis added)
This Declaration of 2002 was signed by China and asean’s ten members, and 
the undertaking has since been confirmed time and again.39 More recently, in 
July, 2011, China and the asean members signed a document in this context: 
“Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Par-
ties in the South China Sea.” The Guidelines have yet to be approved by the 
governments of China and the asean member States, but all sides called it 
a hopeful sign towards a peaceful resolution of the overlapping claims in the 
South China Sea.40
The question now is whether this can be taken as a firm commitment of 
China in its relations with the asean States. The latest development at the 
time of this writing is that the Philippines has submitted its dispute with China 
over the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea to the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea (hereinafter “itlos”), and the itlos announced 
on 25 April 2013 that it has chosen five arbitrators.41 But China has, as was ex-
pected, expressed its opposition to the itlos exercising its jurisdiction in this 
case.42
As to China’s approach to dispute settlement, a seasoned Indonesian diplo-
mat reflecting on South China Sea issue once said:
38 The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 4 November 2002, 
paras. 4, 5.
39 See, for example, Xinhua news from Beijing, 23 December 2010: China, asean Agree 
to Follow South China Sea Declaration, available at news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/
china/2010–12/23/c._13662098.
40 Kathy Quiano, China, asean agree on plans to solve South China Sea dispute, cnn, 21 July 
2011.
41 itlos/Press 191, 25 April 2013, which states that “[B]y a Notification and Statement of 
Claim dated 22 January 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral proceed-
ings against the People’s Republic of China pursuant to Annex vii to the Convention.” 
The Philippines appointed a German national as a member of the arbitral tribunal but 
China failed to appoint a member of its choice within 30 days of receipt of the notifica-
tion, as provided in Article 3, subparagraph (c), of Annex vii to the Convention, and the 
itlos President finally appointed four members, composing a total of five members of 
the arbitral tribunal. But as a result of Mr. M.C.W. Pinto stepping down as a member and 
President of the arbitral tribunal because of his family member’s affiliation with one of 
the Parties, the itlos President appointed Mr. Thomas Mensah as Mr. Pinto’s replace-
ment. itlos/Press 197, 24 June 2013.
42 the Asahi Shimbun, 27 April 2013, at 4.
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The issue of whether the prospect for solution would better be achieved 
bilaterally or through a regional approach still haunts the workshop un-
til now. China is particularly keen on seeking bilateral solutions with each 
claimant, while the Southeast Asian claimants are not so sure whether 
this is the right approach …. I feel that the Southeast Asian claimants 
seem to have come to a conclusion that while bilateral dialogues and con-
sultations would be useful, the solution to the Spratly claims would have 
to be in a regional context involving all claimants.43 (Emphasis added)
Should China, despite its ostensible accession to joint efforts for dispute set-
tlement with the asean States, continue to stick to its seemingly traditional 
approach, i.e., reluctance to accede to third-party settlement and preference 
for bilateralism on the one hand and should the asean States never accept 
the Chinese bilateralism, there would be no way out of the present impasse in 
sight in the foreseeable future. What this writer is curious to know is whether 
China is traditionally averse to third-party settlement or whether such an at-
titude is a communist-oriented approach.44
iv Conclusion
Indeed, States seem to have a propensity for control over the settlement of dis-
putes to which they are parties, and therefore preference for arbitration over 
judicial settlement, most typically the icj.45 Even so the icj Statute has provi-
sions that if no judge of the nationality of one or both of the parties is included 
in the Court, that party or both parties may choose a person to sit as judge.46 
This implies that even the icj allows an arbitration-like characteristic in the 
43 Observation made by Hasjim Djalal, then ambassador-at-large of Indonesia, at a speech 
on the first day of the seapol Tri-Regional Conference on Current Issues in Ocean Law, 
Policy and Management: Southeast Asia, North Pacific, and Southwest Pacific, Bangkok, 
13 December 1994. Hasjim Djalal, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Prospects for 
Settlement (unpublished text of the speech in mimeo) at 5.
44 There seems to be good reason to suspect that the avoidance of a third-party settlement 
of disputes in favour of direct negotiations with their opponents has been the traditional 
policy of Communist regimes, the former Soviet Union among them.
45 For this propensity of States, see Masahiro Miyoshi, The State’s Propensity for Con-
trol over Proceedings in the Settlement of Disputes, in Kathleen I. Matics and 
Ted L.  McDorman (eds.), Summary and Selected Papers of the seapol 
 Tri-Regional Conference 106–112 (1995).
46 icj Statute, Article 31, paras. 2 and 3.
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composition of the bench, especially in view of its allowance of such choice in 
the composition of a chamber of three or more judges as well.47 Even if such 
a procedure does not ensure a strict application of the principle nemo judex in 
causa sua,48 it is a third-party settlement and amenable to the rule of law.
A lesson may be learned from the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitra-
tion of 1977. Originally, the United Kingdom wanted to go to the icj while 
France wanted an arbitration49 in which it could have more control over the 
choice of arbitrators. The consultations resulted in an arbitration in which the 
UK also had an equally comfortable control over the composition of the tri-
bunal.50 It has another aspect of control by the parties over the proceedings. 
The two Governments first agreed that “[a]ny question of the subsequent pub-
lication of the proceedings shall be decided by agreement between the two 
Governments.”51 Subsequently they agreed not to publish them, thus avoiding 
possible embarrassing domestic effects of the Award. Despite such control 
over the procedural matters by the parties, this is a third-party settlement and 
reflects a spirit of the rule of law. One would do well to think well over the 
maxim: nemo judex in causa sua.
47 Ibid., Article 26, paras. 1 and 2. To the same effect the Statute of the International Tribu-
nal for the Law of the Sea, Article 15, paragraph 2, provides that the Tribunal shall form 
a “chamber for dealing with a particular dispute submitted to it if the parties so request.” 
(Emphasis added) Such a chamber is to be composed by the Tribunal with the approval of 
the parties. For its arbitration-like nature, see Rüdiger Wolfrum, Ad hoc Chambers, in Jon 
M. Van Dyke et al. (eds.), Governing Ocean Resources: New Challenges 
and Emerging Regimes-A Tribute to Judge Choon-Ho Park 275–283 (2013).
48 The Latin expression means: “No one should be a judge in his own cause.”
49 France was said to have had a distrust of the icj’s handling of publicity in the Nuclear 
Tests cases of 1974. Interview with Professor René-Jean Dupuy, counsel for the Govern-
ment of France in this continental shelf arbitration, at Sophia University in Tokyo on 
9 March 1978.
50 But after the two Governments basically agreed on arbitration, it took them another year 
or so formally to sign the compromis with the names of the five members of the arbitral 
tribunal specifically mentioned, indicating how difficult it was for them to agree on the 
composition of the tribunal. The parties each chose an eminent international lawyer of 
their nationality first and then agreed on the three other neutral arbitrators. See Com-
promis of 10 July 1975, Article 1, para. 1., 18 Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards 5 (1978).
51 Compromis, Article 9, para. 4, ibid., at 6.
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Peaceful Proposals and Maritime Cooperation 
between Mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan  




In the East China Sea, there exist two sets of peaceful proposals and two sets 
of agreements on maritime cooperation, both of which deal with the compli-
cated maritime disputes and aim to help maintain peace and stability in this 
important body of water between the three parties, namely, China,1 Japan, 
and Taiwan.2 The first set of proposals refer to the peace initiatives that were 
announced by the Chinese and Japanese leaders after they met in Beijing 
and Tokyo, respectively, during the period of time between 2006 and 2008,3 
and the East China Sea Peace Initiative (hereafter referred to as “ecspi”) pro-
posed by Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-Jiou on 5 August 2012.4 The second set of 
1 The governments of the People’s Republic of China (prc) and the Republic of China (roc) 
adhere to the principle of “One China” under the “92 Consensus,” “One China Structure,” or 
“One China Framework.” The current Tsai Ing-wen administration refuses to accept the prin-
ciple and the consensus. Throughout this paper, China is referred to as the prc and Taiwan is 
referred to as the roc. China, Taiwan, the prc, and the roc will be used interchangeably.
2 Ibid.
3 Chinese, Japanese Leaders Call for Maintaining Good Momentum of Bilateral Ties, People’s 
Daily Online (19 November 2006), available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ 
200611/19/eng20061119_323010.html; Chinese Premier Advocates Five Principles for  Promoting 
Sino-Japanese Ties, People’s Daily Online (12 April 2007), available at http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn/200704/12/eng20070412_36 5829.html; Chinese, Japanese Leaders Reach 
Consensus on East China Sea Issue, Gov.cn (28 December 2007), available at http://www.gov 
.cn/misc/2007-12/28/content_846359.htm; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint 
Statement Between the  Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common 
Strategic Interests” (7 May 2008), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/
joint0805.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
China and Japan Reach Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue (18 June 2008), avail-
able at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t466632.htm.
4 For the initiative, visit the website of the Republic of China, available at http://www.mofa 
.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/TopicsIndex/?opno=cc7f748f-f55f-4eeb-91b4-cf4a28bbb86f.
21Peaceful Proposals and Maritime Cooperation
<UN>
agreements on maritime cooperation refer to the fisheries agreement signed 
between China and Japan in November 1997, entered into force in June 2000,5 
and the Principled Common Understanding on the East China Sea Issues 
(hereafter referred to as “the 2008 Understanding”) between the two countries 
in June 2008,6 and the fisheries agreement signed by Chairman Liao Liou-yi of 
Taiwan’s Association for East Asian Relations and Chairman Mitsuo Ohashi of 
Japan’s Interchange Association on 10 April 2013.7 These proposals and agree-
ments have the potential not only to help govern the activities that are related 
to exploration, exploitation, preservation, or protection of the living and non-
living resources of the East China Sea, but also to manage the conflicts that 
arise from the sovereignty and maritime disputes over the Diaoyutai/Diaoyu/
Senkaku island group (hereafter referred to as “the dig”) among the three par-
ties in this important East Asian semi-enclosed sea. In the long run, it is hoped 
that these peaceful proposals and agreements on maritime cooperation, if car-
ried out faithfully and successfully, can help transform the East China Sea from 
a sea of confrontation into a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation. Before 
reaching that goal, however, there exist a number of challenges that face 
China, Japan, and Taiwan. One of the biggest challenges concerns the possibil-
ity of combining these bilateral or unilateral peaceful proposals and bilateral 
agreements on maritime cooperation into a multilateral peaceful proposal 
and agreement that are acceptable to all of the three parties.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the progress that has been made so 
far and the challenges that lie ahead with regard to the future development 
and implementation of the peaceful proposals and agreements on maritime 
cooperation made or agreed to between China, Japan, and Taiwan in the East 
5 For the English text of the Agreement on Fisheries Between the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Government of Japan, see Guifang Xue, China and Interna-
tional Fisheries Law and Policy 295–299 (2005), Appendix 6.
6 For the text of the Understanding, visit the website of the Center for International Law, Na-
tional University of Singapore, available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/il/pdf/2008%20China 
-Japan%20Principled%20Consensus%20on%20the%20East%20China%20Sea%20Issue 
-pdf.pdf. See also, Gao Jianjun, A Note on the 2008 Cooperation Consensus Between China and 
Japan in the East China Sea, 40 Ocean Development and International Law 302–303 
(2009).
7 For more information about the signing of the agreement, visit the website of the Republic of 
China, available at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/ArticleDetail/DetailDefault/f0 
17f4b3-5d0d-4408-ad7b-abe4044d7551?arfid=7b3b4d7a-8ee7-43a9-97f8-7f3d313ad781& 
opno=84ba3639-be42-4966-b873-78a267de8cf1. For the text of the agreement (in Chinese), 
available at http://news.stnn.cc/hk_taiwan/201304/ t20130411_1879091.html. For the text of 




China Sea between 1997 and 2013. The paper is organized into six parts. Follow-
ing this introductory part, Part two provides a background explanation on the 
development of these peaceful proposals and maritime cooperation-related 
agreements. Part three examines the content of these proposals and agree-
ments. Part four discusses the current status of the proposals and agreements 
and their implementation. Part five examines the challenges China, Japan, and 
Taiwan are facing individually, bilaterally, or collectively. Concluding remarks 
are made in Part six that ends the article.
ii Background Explanation on Peace and Maritime Cooperation-
related Developments in the ecs
1 Agreement on Fisheries between China and Japan
On 16 November 1994, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(hereafter referred to as “the los Convention”) entered into force.8 Japan 
signed the Convention on 7 February 1983 and ratified it on 20 June 1996, which 
entered into force for Japan on 20 July, 1996. China signed the Convention on 10 
December 1982 and ratified it on 15 May 1996. The los Convention entered into 
force for China on 7 July 1996.
Immediately after becoming a party to the los Convention, Japan amended 
its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone9 and enacted the Law 
on the eez and the Continental Shelf.10 Japan claims that its eez comprises 
the areas of the sea extending from the baseline of Japan, which are measured 
200 nautical miles (nm) from the nearest point on the Japanese baseline and 
its subjacent seabed and its subsoil. The continental shelf claimed by Japan 
comprises the seabed and its subsoil to the following areas: (1) the areas of the 
sea extending from the baseline of Japan “to the line in which every point is 
200 nautical miles from the nearest point on the baseline of Japan (excluding 
from its territorial sea)”; (2) “the areas of the sea adjacent seaward to the areas 
8 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 
1982, 1833 unts 397, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. As of 30 January 2013, 164 countries and the European Union 
were parties to the los Convention. For status of the Convention, visit the UN website, 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf.
9 See Bureau of Oceans and Int’l Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Pub. no. 120, Limits in the Seas: Straight Baseline and Ter-
ritorial Sea Claims: Japan (1998), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/57684.pdf.
10 See Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Law No. 74 of 1996), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties/pdffiles/jpn_1996_Law74.pdf.
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of the sea referred to” above as prescribed by the Japanese Cabinet Order in 
accordance with Article 76 of the unclos.11 In cases of overlapping with the 
eez and the continental shelf claimed by the states with opposite coasts, the 
problem of maritime boundary delimitation should be resolved by drawing a 
median line, or the line which “may be agreed upon between Japan and a for-
eign country as a substitute for the median line.”12
On 26 June 1998, China enacted its Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and the Continental Shelf.13 Article 2 of the law provides that the eez of China 
is an area beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea extending to a distance of 
200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of Chinese territorial sea 
is measured. Under the same article, the Chinese continental shelf “comprises 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territo-
rial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge 
of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.” China exercises 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its eez and continental shelf.14 In addition, 
Article 14 of the law provides that “The provisions of this Act shall not affect 
the historical rights of the People’s Republic of China.”
Under Article 61 of the los Convention, both Japan and China should 
ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the 
maintenance of the living resources in the eez is not endangered by over-
exploitation. Under Article 74, Japan and China should enter into negotiation 
to delimit their eezs. However, if no agreement can be reached, Japan and 
China should “make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or ham-
per the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without 
prejudice to the final delimitation.”15
In the face of aggressive fishing activities by an increasing number of Chinese 
fishing vessels in the East China Sea, Japan asked China to enter into negotiation 
11 Ibid. art. 1, § 2.
12 Ibid. art. 1, § 2, art. 2.
13 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic 
of China, adopted at the 3rd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National 
People’s Congress on 26 June 1998 and promulgated by Order No. 6 of the President of the 
People’s Republic of China on 26 June 1998, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/
cen/laws/loteezatcsotproc790/.
14 Arts. 3 and 4, ibid.
15 Art. 74(3), los Convention.
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for a new fisheries arrangement in the overlapping eez area.16 After intense 
and difficult negotiations, China and Japan signed the Agreement on Fisher-
ies on 11 November 1997.17 The new fisheries agreement shelved a territorial 
dispute over the dig in the East China Sea. On 1 June 2000, the Agreement 
on Fisheries between the Government of People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of Japan entered into force.
2 The 2008 Understanding
Between 2003 and 2008, China and Japan were at odds over the right to explore 
and exploit oil and gas resources in the East China Sea. In August 2003, China 
set up a production platform at the Chunxiao oilfield, which prompted Japan 
to lodge a strong protest, asserting that the Chinese drilling in the area about 
5 kilometers west of the Japanese claimed median line in the East China Sea 
would siphon off oil and gas reserves from Japan’s side. Japan called on China 
to suspend production close to the median line pending a diplomatic resolu-
tion of the dispute and to share geological data on the Chinese gas fields in 
the area. In July 2004, Japan conducted its own survey in the area near the 
disputed median line in the East China Sea by chartering a Norwegian seismic 
survey ship. For the purpose of managing the conflict arising from China’s oil 
and gas exploration activities in the East China Sea, Tokyo and Beijing agreed 
to send governmental officials to talk about the issue. The first round of the 
Sino-Japanese talks took place in October 2004.
In September 2005, in response to an experimental drilling conducted by 
the Japanese Teikoku Oil Company in the areas near the Chinese natural gas 
fields in the East China Sea in July 2005, China deployed a fleet of five warships 
near the Chunxiao gas field. In March 2006, China National Offshore Oil Cor-
poration said that it was proceeding with work to develop natural gas reserves 
in the disputed areas of the East China Sea where Japan rejected a proposal to 
jointly explore for natural gas with China. In April 2006, China lodged an offi-
cial protest when Japan’s Education Ministry approved the textbooks in which 
it is stated that the Diaoyutai Islands are part of the Japanese territory. In the 
same month, Japan lodged complaints with Beijing, saying that China had con-
ducted aerial surveys several times beyond the Japanese claimed median line 
in the East China Sea.
16 Park Hee Kwon, The Law of the Sea and Northeast Asia: A Challenge for 
Cooperation 52 (2000); Guifang Xue, China and International Fisheries Law 
and Policy 182 (2005); Zou Keyuan, Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and 
Prospects 99–100 (2005).
17 Japan, China Sign New Bilateral Fisheries Pact, Japan Economic Newswire, 11 Novem-
ber 1997.
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In June 2008, after 11 rounds of serious consultations, China and Japan 
reached the Principled Common Understanding on the East China Sea Issues. 
Paragraph 1 of the Understanding provides that
In order to make the East China Sea, of which the delimitation between 
China and Japan is yet to be made, a “sea of peace, cooperation and 
friendship,” China and Japan have, in keeping with the common under-
standing reached by leaders of the two countries in April 2007 and their 
new common understanding reached in December 2007, agreed through 
serious consultations that the two sides will conduct cooperation in the 
transitional period prior to delimitation without prejudicing their re-
spective legal positions. The two sides have taken the first step to this end 
and will continue to conduct consultations in the future.
In addition, Japanese companies are allowed to participate in the develop-
ment of Chunxiao oil and gas field in accordance with the relevant Chinese 
laws that govern cooperation with foreign enterprises in the exploration and 
exploitation of offshore petroleum resources. In addition, the two sides agreed 
to establish a block for joint development in the East China Sea.18 To carry 
out this joint development proposal, China and Japan will work to fulfill their 
respective domestic procedures and arrive at the necessary bilateral agreement 
at an early date. The two sides also agreed to continue consultations for the 
early realization of joint development in other parts of the East China Sea.19
3 The East China Sea Peace Initiative
In the same month that the 2008 Understanding was released, a Taiwanese ves-
sel Lienhe collided with a Japanese Coast Guard patrol boat in the waters near 
the disputed dig in the southern part of the East China Sea. The vessel sank fol-
lowing the collision, but all three of its crew members and 13 passengers were res-
cued by the Japanese patrol boat. Japanese authorities detained the captain of 
18 The block for joint development is the area that is bounded by straight lines joining the 
following points in the order listed:
 1. Latitude 29°31’ North, longitude 125°53’30” East
 2. Latitude 29°49’ North, longitude 125°53’30” East
 3. Latitude 30°04’ North, longitude 126°03’45” East
 4. Latitude 30°00’ North, longitude 126°10’23” East
 5. Latitude 30°00’ North, longitude 126°20’00” East
 6. Latitude 29°55’ North, longitude 126°26’00” East
 7. Latitude 29°31’ North, longitude 126°26’00” East
19 For the text of the common understanding reached between Japan and China on 18 June 
2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/18/content_8394206.htm.
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the vessel for three days for questioning, prompting Taipei to file a formal protest 
with Tokyo to complain about the act.20 The incident ended with apologies and 
compensation from the Japanese government to the Taiwanese boat captain.21
On 30 June 2008, a group of Japanese lawmakers viewed the areas around 
the dig by airplane, which immediately drew strong protests from China and 
Taiwan.22 In December 2008, two Chinese marine surveillance vessels, the 
1,100-tonne Haijian 46 and 1,700-tonne Haijian 51, entered the Japanese claimed 
territorial waters around the Diaoyutai Islands. Japan immediately lodged a 
diplomatic protest against the act.23 In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman stated that “[t]he Diaoyu Islands and its adjacent islets are parts 
of Chinese territories since ancient times. The Chinese ships are justified in 
conducting usual patrol in waters within China’s jurisdiction.”24
In April 2010, 10 Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (plan) vessels, 
including two submarines and eight warships, sailed through international 
waters between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako in the East China Sea, 
heading southeast into the Pacific Ocean. Japanese Maritime Self-Defense 
Force (msdf) sent destroyers to follow the Chinese warships and monitor the 
passing activities. In response, China sent a navy helicopter to fly close to the 
Japanese msdf destroyer, which drew protest from the government of Japan. 
While Japan argued that it was a dangerous act for the navigation of the Japa-
nese vessel, China considered it a “necessary defense measure” in response to 
the Japanese surveillance activities.25 In July 2010, Chinese navy conducted 
live-firing exercises in the East China Sea.26
20 Tensions rise in Taiwan over boat sinking in disputed waters with Japan, bbc Monitoring 
Asia Pacific – Political, 12 June 2008.
21 Japan apologies, offers compensation to Taiwan over boat sinking, JapanToday: Japan 
News and Discussion, 25 June 2008, available at http://www.japantoday.com/category/
national/view/japan-apologizes-offers-compensation-to-taiwan-over-boat-sinking.
22 Japanese MPs view disputed islets from air amidst China, Taiwan protests, bbc Monitor-
ing Asia Pacific – Political, 1 July 2008.
23 For the protest dated 19 December 2008, see website of the Japanese House of Repre-
sentatives (in Japanese) available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_shitsumon.nsf/html/
shitsumon/ b170326.htm.
24 Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao’s Remarks on Chinese Marine Surveillance Ships 
Entering the Waters near the Diaoyu Islands, 8 December 2008, see website of the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t525428.
htm.
25 Japan lodges protest with China over navy helicopter approach, bbc Monitoring Asia 
 Pacific – Political, 21 April 2010; China says navy chopper approach to Japanese ship 
necessary measures, bbc Monitoring Asia Pacific – Political, 23 April 2010.
26 Goh Sui Noi, China needs to show its rise is benign, The Straits Times (Singapore), 16 
August 2010; Chinese navy organizes military drill in E Sea, China Daily, 7 July 2010, avail-
able at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/photo/2010-07/07/content_10074475.htm.
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On 7 September 2010, “the most serious China-Japan conflict in decades”27 
erupted in the East China Sea, in which a Chinese fishing boat collided with 
two Japanese patrol vessels in the waters near the dig. Japan detained the 
boat’s captain together with 14 crew members on the ground of obstructing the 
public duties of Japanese law enforcement personnel. On 13 September 2010, 
nearly a week after the incident occurred, Japan released the Chinese crew 
members, but kept the captain in custody before deciding whether to press 
charges against him. China lodged a protest and demanded Japan to release 
the detained boat captain immediately.28 Beijing signaled its anger by taking a 
number of actions, which included postponing the scheduled talks with Japan 
about the follow-up matters relating to the Principled Common Understand-
ing, canceling a scheduled cultural exchange visit of 1,000 Japanese youth to 
the Shanghai World Expo, blocking crucial exports to Japan of rare earth, and 
detaining four Japanese construction company employees in the Chinese 
province of Hebei for videotaping military installation.29 The fishing boat inci-
dent ended on 25 September 2010 when Japan released the Chinese captain.30
Tensions in the East China Sea have risen since April 2012 when the for-
mer Japanese Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara announced his plan to pur-
chase the disputed islands in Washington at the Heritage Foundation.31 On 
7 July 2012, the Japanese Noda administration announced its plan to purchase 
Diaoyu Dao, the largest of the dig, and Bei Xiaodao and Nan Xiaodao nearby.32
27 See Tanaka Sakai, Rethinking China-Japan Conflict: The Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands Clash, a 
translation of an article 日中対立の再燃 that appeared in Tanaka News, 1 September 
2010 with a follow-up story on 21 September 2010, available at http://www.japanfocus.org/
articles/print_article/3418.
28 China Protests Japan’s Seizure of Chinese Fishing Boat near Diaoyu Island, Caijing Maga-
zine, 9 September 2010, available at http://english.caijing.com.cn/templates/inc/web-
contentens.jsp?id=110516865&time=2010-09-09&cl=104&page=all.
29 China postpones E China Sea negotiation with Japan, China Daily, 11 September 2010, 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/11/content_11288437.htm; 
 Jacob M. Schlesinger and Yuka Hayashi, Japanese Youth Scrap Shanghai Expo Visit, The 
Wall Street Journal, 20 September 2010, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/japan-
realtime/2010/09/20/japanese-youth-scrap-shanghai-expo-visit/; Keith Bradsher, Amid 
Tension, China Blocks Crucial Exports to Japan, The New York Times, 23 September 
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/business/global/24rare.html; and 
 Minoru Matsutani and Kanako Takahara, Four Fujita employees held in Hebei Province, 
The Japan Times, 25 September, 2010, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi 
-bin/nn20100925a3.html.
30 Martin Fackler and Ian Johnson, Japan Retreats with Release of Chinese Boat Captain, The 
New York Times, 24 September 2010.
31 Yuka Hayashi, Tokyo Chief Plots to Buy Disputed Islands, The Wall Street Journal, 17 
April 2012.
32 Navy to launch live-fire drill in disputed waters; Exercise to be staged as tensions rise between 
Beijing and Tokyo over the Diaoyu Islands, South China Morning Post, 10 July 2012.
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In August 2012, mainly in response to the rising tension in the East China 
Sea, and under increasing domestic political pressures that asked the govern-
ment to take stronger actions to safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty over the dig 
and protect the right of fishermen to fish in the waters off the disputed islands, 
Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou proposed the five points East China Sea 
Peace Initiative. This was followed by the guidelines to implement the ecspi 
that were announced on 7 September 2012 at one of Taiwan’s offshore islands 
located in the East China Sea.33
4 Agreement on Fisheries between Japan and Taiwan
In January 1998, Taiwan enacted the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contig-
uous Zone,34 and the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continen-
tal Shelf.35 In February 1999, the base points and baselines were announced 
by Taiwan in the first part of the baselines of the territorial sea of the roc.36 
Taiwan’s eez and continental shelf claim is identical with that of China’s.37 
Article 4 of Taiwan’s eez law also provides that before reaching agreements 
with adjacent or opposite countries, Taiwan, in a spirit of understanding and 
co-operation, may reach a modus vivendi with the countries concerned, which 
however should be without prejudice to the final delimitation.38
Between 1996 and 2012, sixteen rounds of fisheries talks between Taiwan 
and Japan were held.39 Taiwan proposed to Japan that a jointly management 
zone be established in waters off the disputed dig so both sides can fish in 
each country’s overlapping eez, but Japan rejected the proposal.
33 East China Sea Peace Institute Implementation Guidelines, Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs  Republic of China (Taiwan) (7 September 2012), available at http://www.mofa.
gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/TopicsArticleDetail/9d66bed6-16fa-4585-bc7c-c0845f2dfc39 
[hereinafter Initiative].
34 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992, available at 
http://www.library.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/sealaw.pdf.
35 See Bureau of Oceans and Int’l Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Pub. no. 127, Limits in the Seas: Taiwan’s Maritime Claims 
(2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57674.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Taiwan’s Maritime Claims].
36 Decree No. Tai 88 Nei Tze #06161, Executive Yuan Gazette (Taiwan), 10 February 1999, 
at 36.
37 Taiwan’s Maritime Claims, supra note 35, at 26–33.
38 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Republic of China 
(26 June 1998), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties/pdffiles/
chn_1998_eez_act.pdf.
39 Japan, Taiwan to Hold Second Preparatory Fish Talks, The Japan Times, 26 December 
2012), available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/12/26/national/japan-taiwan-
to-hold-second-preparatory-fishery-talks/#.usiq;FfshBk [hereinafter Japan-Taiwan Fish 
Talks].
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In November 2012, the first preparatory meeting for the 17th round of Japan-
Taiwan Fishery Talk was held in Tokyo40 and the second preparatory meeting 
was to be held in January or February 2013.41 The meeting was further post-
poned because a boat with Taiwanese activists that headed for the disputed 
waters near Dioayutai/Senkaku Islands but was turned back on 24 January 2013 
after coastguard vessels from Japan and Taiwan converged and dueled with 
water cannon.42 On 10 April 2013, at the 17th round of Taiwan-Japan Fishery 
Talk, a fisheries agreement was signed by Taiwan’s Association for East Asian 
Relations and Japan’s Interchange Association. The agreement includes an 
escape clause which Taipei said allows both sides to set aside disputes over 
their competing sovereignty claims.43
iii The Content of the Peaceful Proposals and the Agreements
1 The Chinese-Japanese Peaceful Proposals
In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe met in Hanoi, Vietnam when attending the apec meeting. The 
two leaders agreed: (1) to speed up consultation on the East China Sea issue 
in line with the principle of mutual benefit and reciprocity; (2) to adhere to 
negotiation and dialogue; (3) to put aside disputes and pursue joint devel-
opment; and (4) to make East China Sea the “sea of peace, cooperation and 
friendship.”
In April 2007, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to Japan. 
During the visit, Japan and China reached the following five common under-
standings on properly addressing the East China Sea issue: (1) both sides are 
committed to making the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friend-
ship; (2) they agreed to carry out joint development based on the principle of 
mutual benefit as a temporary arrangement pending the final demarcation and 
without prejudice to the positions of either side on matters concerning the law 
of the sea; (3) they will conduct consultation at higher level when necessary; 
40 Taiwan, Japan Make Little Progress at Fishery Talks, Want China Times, 1 December 
2012, available at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=201212010
00074&cid=1101.
41 Japan-Taiwan Fish Talks, supra note 39.
42 Amber Wang, Taiwanese Activists And Japanese Coast Guard Have Water Cannon Duel 
Near Disputed Islands, Business Insider, 24 January 2013, available at http://www.
businessinsider.com/taiwanese-activists-and-japanese-coast-guard-have-water-cannon-
duel-near-disputed-islands-2013-1.




(4) they will carry out joint development in larger waters acceptable to them; 
and (5) they will speed up consultations and hope to submit a detailed plan on 
joint development to the leaders of the two countries in autumn of 2007.
In December 2007, the Chinese and Japanese leaders reached a 4-point new 
consensus on the East China Sea issue: (1) to continue to adhere to the five-
point consensus achieved by leaders of the two countries in April 2007 in a bid 
to turn the East China Sea into a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship; (2) 
the two sides have elevated the level of consultation, conducted earnest and 
substantive consultation on the concrete solution to the issue and made posi-
tive progress; (3) to conduct vice ministerial-level consultation, if necessary, 
while maintaining the current consultation framework; (4) the solution to the 
East China Sea issue conformed with the interests of both China and Japan. 
The two sides agreed to strive for an early solution in the process of developing 
bilateral ties. In May 2008, China and Japan issued a joint statement on pro-
moting strategic, mutually beneficial ties. The two sides pledged again to work 
together and make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friend-
ship. The proposal to make the East China Sea a “sea of peace, cooperation and 
friendship” is reiterated in the 2008 Understanding.
2 The East China Sea Peace Initiative
The five points East China Sea Peace Initiative calls all parties concerned to: 
(1) Refrain from taking any antagonistic actions; (2) Shelve controversies and 
not abandon dialogue; (3) Observe international law and resolve disputes 
through peaceful means; (4) Seek consensus on a code of conduct in the East 
China Sea; and (5) Establish a mechanism for cooperation on exploring and 
developing resources in the East China Sea.44
This peace proposal, based on the principle of “safeguarding sovereignty, 
shelving disputes, pursuing peace and reciprocity, and promoting joint explo-
ration and development,”45 was followed by the implementation guidelines 
that were announced on 7 September 2012 at one of Taiwan’s offshore islands 
located in the East China Sea.46
Taiwan’s East China Sea Peace Initiative will be implemented in two stages: 
(1) peaceful dialogue and mutually reciprocal negotiation; and (2) sharing 
resources and cooperative development. The first stage involves (1) promoting 
44 For the proposal, visit the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic 
of China (Taiwan), available at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Topics/Topics 
Index/?opno=cc7f748f-f55f-4eeb-91b4-cf4a28bbb86f.
45 Ibid.
46 Initiative, supra note 33.
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the idea of resolving the East China Sea dispute through peaceful means; (2) 
establishing channels for Track I and Track II dialogue; and (3) encouraging 
all parties concerned to address key East China Sea issues via bilateral or mul-
tilateral negotiation mechanisms to bolster mutual trust and collective ben-
efit.47 During the second stage, the main task is to institutionalize all forms 
of dialogue and negotiation, to encourage all parties concerned to implement 
substantive cooperative projects, and to establish mechanisms for joint explo-
ration and development of resources that form a network of peace and coop-
eration in the East China Sea area.48
Key issues for the implementation of the peace initiative include fishing 
industry, mining industry, marine science research and maritime environmen-
tal protection, maritime security and unconventional security, and East China 
Sea Code of Conduct.49 This is to be done by moving from three parallel tracks 
of bilateral dialogue (between Taiwan and Japan, Taiwan and China, and Japan 
and China) to one track of trilateral negotiations (among China, Japan and 
Taiwan) to realize peace and cooperation in the East China Sea.50
3 The 2008 Understanding
In June 2008, after 11 rounds of serious consultation, China and Japan reached 
the Principled Common Understanding on the East China Sea Issues. It is 
stated clearly in the Understanding that in order to make the East China Sea a 
“sea of peace, cooperation and friendship,” China and Japan agreed to conduct 
cooperation in the transitional period prior to maritime boundary delimita-
tion without prejudicing their respective legal positions.
As the first step in the joint development of the East China Sea between 
China and Japan, the two sides agreed to establish a block for joint develop-
ment in the East China Sea, which shall be the area bounded by straight lines 
joining the following points in the order listed:
1. Latitude 29°31’ North, longitude 125°53’30” East
2. Latitude 29°49’ North, longitude 125°53’30” East
3. Latitude 30°04’ North, longitude 126°03’45” East
4. Latitude 30°00’ North, longitude 126°10’23” East
5. Latitude 30°00’ North, longitude 126°20’00” East
6. Latitude 29°55’ North, longitude 126°26’00” East







To carry out the above-mentioned joint development, the two sides will work 
to fulfill their respective domestic procedures and arrive at the necessary 
bilateral agreement at an early date. In addition, China and Japan agreed to 
continue consultations for the early realization of joint development in other 
parts of the East China Sea.
In addition, the Japanese companies are allowed to participate in the devel-
opment of Chunxiao oil and gas field in accordance with the relevant Chinese 
laws that govern cooperation with foreign enterprises in the exploration and 
exploitation of offshore petroleum resources. The governments of China and 
Japan will work to reach agreement on the exchange of notes as necessary 
and exchange them at an early date. The two sides will fulfill their respective 
domestic procedures as required.51
4 The 1997 China-Japan Fisheries Agreement
Before signing the Fisheries Agreement in November 1997, fisheries relations 
between China and Japan were governed by the Fisheries Agreement which 
was signed by the two countries on 15 August 1975 and brought into force on 22 
December 1975. The 1975 Fisheries Agreement formalized the three previous 
ones concluded in 1955, 1963 and 1965 respectively between the Japan-China 
Fisheries Council of Japan and the China Fisheries Council. The Fisheries 
Agreement, signed in November 1997 and entered into force on 1 June 2000, 
establishes a new fishery order in the East China Sea for the two countries in 
accordance with the los Convention. It aims to conserve and utilize rationally 
marine living resource of common concern, and maintain the orderly conduct 
of maritime fishing operations in the East China Sea. This agreement has 14 
articles and 2 annexes.
The 1997 Fisheries Agreement applies to the eezs of China and Japan in the 
East China Sea.52 Nationals and fishing boats of each party engaged in fish-
ery activities in the other’s eez should comply with this Agreement and the 
other’s relevant laws and regulations.53 Both China and Japan are required to 
adopt necessary measures to ensure compliance by their nationals and fishing 
boats with the provisions of the Agreement and the conservation measures 
and other conditions provided for in the relevant laws and regulations of the 
other Party when they are engaged in fishery activities in the other’s eez, and 
should inform each other of such conservation measures and other conditions 
provided for in its relevant laws and regulations.54 The two countries also agree 
51 For the text of the common understanding reached between Japan and China on 18 June 
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to cooperate to conduct scientific research in fishery and to conserve marine 
living resources.55
Under the Fisheries Agreement, there are three types of waters: eezs, Pro-
visional Waters, and waters for maintaining current fishing activity. First, the 
eez waters extend to 52 miles from the baselines that measure the Chinese and 
Japanese territorial waters respectively. In these waters, both China and Japan 
have exclusive rights over the exploitation, conservation and utilization of 
marine living resources. Considering the status of fishery resources, its fishing 
capacity, traditional fishing activities and the reciprocal fishing situation, and 
other relevant matters in the eez, each party to the agreement decides annu-
ally on the fish species, amount of catch allocation, fishing area, and other fish-
ing conditions under which it will allow the other party’s fishermen and fishing 
vessels to operate. In deciding these fishing conditions, each contracting party 
respects the result of consultations with the Sino-Japanese Fishery Joint Com-
mittee.56 Each contracting party can take necessary measures in accordance 
with international law to ensure that the other party’s fishermen and fishing 
vessels obey conservation measures for marine living resources and other con-
ditions provided in its relevant laws and ordinances.57 Each contracting party’s 
fishing vessels need a fishing licence issued by the other coastal country to fish 
in its eez. In the case of seizure or detention, the fishing vessel and crew must 
be released rapidly after paying a security or submitting a guarantee.58
Second, in the waters where it is difficult to distinguish each party’s eez 
boundary, a Provisional Measures Zone is established (See Figure 1). The zone 
is enclosed by straight lines connecting in order the following coordinates:
1. Latitude 30°40’ North, longitude 124°10’1” East
2. Latitude 30°00’ North, longitude 123°56’4” East
3. Latitude 29°00’ North, longitude 123°25’5” East
4. Latitude 28°00’ North, longitude 122°47’9” East
5. Latitude 27°00’ North, longitude 121°57’4” East
6. Latitude 27°00’ North, longitude 125°58’3” East
7. Latitude 28°00’ North, longitude 127°15’1” East
8. Latitude 29°00’ North, longitude 128°0’9” East
9. Latitude 30°00’ North, longitude 128°32’2” East
10. Latitude 30°40’ North, longitude 128°26’1” East





59 Article 7 (1).
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Each contracting party has to take appropriate conservation measures and 
quantitative management measures to ensure that the maintenance of 
marine living resources is not threatened by over-exploitation, in accordance 
with the decision of the China-Japan Fishery Joint Committee and taking into 
consideration the effect on traditional fishing activities conducted by each 
contracting party in the Provisional Measures Zone.60 In this area of waters, 
neither country can apply its laws or regulations to the other country’s fish-
ing vessels and fishermen. When one contracting party detects a violation by 
the other party’s fishing vessels or fishermen, it can notify the other party of 
the violation and related details. The other party investigates the fact, takes 
any necessary measures and informs the other party of the results of these 
measures.61
Third, the waters south of latitude 27° North and west of latitude 125° 30′ 
East in the East China Sea, are not included in the Provisional Measures Zone. 
However, the relevant laws and regulations of one country are not applied to 
the other country’s fishermen and fishing vessels.62
To achieve the objectives of the agreement, the China-Japan Fishery Joint 
Committee is established. It consists of two representatives appointed by each 
contracting party. The Committee recommends the following: fish species, 
amount of catch allocation, fishing area, and other conditions to allow the 
other party’s fishermen and fishing vessels to fish under Article 3; the mainte-
nance of fishing order; the status and conservation of marine living resources; 
and fishery co-operation. The Committee discusses and determines the con-
servation and management of marine living resources in the Provisional 
Waters based on Article 7.63
5 The 2013 Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement
After 17 years of effort, Taiwan and Japan finally concluded a major fisheries 
agreement. The purposes for signing the agreement include: (1) maintaining 
peace and stability in the East China Sea; (2) promoting friendly relations and 
reciprocity and cooperation between Taiwan and Japan; (3) ensuring conser-
vation and rational utilization of marine living resources of the eezs and (4) 
maintaining fishery operation order.64 The agreement establishes a maritime 
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1. Latitude 27° North, longitude 126°20’ East
2. Latitude 27° North, longitude 122°30’ East
3. Latitude 24°46’ North, longitude 122°30’ East
4. Latitude 24°49’37” North, longitude 122°44’ East
5. Latitude 24°50’ North, longitude 124° East
6. Latitude 25°19’ North, longitude 124°40’ East
7. Latitude 25°29’45” North, longitude 125°20’ East
8. Latitude 25°30’ North, longitude 125°30’ East
9. Latitude 25°32’17” North, longitude 125°30’ East











11. Latitude 26°30’ North, longitude 126° East
12. Latitude 27° North, longitude 126°20’ East
In addition, a special cooperation area is also established, which is enclosed by 
the following points:
1. Latitude 26°30’ North, longitude 126°East
2. Latitude 26°20’ North, longitude 125°30’ East
3. Latitude 25°32’17” North, longitude 125°30’ East
4. Latitude 25°40’ North, longitude 126° East
5. Latitude 26°30’ North, longitude 126° East
The agreement guarantees the rights of Taiwan fishing vessels in a long- 
disputed area of overlap between the two countries’ claimed eezs. It opens 
up a further 4530 square kilometers of ocean within Japan’s claimed eez to 
Taiwanese fishing vessels. Within the “special cooperation zone,” the two sides 
will cooperate to manage fishery resources. A fisheries commission is estab-
lishes to consult on the specific management of the cooperation zone, as well 
as other matters concerning the area designated by the agreement as a whole. 
More importantly, under Article 4 of the Agreement, the provisions of  the 
agreement and any measures that adopted in the future for the purpose of 
implementing the agreement should not be deemed as having any bearing on 
the position on the law of the sea issues taken by the government agencies of 





In this area, both sides exempt applications
of laws and regulations regarding fisheries
Figure 2 The Agreed Zone under the 2003 Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement.
Source: “The Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement -- Embodying the Ideals and 
Spirit of the East China Sea Peace Initiative,” website of the roc Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs at https://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/WebArchive/979/The%20 
Taiwan-Japan%20Fisheries%20Agreement%20(illustrated%20pamphlet).pdf
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iv Current Status of the Proposals and Agreements  
and their Implementation
1 The Japanese and Chinese Peace Proposals
The call for maritime cooperation between Japan and China and turning the 
East China Sea into a “sea of peace, cooperation and friendship” continued 
in the development of Sino-Japanese relations since June 2008 when the two 
sides signed the Understanding. However, it seems that the efforts have been 
put on hold by the rising tensions caused by the territorial dispute over the dig 
in particular since April 2012.
In December 2011, at the China-Japan summit meeting held in Beijing, the 
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda expressed “six initiatives”65 to further 
65 These initiatives include: (1) Enhancing Mutual Trust in the Political Area; (2) Promot-
ing the Cooperation for making the East China Sea a “Sea of Peace, Cooperation and 
Friendship”; (3) Japan-China Cooperation in the Wake of the Great East Japan Earth-
quake; (4) Grading up of Mutually Beneficial Economic Relations; (5) Promoting Mutual 
Figure 3 The location of the Agreed Zones under the 1997 China-Japan Fisheries  
Agreement and the 2013 Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement.
Source: “Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement selling China’s  




deepen diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Among other things, 
China and Japan shared on a basic recognition that it is becoming more 
important for them to tackle regional and global issues together as partners 
for cooperation in accordance with the four basic documents66 that govern 
the China-Japan relations. They also agreed to promote the cooperation for 
making the East China Sea a “Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship.”67 To 
achieve this goal, they agreed to establish High-Level Consultation on Mari-
time Affairs” and made an agreement in principle on the text of “Japan-China 
Maritime Search and Rescue (sar) Cooperation.” In addition, the Prime Min-
ister urged the early resumption of negotiations on the agreement China and 
Japan singed in June 2008 on resources development in the East China Sea. In 
response to this request, the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao stated that 
the said agreement should be put into action and that China intends to fur-
ther communication and to work together with Japan.68 Japan and China also 
shared the view that as major countries in the world, they should strengthen 
dialogues and cooperation concerning regional and global issues.69
In May 2012, when attending the Trilateral Summit of Japan, China and the 
Republic of Korea in Beijing, the Japanese Prime Minister Noda reiterated his 
“six initiatives” and welcomed the first plenary meeting of “Japan-China High-
Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs” that was held in Hangzhou on May 16, 
2012.70 Prime Minister Noda and Prime Minister Wen expressed expectations 
Understanding between People in Both Countries; and (6) Strengthening Dialogue and 
Cooperation on Regional and Global Issues. See Japan-People’s Republic of China Sum-
mit Meeting (Summary), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (25 December 2011), 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/meeting1112.html [hereinafter 
Summit Meeting Summary].
66 These documents include: The 1972 Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China; The 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
between Japan and the People’s Republic of China; The 1998 Japan-China Joint Declaration 
on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development and 
The 2008 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement on All-round Promotion of Strategic and Mutually 
Beneficial Relations.
67 Summit Meeting Summary, supra note 65.
68 Ibid.
69 Liu Weimin, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, People’s Republic of China, Regular 
Press Conference (14 October 2011), transcript available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
xwfw/s2510/2511/t868322.htm.
70 At the meeting, Japan and China introduced the organizations and activities of their re-
spective maritime-related department as well as ongoing cooperation and exchange pro-
grams between the two countries. It was agreed to hold the next meeting in the second 
half of 2012 in Japan and continue to communicate through diplomatic channels. Both 
countries agreed to establish the Working Group on “the Policy and the Laws of the Seas.” 
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that the consultation would lead to enhancing trust between the maritime-
related agencies of the two countries. During the meeting, the two prime min-
isters expressed their respective position on the status of Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku 
Islands. Prime Minister Noda said, “it would be undesirable if this issue were to 
impact adversely on the overall bilateral relations.”71 He also indicated that the 
active maritime activities by the Chinese in the areas surrounding the disputed 
islands are giving undesirable influence to the sentiment of Japanese people 
and therefore he urged China to act with restraint. In addition, Prime Minister 
Noda stressed the importance of maintaining strategic stability among Japan, 
the United States, and China, and stated in this connection that it was essential 
for the three countries to promote dialogue among them.
In response, Chinese Prime Minister Wen said that China was seriously 
considering the trilateral dialogue.72 In July 2012, the Japanese Foreign Minis-
ter Koichiro Gemba and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia on the sidelines of the asean-related Ministers’ Meeting. 
Among other things, they talked about the disputed dig by repeating their 
respective basic stand on the issue. They also agreed to promote more coopera-
tion and dialogue. The Japanese Foreign Minister Gemba strongly requested 
for the early resumption of negotiations for the China-Japan agreement 
regarding the development of natural resources in the East China Sea. He also 
stated that the Japanese side hoped for the early start of the Japan-US-China 
dialogue. China’s Foreign Minister Yang responded by stating that China’s 
The Japanese side explained about the development of making the domestic laws based 
on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy and the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy as well as Japan’s 
efforts in the fields of laws of sea in terms with the promoting rule of law in the inter-
national society. The Chinese side introduced their views and policies on the maritime 
policies and the laws of sea. Due to the diplomatic standoff between the two countries 
escalated on September 11 after the Noda administration finalized the purchase of the 
disputed Diaoyu Dao/Senkaku Islands, the second round of the “Japan-China High-Level 
Consultation on Maritime Affairs” was not held during the second half of 2012. However, 
a Track II international conference entitled “Northeast Asian Cooperation and Integra-
tion: Constructing a Peaceful Security Environment in Northeast Asia: Towards an Un-
derstanding of the Interplay of Cultural and Material Forces” was organized by Zhejiang 
University and The Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies (“kfas”), which was held in 
Hangzhou, China on 14–15 December 2012. For more information about the first meeting, 
see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The First Round Meeting of Japan-China High Level 
Consultation on Maritime Affairs (Outline) (16 May 2012), available at http://www.mofa.
go.jp/policy/maritime/jchlc_maritime01.html.
71 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Japan-People’s Republic of China Summit 





position on implementing a principle agreement concerning the East China 
Sea remained unchanged, and that he would like to continue working-level 
communications.73
In November 2012, the government of Japan expressed its intention to 
strengthen cooperation with China and continue to make efforts to make East 
China Sea a “sea of peace, cooperation and friendship” by promoting under-
standing and trust between the maritime authorities of the two countries 
through the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs” under 
the “Six Initiatives” that were agreed between the two countries.74
As tensions continue to rise in the area near the disputed dig, it has become 
more important for China and Japan to make efforts to make East China Sea 
a “sea of peace, cooperation and friendship” by proposing peaceful measures 
and establishing dialogue and conflict management mechanisms.
2 The 1997 China-Japan Fisheries Agreement
The China-Japan Fisheries Agreement has been implemented successfully 
since its entry into force on 1 June 2000. In addition to the China-Japan Fish-
eries Joint Committee, a group of experts on marine living resources and law 
enforcement dialogue mechanism were also established to help implement 
the agreement. In August 2007, China Fisheries Association and Japan Fisher-
ies Association signed a Protocol on Safety of Fisheries Operation. During the 
period of time between 2000 and 2009, 5,000 Chinese fishing vessels applied 
for operation in the Japanese eez in accordance with the Agreement. During 
the same period of time, 494 patrolling missions, with a total of 4941 patrolling 
days, were conducted by the Chinese fishery agency in the contracting waters.75
In April 2012, the 13th China-Japan Fisheries Joint Committee was held in 
Tokyo, where the two sides reviewed the implementation status of the Fisher-
ies Agreement, discussed the conditions for fishery operations in each side’s 
eez, and decided the number of fishing vessels that were allowed to fish in 
each side’s eez and the Provisional Measures Zone, as well as the allowable 
catch. It was agreed that between 1 January to 31 May 2012, Japan allowed 288 
Chinese fishing trawlers to fish in its eez, with a total catch no more than 2389 
tons. Between 1 June 2012 to 31 May 2013, Japan allowed 288 Chinese trawlers 
73 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (Overview) 
(11 July 2012), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/meeting1207_ 
fm.html.
74 Fact Sheet on the Senkaku Islands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 2012, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/fact_sheeet.html.
75 Ten Years’ Implementation of the China-Japan Fisheries Agreement, China Fishery News, 
8 June 2010, available at http://www.farmer.com,cn/wlb/yyb/yy2/201006080190.htm.
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to fish in Japan’s eez, with a total catch no more than 5,733 tones, and 55 squid 
fishing boats with a total catch no more than 4,141 tons. China allowed 111 Japa-
nese purse seine fishing vessels to enter into China’s eez to fish, with a total 
catch no more than 8,558 tons, and 26 trawlers to fish with a total catch no 
more than 621 tons. Within the Provisional Measures Zone, China agreed to 
control its total number of fishing vessels at 18214, with fishing effort target set 
at 1,703,160 tons. Japan agreed to control its total number of fishing vessels at 
800, with fishing effort target set at 109,250 tons. The two sides also discussed 
the joint study of large jelly fish, the use of special fishing purse seine nets, 
protection of eel larvae, and other fisheries cooperation matters.76
In May 2013, Okinawa Vice Governor Kurayoshi Takara and the members of 
the Okinawa Federations of Fisheries Cooperatives and the Ikema Fisheries 
Cooperatives asked Senior Vice Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisher-
ies, Taku Eto to review the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement. The fisher-
men said the Japanese and Chinese governments concluded this pact in 1997 
without any explanation to the local people before it went into effect in 2000. 
They suggested that the agreement has led to overfishing of coral reefs and has 
devastated the habitat of bottom fish. Accordingly, they asked for the govern-
ment to review the pact by working with China at the Joint Fisheries Committee 
meeting to be held June 2013.77 In addition, since the 1997 Japan-China Fisher-
ies Agreement did not cover the area of water below 27 degrees north latitude, 
Okinawa Vice Governor Kurayoshi Takara and the members of the Okinawa 
Federations of Fisheries Cooperatives and the Ikema Fisheries Cooperatives 
asked the Japanese government to resolve three issues: (1) Rescinding the con-
tent of the Foreign Minister’s letter78 and regulating the Chinese fishing boats 
working within the area of water (2) Creating a system to prevent net fishing 
on coral reefs; and (3) Review the area of water included in the Japan-Taiwan 
fishing pact.79
As tensions continue between China and Japan in the waters near the dig, 
in particular, the respective claimed 12-nm territorial waters  surrounding 
76 The 13th China-Japan Fisheries Joint Committee was held in Tokyo, 3 May 2012, available 
at http://www.shennong.com/n/1/25/121402.shtml, and http://www/fishzf.com/article.
asp?artid=141292 and http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/press/kokusai/120420.htnl.
77 Okinawan fisheries groups ask government to review Japan-China fisheries pact, Ryukyu 
Shimpo, 30 May 2013, available at http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2013/06/05/10488/.
78 In the letter sent by the Foreign Minister of Japan to his counterpart of China in Novem-
ber 1997, Japan agreed that it would not apply the relevant fisheries laws to Chinese fish-
ing boats in that area of water below 27 degrees north latitude.
79 Okinawan fisheries groups ask government to review Japan-China fisheries pact, Ryukyu 
Shimpo, 30 May 2013, available at http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2013/06/05/10488/.
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the disputes islands, and as a result of signing the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries 
 Agreement on 10 April 2013, it can be expected to see the rise of fisheries man-
agement conflicts in the area of water below 27 degrees north latitude in the 
near future (See Figure 3). 
3 The ecspi and Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement
The East China Sea Peace Initiative, proposed in August 2012, has gradually 
gained support from the international community for its contributions to 
reducing tensions and maintaining regional stability. In September 2012, for 
example, Eduard Kukan, a Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the 
European Parliament stated that
The East China Sea Peace Initiative was proposed to promote regional 
peace and security, and as such is in line with the EU’s East Asia Guide-
lines and EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp) which encour-
age peaceful and cooperative solutions to disputes. All parties concerned 
should take this initiative into consideration with a view to bringing 
about peaceful and positive developments.80
In March 2013, the European Parliament passed a report on EU-China Rela-
tions, in which it “takes note of Taiwan’s [East China Sea Peace] initiative with 
a view to reaching a consensus on a code of conduct for the East China Sea 
and the establishment of a mechanism allowing all sides to cooperate in the 
joint exploitation of the region’s natural resources, including capacity for the 
generation of electricity from renewable sources.”81
Although the government of Japan does not consider the dig issue a “dis-
pute,” it accepts the spirit, principles and proposals that are laid out in Taiwan’s 
peace initiative. It seems that what Japan opposes is a three-way dealing with 
the territorial issue. It also does not like to see the China-Taiwan cooperation 
on the dig issue in the East China Sea. On 6 June 2013, Japan’s Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yoshihide Suga rejected President Ma’s call for a three-way dialogue 
with China and Japan on fishery rights and natural resources in the East China 
Sea, but he added, “We haven’t changed our stance that Japan will promote 
concrete cooperation with neighboring countries and regions to ensure peace 
80 East China Sea Peace Initiative positive step to reassuring peace and dialogue for con-
sensus in the region, Press Release, epp Group in the European Parliament, 
20 September 2012, available at http://www.eppgroup.eu/press-release/East-China-Sea 
-Peace-Initiative-positive.
81 European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2013 on EU-China relations, 2012/2137 (ini), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&re
ference=P7-TA-2013-97, para. 49.
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and security in the East China Sea.”82 The signing of the Japan-Taiwan fisheries 
agreement is considered one of the positive responses of Japan to the ecspi.83
On 7 May 2013, Taiwan and Japan established a bilateral fishing commission, 
which serves as an institutionalized negotiation mechanism for future talks 
of fisheries cooperation. Taiwan members of the commission include Chang 
Jen-joe, senior counselor with the Association of East Asian Relations; James 
Sha, director-general of the Fisheries Agency; officials from the roc Coast 
Guard Administration and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and representatives 
from local fishermen’s associations. Japanese members include Michihiko 
Komatsu, director-general of Tokyo-based Interchange Association’s General 
Affairs Department; Kenichi Okada, secretary-general of the IA’s Taipei Office; 
officials from Japan’s foreign ministry, coast guard and fisheries agencies; and 
representatives of an Okinawa fishing committee.84 During the first session of 
Taiwan-Japan Fishing Commission, the two sides agreed to complete revising 
respective laws enabling the Taiwan-Japan fishery agreement to take effect 10 
May 2013 and continue negotiations on fishing issues with commission meet-
ings scheduled at least once a year.
Both sides agreed to temporarily shelve the sovereignty dispute over the 
dig and designated the area between 27° north latitude and Japan’s Sakishima 
Islands as waters where fishing by both Taiwan and Japan vessels would be 
allowed to operate. Most fishermen welcomed the conclusion of the agree-
ment. The agreement expands the fishing grounds of Taiwanese fishermen 
by an additional 4,530 square kilometers beyond the so-called “temporary 
enforcement line.” The second meeting was held in July 2013. It was reported 
that Taiwan catches of yellow fin tuna in waters off northeastern Taiwan have 
increased 20% in May 2013 compared with the same period last year following 
the signing of the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement.85
The signing of Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement has received positive 
responses from the international community, including the US Department 
of State. On 23 April 2013, for example, Raymond Burghardt, the chairman of 
the American Institute in Taiwan (ait), stated that Taiwan and Japan have 
82 Joseph Yeh, Tokyo rejects Diaoyutai talks; mofa reiterates sovereignty, China Post, 8 
June 2013, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign-affairs/2013/06/08/ 
380627/Tokyo-rejects.htm.
83 Kawashima Shin, The Implications for the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement, Nippon.
com, 5 June 2013, available at http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00081/.
84 Taiwan, Japan set up joint fishing commission, Taiwan Today, 8 May 2013, available at 
http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=204842&CtNode=414.




“well-handled” the fishing rights dispute surrounding the dig in the East China 
Sea. He said the agreement “really mapped the interest of both sides in a rather 
neat way.”86 American scholars such as Douglas Paal, Randall Schriver, Richard 
Bush, and Bonnie Glaser are also in support of the move and consider a good 
example of dispute resolution.87 On 10 June 2013, a resolution was proposed in 
the US Senate, in which the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement was considered 
a model for administering fishing resources in the overlapping eezs in the East 
China Sea.88
The East China Sea Peace Initiative, proposed in August 2012, has gradu-
ally gained support from the international community for its contributions to 
reducing tensions and maintaining regional stability. Although official reac-
tions from Japan and China, the parties directly involved in the territorial dis-
pute over the dig and surrounding waters, are not straightforward, there has 
been seen positive responses from the two parties, in particular, after the sign-
ing of the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement on 10 April 2013.
In addition to the positive responses from Japan and the United States to 
both the ecspi and the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, it seems that China 
is also moving toward the direction of supporting the initiative. In May 2013, 
President Ma stated that Taiwan is willing to talk with China about the possi-
bility of signing a bilateral fisheries agreement to help govern fishing activities 
in waters around the dig.89 On 6 June 2013, President Ma said that since there 
are also fisheries matters between Taiwan and China that need to be settled, 
Taiwan does not rule out the possibility of signing a fisheries agreement, simi-
lar to the one between Taiwan and Japan, to establish a joint fishery conserva-
tion and management zone in the East China Sea. In addition, he stressed, just 
like the 18 agreements that have been signed so far between Taiwan and China, 
this fisheries agreement can be signed, not between two countries, but under 
86 Taiwan, Japan fishing rights issue ‘handled well’: ait chairman, Taiwan News, 24 April 
2013, available at http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=2204521.
87 Taiwan-Japan fishery pact good example of dispute resolution: expert, Focus Taiwan, 
16 April 2013, available at http://taiwandiaoyutaiislands.tw/EN/Interview_Detail.
aspx?ID=1373. Assessing Taiwanese President Ma’s Message to America, Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, 16 April 2013, available at http://m.ceip.
org/2013/04/16/assessing-taiwanese-president-ma-s-message-to-america/fyzm.
88 S. Res. 167, Reaffirming the strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolu-
tion of territorial, sovereignty, and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific maritime 
domains, 10 June 2013, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.ees.167.
89 Ma: Taiwan and Japan sign fisheries agreement, welcome China to Join, China Times, 9 
May 2013, available at http://news.chinatimes.com/mainland/11050506/112013050900173.
html (in Chinese).
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special cross-Strait relations.90 In response, Fan Liqing, the spokeswoman of 
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council stated that the two sides can further 
study the matter concerning fisheries cooperation.91
v The Challenges China, Japan, and Taiwan Are Facing
The development and implementation of the peaceful proposals and agree-
ments on maritime cooperation have encountered a number of challenges. 
One of the biggest challenges concerns the Japanese position that Tokyo does 
not have any territorial dispute to be solved over the dig, and that the leaders 
of China and Japan did not reach consensus on putting aside the dig issue in 
1972 on the occasion of the normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations.
On 2 June 2013, Lieutenant General Qi Jianguo, deputy chief of the general 
staff of the pla, stated at the Shangri-La Defense Dialogue in Singapore that, 
“We should put aside disputes, work in the same direction and seek solutions 
through dialogue and coordination, particularly when it comes to disputes 
concerning sovereignty as well as maritime rights and interests.”92 In response, 
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said on 3 June 2013 that there 
are no disputes involved with the dig. He also dismissed the existence of 
bilateral consensus to put the islands dispute aside.93 Although the Japanese 
government has maintained that Tokyo is willing to work with Beijing to pre-
vent individual issues from undermining overall relations from the viewpoint 
of “Mutual Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” and 
“Japan always keeps the door to dialogue open,”94 as long as Tokyo continues 
to insist on its current position on the dig, it is unlikely for the two countries 
to move forward to make the East China Sea a “sea of peace, friendship, and 
90 President: Does not rule out signing a fishery agreement with Mainland China, Central 
News Agency, 6 June 2013, available at http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aipl/2013 
06060432-1.aspx.
91 Taiwan Affairs Office’s Response to A Reporter’s Question Concerning Ma Ying-jeou’s 
Proposal to sign a Cross-Strait Fishery Pact, 9 June 2013, available at Http://roll.sohu.
com/20130609/n378506284.shtml.
92 China proposes putting aside Asian maritime disputes, The Mainichi, 3 June 2013, avail-
able at  http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130603p2g00m0dm0410 
00c.html.
93 Japan politicians seek to mend ties, China Daily, June 4, 2013, available at http://usa.china-
daily.com.cn/china/2013-06/04/content_16562495.htm.
94 See, Speech by H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 19th 
International Conference on “The Future of Asia,” Imperial Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, 23 May 
2013, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/page3e_000057.html.
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cooperation” as they agreed before. It is also unlikely for them to resume talks 
on joint development of oil and gas resources in the East China Sea in accor-
dance with the 2008 Understanding.
Another challenge for the development and implementation of the peace-
ful proposals and agreements on maritime cooperation in the East China Sea 
concerns the sensitive “one China” issue. Both China and Japan have been very 
careful in responding to President Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative.
On 12 April 2013, two days after signing the fisheries agreement between 
 Taiwan and Japan, the spokesperson of China’s Foreign Ministry, Hon Lei, 
stated at a regular press conference that “China opposes Japan’s unilateral 
actions in relevant waters and urges Japan to properly deal with Taiwan-related 
issues in strict accordance with the principles and spirit of the China-Japan 
Joint Statement.”95 It is clear that China is concerned about a possible revival 
of Taiwan’s diplomatic status and its political relations with Japan. At the same 
time, China considers the Beijing government the authoritative defender of 
Chinese sovereignty over the dig and Taiwan should work together with China 
in safe-guarding the islands and relevant maritime rights and interests. Fan 
Liqing, a spokeswoman for the Taiwan Affairs of the State Council, also urged 
that “It is the duty across the Straits to ensure the fishing rights and interest of 
fishermen from both sides (to operate) in this traditional fishery area on the 
basis of safeguarding territorial sovereignty.”96
Japan considered the agreement it signed with Taiwan as a private sector 
fisheries arrangement, instead of a government-to-government agreement 
between Tokyo and Taipei. On 18 April 2013, in response to a question concern-
ing the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement, Japanese Assistant Press Secretary 
Masaru Sato stated that
This Japan-Taiwan private sector fisheries arrangement was signed April 
10, and negotiations had been held between private bodies of Japan and 
Taiwan. … the two private authorities have been negotiating over the fish-
eries issue for many years since 1996, … But it was postponed sometime in 
2009, but after the situation concerning the Senkaku Islands intensified 
since last September, we resumed discussions. And this time the Fishery 
Arrangement was successfully made. Although we have not changed our 
policy in any way regarding the treatment of Taiwan vis-à-vis China, the 
95 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on 12 April 2013, 13 April 
2013, website of the prc Foreign Ministry, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
xwfw/s2510/t1031012.shtml.
96 Japan-Taiwan fishery agreement raises ‘concern,’ China Daily, 11 April 2013, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-04/11/content_16391602.htm.
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Japanese Government welcomed the signing as the non-governmental 
working relations between Taiwan and Japan bearing fruit. So it is hoped 
this will have a positive impact even on the situation concerning the Sen-
kaku Islands.97
On 1 June 2013, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the Japanese Minister 
Itsunori Onodera reiterated the Japanese position on the legal nature of Tai-
wan-Japan Fisheries agreement. He said, it is a private sector agreement with 
Taiwan. But he added, the signing of the agreement “is a benefit for the fisher-
man and the economies of both countries and that this is progress.”98
In February 2013, President Ma gave reasons to explain why Taipei decides 
not to collaborate with Beijing on the dig issue. First, he said, because China 
has never recognized the legitimacy of the Peace Treaty signed between Tai-
wan and Japan in 1952. Second, the Chinese government has not responded to 
Taiwan’s East China Sea Peace Initiative. And finally, Beijing hoped the sover-
eignty issue would be kept out of the fishery talks between Taipei and Tokyo.99 
Unless a flexible arrangement between China and Taiwan can be made, it is 
unlikely for Taipei to be included in any of the future bilateral negotiations 
between China and Japan for law enforcement mechanisms or agreements on 
maritime cooperation in the East China Sea. It is also unlikely to see a three-
way talk between China, Japan, and Taiwan.
A third challenge is the potential conflicts in the territorial waters 12 nm 
measured from the baselines of the dig that are claimed respectively by China, 
Japan, and Taiwan. If no agreements can be reached between the three parties 
in the near future, this body of waters and the air above it will become the site 
of accidental conflicts between China and Japan as well as between Japan and 
Taiwan. The chance for conflicts will be bigger between China and Japan, since 
activists from Japan and from Hong Kong, Macau, and Mainland China will 
continue to take actions for the purpose of safeguarding sovereignty over the 
dig. Actually it happened twice since the signing of Japan-Taiwan Fisheries 
Agreement. In April and May 2013, respectively, the Japanese activists and fish-
ermen, guarded by the Japanese coast guard vessels, sailed to the waters near 
the dig. In response, China dispatched maritime surveillance vessels to expel 
97 Press Conference by Assistant Press Secretary Masaru Sato, 18 April 2013, available at http://
www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken6e_000005.html.
98 Defending National Interests; Preventing Conflict: Q&A, 1 June 2013, available at http://www 
.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/
second-plenary-session-8bc4/qa-1497.




the Japanese intruders. The possibility for Chinese Taiwanese vessels to enter 
the 12 nm zone surrounding the dig cannot be ruled out.
A fourth challenge is the increasing call from Japanese fishermen to review 
the 1997 Japan-China Fisheries Agreement and the 2013 Taiwan-Japan Fisheries 
Agreement. Okinawa fishermen asked the Japanese government to review the 
fisheries agreement with China because the agreement has led to overfishing of 
coral reefs and has devastated the habitat of bottom fish.100 In addition, they com-
plained that the Japanese government failed to take their interests into account 
as Taiwanese trawlers are given more waters to operate in the maritime zones 
established under the April 2013 Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement. Okinawa 
fishermen stated that competition with Taiwanese fishing vessels will intensify 
and good fishing areas for them will shrink as a result.101 However, Taiwanese 
fishermen stated that Japanese authorities are implementing the agreement 
“too strictly” and they would like to see a buffer zone set up immediately outside 
the maritime zones covered by the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement.102
A fifth challenge is related to the demand from the Chinese fishermen for 
the right to operate in the maritime zones covered by the Taiwan-Japan Fish-
eries Agreement and the demand from the Taiwanese fishermen for the right 
to operate in the provisional measures zone established by the 1997 China-
Japan Fisheries Agreement (See Figure 3). This requires cross-Strait negotia-
tions under the ecspi. In addition, it will be necessary for Japan, Taiwan, and 
China to enter into trilateral talks that aim to combine the two existing fish-
eries agreements and come to an agreement for a new agreement between 
the three parties. In order to avoid the rise of the “one-China” issue, a flex-
ible arrangement similar to the Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (ccsbt) or the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(wcpfc) can be made so to allow “Fishing Entity of Taiwan” become a member 
of the Extended Commission of the ccsbt or a member of the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission as Chinese Taipei. Alternatively, a fish-
eries agreement can be signed between China Fisheries Association,103 Japan 
Fisheries Association,104 and Taiwan’s National Fishermen’s Association.105
100 Okinawa fisheries groups ask government to review Japan-China fisheries pact, Ryuku 
Shimpo, 30 May 2013, available at http://english.ryukushimpo.jp/2013/06/05/10488/.
101 Okinawa fishermen protest to the Government over agreement with Taiwan on fishing rights, 
Ryuku Simpo, 13 April 2013, available at http://english.ryukushimpo.jp/2013/04/20/10039/. 
See also, Japan-Taiwan fisheries pact leaves fishermen on both sides dissatisfied, Kyoto 
News, June 10, 2013, available at http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2013/06/229573.html
102 Japan-Taiwan fisheries pact leaves fishermen on both sides dissatisfied, ibid.
103 Available at http://www.china-cfa.org/.
104 Available at http://www.suisankai.or.jp/index_e.html.
105 Available at http://www.tpfae.org.tw.
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vi Concluding Remarks
Maritime cooperation between China, Japan, and Taiwan is possible in the 
areas of conservation and management of fisheries resources as well as explo-
ration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in the East China Sea, including 
the area surrounding the Diaoyutai/Senkau Islands. Possible non-government 
organizations for fisheries cooperation include China Fisheries Association, 
Japan Fisheries Association, and Taiwan’s National Fishermen’s Associa-
tion. Possible non-government organizations for oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation include China National Offshore Oil Corporation (cnooc), Japan 
Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (jogmec),106 and Taiwan’s cpc 
Corporation.107
Maritime cooperation between and/or among the three parties have the 
potential not only to help govern the activities that are related to exploration, 
exploitation, preservation, or protection of the living and non-living resources 
of the East China Sea, but also to manage the conflicts that arise from the sov-
ereignty and maritime disputes over the dig. Unfortunately there has been 
seen a lack of political willingness, in particular, from the prc and Japanese 
governments, to promote maritime cooperation so that the East China Sea can 
be transformed into “a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.” Apparently, 
more efforts need to be taken by the leaders of China, Japan, and Taiwan.
106 Available at http://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/index.html.
107 Available at http://www.cpc.com.tw/english/home/index.asp.
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The South China Sea Disputes: An Opportunity for 
the Cross Taiwan Strait Relationship
Yen-Chiang Chang
I Introduction
The South Sea, also called the South China Sea, is a semi-enclosed marginal 
sea in the Pacific Ocean. It is located north of China and the island of Taiwan, 
east of the Philippines, south of Kalimantan Island and Sumatra Island and 
west of the Malay Peninsula and the Indo-China peninsula. States and terri-
tories with borders on the South China Sea, include mainland China, Taiwan 
(China), Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines.1
The total area of the South China Sea is  350 square kilometres. The South 
China Sea contains over 230 small islands, atolls, cays, and shoals, collectively 
known as the South China Sea islands. These islands are geographically divid-
ed into four parts: the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, the Pratas Is-
lands and the Spratly Islands. Most of these islands are very small, the largest 
of which is Pratas, with 12 square kilometres and Itu Aba Island, the largest 
island of Spratly Islands, is also only 0.4 square kilometres in size.2
Territorial disputes on the South China Sea islands began in the mid-late 
20th Century. Since the 1970s, neighbouring countries in the South China Sea, 
such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, began to conduct activities in 
the South China Sea islands and claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, 
for the following two reasons. On the one hand, the South China Sea is rich 
in natural resources including oil, gas and fish. On the other hand, the South 
China Sea, as a strategic road connecting the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean 
and a major shipping lane connecting Asia and Oceania, Europe and Africa, 
1 Chao Ma, On the Island System and the International Maritime Delimitation 
(Master’s thesis, Guizhou University, May 2007) at 28.
2 Lihai Zhao, On the South China Sea Islands, A Number of Legal Problems, 4 Law and Social 
Development 50 (1995); Jianming Shen, International Law Rules and Historical Evidences 
Supporting China’s Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review 2 (1997–1998).
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plays a significant role in national defense and economics.3 The 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter unclos) sets up the 
legal systems for a continental shelf and exclusive economic zones.4 Article 
121 of unclos states that as long as territory can sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own, they shall have a corresponding continental shelf 
and an exclusive economic zone. This provision will undoubtedly broaden the 
scope of jurisdiction of a State, expand its economic interests gained by using 
the sea5 and potentially aggravate the rivalry for activities on and sovereign 
rights over, the South China Sea, among States surrounding it.
In recent years, rivalry for the South China Sea has become increasingly 
intense among surrounding States. In addition, Southeast Asian States have 
tried to involve the United States, Japan and other States, apparently in order to 
make the South China Sea disputes more international and a potentially more 
complex issue.6 On 17 February 2009, the Congress of the Philippines enacted 
the Philippine Baselines Law, which classifies the Spratly Islands and Scarbor-
ough Shoal, ‘as a regime of islands under the Republic of Philippines’. On 5 
March 2009, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi landed 
on Swallow Reef and claimed sovereignty over the reef and its adjacent wa-
ters. On 8 March 2009, the usns Impeccable conducted monitoring activities, 
without the authorization from the Chinese government, within the Chinese 
exclusive economic zone.7 On 23 July 2010, the US Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton, stated at the asean Regional Forum, that the settlement of disputes 
over the South China Sea is, ‘related to US national interests’. Meanwhile, the 
United States has strengthened cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet-
nam and has conducted several military exercises in the area.8 A recent event, 
3 Xiaowei Lv, The Status of the South China Sea Dispute, Causes and Countermeasures, 7 Con-
temporary Social Horizons 76 (2009).
4 Regulations of continental shelf are Articles 76 and 77 of the Convention; regulations of the 
exclusive economic zone in the Convention are Articles 55, 56, and 57. The widths of the con-
tinental shelf and exclusive economic zones, according to the Convention, are 200 nautical 
miles.
5 Guoqiang Luo, The Multilateral Path to Solve the South China Sea Dispute and its  Construction - 
Comment on “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”, 25 Legal Forum 
94 (2010).
6 Hao Chu, The New Situation and New Developments of South China Sea Issue, 12 Interna-
tional Data Information (China) 40 (2010).
7 Yen-Chiang Chang, Thinking about the Impeccable in the International Law of Sea, Shan-
dong University Law Review 161 (2010); Feng Dan, Liming Hu, and Shandan Zhou, New 
Trends in the South China Sea Dispute and China’s Road to Protect Rights activists, 19 World 
Geography 14 (2010).
8 Siqi Peng, New Trends in the South China Sea Issue, 18 Managers’ Journal 45 (2010).
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which occurred on 20 July 2011, involved five Philippine congressmen landing 
on Thitu Island of the Spratly Islands, raising the Philippines flag and declar-
ing sovereignty over the Thitu Island. In April 2012, the Gregorio del Pilar, the 
largest warship of the Philippines fleet, confronted two Chinese ocean surveil-
lance ships at the Scarborough Shoal. The Philippine Navy was trying to arrest 
Chinese fishermen near the Scarborough Shoal but the arrest was prevented by 
the presence of Chinese surveillance boats. In June 2012, Vietnam launched the 
‘Oceans Act’ in order to extend its maritime jurisdiction over Paracel and Sprat-
ly Islands. China had subsequently raised strong diplomatic protests against 
Vietnam’s enactment. The release of the South China Sea Arbitration Award on 
12 July 2016, has caused the South China Sea dispute to reach new heights. The 
events mentioned above amply demonstrate that States surrounding the South 
China Sea islands regard the rivalry for the South China Sea as a significant ele-
ment in their strategy in resolving this issue has become of great concern for 
mainland China in the process of mainland China’s growth process.
The South China Sea disputes are mainly focused on two issues. One is ter-
ritorial sovereignty and the other is the maritime delimitation in the South 
China Sea. These two issues will be discussed separately, in the following parts 
of this article.
II Legal Basis for Each Claiming State
Territorial sovereignty claims over the South China Sea islands have been made 
by six countries, namely, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei 
and Indonesia. In addition, Taiwan (China) also has made claims based upon 
special political factors, thus creating a six-nation-and-seven-party situation 
in the area. The Pratas Islands are garrisoned by Taiwan’s (China) armed forces. 
The Macclesfield Bank is dominated by the practical control of the Philippines. 
The Paracel Islands are controlled by mainland China. The Spratly Islands are 
controlled by the following countries respectively, mainland China controls 7 
reefs, Taiwan (China) 2, Vietnam 29, Philippines 8, Malaysia 5, with Brunei 2, 
and Indonesia 1.9
1 Mainland China
Mainland China claims sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, based 
upon the principle of occupation. Occupation is defined as when a State 
 intentionally takes the territorial sovereignty of terra nullius.10 The object of 
9 Luo, supra note 5 at 93.
10 Tieya Wang, International Law 171 (1995).
53The South China Sea Disputes
<UN>
occupation is terra nullius, which indicates that the territory has never before 
been discovered by human beings or over which, any prior sovereignty has 
been relinquished.11 According to traditional international law before the 18th 
Century, a State enjoyed the full sovereignty of the terra nullius, only by meet-
ing the requirement of ‘discovery’.12 Since the 18th Century, however, the domi-
nant doctrine accepted by scholars and State practice has been that ‘discovery’ 
can only give the discovering country partial sovereignty and a country will 
only enjoy full sovereignty when it exercises effective occupation over the terra 
nullius and undertakes proper legislative, judicial or administrative action or 
performs its sovereignty, which is called, ‘effectiveness principle’.13
As early as the 2nd Century bc, during the ruling period of Emperor Wudi 
of the Han Dynasty, the Chinese began sailing in the South China Sea and they 
found the South China Sea islands through long-term sailing and production 
practices. Prior to this, the South China Sea islands have not been set foot upon, 
which meets the criterion of occupation, whereby land discovered should be 
deemed terra nullius.14 According to the principle of international law prior to 
the 18th Century and ‘inter-temporal law’,15 mainland China enjoys full sover-
eignty over the South China Sea islands, based on discovery.16
In addition, according to the view of modern international law, China’s sover-
eignty over the South China Sea islands continues to exist. A series of  activities 
11 Shen, supra note 2 at 7.
12 Gerhard Von Glahn, Law Among Nations 311 (1986).
13 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International 
Law 686–689 (1992); Wang, supra note 10 at 171; Shen, supra note 2 at 10–11; Gaoqiang 
Cai and Yang Gao, International Law Approach to Resolve the South China Sea Dispute, 35 
Journal of Xiangtan University 40 (2011); Dexin Gu, The Application of Law of the 
sea in the South China Sea Dispute, 6 Strategy and Management 97(1995); Xiaoxuan 
Zhang, The South China Sea Dispute between China and the Philippines and Legal Protec-
tion of Maritime Sovereignty, 5 Theoretical Circles 54 (2010).
14 Gu, supra note 13 at 97; Zhang, supra note 13 at 54; Cai and Gao, supra note 13 at 39.
15 ‘Inter-temporal law’ was first proposed by Huber, the arbitrator in the Island of Palmas 
Arbitration case in 1928. It indicates that ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light 
of the law contemporary with it and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute 
with regard to it rises or falls to be settled’. Huber further explained when there is a sov-
ereignty dispute it should be determined whether there is a continued existence of right 
at the time dispute rises according to the progressed international law. After the Island of 
Palmas Arbitration case, ‘Inter-temporal law’ becomes a universally recognised principle 
of international law. Therefore, sovereignty of the South China Sea Islands should be de-
termined according to the principles of international law at the time, that is, ‘Acquisition 
of Property by Discovery’ principle. See Lingling Sun, Analysis of the Sovereignty of the Di-
aoyu Islands from the Perspective of International Law, 2 Journal of Japanese Studies 
140–141 (2004); see also Yuanlong Huang, Concept of Inter-temporal Law in International 
Law, 2 Foreign Law (2000).
16 Zhang, supra note 14 at 55.
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conducted by mainland China, during various dynasties, such as naming the 
islands, exploitation, management, measurement, observation, inspection and 
stationing troops, shows the jurisdiction of mainland China, which is in com-
pliance with the, ‘principle of effective occupation’.17 ‘It is worth noting that 
the effective occupation or control is a comparative concept, which means its 
criterion varies depending upon the nature of the terra nullius,  involving its 
size, geographical location, climatic conditions and whether there is human 
inhabitation’.18 For example, it is much easier to effectively occupy an uninhab-
ited land, than a primitive tribal land because a State’s troops may be stationed 
in the latter, while not in the former.19 The Clipperton Island Arbitration20 in 
1931, between France and Clipperton Island, the Eastern Greenland Case21 in 
1933 between Norway and East Greenland Denmark and advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice22 on the Status of Western Sahara, all reflect a 
common characteristic, that is, the criterion of effective occupation in interna-
tional law for sparsely populated or uninhabited terra nullius is not significant. 
A tiny or symbolic activity of sovereignty declaration will enable a country to 
enjoy full sovereignty over the terra nullius, while continuous exercise of sov-
ereign acts is not required.23 There are a large number of sparsely populated 
or uninhabited islands and reefs in the South China Sea islands. Even although 
mainland China has not exercised continuous sovereign acts, a series of acts, 
including naming and inspection, are deemed sufficient to constitute effective 
occupation.
From the 1830s until the end of the Second World War, the South China Sea 
islands were invaded and occupied by France and Japan. In 1946, the Chinese 
government took over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, based upon the 
statement of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, and re-erected 
a sovereignty monument on the islands.24 The invasion and occupation by 
France and Japan of the South China Sea islands, cannot nullify the effect of 
territorial changes under international law, since the acquisition or occupation 
17 There will not be an elaboration on the specific activities of China’s exercise of jurisdic-
tion in the South China Sea islands. See Shen, supra note 2; Gu, supra note 14; Zhao, su-
pra note 2; Lihai Zhao, China’s Indisputable Sovereignty over the South Sea Islands from 
International Law, 3 Journal of Peking University (Philosophy and Social 
Sciences) (1992).
18 George Schwarzenberger and E.D. Brown, A Manual of International 
Law 97 (1976).
19 Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law 143 (1984).
20 Clipperton Island Arbitration (Fr. v. Mex.), 2 r.i.a.a. 1105, 26 Am. J. Int’l L. 390 (1931).
21 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J (Ser. A/B) No.53 (5 April).
22 Advisory Opinion on the Status of Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, 43 (Oct. 16).
23 All cases cited above were taken from Shen, supra note 2 at 13.
24 Zhao, supra note 2 at 53; Gu, supra note 14 at 98.
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of land by the threat or the use of force is illegal and will not be recognised in 
international law.25
From the analysis above, mainland China’s claim to the South China Sea is-
lands is based upon, ‘the principle of occupation’, which specifies terra nullius 
discovery and the principle of effective occupation. Meanwhile, before neigh-
bouring States in the South China Sea claimed territorial sovereignty, main-
land China had not been subject to intervention by any State, except the illegal 
invasion and occupation by France and Japan. These facts constitute powerful 
proof in international law of mainland China’s to claim sovereignty over the 
South China Sea islands.
2 The Philippines
The Philippines claims sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal and part of 
the Spratly Islands, for the following three reasons. Firstly, these islands are es-
sential to the national security and economic development of the Philippines. 
Secondly, the Philippines is the State geographically closest to these islands. 
Thirdly, these islands are, ‘ownerless islands’.26
There is no legal basis under international law as regards the first and sec-
ond reasons. It is generally believed that there are five traditional ways of 
achieving territorial acquisition and changes in international law, these being 
occupation, accretion, prescription, cession and conquest.27 Security or eco-
nomic development needs and the ‘adjacency principle’, are not recognised 
methods of territorial acquisition and change. As for the adjacency principle, 
the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 1969 North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf case negated it and pointed out that the ‘submarine areas did not 
appertain to the coastal State merely because they were near it’.28
The third reason is also unacceptable in international law. In 1948, Thomas 
Cloma and his team claimed to discover part of the Spratly Islands in the South 
China Sea and regarded these islands as, ‘ownerless islands’. As mentioned 
above, however, as early as the Western Han Dynasty, mainland China had 
discovered and exercised jurisdiction continuously over the South China Sea 
islands. Meanwhile, mainland China has never had the intention of or acted to 
relinquish the South China Sea islands. The reasons offered by the Philippines 
are thus untenable. For a number of uninhabited islands in the Spratly Islands, 
especially those islands and reefs which appear and disappear with the ebb and 
25 Wang, supra note 10 at 173.
26 Shen, supra note 2 at 59.
27 Wang, supra note 10 at 171.
28 The Judgment of the icj Advisory Opinion and Command Summary (1948–1991), at 85, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/ch/files/sum_1948-1991.pdf; Zhao, supra 
note 2 at 55.
Chang56
<UN>
flow of the seas, make them impossible to permanently occupy but this does 
not mean that the sovereign States relinquished their claims on sovereignty. 
Whether a State relinquishes a claim to sovereignty depends on whether the 
State has the intention to relinquish it and has no intention to continue ‘owner-
ship’. It is evident that mainland China has always claimed its sovereignty over 
the South China Sea islands and no indication to relinquish has been given.29 
The legal basis for the claim of the Philippines to have sovereignty over some 
of the South China Sea islands is thus untenable under international law.
3 Vietnam
Vietnam’s claim on the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands is mainly based on 
the following two points. Firstly, Vietnam claims its control over the Paracel 
Islands and Spratly Islands on the basis of history. Secondly, Vietnam inherited 
France’s rights over the Spratly Islands.
The first reason proposed by Vietnam is that ‘Hoang Sa’ and ‘Truong Sa’, in 
its historic documents, are referred to as the ‘Paracel Islands’ and the ‘Spratly 
Islands’. According to Chinese historical research, however, the aforemen-
tioned documents are referring merely to the islets and shoal along the coast 
of central and west Vietnam, rather than the Paracel Islands and the Spratly 
Islands.30 (See Figure 3.1) If the authenticity of this research is not questioned, 
it may be assumed that ‘Hoang Sa’ and ‘Truong Sa’ refer to the ‘Paracel Islands’ 
and the ‘Spratly Island’, then Vietnam was indeed the first to have discovered 
the South Sea islands. Mainland China has, however, claimed effective control 
over the South China Sea islands for up to 2000 years, while Vietnam only ap-
parently began to claim sovereignty over islands in the 20th century. Vietnam, 
however, should not be able to obtain sovereignty over the South China Sea 
islands because its action does not satisfy ‘the principle of occupation’ in inter-
national law. The result would thus appear to be that Vietnam cannot acquire 
sovereignty over the South China Sea islands.
In addition, before Vietnam’s reunification in 1975, Vietnam had confirmed 
that the South China Sea islands have been a territory of mainland China. The 
‘Vietnam Atlas’ and ‘World Atlas’, published by the Vietnam Bureau of Survey-
ing and Mapping, even include the South China Sea islands within the ter-
ritory of mainland China.31 Based on the abovementioned facts, Vietnam’s 
29 Shen, supra note 2 at 62.
30 Jinming Li, Vietnam’s Hoang Sa and Truong Sa are not China’s Paracel Islands and Spratly 
Islands, 2 Chinese Borderland History and Geography (1997).
31 Gu, supra note 13 at 98.
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 sovereignty claims over the South China Sea islands after 1975 are, in fact, in 
violation of estoppel in international law.32
As to the second reason proposed by Vietnam, as mentioned earlier, the 
French occupation of the Spratly Islands is considered a breach of internation-
al law. As a result, the apparently illegal activity cannot grant France legitimate 
rights over the South China Sea islands and inheritance of rights from France 
seems spurious.
4 Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia
The sovereignty claims from these three States over the islands of the South 
China Sea are based upon the fact that these islands are within the 200- 
nautical-mile exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. In fact, this propo-
sition involves some apparent erroneous juxtaposition. unclos specifies that 
delimitation of an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf is based 
upon the area being a part of a country’s territory, which is embodied in the 
principle, ‘the land dominates the sea’. It is manifested in the judgment of the 
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case as early 
32 Zhao, supra note 17 at 30–40; Shen, supra note 2 at 57.
Figure 3.1 Vietnam Map, 1834.
Source: www.nansha.org.cn, Last visited: 2018/6/28
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as in 1969, that is, ‘the rights of the coastal State to its continental shelf areas 
were based on its sovereignty over the land domain, of which the shelf area 
was the natural prolongation under the sea’.33 The result is that, a State cannot 
claim sovereignty over a land based upon claiming its exclusive ownership of 
an economic zone or continental shelf of the land, since this claim does not 
conform to the basic principle of international law.
5 Taiwan (China)
Taiwan (China) claims sovereignty over the South China Sea islands based 
upon reasons similar to those of mainland China, that is, ‘the principle of 
occupation’.34 Before 1950, mainland China, as a unified entity, occupied and ex-
ercised jurisdiction over the South China Sea islands; while after 1950, the split 
of mainland China and Taiwan (China) created the situation where the two 
parties exercised State functions in the South China Sea, respectively. Taiwan 
(China), as the ‘The Republic of China’, exercised jurisdiction over the South 
China Sea. For instance, the ‘Pratas garrison area’ and the ‘Spratly garrison dis-
trict’, were set up in 1956. Ships were dispatched to inspect the Spratly Islands 
respectively in 1963 and 1966. The Islands of Spratly were hosted by the Kaoh-
siung City Government in 1980 and a ‘district office’ was also set up.35 All these 
facts satisfy the elements of, ‘the principle of occupation’ as discussed above.
6 Summary
In summary, putting aside the political issues, both mainland China, as rep-
resented by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan 
( China) represented by the Republic of China, can exercise a strong claim to 
sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, based on the principle of oc-
cupation. Claims from other Southeast Asian States cannot, however, be sup-
ported by international law, according to the above analysis.
III Delimitation of the South China Sea
unclos states in Articles 3, 57 and 76 that, measured from baselines, every 
State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit 
not exceeding 12 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone not beyond 200 
33 Yuan Guo, Analysis of the South China Sea Disputes in the Law of the Sea, 2 Northern 
Legal Science 136 (2009).
34 Hasjim Djalal, South China Sea Island Disputes, available at http://rmbr.nus.edu.sg/rbz/
biblio/s8/s08rbz009-021.pdf
35 Available at http://lg2005.blog.hexun.com/2757179_d.html.
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nautical miles and a continental shelf, not exceeding 350 nautical miles. Un-
doubtedly, the formulation of unclos provides an authoritative reference for 
the world, in terms of maritime delimitation. Scholars have, nonetheless, com-
mented that, “The provisions of the law of the sea have caused a new dispute 
similar to friend-or-foe dispute in Asia. No Asian State claims the limit of the 
continental shelf or the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone without 
causing conflict with claims of other States”.36 Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, some States misuse the relevant provisions of the continental shelf and 
exclusive economic zone stated in unclos, to claim territorial sovereignty 
over the South China Sea islands, which aggravates the sovereignty dispute in 
the region and complicates the issue of maritime delimitation. In addition, the 
‘historic waters’ issue and historical rights, have not been mentioned in detail 
in unclos. Thus, accepting that there are provisions for the delimitation of 
straight baselines in Article 7, Paragraph 2, the exception of the historic gulf in 
Article 10, Paragraph 6 and the delimitation of the boundaries of territorial wa-
ters in Article 15,37 there is little explanation or definition of the concept of ‘his-
toric waters’. These defects, to some extent, hinder the solution of the problem 
of the South China Sea. unclos does, however, expressly provide in Articles 
74 and 83, that the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and continen-
tal shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts, shall be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution. This means that although the Convention does not provide specific 
methods to solve the problem of the maritime delimitation, it guides States 
to settle the dispute on the basis of basic principles and rules of international 
law. The rule of ‘historic waters’, as an international customary law referred to 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, should be con-
sidered by States in negotiation, as recognised and supported by unclos.38
The concept of ‘historic waters’ has been proposed since the last century. In 
1957, the Secretariat of the United Nations published a document entitled, ‘His-
toric Bays’, which specifies a State’s ‘historic rights’, should include not only the 
‘historic bays’ but also ‘historic waters’. The so-called ‘historic waters’ are mari-
time areas which can be archipelagic waters, the water areas lying  between an 
archipelago and the neighbouring mainland, as well as straits, estuaries and 
36 George Lauriat, Chaos or Cooperation?, 199 Far Eastern Economic Review (1983); 
Guo,  supra note 33 at 136.
37 Jian He and Ao Wang, South China Sea Dispute in the View of International Law of the Sea, 
1 Academia in China 257(2008).
38 Cai and Gao, supra note 13 at 41.
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other similar bodies of water.39 The document entitled, ‘Juridical Regime of 
Historic Waters, including Bays’, published by the United Nations Secretariat 
in 1962, defines historic waters as, ‘maritime areas which they considered vital 
to them without paying much attention to divergent and changing opinions 
about what general international law might prescribe with respect to the de-
limitation of the territorial sea’.40 The document also explicitly puts forward 
the elements of ‘historic waters’, as being a State exercising rights over the 
claimed, ‘historic waters’ effectively. The rights exercised effectively by a State 
over the waters should be continuous and the exercise of the rights should 
obtain acquiescence or tolerance of foreign States.41
The nine-dashed line, which mainland China has always maintained in the 
South China Sea delimitation, meets the requirements of ‘historic waters’.42 
Firstly, mainland China had discovered the South China Sea and exercised 
sovereign rights since the Western Han Dynasty. Secondly, the persistent exer-
cise of sovereign rights over the South China Sea can be supported by  several 
historical facts, as mentioned earlier. Thirdly, before the promulgation of 
39 UN Secretariat, Historic Bays, UN doc A/CONF.13/1, 1 Official Records of 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1957) at 2. The original 
statement is: Historic rights are claimed not only in respect of bays, but also in respect of 
maritime areas which do not constitute bays, such as the waters of archipelagos and the 
water area lying between an archipelago and the neighboring mainland; historic rights 
are also claimed in respect of straits, estuaries and other similar bodies of water. There 
is a growing tendency to describe these areas as ‘historic waters’, not as ‘historic bays’. 
Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1958/docs/
english/vol_I/4_A-CONF-13-1_PrepDocs_vol_I_e.pdf.
40 UN Secretariat, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, including Bays, UN 
doc A/CN.4./143, 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1962) at 7. 
The original statement is: the concept of ‘historic waters’ has its roots in the historic fact 
that States through the ages claimed and maintained sovereignty over maritime areas, 
which they considered vital to them, paying little attention to divergent and changing 
opinions about what general international law might prescribe with respect to the delimi-
tation of the territorial sea.
41 UN Secretariat, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, including Bays, at 
13–19. Ibid. The original statement is, “These factors are: (1) the exercise of authority over 
the area by the State claiming the historic right; (2) the continuity of this exercise of au-
thority; (3) the attitude of foreign States”.
42 There is a State’s uncertain boundary marked by eleven-dotted discontinuous line South 
China Sea Islands Location Map published in 1947 by Division of Territory Administration, 
Department of the Interior of Chinese government after new China was formed, there 
was also such a line in the same location of the map published and audited by the rel-
evant government department with the only difference being that eleven-dotted-line was 
changed to nine-dotted-line, which is often called the traditional boundary line. Because 
the line is U-shaped, it is also known as U-shaped line. Cited from Cai and Gao, supra note 
13 at 42.
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unclos, the sovereign right of mainland China over the South China Sea had 
not been subjected to any State’s opposition for many years. The result is that, 
based on the particularity of ‘historic waters’, mainland China should have 
exclusive sovereign rights over the South China Sea, not being restricted by 
the relevant delimitation provisions of unclos. The ‘Map of Location of the 
South China Sea Islands’, published by the Republic of China (refers to  Taiwan 
(China), hereinafter roc) in 1947, creates the U-shaped line whose legal nature 
is that the islands or groups of islands enclosed by a U-shaped line are part 
of  territories of the State of China. (see Figure 3.2) As to the legal nature of 
the maritime area enclosed by the U-shaped line, the Policy Guidelines for the 
South China Sea adopted by the Executive Yuan of Taiwan (China) on 13 April 
1993, clarifies that, ‘the South China Sea area within the historic waters limit 
is the maritime area under the jurisdiction of Taiwan (China), where Taiwan 
(China) possesses all rights and interests’.43 As to U-shaped line, the position 
of the mainland China is similar to that of Taiwan (China). Mainland China 
stated in Notes Verbale in response to the Malaysia/Vietnam Joint Submission 
and the Vietnam Submission that, ‘China has indisputable sovereignty over 
the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sov-
ereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters, as well as the seabed 
and subsoil thereof ’.44 (see Figure 3.3) It is, therefore, not difficult to conclude 
that mainland China and Taiwan (China) stand on the same legal ground with 
respect to the South China Sea waters.
iv Possible Breakthrough Regarding Existing Difficulties
From the analysis mentioned above, based on international law, mainland Chi-
na enjoys territorial sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands based on, ‘the 
principle of occupation’ and enjoys the historic sovereign rights over the South 
China Sea, based on the rule of ‘historic waters’. Claims proposed by neighbour-
ing States of the South China Sea concerning the delimitation of South China 
Sea islands are difficult to find legal ground. The delimitation of the South Chi-
na Sea can, however, be advocated in international law. From this perspective, 
once the dispute is submitted by disputing States to international arbitration 
43 See Michael Sheng-Ti Gau, The U-Shaped Line and a Categorization of the Ocean Disputes 
in the South China Sea, 43 Ocean Development & International Law 58 (2012). 
Also see, The Republic of China, South China Sea Policy Guidelines,attached as an appen-
dix to Kuan-Ming Sun, Policy of the Republic of China Towards the South China Sea, 19 Ma-
rine Policy 408 (1995).
44 prc, Letter cml/17/2009, 7 May 2009; and Letter, cml/18/2009, 7 May 2009.
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institutions or the International Court of Justice, mainland China has a great 
advantage. This solution is also relatively fair and complete. Mainland China 
has, however, not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice. Furthermore, there is no relevant treaty between mainland 
Figure 3.2 Map of location of the South China Sea islands, Ministry of the Interior of the 
Republic of China, 1947.
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Compilation of Historical 
 Archives on the southern Territories of the Republic of China, 
(2015), p. 51
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Figure 3.3 Nine dotted lines claimed by the People’s Republic of China in the South 
China Sea (See Notification of the prc dated 7 May 2009 to challenge the Joint 
 Submission of Vietnam and Malaysia to the clcs dated 6 May 2009. The lines are 





China and other disputing States, to authorize such a jurisdiction or arbitration 
agreement. Mainland China is not willing to let this issue to be judged by a third 
party, primarily because it has always maintained the South China Sea islands 
and the South China Sea, are among its inherent territories, which thus cannot 
be judged.45 This position can be seen from the response of mainland China 
to the fact that the Philippines has submitted the two States’ disputes over the 
Spratly Islands to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.46
Mainland China tends to solve South China Sea disputes through bilat-
eral negotiations, which can be seen from the fact that mainland China and 
asean signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
in 2002.47 According to Article 4 of the Declaration, “The Parties concerned 
undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful 
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consul-
tations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned, in accordance 
with universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”. Article 5 of the Declaration provides 
that “The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activi-
ties that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability 
including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently 
uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their 
differences in a constructive manner”. However, the situation of the South Chi-
na Sea dispute becomes increasingly complex and internationalised in recent 
years, which shows that the Declaration has failed to play its role originally 
envisaged. This indicates that with increasingly prominent contradictions 
and differences among parties of the South China Sea, whether negotiations 
are multilateral or bilateral, it is very difficult for the various disputing par-
ties to reach an agreement on the territorial sovereignty of the South China 
Sea Islands and delimitation of the South China Sea waters. That is why main-
land China has strongly advocated “putting aside disputes and seeking joint 
development”. However, according to the analysis of Professor Guocai Zhao, 
the prerequisite for joint development is that each State should recognise the 
existence of the dispute, reach a consensus on the scope of the areas in dispute 
and confirm that their occupation of the islands and reefs cannot be regarded 
45 Guocai Zhao, Cross-strait Cooperation to Develop Oil and Gas Resources in the South Chi-
na Sea from the Point of View of International Law, 56 Special Issue of Martial Law 62 
(2010).
46 China’s response to the Philippines’ advice to submit the South China Sea to the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, available at http://gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc 
/1017/6/5/3/101765366.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=101765366&mdate=0713164945.
47 Luo, supra note 5 at 96.
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as recognition of its territorial sovereignty. However, it is difficult for each State 
to make concession to the last point in negotiations. For instance, Vietnam 
insists on the priority of delimitation over of discussion of joint development. 
Meanwhile, there are different understandings of States about the way for joint 
development.48 Therefore, to achieve the target to develop the resources of the 
South China Sea jointly with Southeast Asian States can be described as dif-
ficult and will be a long process.
However, it is worth noting that there is plenty of space and possibilities for 
the cross-strait cooperation in resource development of the South China Sea. 
First, mainland China’s and Taiwan’s (China) positions on the South China Sea 
are the same in essence. As mentioned above, both sides have denied sover-
eignty claims of various States of Southeast Asia. This position lays a founda-
tion for both parties to avoid sensitive political topics, cooperate unanimously 
to resist externally. Second, Taiwan’s (China) “Blue Ocean Strategy” which ad-
vocates “shelving disputes, keeping peaceful and reciprocal, and seeking joint 
development”49 is consistent with mainland China’s principle “putting aside 
disputes and seeking joint development”, which also guarantees cross-strait 
cooperation. Third, since 1994, the two parties have already launched a series 
of exploration cooperation programme of oil and gas in the Taiwan Strait. 
Mainland China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation and Taiwan’s (China) 
Chinese Petroleum Corporation have negotiated for many times, worked out 
agreements and established the principle of “keeping reciprocal and mutually 
beneficial, and putting aside sovereignty problem”.50 Cross-strait cooperation 
in the South China Sea can draw lessons from the cooperation in the Taiwan 
Strait to exploit oil and gas.
Therefore, the two sides can fully draw lesson from the cooperation mech-
anism of oil and gas exploitation in the Taiwan Strait, to avoid the relevant 
political factors and to develop the South China Sea resources jointly. To 
specify, the two sides can divide resources into two parts which are renewable 
resources such as fishery resources, and non-renewable resources such as oil 
and natural gas. The two sides can start from the less controversial negotia-
tion of fishery resources to conclude an agreement of joint development, and 
then gradually expand to the relatively more complex negotiation of the joint 
development of oil, gas and other non-renewable resources and conclude an 
agreement different from the development of fisheries resources. Such sepa-
rate regulation reflects the characteristics of different resources in a better way 
48 Zhao, supra note 45 at 64–65.




and accelerates the pace of cooperation. To a certain extent, the cooperation 
of mainland China and Taiwan (China) in the South China Sea can play a role 
to resist unanimously, to suppress disputing States in Southeast Asia, and to 
achieve and safeguard maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea in 
a better way. In addition, with the further deepening of cross-strait coopera-
tion, the two sides can also cooperate and exert pressure on disputing States in 
Southeast Asia to promote the negotiation of resource cooperation and joint 
exploitation as soon as possible.
V Conclusion
From the perspective of international law, there is strong legal basis for 
mainland China to claim sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and 
 sovereign rights over the surrounding waters. Facing the increasingly intensi-
fied  situation in the South China Sea, “putting aside disputes and seeking joint 
development” is the better solution to meet the interests of all States; however, 
it is still difficult to achieve this goal.
From the analysis mentioned above, based on the common interests of 
mainland China and Taiwan (China) and the positions of the various claimant 
States in the South China Sea disputes, there is a great space in the joint de-
velopment of the South China Sea. Therefore, the first action should be to pro-
mote the cooperation of the two sides in resource development of the South 
China Sea. At the same time, pressures from the two sides on Southeast Asian 
States can also promote cooperation and negotiations among the disputing 
States as soon as possible, which will further ease the situation in the South 
China Sea, and achieve a win-win situation.
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Management of Fishery Resources: A Starting Point 
Towards Cooperation in the East China Sea
Kuan-Hsiung Wang
i Introduction
The disputes in the East China Sea could be categorized into two parts: one is 
on the sovereignty of those island features, and the other is the maritime zones 
claimed by related Parties in the region. It is understandable that the best way 
to solve the disputes might be delimiting boundaries so that the areas of sover-
eignty and jurisdiction could be decided. However, such situation is not always 
possible. It is mainly because negotiation and adoption of a maritime bound-
ary between the related Parties always focused on political considerations and 
there are no well-established as well as well-recognized regulations for making 
boundaries. It is recognized that “equitable solution” is one of the most impor-
tant principles in boundary making. However, there are no definite elements 
which have been decided in jurisprudence. There have been cases which rec-
ognize geographical and geological factors, coastal length, traditional fishing 
activities, relative impact on the livelihood and economic dependency as con-
siderations in setting maritime boundaries.
Under such circumstances, joint development/joint cooperation then could 
be treated as a way to solve the disputes. This is not only an expectation made 
by the related Parties, but could also be found in the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (unclos). Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of unclos,1 
both provide “provisional arrangements” in situations before the boundary 
lines are agreed upon. The term “provisional arrangement” could be interpret-
ed to refer to “joint cooperation” which is a popular term quoted and cited by 
the leaders of the Parties in the region. However, no practical exercises have 
been realized. Lack of political will is a possible reason.
It is not difficult to locate opportunities for joint cooperation in the East 
China Sea region. Joint military exercises, joint development of hydrocarbon 
1 unclos Article 74(3) provides “Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States 
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter 
into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not 
to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be 
without prejudice to the final delimitation”.
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resources, marine scientific research, marine environmental protection and 
fisheries cooperation are options to this end. To date, however, disputes sur-
rounding possible hydrocarbon resources in the area and actions in favor of 
conservation and management of fishery resources have been delayed. Nev-
ertheless, conservation and management of fishery resources could be the 
starting point for cooperation in this region and could have a “spillover effect” 
into other areas of cooperation. Moreover, there might be possibilities that the 
disputes could be solved through peaceful means.
In this respect, cooperating to manage and conserve fisheries resources is 
especially significant because fish are migratory, and even some of them are 
highly migratory. Moreover, overfishing is a serious and pressing problem in 
the region. In this regard, a maritime boundary cannot entirely protect a State’s 
fishery resources from encroachment, because fishery resources migrate be-
yond the State’s jurisdiction, and overfishing beyond its borders could also 
have great impact on the fish stocks within its territorial boundaries.
Therefore, a proper management mechanism, subject to natural conditions, 
is necessary for the coastal States to keep stocks at sustainable levels. This is 
especially important for the littoral States around the East China Sea. Because 
this region is a semi-enclosed sea in its geographical features,2 any change in 
the fishery policy-making could have far-reaching effects on the continuation 
of the fishery resources in this area.
ii Issues in the East China Sea
The development of globalization has already become an important phenome-
non in the modern international society. Such phenomenon was demonstrated 
in the economy elements of production flowing with an unprecedented speed 
and scale in the global scope. Although the process of globalization has been 
witnessed for several decades, it is still under a drastic debate if  globalization 
would cause the collapse of national boundaries.  Furthermore, will States be 
collapsed in the future due to their functions have been restricted?
For discussions or debates on “globalization”, most of them are on inter-
national financial transaction, technology flows, transnational cooperation, 
capital flows, cross border movements of people, and so forth. In other words, 
2 unclos Article 122 provides that “[E]nclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means a gulf, basin or 
sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow 
outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones 
of two or more coastal States.
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States, as the members of the international community, are getting closer and 
sharing common interests. Therefore, more functional fields, and even dis-
putes, are emerging.
It is a trend that national sovereignty had been challenged by the devel-
opments mentioned above. Not only such phenomenon appears in daily 
economic life, but also appears in the development of the international legal 
system, especially in the fields of high seas fisheries and international environ-
mental protection.
For purposes of statistics concerning fish catches, a list of major fishing ar-
eas is maintained by the fao.3 The East China Sea region is within Area 61, 
which is under the title of Northwest Pacific. In terms of global production 
of marine capture fisheries, global capture fisheries production in 2008 was 
about 90 million tonnes, with an estimated first-sale value of US$93.9 billion, 
comprising about 80 million tonnes from marine waters. In 2008, the North-
west Pacific had the highest production of 20.1 million tonnes (25 per cent of 
the global marine catch), followed by the Southeast Pacific, with a total catch 
of 11.8 million tonnes (15 per cent), the Western Central Pacific with 11.1 mil-
lion tonnes (14 per cent) and the Northeast Atlantic, with 8.5 million tonnes 
(11 per cent).4 More specifically, the fish capture production of 2010 in Area 61 
by China, Korea, Japan and Taiwan is 12.7 million tonnes, 1.2 million tonnes, 3.6 
million tonnes, and 0.4 million tonnes.5 This demonstrates the fact that China’s 
fish capture production occupies most of the volume comparing with other 
States in the Northwest Pacific area.
The East China Sea is a marginal sea in the west Pacific Ocean as well as 
the west part of the aforementioned fao fishing Area 61. It is an area of about 
700,000 square kilometers to the east of China, north of Taiwan, west of Japan’s 
Ryuku islands, and south of Korea. The eight Daioyu/Senkaku (Chinese name/
Japanese name) Islands are to the northeast of Taiwan, the largest island, with 
the area of 4.32 square kilometers, is two miles long and less than a mile wide. 
Though incapable of sustaining life, the islands are important for strategic 
and political reasons, as claims of ownership are used to bolster claims to the 
 surrounding sea and its resources.6 That causes the conflicts for the countries 
surrounding the maritime area, which makes it one of the flashpoints in the 
east Asia.
3 Available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/search/en.
4 fao, World Review of Fisheries and Aquaculture 35 (2010).
5 fao, fao Yearbook 2010 (2012).




Although it is reported that the oil reserve is abundant in the East China 
Sea,7 there is no definite assessment of it. Oil reserve estimates for the East 
China Sea vary within the same general range. Official Chinese unproven oil 
reserve estimates tend to vary and tend to be high, at 70 to 160 billion barrels 
of oil (Bbbl) for the entire East China Sea. Foreign estimates fall closer to the 
middle of that range at 100 Bbbl. As for gas, Chinese estimates of potential East 
China Sea gas reserves on the entire shelf range from 175 trillion to 210 trillion 
cubic feet in volume.8 Such an abundant oil reserve creates the possibility of 
fighting for energy among the parties concerned in the East China Sea region. 
This is especially clear when the oil consumption for those parties is taken into 
consideration.9
As for the fishery resources in the East China Sea, they are rapidly being 
exploited by the people of the region, who are heavily concentrated along the 
coastline. Overfishing or a declining average annual fish catch now threatens 
the extensive fishing industry. Many fishermen are forced to apply more effi-
cient but aggressive fishing techniques, and to venture further out to new fish-
ing grounds. Even worse, fishing in the overlapping areas becomes ordinary 
practices and creates more disputes among the States related.
It is common that tensions will be mounting in a region where resources 
are getting fewer and fewer, and demand is on the rise. Owing to its economic 
development and the change of diet habits, China is consuming more and 
more fish. In the same time, it is also a fact that China plays an important role 
of fishing States in the world.10 Under the situation that global fish stocks are 
down, especially the catches in the East China Sea region, this would make 
perfect sense that Chinese fishing vessels are going farther and farther and into 
disputed waters. In terms of the Diao Yu Tai Islands, the fishing ground there 
attracts fishermen from along the northeastern coastline of Taiwan and the 
eastern part of Fujian. Chinese fishermen have been working there for gen-
erations, but in recent years, Japan’s coastguard has been increasingly active, 
confronting Taiwanese and Chinese fishing vessels, which makes the situation 
more complicated.11
7 K.O. Emery, Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of the East China Sea and 
the Yellow Sea, ccop Technical Bulletin 41 (1969).
8 Energy Information Administration, supra note 3; also see Selig S. Harrison, Seabed Petro-
leum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation? in Selig S. Harrison, (ed.), Seabed 
Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation? 5 (2005).
9 Energy Information Administration (eia), Country Analysis Briefs: South China Sea, avail-
able at http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/East_China_Sea/pdf.
10 For example, China, Peru and Indonesia were the top producing countries in 2008. China 
remained by far the global leader with production of about 15 million tonnes. fao, supra 
note 4, at 5.
11 afp, Fading Fish Stocks Driving Asian Sea Rivalries, 15 November 2010.
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iii Solution: Cooperation as an Obligation
It is not the purpose of this article to define the term “global governance” as 
there are a variety of definitions on this subject. Instead, the author would like 
to use the concept of cooperation to describe the on-going processes of man-
aging and conserving fishery resources. Such processes include international 
instruments, international organizations, and behavior of States.
1 International Instruments
Basically, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea12 (here-
inafter cited as “unclos”) and the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of 
the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks13 (hereinafter cited as “unfsa”) 
provide certain possibilities on the regulation of cooperation among States in 
dealing with the issues of high seas fisheries.
One of the basic issues to be considered is the nature of the duty to cooper-
ate. It is noteworthy that the duty to cooperate among States which applies 
whether they are amicable or antagonistic against each other, could be traced 
back to certain documents made more than three decades ago. In a declaration 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1970,14 states that 
“States have the duty to cooperate with one another, irrespective of the differ-
ences in their political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of 
international relations…”
This duty can be characterized into one of two forms: a duty to enter into ne-
gotiations; and a duty to negotiate and to reach an agreement. Obviously, both 
duties of cooperation will require negotiations to be entered into in good faith. 
Moreover, the parties concerned shall be obliged to work together in good faith 
to attempt to reach an agreement, and to carry that agreement through to a 
successful conclusion.15 Under such considerations, certain provisions regu-
lated in the unclos and the unfsa embrace the spirit of cooperation.
12 The unclos entered into force on 16 November 1994 and there are 160 States which have 
ratified this Convention. See, Status of the Convention, available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf.
13 The unfsa entered into force on 11 December 2001 and there are 67 States which have 
ratified the Agreement. Ibid.
14 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 
2625(xxv), 24 October 1970.
15 L. Guruswamy, The Promise of the United Natins Convention on the Law of the Sea: Justice 
and Environmental Disputes, 25 Ecology Law Quarterly 189 (1998), cited in Stuart 
M. Kaye, International Fisheries Management 111 (2001).
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According to Article 118 of unclos, States fishing on the same living marine 
resources or in the same area of the high seas shall cooperate in the conserva-
tion of these resources. With respect to straddling fish stocks and highly migra-
tory species on the high seas, such obligation is supplemented with the special 
obligations of the relevant coastal States and States fishing for these stocks 
in adjacent areas of the high seas to cooperate for the conservation of these 
stocks.16 Taking into consideration the practices in recent years from States 
and international organizations, these obligations have become part of inter-
national customary law.17
Part 3 of the unfsa includes several provisions for mechanisms for co-
operation on the conservation of straddling fish stocks and highly migra-
tory species. Although the introductory paragraph of Article 8 seems to leave 
States a choice whether to cooperate directly or through regional or sub-
regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements, the ensuing 
paragraphs place radical limitations on this freedom. Where there exists a 
fisheries management organization or an arrangement competent to regu-
late the fishery for a specific straddling fish stock or highly migratory fish 
stocks, those States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and the relevant 
coastal States shall become members of the organization or participants of 
the arrangement.18
States fishing for the stock on the high seas may choose not to join or par-
ticipate but are then obligated to apply the management measures adopted by 
the organization or arrangement, in order to be entitled to fish on the stock.19 
If the straddling fish stock or highly migratory fish stocks is not subjected to 
the regulatory competence of any organization or arrangement, States fishing 
for the stock on the high seas and the relevant coastal States are obligated to 
establish either an organization or other appropriate arrangements.20
2 International Organizations: Regional Fisheries  
Management Organizations
In the absence of an effective centralized authority in dealing with the matters 
of fishing issues, then probably the regional fisheries organization is an alter-
native to secure sustainable conservation and management of transboundary 
16 unclos, Articles 63(2) and 64(1).
17 Also see Tore Henriksen, Geir Honneland, and are Sydnes, Law and Poli-
tics in Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and Regional 
Fisheries Management Regimes 15 (2006).
18 unfsa, Article 8(3).
19 unfsa, Article 8(4).
20 unfsa, Article 8(5).
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marine resources. Such regional fisheries cooperation involves efforts by States 
to overcome collective action problems related to the use of shared and com-
mon fisheries. This cooperation arises when two or more States concerned 
identify a shared problem or goal which requires a common and cooperative 
solution. Such cooperation is often formalized through bilateral or multilateral 
agreements establishing principles, rules, procedures and institutional organi-
zations for the implementation of cooperation between the parties. In many 
cases, these agreements are institutionalized by the formation of Regional 
Fishery Management Organizations (hereinafter cited as rfmos).21
Most of the rfmos operative in developing regions during the 1950s and 
1960s were established at the initiative of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (fao). They were constituted with broad mandates 
to promote research, development and management, but without regula-
tory powers. Moreover, these organizations were established as development 
mechanisms, their operations dependent on funding from fao and other do-
nors. Thus, for the functions to be fulfilled, they relied heavily on the political 
will of members of the rfmos to enforce regulations.22
Some scholars mention that the cooperative governance problem in marine 
resources management is to provide adequate means for meeting three major 
tasks: generation of adequate and reasonably consensual scientific knowledge 
to permit informed judgments about whether and how exploitation of re-
sources shall be conducted; adoption of legitimate and appropriate regulatory 
measures to govern economic activities while taking heed of existing knowl-
edge; and a system to promote compliance with such measures among those 
engaged in resource use in the area.23 Therefore, the latter two problems, i.e., 
regulatory measures and compliance of the members, rely heavily upon mem-
bers’ positive practices.
Even so, some of the rfmos had taken steps to improve their performance 
in managing and conserving marine living resources. The author shall take the 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (iattc) for instance, to examine 
21 Are K. Sydnes, Regional Fishery Organizations: How and Why Organizational Diversity 
Matters, 32 Ocean Development and International Law 350–351 (2001). Also see, 
Are K. Sydnes, Regional Fisheries Organizations and International Fisheries Governance, 
in Syma Ebbin, Alf Hoel, and are K. Sydnes (eds.), A Sea Change: The Ex-
clusive Economic Zone and Governance Institutions for Living Marine 
Resources 117–133 (2005).
22 Are K. Sydnes, Regional Fishery Organizations in Developing Regions: Adapting to Changes 
in International Fisheries Law, 26 Marine Policy 374 (2002).
23 Olav Schram Stokke, Governance of High Seas Fisheries: The Role of Regime Linkages, in 
Davor Vidas and Willy Ostreng (eds.), Order for the Oceans at the Turn 
of the Century 159, 162–170 (1999).
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its progress. iattc was established in 1950 in accordance with the entry into 
force of the 1949 Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Trop-
ical Tuna Commission.24 After almost fifty years, it was decided that the iattc 
(Commission) and the 1949 iattc (Convention) should be strengthened and 
modernized to take into account recently adopted international instruments, 
such as unclos, the 1992 Agenda 21 and Rio Declaration, the 1993 fao Agree-
ment to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Manage-
ment Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, the 1995 fao Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the 1995 unfsa.25 An ad hoc Working 
Group was formed to review the 1949 Convention.26
The revising work was done in June 2003 with the adoption of an amended 
convention.27 According to Article 10 of the Antigua Convention, a Committee 
for the Review of Implementation of Measures Adopted by the Commission 
is established to: (a) review and monitor compliance with conservation and 
management measures adopted by the Commission, as well as other coop-
erative measures; (b) analyze information and any other information neces-
sary to carry out its functions; (c) provide the Commission with information, 
technical advice and recommendations relating to the implementation of, and 
compliance with, conservation and management measures; (d) recommend 
to the Commission means of promoting compatibility; (e) recommend to the 
Commission means to promote the effective implementation of the Antigua 
Convention; (f) in consultation with the Scientific Advisory Committee, rec-
ommend to the Commission the priorities and objectives of the program for 
data collection and monitoring of this Convention and assess and evaluate the 
results of that program; (g) perform other functions.28
Furthermore, Article 18 provides that Parties shall take the measures nec-
essary to ensure the implementation of and compliance with the Antigua 
Convention and any conservation and management measures adopted pur-
suant thereto, including the adoption of the necessary laws and regulations. 
Also, Parties shall provide to the Commission all the information that may be 
24 For 1949 Convention, available at http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/IATTC_convention_1949 
.pdf.
25 iattc, Resolution on the Establishment of a Working Group to Review the iattc Conven-
tion, June 1998.
26 Ibid.
27 Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Es-
tablished by the 1949 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic 
of Costa Rica (also known as “Antigua Convention”). For full text, available at http://www 
.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Antigua_Convention_Jun_2003.pdf.
28 Annex 3, Committee for the Review of Implementation of Measures Adopted by the 
Commission, Antigua Convention.
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 required for the fulfillment of the objective of the Antigua Convention, includ-
ing statistical and biological information and information concerning its fish-
ing activities in the Convention Area, and shall provide to the Commission 
information regarding actions taken to implement the measures adopted in 
accordance with the Antigua Convention.
Except for the actions made by the iattc, other rfmos take similar actions 
either by adopting resolutions or taking related measures so that the conserva-
tion and management measures could be achieved.29
From the aforementioned discussion, it might be safe to conclude that the 
rfmos and arrangements are given exclusive competence to regulate the high 
seas fisheries of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.30
iv Regional Cooperation in the Semi-Enclosed Sea
In terms of geographical location, the East China Sea could be categorized as a 
“semi-enclosed sea”, which is defined in Article 122 of unclos as follows:
“[E]nclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded 
by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a 
narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and 
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.
Because the East China Sea is semi-enclosed, any change in the ecosystem of 
the semi-enclosed sea will have significant impact on the whole area. It is gen-
erally recognized that the living resources in the East China Sea area migrate 
from one eez to another, particularly highly migratory species, such as tuna 
and other shared stocks. Each country may already have its own assessment of 
its living resources in its eez, assuming that the definition and delineation of 
29 For example, on 27 December 2000, the International Commission for the Conservation 
of Atlantic Tunas (iccat) adopted a resolution under the title of Supplemental Resolution 
by iccat to Enhance the Effectiveness of the iccat Measures to Eliminate Illegal, Unregu-
lated and Unreported Fishing Activities by Large-Scale Tuna Longline Vessels in the Conven-
tion Area and Other Areas. Under this resolution, the iccat Commission urged Japan and 
Taiwan to take the necessary measures to complete the scrapping of iuu vessels built in 
Japan and Taiwan.
30 Tore Henriksen, Geir Honneland, and are Sydnes, Law and Politics in 
Ocean Governance: The UN Fish Stocks Agreement and Regional Fisher-
ies Management Regimes 16 (2006); Robin Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law 
of the Sea 309 (1999); F.O. Vicuna, The International Law to High Seas Fisheries: From 
Unrestricted Freedom of Fishing to Sustainable Use, in O.S. Stokke (ed.), Governing 
High Seas Fisheries 40–42 (2001).
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each eez is clear. The problem is that many of those eez boundaries are not 
well defined or mutually agreed upon by the relevant parties. Likewise, there 
are various conflicting claims to islands that complicate and defer the determi-
nation of the eez boundaries. For this reason, many experts and scholars are 
convinced of the need to cooperate on the assessment of the living resources 
in the East China Sea area without regard to jurisdictional boundaries. The 
basis for this endeavor would be Article 123 of unclos regarding enclosed 
and semi-enclosed seas. unclos has foreseen this problem, since Article 123 
provides:
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with 
each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their 
duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly 
or through an appropriate regional organisation:
(a)  to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and ex-
ploitation of the living resources of the sea;
(b)  to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with re-
spect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c)  to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where 
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
(d)  to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international or-
ganisations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions 
of this article.
Therefore, all parties concerned should be aware that fish are migratory and 
fishery resources are exhaustible, so that rational use of the East China Sea and 
the preservation of its marine environment are important to all parties. Thus, 
cooperation among littoral States in the region is essential. In order to avoid 
overfishing or depletion of resources, conservation measures have to be taken. 
Such measures are not possible without regional cooperation and require close 
coordination among the parties concerned, especially in a semi-enclosed sea.
Indeed, a semi-enclosed sea concept could conceivably provide the catalyst 
to promote cooperation and coordination of the management of resources 
in the disputed region.31 Under such circumstances, for all the littoral States 
to make boundary delimitation issue the first priority seems unwise. Rather, 
concentrating upon their common interests will be an essential motivation to 
resolve conflicts rationally.
31 Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, 25 Ocean Develop-
ment and International Law 71 (1994).
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Fishery cooperation could be the most feasible course of action for the lit-
toral States since through cooperation, fishery resources could be properly 
conserved and managed such that economic waste and over-exploitation may 
be avoided. Cooperation in the utilization of fishery resources is a feasible and 
practical way to start a regional cooperation regime. It sidesteps the issue of 
sovereignty and focuses upon a common interest, namely the utilization of 
living resources. It also defers long-term negotiations with respect to delimita-
tion of the continental shelf relating to the hydrocarbon resource issue. Thus, 
as cooperative relationships are forged with regard to fishery resources, mutual 
confidence will build among the various parties that may eventually contrib-
ute to successful cooperation with respect to hydrocarbon resources. Fishery 
resources management is crucial in preventing over-exploitation or overfish-
ing and may be a touchstone of the littoral States’ sincerity.
Without affecting jurisdictional boundaries as laid down in the unclos, 
it is certainly possible to have regional joint fishery management in the East 
China Sea as the starting point for further cooperation. If all States in this re-
gion treat cooperation as a key step toward achieving mutual benefit, then the 
future for such a regional cooperation mechanism is assured.
v Pursuing Sustainable Fisheries
Fishing or fishery is a vital aspect of the world’s diet, economy, and biodiversity. 
However, overwhelming evidence shows that these crucial uses of the marine 
world are in danger. Under such circumstances, the depletion of fishery re-
sources is not a crisis for food, but also a crisis for environment.
The history of high-seas fisheries management over the last 150 years can 
be classified into three phases. The first phase, up until the early 1970s, saw 
a rapid increase in both the number of fishing vessels operating in the indi-
vidual oceans and advances in technology which allowed greater catches. The 
phase was characterized by generally narrow coastal State maritime zones 
and large areas of high seas. Also, a considerable proportion of fisheries in the 
high seas fell under the jurisdiction of international or regional fishery com-
missions by the mid-1970s. The second phase, the period from the mid-1970s 
up until the early 1990s, reflected the developments and negotiations of the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Owing to the practices 
on claiming exclusive economic zone from countries, coastal States extended 
their jurisdiction out to 200 nautical miles so that many areas (and fisheries) 
that were previously classified as high seas came under national jurisdiction. 
The area defined as high seas was thus considerably reduced and conse-
quently so was the area under the jurisdiction of regional and international 
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fisheries  commissions. Since the mid-1990s, high-seas fisheries management 
has entered its third phase. This phase reflects the international community’s 
concerns about overfishing in the high seas. Even greater emphasis has been 
placed on the international duties and responsibilities of all nations in the 
conservation of ocean resources, as well as the importance of cooperation be-
tween States both adjacent to the fisheries and those exploiting them.32
For the purposes of conserving and managing marine living resources, tradi-
tional thought on utilization should be transformed to sustainability. In order to 
reach this object, “sustainable development” is one of the main policy bases, un-
der which sustainable development is the development that “meets the needs 
of the present generation without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs”.33 Governments should take this position in mak-
ing the fishery policy, but not concentrate on increasing fishing capacity or the 
amount of fishing, especially when the fao reiterates the serious situation in 
the 1999 International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.34
Following on the concept of sustainable development of fisheries, another 
consideration that should be taken when making policy on fisheries is the 
“precautionary approach”. The concept of the precautionary approach devel-
oped in the mid-1980s and in regional legal instruments for the protection of 
the terrestrial, and subsequently marine, environment, and finally enshrined 
in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration,35 which states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.
Based on the precautionary approach, the unfsa not only includes this ap-
proach as a kind of duty to cooperate,36 but also demands the application of 
the precautionary approach. This can be seen from Article 6 of the unfsa:
32 Sevaly Sen, The Evolution of High-Seas Fisheries Management in the North-East Atlantic, 35 
Ocean & Coastal Management 85–86 (1997).
33 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common 
 Future 43 (1987).
34 Rosemary Rayfuse, The Challenge of Sustainable High Seas Fisheries, in Nico Schrijver 
and Friedl Weiss (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Develop-
ment: Principles and Practice 469–477 (2004).
35 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment, Rio de  Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 12 August 1996.
36 unfsa, Article 5(c).
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1. States shall apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation, 
management and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migra-
tory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine resources and pre-
serve the marine environment.
2. States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable 
or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not 
be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and 
management measures.
3. In implementing the precautionary approach, States shall:
(a) improve decision-making for fishery resource conservation and 
management by obtaining and sharing the best scientific informa-
tion available and implementing improved techniques for dealing 
with risk and uncertainty; …
Such consideration has to be taken into account when a natural phenomenon 
has a significant adverse impact on the status of straddling fishing stocks or 
highly migratory fish stocks, States shall adopt conservation and management 
measures on an emergency basis to ensure that fishing activity does not exac-
erbate such adverse impact. States shall also adopt such measures on an emer-
gency basis where fishing activity presents a serious threat to the sustainability 
of such stocks.37
Policy assessment is one of the most important parts in a policy-making 
circle. During the period of focusing on economic development and trading, 
exploring the marine living resources and increasing the production might be 
the right choice. However, under a globalized world, it is hard to distinguish the 
complicated web of influence between trade and environment. So is the fish-
ery. Nonetheless, since we are in the phase of conserving and managing fishery 
resources, and international instruments and rfmos have already  embedded 
the concepts of sustainability and precaution into the fishery  activities, then 
it might be the right time and right choice to adjust fisheries policy bases to 
a more environmental deliberation. Moreover, States bordering the semi- 
enclosed sea should have responsibilities to embed the consideration of 
 regional cooperation into its national ocean policy.
1 A Positive Development: Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement
After Japan announced its nationalization of Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands on 11 
September 2012, the tension in the East China Sea has been on the verge of 
breaking out into a serious conflict. In responding to Japan’s announcement, 
China and Taiwan issued tough statements against Japan’s action.
37 unfsa, Article 6(7).
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China’s foreign minister Yang said that the “moves taken by Japan are totally 
illegal and invalid”, he said. “They can in no way change the historical fact that 
Japan stole Diaoyu and its affiliated islands from China and the fact that China 
has territorial sovereignty over them”. He continually said that the Japanese 
government had “grossly violated China’s sovereignty”.38
Also, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a strong protest against Japan, call-
ing the island purchase an “extremely unfriendly move” that “not only harms 
the longtime cooperation between Taiwan and Japan but will also aggravate 
regional tensions in East Asia”.39
Seven months later, the conclusion of the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agree-
ment on 10 April 2013 (hereinafter cited as “the Agreement”) was a develop-
ment considered as a way to defuse the tension,40 because Taiwan and Japan 
were trying to solve the dispute through a more pragmatic way. Furthermore, 
a more detailed examination of the provisions in the Agreement show that it 
conforms to the spirit of ‘provisional arrangements’ provided for in unclos.
The background for finalizing the Agreement is mixed with international 
politics as well as international law significance. In terms of international poli-
tics, the East China Sea has always been an important strategic sea lane and 
 Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands play a key role in this context. Japan wants to pro-
tect its strategic interests in the East China Sea and tries to prevent  Taiwan 
from cooperating with China while the conflict between Japan and China 
 remained. In addition, the influence from the United States should not be ig-
nored. Both Japan and Taiwan are important to the United States in guard-
ing its rebalancing strategy in East Asia.41 Under such circumstances, the joint 
fisheries cooperation between Taiwan and Japan would be a positive way to 
ease off the tension as well as maintain US strategic interests.
As far as resources management is concerned, it is understandable that any 
change in the ecosystem of the semi-enclosed East China Sea would have sig-
nificant impact on the whole area. In addition, it also demonstrated the need 
38 Japan and China Trade Barbs over Islands at UN, bbc News, 28 September 2012, available 
at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19754353.
39 China Sends Patrol Ships to Islands Held by Japan, The Seattle Times, 12 September 
2012, available at http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/china-sends-patrol-ships 
-to-islands-held-by-japan/.




41 For “rebalancing strategy”, see Robert G. Sutter, Michael E. Brown, and Timothy J. A. Adam-
son, Balancing Acts: The u.s. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability, August 2013, available at 
https://www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf.
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to cooperate on the conservation and management of the living resources in 
the East China Sea region without regard to sovereignty claims or maritime 
boundaries. The basis for this endeavor would be the practices of provisional 
arrangements in Articles 74(3) and 83(3), as well as the rights and duties for 
States boarding semi-enclosed seas to cooperate on coordinating the manage-
ment, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources in Ar-
ticle 123 of unclos.
Four parts included in the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement are in accor-
dance with those provisions mentioned above:42
1. Object of the Agreement: The purpose is to promote conservation and 
utilization of marine living resources in the overlapping exclusive eco-
nomic zone between Taiwan and Japan. In other words, the Agreement 
touches upon the sovereign rights issues as well as promoting the man-
agement of living resources, such as tuna, billfish, bonito, and mackerel. 
It does not refer to the sovereignty issue over Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands.
2. Fisheries Cooperation Area: The Agreement will be applicable to a Des-
ignated Zone which is south of 27 degrees north latitude and north of 
Japan’s Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands, covering an area of 74,000 
square kilometers. (See Map 1) Two sub-areas are allocated as follows:
2.1  Waters where the other party’s laws are not applicable: After en-
try into force of the Agreement, one party’s fisheries laws and regu-
lations will not be applicable to the other party’s fishing activities. 
In other words, fishing activities are governed by each party’s na-
tional laws and regulations. Any intervention from the other party 
shall not be allowed.
2.2  A special cooperation zone: In an area within the Designated 
Zone where disputes frequently arise between fishing vessels from 
both parties, a special cooperation zone has been created. Both 
parties cooperate under the principles of equality and reciproc-
ity with regards to fishing operations in this area. Details concern-
ing this arrangement will be discussed by a Taiwan-Japan Fishery 
Committee formed from the Agreement.
3. Management Body: The Taiwan-Japan Fishery Committee was created 
and held its first meeting in Taipei on 7 May 2013,43 in accordance with 
42 Dustin Kuan-Hsiung Wang, Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement: Light at the End of a Dark 
Tunnel, 1 (1) Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy 127–130 (2016).
43 Up to this date, five meetings have been carried out. The second meeting was in Tokyo 
on 26 December 2013; the third meeting was in Taipei on 23 January 2014; the fourth one 
was  back to Tokyo on 7 March 2015; and the fifth one was on 2 March 2016 in Taipei. 
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the provisions of the Agreement. This committee is an institutionalized 
joint management mechanism created with aiming to maintain order in 
fishing operations and preserve the living resources in the Designated 
Zone.
4. Without-Prejudice Clause: Both parties consented to the inclusion of a 
without-prejudice clause to ensure that the provisions of the Agreement 
do not undermine their position on and interpretation of international 
law regarding its sovereignty and maritime claims, affirming their consis-
tent position on the issue of sovereignty claims.
In terms of legal significance, the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement is a posi-
tive contribution in State practice fulfilling the spirit of unclos, especially the 
concept of provisional arrangements.
According to the Agreement, the maritime area of 12 nautical miles sur-
rounding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands is excluded from the cooperation 
mechanism in the Designated Zone. This is an arrangement of “shelving sov-
ereignty disputes” and focusing on living resources joint cooperation matters, 
which conforms to the spirit of joint development. However, the sovereign-
ty  issue over those islands will be subject to future negotiations rather than 
changing or even giving up the position on sovereignty claims. The Agree-
ment itself is a great progress not only in stabilizing the tension in the East 
China Sea, but also in realizing the term ‘provisional arrangements’ provided 
in unclos in Articles 74(3) on eez delimitation and 83(3) on continental shelf 
delimitation.
Moreover, under the unclos framework, a semi-enclosed sea could con-
ceivably provide the catalyst to promote cooperation and coordination of the 
management of resources in the East China Sea. Concentrating upon common 
interests will provide the essential motivation to resolve the conflicts rational-
ly. Hence, fishery cooperation would be a feasible course of action for the par-
ties concerned since through cooperation, fishery resources could be properly 
conserved and managed so that the resources could be utilized in a sustain-
able way. The Agreement is a good start for sustaining peace in the East China 
Sea. It focuses on the fisheries issue and puts aside territorial sovereignty or 
maritime delimitation considerations, which is a praise worthy move made by 
both Taiwan and Japan. It is also a remarkable practice of ‘provisional arrange-
ments’ stipulated in the unclos.
The discussion were mainly on the issues of reducing fishery conflicts between fishermen 
from both sides through setting fishing regulations as well as communication measures.
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vi Conclusion
Under the circumstances that eez has become customary international law, 
all States, especially those in the region of the East China Sea, had claimed 
different maritime zones to extend their jurisdiction over living and non- living 
resources of these zones. This then is the central element with regard to the 
disputes in the region. There are three motivating factors behind the con-
flicts: the first one relates to strategic or political concerns, whilst the other 
two relate to resource utilization or economic considerations. These factors 
are interrelated, which further complicates the disputes. However, such situ-
ation should not prevail over the consideration of resolving the issue from a 
pragmatic viewpoint. The idea of cooperation has gradually come to play an 
important role in a semi-enclosed region like the East China Sea. For this rea-
son, building up an East China Sea rfmo could be the starting step and the 
newly concluded Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement might be a pilot project. 
Not only for the fact that fish migrates without regard to State borders and 
needs careful conservation and management, but also for possibility that the 
successful experience might spill-over into other controversial issues. Unless a 
State is ready to go to war over its terra irredenta, the best solution is the will to 
arrive at a non-boundary-based settlement that guarantees peace and progress 
for all parties concerned.
<UN>
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Framework for the Joint Development  
of Hydrocarbon Resources
Robert Beckman and Leonardo Bernard*
i Introduction
The Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) regime under Part v of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (unclos)1 grants coastal States ex-
clusive rights to explore and exploit the natural resources, whether living and 
non-living (including minerals and hydrocarbon resources), of the seabed and 
its subsoil, and sovereign rights with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation of the zone. The eez may extend up to 200 nautical miles (M) 
from the territorial sea baseline.2 When the eez regime was established by the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,3 it placed 87 per cent 
of the world’s known offshore hydrocarbon fields under coastal State jurisdic-
tion.4 This prompted coastal States to maximize their maritime zones claims, 
either through eez claims or through extended continental shelf claims.
In situations where there are a number of claimants with maritime claims 
to the same geographic area, it may be difficult for the disputes to be resolved 
through negotiation, especially if sovereignty disputes over land territory are 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 unts 3 (entered 
into force 16 November 1994) [unclos]. As of 19 February 2013, unclos has 165 parties (in-
cluding the European Union), with Timor Leste being the most recent State to accede on 8 
January 2013.
2 unclos, ibid, Art. 56(1)(a).
3 The conference held its first session in 1973, and worked for several months each year until it 
finally adopted a convention in 1982.
4 United Nations, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective), 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical 
_perspective.htm.
* In writing the present article, we have drawn on some works which have been published in 
Beckman, et al, (eds.), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: 
Legal Framework for the Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources 
(2013), especially works by Gavin Maclaren and Rebecca James, Negotiating Joint Develop-
ment Agreements, at 139–144 and by David Ong, Implications of Recent Southeast Asian State 
Practice for the International Law on Offshore Joint Development, at 192–193.
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also involved. The possibility of offshore hydrocarbon deposits being situated 
in areas of overlapping claims adds to the complexity of the disputes. In order 
to exploit these hydrocarbon resources, petroleum companies need to be con-
fident that their investment will not be adversely affected by uncertainty as to 
which State or entity has jurisdiction to grant licenses or leases in the area. A 
long period of legal stability is therefore essential for petroleum companies.
This article demonstrates that international law imposes certain rights and 
duties in relation to exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in overlapping 
claim areas. These rights and duties constrain the conduct of the claimants in 
their exploration and exploitation of such resources. It argues that under both 
unclos and general international law, States are obliged to cooperate with 
each other in the management of resources in overlapping claim areas, either 
through Joint Development Arrangements ( jdas) or other forms of provision-
al arrangements pending resolution of the maritime boundaries. The article 
then sets out the legal framework for jdas for the exploration and exploitation 
of hydrocarbon resources under unclos, before examining the preparation 
process and the circumstances in which joint development may be desirable. 
It also discusses the various models for jdas. Finally, the article concludes with 
an overview of the challenges facing jdas.
ii unclos and jdas
unclos establishes a legal framework to govern all uses of the oceans. It has 
no provisions on how to resolve sovereignty disputes over offshore features. 
However, it does contain provisions on the nature and extent of the mari-
time claims that can be made from land territory and offshore features. Un-
der  unclos, coastal States have sovereignty over their land territory as well as 
over a 12 M belt of sea adjacent to their coast called the territorial sea,5 albeit 
this is subject to the passage regimes in unclos and to other rules of interna-
tional law.6 A coastal State is also entitled to a contiguous zone extending out 
to 24 M from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured.7 In the 
5 unclos, supra note 1, Arts. 2 and 3.
6 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 17. Article 17 provides that the ships of all States have a right of 
innocent passage through the territorial sea.
7 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 33.
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contiguous zone, a coastal State has the right to enforce violations of its cus-
toms, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws.8
One of most important features of unclos is that it gives coastal States 
sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources adjacent to its ter-
ritorial sea in two resource zones – the eez and the continental shelf. First, 
coastal States have the right to establish an eez extending to 200 M from the 
baselines from which their territorial sea is measured.9 In the eez, a coastal 
State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the living 
and non-living natural resources of the seabed and its subsoil and of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed.10
Second, coastal States also have sovereign rights to explore and exploit 
the natural resources of the continental shelf.11 The extent of a coastal State’s 
continental shelf was one of the most heavily debated topics during the 
 negotiations in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. The Con-
ference finally agreed to a 200 M limit from the coastline.12 However, States 
with a broad continental shelf off their coasts, through a complex assessment 
mechanism, may extend their sovereign rights claim to the resources of their 
continental shelf up to 350 M from their coastline or to the outer edge of the 
continental margin.13 Claims to an extended continental shelf beyond 200 M 
(referred to as “outer continental shelf”), however, must be submitted to and 
accepted by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (clcs).14
As mentioned above, unclos also allows States to claim maritime zones 
from islands under their sovereignty. Article 121(1) defines an “island” as “a 
naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at 
high tide”.15 Islands which are capable of sustaining human habitation or an 
economic life of their own are entitled to a territorial sea, contiguous zone, 
eez and continental shelf.16 “Rocks” fall within the definition of an island. 
8 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 33 (1).
9 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 57.
10 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 56.
11 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 77.
12 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 76(1).
13 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 76(5).
14 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 76(8); as of May 2013, 65 countries have put in their sub-
missions to the clcs, and the clcs has issued 18 recommendations. See, Submissions, 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/
clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm.
15 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 121(1).
16 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 121(2). For further discussion on rocks and islands, see The 
Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, Award on the Merits of 12 July 
2016, at 204–260, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7.
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 However, Article 121(3) provides that rocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no eez or continental 
shelf.17
A unclos Provisions on Boundary Delimitation and 
Provisional Arrangements
The drafters of unclos recognized that there would be instances where 
claims to maritime space would overlap. unclos therefore has provisions on 
the delimitation of overlapping territorial sea,18 eez19 and continental shelf 
claims.20 For purposes of this article, the provisions on delimitation of the eez 
and continental shelf are the most salient. Articles 74(1) and 83(1), which are 
identical, state that:
The delimitation of the [continental shelf/eez] between States with op-
posite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of 
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
Over the subsequent years, international courts and tribunals have attempted 
to articulate the method by which the delimitation should be determined in 
order to reach an equitable solution. Some international courts and tribunals 
have described the method provided for in unclos Articles 73 and 84 as the 
“equitable principles-relevant circumstances method”.21 In the Libya/Malta 
decision, the icj explained that the equidistance method may be applied if 
it leads to an equitable solution.22 The icj went further in the Qatar/Bahrain 
decision, stating that for the delimitation of maritime zones beyond 12 M, it 
would first draw a provisional equidistance line before considering whether 
there are circumstances that require an adjustment of that line.23
In the 2009 Black Sea Case between Romania and Ukraine, the icj intro-
duced a three stage approach to maritime delimitation: (i) establish a provi-
sional equidistance line; (ii) consider whether there any factors which call for 
17 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 121(3).
18 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 15.
19 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 74.
20 unclos, supra note 1, Art. 83.
21 See, for example, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon 
v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening) [2002] icj Reports 303 at para. 288.
22 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, (1982) icj Reports, at para. 62 [Tunisia/
Libya].
23 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judg-
ment (2001) icj Reports 40, at para. 176.
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an adjustment of the equidistance line to reach an equitable result; and (iii) 
verify that that line does not lead to an inequitable result by reason of any 
marked disproportion between the ratio of the respective coast lengths and 
the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each State by reference to the 
delimitation line.24 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) 
also confirmed this approach as the preferred method for delimitation of the 
eez and continental shelf in its recent decision regarding delimitation of the 
eez and outer continental shelf between Bangladesh and Myanmar.25
However, while international case law has attempted to clarify the interna-
tional rules governing the delimitation of maritime boundaries, there is still 
room for differing interpretations as to how to draw the provisional median 
line and which factors should be taken into account in order to adjust that 
provisional median line. The inherent nature of the sovereign rights of the 
coastal States over their continental shelf adds to the problems of delimiting 
areas of overlapping claims,26 since all such claims over continental shelf are 
presumably valid due to the coastal States’ inherent sovereign rights.27 Thus, 
States have a choice between settling the boundary, which may require long 
negotiations during which time the resources of the disputed area are not ex-
ploited, and cooperating to jointly develop the resources while setting aside 
the boundary dispute.28
B Nature of Obligation to Negotiate “Provisional Arrangements  
of a Practical Nature”
unclos caters for the fact that it may be extremely difficult for States to reach 
agreement in areas of overlapping eez and continental shelf claims; and it 
purports to provide a temporary solution to this situation in paragraph 3 of 
Articles 74 and 83. These interim solutions include a moratorium on resource 
exploitation pending final delimitation and an obligation on States concerned 
24 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v Ukraine) (2009) icj Reports 61, at paras. 
116–122.
25 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myan-
mar in the Bay of Bengal (2012) Judgment, itlos Case No 16 [Bangladesh/Myanmar] at 
para. 455, available at http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases 
_english/PR.140-E.pdf.
26 Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation – Reflections 9–14 (1989).
27 Peter C. Reid, Petroleum Development in Areas of International Seabed Boundary Disputes: 
Means for Resolution 8 Oil & Gas Law & Taxation Review 214, 215 (1984–85).
28 Fox et al, Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Model Agreement 
for States with Explanatory Commentary 39 (1989).
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to take every effort to make “provisional arrangements” in the interim.29 It pro-
vides that if delimitation cannot be effected by agreement:
[T]he States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, 
shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a prac-
tical nature and, during the transitional period, not to jeopardize or 
hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be 
 without prejudice to the final delimitation.30
Provisional arrangements under unclos share a common goal with the pro-
visional measures powers of the United Nations Security Council, this being 
to prevent aggravation of a situation in dispute.31 The provision is designed 
to “promote interim regimes and practical measures that could pave the way 
for provisional utilization of disputed areas pending delimitation” and “consti-
tutes an implicit acknowledgement of the importance of avoiding the suspen-
sion of economic development in a disputed maritime area”.32
There are three aspects to the obligation contained in unclos Articles 74(3) 
and 83(3). First, States should make every effort to enter into provisional ar-
rangements of a practical nature. This imposes on parties a “duty to negotiate 
in good faith”33 and to take “a conciliatory approach to negotiations in which 
they would be prepared to make concessions in the pursuit of a provisional 
arrangement”.34 Second, during this transitional period before there is final 
agreement on the boundaries, States are obliged not to jeopardize or hamper 
the reaching of a final agreement on delimitation. International courts and 
tribunals have found that any activity which represents an irreparable preju-
dice to the final delimitation agreement is a breach of this obligation.35 Third, 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature are “without prejudice to the 
final delimitation”.36
29 Ibid., at 34.
30 unclos, supra note 1, Arts. 74(3) and 83(3); Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, UN Law of 
the Sea Annex vii Arb Trib, award on 17 September 2007, at para. 461, available at http://
www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Guyana-Suriname%20Award.pdf; see also, Ranier Lagoni, 
Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 78 ajil 345 (1984) at 358.
31 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 unts xvi, Art. 40, avail-
able at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html.
32 Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, supra note 30, at para. 460.
33 Ibid., para. 460.
34 Ibid., at paras. 471–478.
35 Ibid., at para. 480.
36 unclos, supra note 1, Arts. 74(3) and 83(3); Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, supra note 30; 
see also, Lagoni, supra note 30, at 358.
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The obligation of States to make every effort to enter into provisional ar-
rangements of a practical nature has been succinctly summarized by scholars:
The States concerned are obliged to “enter into negotiations with a view 
to arriving at an agreement” to establish provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature and … “not merely to go through a formal process of ne-
gotiation.” The negotiations are to be “meaningful, which will not be the 
case when either [state] insists upon its own position without contem-
plating any modification of it.” However, the obligation to negotiate does 
not imply an obligation to reach agreement …37
This view was endorsed in the 2007 arbitration between Guyana and Suriname 
by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex vii of unclos.38 While it 
was acknowledged that the language “every effort” leaves “some room for in-
terpretation by the States concerned, or by any dispute settlement body”, it 
imposes on the parties to the dispute “a duty to negotiate in good faith”. This 
requires the parties to take “a conciliatory approach to negotiations, pursu-
ant to which they would be prepared to make concessions in the pursuit of a 
provisional arrangement”.39 Further, the obligation to negotiate in good faith 
“is not merely a nonbinding recommendation or encouragement but a man-
datory rule whose breach would represent a violation of international law”.40
The second part of the obligation provides that during this transitional 
period States are obliged not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final 
agreement on delimitation. It is said that a court or tribunal’s interpretation of 
this obligation must reflect the delicate balance between preventing unilateral 
activities that affect the other party’s rights in a permanent manner but, at the 
same time, not stifling the parties’ ability to pursue economic development in 
a disputed area during a time-consuming boundary dispute.41
International courts and tribunals have found that “any activity which rep-
resents an irreparable prejudice to the final delimitation agreement”42 is a 
breach of this obligation and that “a distinction is to be made between activi-
ties of the kind that lead to a permanent physical change, such as exploitation 
of oil and gas reserves, and those that do not, such as seismic exploration”.43 
For example, in the Guyana/Suriname Arbitration it was found that allowing 
37 Lagoni, supra note 30, at 356.
38 Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, supra note 30, para. 461.
39 Ibid.
40 Lagoni, supra note 30, at 354.
41 Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, supra note 30, at para. 470.
42 Lagoni, supra note 30, at 366.
43 Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, supra note 30, at para. 467.
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exploratory drilling in disputed waters was a breach of the obligation to make 
every effort not to hamper or jeopardize the reaching of a final agreement as 
this could result in a physical change to the marine environment and engen-
ders a “perceived change to the status quo”.44 This was in contrast to seismic 
testing, which did not cause a physical change to the marine environment.
However, it is clear that States are under no obligation to enter into any pro-
visional arrangement but must only “make every effort” to negotiate in good 
faith. Articles 74(3) and 83(3) also do not mandate the type of provisional ar-
rangements States can enter into, but leave it to the discretion of the States 
concerned.45 Provisional arrangements can include a wide variety of arrange-
ments such as mutually agreed moratoriums on all activities in overlapping 
areas,46 joint development or cooperation on fisheries,47 joint development 
of hydrocarbon resources,48 agreements on environmental cooperation49 and 
agreements on allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction.50 The term “arrange-
ments” implies that the arrangement can include both informal documents 
such as Notes Verbale, Exchange of Notes, Agreed Minutes, or  Memorandum 
of Understanding (mou); as well as more formal agreements, such as trea-
ties.51 With regard to the meaning of “a practical nature”, Articles 74(3) 
44 Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, supra note 30, at para. 480.
45 Natalie Klein, Provisional Measures and Provisional Arrangements in Maritime Bound-
ary Disputes (2006) 21 International Journal of Marine and Coastal 423, 444 
(2006); see also, Sun Pyo Kim, Maritime Delimitation and Interim Arrange-
ments in North East Asia 94 (2004).
46 Maritime Delimitation Treaty between Jamaica and the Republic of Colombia, 12 November 
1993, Article 3, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/
PDFFILES/TREATIES/JAM-COL1993MD.PDF.
47 Agreement on Fisheries between the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China, 3 
August 2000 (entered into force 30 June 2001), reprinted in Kim, supra note 45, at 347.
48 Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand on the Es-
tablishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the Resources in the Sea-Bed in a De-
fined Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 21 February 
1979 (entered into force 24 October 1979), reprinted in David M Ong, Thailand/Malaysia: 
The Joint Development Agreement 1990, 6 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 57, 61 (1990).
49 Agreement between the Government of Jamaica and the Government of the Republic of Cuba 
on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between the Two States, 18 February 1994, 
Article 5, reprinted in 34 Law of the Sea Bulletin, Division of Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, at 64.
50 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government 
of Malaysia on the Constitution and Other Matters relating to the Establishment of the 
 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, 30 May 1990.
51 Kim, supra note 45, at 47. Kim notes that “some States may prefer mous to formal agree-
ments for provisional arrangements because these have some advantages in several 
aspects: no need to publish them as these are not treaties; no need for elaborate final 
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and 83(3) do not give much guidance, but have been interpreted to mean that 
such arrangements “are to provide practical solutions to actual problems re-
garding the use of an area and are not to touch upon either the delimitation 
issue itself or the territorial questions underlying this issue”.52
The use of the word “provisional” implies that the arrangements are interim 
measures pending the final delimitation of maritime boundaries.53 Also, the 
provisional arrangements are “without prejudice” to the final delimitation of 
the maritime boundary. This means that nothing in the arrangement can be 
deemed as a renunciation of the claim of any party to sovereignty over the 
features or sovereign rights in the surrounding waters. Also, the provisional ar-
rangement does not constitute an explicit or implicit acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of the claim of any other party.54
C Joint Development Arrangements as a “Provisional Arrangement”
The concept of joint development of hydrocarbon resources appears to have 
emerged in the 1950s.55 However, despite considerable State practice since that 
time, there is no common or uniform definition of joint development of hy-
drocarbon resources.56 It is usually used as a “generic term”57 and extends from 
unitization of a single resource straddling an international boundary to joint 
development of a shared resource where boundary delimitation is shelved 
clauses or the formalities surrounding treaty-making; easy amendment; and no need to 
be submitted for an approval of the parliament”; see also, Lagoni, supra note 30.
52 Lagoni, supra note 30, at 358.
53 Lagoni, supra note 30, at 356.
54 See for example, Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Co-
operation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern  Australia, 
11 December 1989 [1991] ats 9, Article 2(3), (entered into force 9 February 1991) [Timor 
Gap Treaty]; generally, see also, Gao Zhiguo, Legal Aspects of Joint Development in Interna-
tional Law, in M Kusuma-Atmadja, T Mensah and B Oxman (eds.), Sustainable 
Development and the Preservation of the Oceans: The Challenges of 
unclos and Agenda 21, Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute’s Twenty-Ninth An-
nual Conference, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, 19–22 June 1995, 639 (1997).
55 Fox et al, supra note 28, at 54.
56 Thomas Mensah, Joint Development Zones as an Alternative Dispute Settlement Approach 
in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in Ranier Lagoni and Daniel Vignes (eds.), 
Maritime Delimitation 143–153, 146 (2006). For example, Mensah states that “some 
scholars seek to distinguish between, on the one hand, ‘unitization of shared resources’ 
which they describe as an arrangement under which ‘a single resource straddling an in-
ternational boundary is developed subsequent to agreement without reference to such 
boundary’ and on the other, joint development properly so called which they define as 
‘a regime under which the entire boundary dispute is set aside, thus creating an ambient 
development of political cooperation from the outset.’”
57 Fox et al, supra note 28, at 43.
95FRAMEWORK FOR JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF HYDROCARBON RESOURCES
<UN>
 because it is not feasible or possible to reach agreement on a boundary at the 
time.
There is no doubt that jdas are a type of “provisional arrangement of a prac-
tical nature”. Their legal basis stems from Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of  unclos. 
Indeed, they appear to be the most commonly used arrangements for over-
lapping claim areas. International courts and tribunals have also endorsed 
joint development agreements as an alternative to maritime delimitation.58 
For example, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the icj held that joint 
exploration agreements were “particularly appropriate when it is a question 
of preserving the unity of a deposit” in areas of overlapping claims.59 In his 
dissenting opinion in the 1982 continental shelf delimitation case between 
 Tunisia and Libya, Judge ad hoc Evensen proposed a system of joint exploration 
of petroleum resources based on his view that joint development represented 
an alternative equitable solution to the maritime boundary dispute which was 
eventually adopted by the parties.60 In the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, the Ar-
bitral Tribunal stated that the parties should give every consideration to the 
shared or joint or unitized exploitation of any such resources.61
There has been considerable doctrinal debate on whether there exists an 
obligation to enter into jdas.62 However, while jdas are a useful mechanism, it 
appears clear that States do not have a specific duty to enter into jdas in areas 
of overlapping claims. First, there is no provision in unclos which specifies 
this obligation. Articles 74(3) and 83(3) leave it to the discretion of the States as 
to what type of provisional arrangement they enter into and, again, the States 
are merely under an obligation to negotiate in good faith. Article 123 provides 
that States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with 
each other, but it imposes no “specific and legally enforceable” obligation on 
these States, as its language is more “exhortatory than obligatory”.63 Also, the 
call for cooperation in Article 123 is limited to conservation of marine living 
58 Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, supra note 30, at para. 463.
59 North Sea Continental Shelf Sea Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), 1969 icj 4, at para. 99.
60 Ong, supra note 48, at 787.
61 The Government of the State of Eritrea v The Government of the Republic of Yemen (1999), 
119 ilr at 417, (1999), Award Of the Arbitral Tribunal in The Second Stage of the Pro-
ceedings (Maritime Delimitation), available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.
asp?pag_id=1160.
62 For a summary of the two opposing schools of thought, see, Chidinma Bernadine Okafor, 
Joint Development: An Alternative Legal Approach to Oil and Gas Exploitation in the Nige-
ria-Cameroon Maritime Boundary Dispute? 21(4) International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 506–509 (2006).
63 Ong, supra note 48, at 781.
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resources, protection of the marine environment and coordination of marine 
scientific research. It does not include the joint development of hydrocarbon 
resources.64
Second, there is no obligation in customary international law to enter into 
joint development agreements. Customary international law consists of State 
practice, which must be both constant and uniform and common to a sig-
nificant number of States, particularly those States whose interests are spe-
cially affected, and there must be opinio juris in that States must recognize 
that this practice constitutes law binding on them.65 While there is arguably 
widespread State practice on joint development in many areas of the world, it 
does not appear to be constant or uniform. Nor does it appear to be a result of 
the fact that States believe they are under a legal obligation to enter into such 
agreements.66
The lack of status of joint development as solution to maritime boundary 
disputes under customary international law, however, does not necessarily in-
dicate a legal void.67 There is a strong argument to be made that States have a 
general obligation to cooperate in the exploitation of shared natural resources, 
even if the normative content of this rule is yet to be determined.68 Indeed, 
cooperation to manage and exploit shared marine resources may be a better 
solution for settling overlapping maritime claims than waiting for an agree-
ment to be reached after a long negotiation process.69
III Conditions Necessary for jdas70
Before negotiating a jda, there are a number of factors that States should con-
sider which go beyond a mere exploration of their legal rights and entitlements. 
Although many of these factors would not be given weight by an international 
64 Ong, supra note 48, at 782.
65 See Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law 30–37 (2007).
66 Ian Townsend-Gault and William Stormont, Offshore Petroleum Joint Development Ar-
rangements: Functional Instrument? Compromise? Obligation? in Gerald Blake, et al 
(eds.), The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources 53 (1995).
67 David Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: ‘Mere’ State Prac-
tice or Customary International Law?, 93(4) ajil 771, 792 (1999).
68 Ibid.
69 Douglas Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean Boundary Making 
227–229 (1988).
70 This section draws heavily from Gavin Maclaren and Rebecca James, Negotiating Joint De-
velopment Agreements, in Beckman, et al, (eds.), Beyond Territorial Disputes 
in the South China Sea: Legal Framework for the Joint Development of 
Hydrocarbon Resources 139–144 (2013).
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court or tribunal, they will usually be significant for a State in determining its 
approach to negotiations.71
A Recognition of Overlapping Claims72
Understanding and recognising the overlapping claims is the important first 
step in considering joint development. This is because joint development does 
not occur in a vacuum, but proceeds in the context of the underlying strengths 
and weaknesses of the overlapping claims as assessed by reference to the rel-
evant principles of public international law.73 The legitimacy of the respective 
States’ claims under international law usually has a significant bearing upon 
the negotiation of the size and location of the joint development area and the 
revenue sharing arrangements that will apply within it.74
B Political Will75
The presence of political will in support of joint development in all rel-
evant States is critical to the success of any joint development negotiation. 
 Negotiating joint development agreements, which are often complex, requires 
considerable expertise and commitment of time and resources. Joint devel-
opment agreements also require, almost by definition, willingness to compro-
mise. A high level of political will within each State is necessary to achieve 
progress. Negotiations which proceed on the basis of ambit claims and/or ag-
gressive posturing will almost always fail to bring about a joint development 
agreement. Maintaining a spirit of cooperation beyond the negotiation pro-
cess is also critical as States must often work together for many years after the 
original agreement is struck in order to achieve the full benefits of any joint 
development agreement.76
C Domestic Political Opinion77
If negotiations are taking place within a context of a highly charged domes-
tic political debate, it will be more difficult for a dispute to be set aside and 
71 Gavin Maclaren and Rebecca James, Negotiating Joint Development Agreements, in 
Beckman, et al, supra note 70, at 141.
72 Ibid, at 140–141.
73 MacLaren and James, supra note 71, at 140–141.
74 MacLaren and James, supra note 71, at 140–141.
75 MacLaren and James, supra note 71, at 141–142.
76 One commentator has observed that “the intermittently coincidental political will of 
both Malaysia and Thailand” was “one of the mains reasons for the 11-year delay in the full 
implementation of the provisions of the 1979 Memorandum of Understanding”; see Ong, 
supra note 48, at 221.
77 Maclaren and James, supra note 71, at 142.
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 opportunities for joint development to be agreed upon. This is sometimes the 
case where sovereignty over particular geographic features is in issue. In such 
circumstances it is not uncommon for domestic political parties to seize upon 
maritime issues as part of their domestic political agenda, for public opinion to 
become entrenched against cooperation, and for national governments to use 
nationalistic sentiment as part of their negotiating strategy. The domestic po-
litical landscapes of the States in question and broader issues pertaining to the 
relationships between neighbouring States will therefore be highly relevant.78
D Other Factors
1 Historical factors79
Historical factors are often relevant to the negotiation and conclusion of a joint 
development agreement. The legacy of past military action, disputes over sov-
ereignty of particular features or a history of failed negotiations, among many 
other things, can make the process of achieving joint development far more 
difficult.
2 Economic factors80
Economic factors can be critical to a State’s approach to joint development. 
While the presence of oil concessions or oil wells within a disputed area would 
not be taken into consideration in its own right in a maritime delimitation 
determination,81 the nature, extent and location of hydrocarbon resources 
may be critical to a State when considering its approach to joint development 
negotiations.
A State’s domestic need for hydrocarbon resources may prove to be an in-
fluential factor which adds impetus to jointly developing a potentially pro-
spective area.82 Accordingly, States should develop an understanding of the 
78 Okafor, supra note 62, at 510–512.
79 Maclaren and James, supra note 71, at 142.
80 Ibid.
81 The icj and Permanent Court of Arbitration have found that oil concessions and oil wells 
are not in themselves to be considered as relevant circumstances justifying the adjust-
ment or shifting of a provisional delimitation line, though they may be taken into ac-
count if based on express or tacit agreement between the parties (which may indicate a 
consensus on the maritime areas to which they are entitled): see further, Land and Mari-
time Boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea 
intervening) ( Judgment) [2002] icj Rep 303, 447–448 [304]; Barbados v The Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago (Award of 11 August 2006) at 108–109, [364] available at http://www 
.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1152.
82 Okafor, supra note 62, at 512. See for example the now defunct Timor Sea Treaty between 
the Government of East Timor and the Government of Australia, East Timor-Australia, 
signed 20 May 2002, 2258 UNTS 3.
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relevant economic resource potential of the area of overlap and the potential 
location of those resources. However, it must also be kept in mind that the 
greater the degree of knowledge about the geological potential of the joint de-
velopment area, the greater the risk that States will make expansive claims and 
be less willing to compromise.83
If resources are primarily located in an area to which one State considers it 
has a particularly strong (or defensible) claim, this will tend to result in that 
State pushing for a smaller joint development area which leaves it with direct 
control over those resources, or for a joint development agreement that pro-
vides it with a disproportionate share of the benefits of joint development. The 
other State is likely to be equally determined to expand the size of the joint 
development area to include the relevant resources and to seek the greatest 
possible share of those resources.
3 Availability of third party dispute resolution84
Where compulsory third party dispute resolution is available, it is often the 
case that one State will decide to achieve a final delimitation through these 
means. This is because in any given set of circumstances, one State will often 
consider that, having regard to the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and 
the location of resources, it will obtain a superior outcome through delimita-
tion rather than joint development.
4 Number of States involved85
It is typically more difficult to resolve multilateral disputes through joint de-
velopment than bilateral disputes. Most joint development agreements to date 
have been bilateral, though in principle a joint development agreement need 
not be limited to two States.
As is evident from the above discussion, various factors should be consid-
ered when assessing whether joint development is a viable option in the cir-
cumstances surrounding a particular dispute. It is also evident that politically 
motivated activities and nationalist sentiments described above diminish the 
83 One example of this is that “negotiations for the Timor Sea Treaty were made more com-
plex in light of the discovery of two fields, known as Greater Sunrise, that straddle the 
jpda across the eastern limits,” in Report Number 6-20(1) and (2) -Australia-East Timor, 
in DA Colson and RW Smith (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, 
Volume V 3806, 3808 (2005). See also, Okafor, supra note 62, at 513.
84 Maclaren and James, supra note 71, at 143. Compare this, however, with the compulsory 
conciliation under Annex V of UNCLOS. See for example the Report and Recommenda-
tions of the Compulsory Conciliation Commission between Timor-Leste and Australia on the 
Timor Sea, Conciliation Commission, 9 May 2018.
85 Maclaren and James, supra note 71, at 144.
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prospects of achieving a successful joint development agreement, and should 
be avoided.
Once States have decided to explore joint development as a possible solu-
tion to delimitation disputes, a further range of issues, such as the possible 
form of the joint development agreement, should be explored. Each dispute 
is different and there is no precise formula for States to adhere to when deter-
mining their approach.
IV Form and Content of jdas
Once States that have overlapping claims acknowledge that the best way for 
them to reach an agreement is by entering into some form of jda, there are 
several issues that need to be addressed during the negotiation process. First, 
the claimant States need to ensure that their national positions would not be 
jeopardized by agreeing to enter into the jda. Second, the negotiating States 
need to identify the areas that are to be jointly developed. Third, the negotiat-
ing States need to agree on the form and extent of the jda.
A Without Prejudice
It is important to note that entering into a jda is the second best option for 
States; having a defined maritime boundary being the first preferred option. 
Thus, it is natural that all parties to the jda wish to preserve their respective le-
gal positions.86 As noted above, jdas as provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature are “without prejudice to the final delimitation”.87 The “without preju-
dice” provision ensures that whatever arrangement agreed to will not affect 
the final boundary agreement. This means that if a State makes concessions in 
order to agree to a jda, the concessions cannot be used against it in any nego-
tiations or adjudication to reach a final maritime boundary agreement. A jda 
gives the States the opportunity to exploit the hydrocarbon resources without 
giving up their claims to sovereignty or sovereign rights in the joint develop-
ment area. Furthermore, it is important to remember that although a jda is 
a provisional measure, it usually lasts for 20 or 30 years or even longer. Thus, 
agreeing to a jda in effect means shelving the dispute for a generation or two, 
while enabling the States to benefit from the exploitation of the hydrocarbon 
resources in the agreed area.
86 David Anderson, Modern Law of the Sea: Selected Essays 495 (2008).
87 unclos, supra note 1, Articles 74(3) and 83(3); Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, supra note 
30; see also, Lagoni, supra note 30, at 358.
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B Identifying the Area to be Jointly Developed88
One of the major obstacles in concluding jdas is the difficulty of the claim-
ants agreeing on a geographic area/s that can be subject to joint development. 
jdas tend to be concluded in areas where there are clearly defined overlapping 
claims, for example, in an overlapping eez or continental shelf claim.89 It is 
typically the case that each State must at a minimum clarify the extent of, and 
the rationale for, its claim by reference to principles of public international 
law.90 It is almost impossible to make significant progress without doing so. 
The agreed area of the joint development zone will either cover the entirety 
of the overlapping eez or continental shelf claim91 or will be an area within 
the overlapping claim area.92 There are examples of States refusing to clearly 
articulate the limits of their maritime claims. Often this type of conduct is 
perceived as a negotiating tactic by other States and can become a stumbling 
block preventing further progress.93
From the process of analysing and testing each relevant State’s claim, a con-
sensus must emerge regarding the location, size and shape of the area to be 
jointly developed.94 The joint development area should be as small as possi-
ble, as having a joint development agreement is a second best outcome where 
claimant States have failed to reach an agreement on fixing the maritime 
boundaries between them, but agree on a practical accommodation for a cer-
tain period of time.95 The duration may be tied to the duration of the offshore 
activities. Generally, between the initial seismic work and the completion of 
88 Maclaren and James, supra note 71, at 144–145.
89 See Tara Davenport, et al., Conference Report, Conference on Joint Development and the 
South China Sea Organized by the Centre for International Law, 16 – 17 June 2011, available 
at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Report-of-CIL-Conference-on 
-Joint-Development-and-the-South-China-Sea-2011-04.08.2011.pdf.
90 Maclaren and James, supra note 71, at 144.
91 The Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area consists of the entirety of the overlap-
ping claims between Malaysia and Thailand: See, the 1979 Memorandum of Understanding 
between Malaysia and Thailand on the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploi-
tation of the Resources of the Sea-bed in a Defined Area and the 1990 Agreement between 
the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on the Con-
stitution and Other Matters Relating to the Establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint 
Authority.
92 See, for example, the 2008 Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue, where the area 
identified for joint development only consisted of a part of the overlapping claim area.
93 Maclaren and James, supra note 71, at 144.
94 Ibid.
95 Anderson, supra note 86, at 498.
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production to decommissioning and disposal of the installation, periods of 40 
or 50 years are normal in joint development agreements.96
Following agreement on the area to be jointly developed, the next most 
significant issue is typically the basis on which government revenues are 
to be shared. In many cases, this has occurred by way of equal division of 
 “government take.”97 However, on some occasions a significant disproportion 
has been agreed.98
C Forms of a Joint Development Agreements
A number of authors have identified three broad structural models for joint 
development agreements.99 In essence, these are:
1 The single-state model100
The first joint development model examined here is arguably the simplest op-
tion available to States because it requires the least amount of effort by the 
governments concerned by way of formal bilateral cooperation and legal and 
institutional harmonization. This model comprises an agreement whereby 
one State manages the development of the deposits located in a disputed area 
on behalf of both States. The other State shares in the revenues arising from 
the resource exploitation, once the costs incurred by the first State have been 
subtracted. Several of the earliest joint development agreements utilized this 
model.
Of late, this model has fallen into disuse. This is principally due to the ap-
parently unacceptable loss of autonomy on the part of the State that allows its 
sovereign rights to be administered by another State. Many States are reluctant 
to accept such a situation, especially within a disputed seabed area subject to 
overlapping claims. They are fearful of appearing to accept, however implicitly, 
a status quo that confers de facto jurisdiction to the other State, even if the de 
96 Ibid.
97 Maclaren and James, supra note 71, at 144.
98 A good example of this is the Timor Sea Treaty between the Government of East Timor and 
the Government of Australia, 20 May 2002, [2003] ats 13 (entered into force on 2 April 
2003) (Timor Sea Treaty). For further examples, see Ana Bastida, et al, Cross-border Unit-
ization and Joint Development Agreements: An International Law Perspective, 29(2) Hous-
ton Journal of International Law 356, 416 (2007).
99 See for example, Ong, supra note 67, at 788–792; Bastida, et al, ibid, at 416–418; Yusuf Mo-
hammad Yusuf, Is Joint Development a Panacea for Maritime Boundary Disputes and for 
the Exploitation of Offshore Transboundary Petroleum Deposits?, 4 International Law 
Energy Review 130, 132–133 (2009).
100 The text in this section draws heavily from David Ong, Implications of recent Southeast 
Asian State practice for the international law on offshore joint development, in Beckman, 
et al, supra note 70, at 192–193.
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jure position is explicitly reserved. The main disadvantage is the other State’s 
concern regarding the possible adverse inferences drawn from the managing 
State’s pre-emptive role in the disputed area and its effect on the strength of 
the other State’s claims to this area.101 However, this thesis is arguably turned 
on its head by the latest manifestation of a jda in the Southeast Asian region, 
namely the Brunei-Malaysia arrangements established by the bilateral Ex-
change of Letters in 2009. That arrangement represents a return to a single 
State model.
2 The joint-venture model102
The second joint development model is the most popular option among the 
three models. It comprises an agreement requiring the Parties to establish 
compulsory joint ventures between their national or other nominated oil com-
panies in designated joint development zones. Alternatively, the agreement 
provides for the compulsory unitization of transboundary deposits and the 
nomination of a single operator to exploit the unitized deposit on behalf of 
all the interested operators. A few agreements also combine several of these 
features.
A number of joint venture model jdas provide for the unitization of depos-
its found both within, or lying across, the boundaries of a specifically desig-
nated area of marine space. These designated joint development zones usually 
correspond to disputed continental shelf/eez claims between the two States 
concerned. Other joint venture model jdas require the compulsory unitiza-
tion of transboundary deposits in situations where the maritime boundary has 
been previously agreed. This latter type of joint venture model jdas has been 
renounced as not being true “joint development.”103 Despite this objection to 
the classification of these types of agreements as being “jdas,” we have classi-
fied them as jdas in order to provide as many different working examples of 
State practice as possible. Moreover, these transboundary unitization agree-
ments represent successful instances of international cooperation that merit 
examination in their own right.
Thus, it may be noted that there are two distinctive sub-species of joint 
venture model jdas. The first type is agreements that designate specific joint 
101 Fox et al, supra note 28, at 149, 152.
102 Ong, supra note 100, at 196–197.
103 Kusuma-Atmadja for example argues that “joint development” properly relates only to 
overlapping claim areas subject to joint jurisdiction, rather than the unitization of oil 
and gas structures straddling the boundaries of neighbouring countries, which is merely 
a well-known principle in the petroleum industry. See, Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, Joint 
Development of Oil and Gas by Neighbouring Countries, in Kusuma-Atmadja, Mensah 
and Oxman, supra note 54, at 592.
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development zones in which compulsory joint ventures are established in 
respect of unitized deposits. The second type is transboundary unitization 
agreements that provide for a single operator to exploit a “straddling” deposit 
lying across a previously agreed maritime boundary. The second type is mainly 
found in the North Sea region.
3 The joint authority model104
The third joint development model is the most complex and institutionalized 
option, requiring a much higher level of cooperation than the previous two 
models. This model consists of an agreement between the interested States es-
tablishing an international joint authority or commission with legal personal-
ity, licensing and regulatory powers, and a comprehensive mandate to manage 
the development of the designated zone on behalf of the States. These joint 
authorities have been described as “strong” institutions, with extensive super-
visory and decision-making powers and wide-ranging functions, as opposed 
to the “weak” liaison or consultative-type bodies under the direction of the 
parties established by a number of agreements incorporating the second joint 
development model, described above.105 Within the Southeast Asian maritime 
region as defined in this article, the 1979 and 1990 Malaysian-Thailand agree-
ments are good examples of this third joint development model.
D Factors Influencing the Form of a Joint Development Agreement106
The choice between a simple or more comprehensive joint development model 
will be governed, to a very significant extent, by the willingness of one State to 
allow another State’s laws to apply within all or part of the joint development 
area and, consequently, for one State to have disproportionate administrative 
responsibility for all or part of the joint development area. Where States are 
prepared to apply one State’s laws within the joint development area, the cre-
ation of a jda is a much more straightforward undertaking. Most commonly, 
this is acceptable where one State perceives that it has a very weak claim to the 
relevant area, where one State has a longer history and a greater knowledge of 
petroleum regulation, or where the area in question is a very small portion of 
the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of the relevant State.
104 Ong, supra note 100, at 200.
105 Masahiro Miyoshi, The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to Mari-
time Boundary Delimitation, 2 (5) International Boundaries Research Unit, 
 Maritime Briefing 43–44 (1999).
106 Maclaren and James, supra note 71, at 146–149.
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Often neither State is prepared to allow the other to have a disproportionate 
level of control or influence over the joint development area. In these circum-
stances, it is typical to pursue a more comprehensive jda, which involves an 
application of the joint authority model referred to above to the circumstances. 
Developing a stand-alone regime for petroleum activities becomes essential in 
this scenario. In essence, the States will need to ensure either that they have di-
rect control over petroleum activities (for example, through national oil com-
panies as proxies for each State) or that there is a framework for the regulation 
of petroleum activities so that investors are comfortable to invest their money. 
As a practical matter, this is an involved and complex process. Typically, com-
prehensive joint development solutions tend to be more appropriate where 
the area of overlap is large, petroleum exploration is required and/or where 
the respective claims of relevant States are equally legitimate.
Significant expertise is required to develop a stand-alone oil and gas regula-
tory framework in light of the complex technical issues and policy questions 
which need to be dealt with. Even where States have experience in regulating 
petroleum activities, they often will not have recent experience in establishing 
an oil and gas regulatory framework. Furthermore, there is potential for the in-
terests of the States to diverge on matters that lead to asymmetries in the eco-
nomic benefit that each derives from joint development. Taken together, these 
factors make negotiating joint development agreements time-consuming and 
difficult, even where there is considerable political will in support of resolu-
tion, willingness to compromise and the assistance of appropriate experts.
The presence of gas resources within an area of overlapping claims gives 
rise to additional complexity, and has often created problems in the imple-
mentation of joint development agreements for a number of reasons. The 
typical joint development model has focussed on oil. Apportionment of the 
benefits of oil development between States is usually achieved by a division 
of “government take” (in cash or in kind) at the well head and the sharing of 
tax revenues by each State in accordance with a pre-agreed formula. Other 
economic benefits of oil development, such as associated service industries, 
tend to accrue to the State with the greatest capacity to service the oil industry. 
Typically, little or no attempt is made to apportion these benefits between the 
States. However, gas projects require significant development downstream of 
the well head and there is considerable value in delivering the physical product 
to market. This is the case even where the gas is ultimately to be processed into 
lng and exported, as the economic benefits of lng processing are significant. 
The  potential economic benefits of gas exploitation include infrastructure 
development, pipeline tariffs, employment opportunities, additional tax rev-
enue, an increase in the value of the product onshore processing, import-offset 
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 benefits and enhanced energy security. Joint development agreements often 
do not provide for the allocation of benefits between States downstream of the 
well head. This creates the potential for States to disagree about the develop-
ment of gas resources after the joint development agreement has been final-
ised and, in turn, for delays or breakdowns in implementation. It will, for in-
stance, be difficult to have gas development plans approved and agreed where 
the consent of both States is required.
Consequently, it is in the interests of States to give consideration to the 
eventual development of gas resources in the process of negotiating a joint 
development agreement over gas-prone areas to avoid the potential for stale-
mate to arise later. One way of addressing this issue is to provide for the sharing 
of some of the economic benefits of downstream gas development between 
States through the framework of joint development. Oil companies can also 
play a role in this regard. In some circumstances, careful commercial structur-
ing has allowed parties to proceed with a development in circumstances where 
stalemate might otherwise have arisen.107
As will be apparent, there is a trade-off to be made between negotiating a 
joint development agreement which seeks to provide for all eventualities and 
one which records agreement on key matters only. While it is easier to negoti-
ate and record the latter, this type of agreement is accompanied by the risk of 
interminable delays down the track which may frustrate the anticipated ben-
efits of joint development.108
107 A novel compromise was reached between Australia and East Timor in respect of the 
Bayu Undan project. In this scenario, the energy company Conoco was successful in fa-
cilitating East Timor’s approval of the Bayu Undan lng and liquids project in Australia 
on the basis that it would construct and operate the gas pipeline to Australia and the lng 
facility located in Darwin on a basis which provided a low “infrastructure rate of return,” 
consequently pushing profits upstream to the well head. This benefited East Timor as it 
was entitled to 90% of the government revenue achieved at the well head, but was also 
acceptable to Australia since it obtained the employment benefits and tax revenues from 
the lng facility and pipeline.
108 For instance, the first Memorandum of Understanding entered into between Thailand 
and Malaysia in 1979 “did not provide a sufficiently detailed legal framework for the ex-
ploration and exploitation of the petroleum resources in the Joint Development Area.” 
The parties subsequently encountered difficulties in light of “the enormity of the task in-
volved in attempting to come up with a new legal regime for joint development which the 
Joint Authority could operate in the Joint Development Area, but which also represented 
a viable compromise between both parties” own, incompatible, domestic petroleum de-
velopment regimes”; see Ong, supra note 48, at 229–230.
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E Common Provisions in Joint Development Agreements
Regardless of the joint development model utilized in State practice, similar 
types of provisions can be found in most of these agreements. Such common 
provisions include the following: non-prejudice exceptions to the sovereign 
rights of each party over the disputed deposit; jurisdictional allocations; in-
stitutional arrangements and sometimes, a hydrocarbon licensing regime; 
dispute settlement; environmental protection; third party rights. In seeking to 
understand these alternatives, it is important to note that there is no need for 
States to draw on any specific form of joint development model.109 States are 
ultimately free to appropriately tailor their treaty arrangements to the circum-
stances of the underlying dispute, and they almost invariably do so.
There are certain terms common to many joint development agreements. 
These include a demarcation of the area that is covered by the joint develop-
ment agreement, the basis for sharing government revenues and costs within 
the joint development area, the scope of activities to which the joint develop-
ment agreement will apply, the applicable law to apply within the joint devel-
opment area, the duration of the agreement to be entered into, how it is to be 
terminated and dispute resolution between the parties.
V Conclusions
If a State party to unclos is not able to reach an agreement through negotia-
tions on its eez or continental shelf boundaries with an adjacent or opposite 
State, and it is not willing or able to request for an international court or tribu-
nal to delimit the maritime boundary, certain obligations are triggered under 
unclos. First, both States have an obligation to make every effort to enter into 
“provisional arrangements of a practical nature” pending a final agreement on 
their maritime boundary. Second, they have an obligation not to take any ac-
tions that would jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement on the 
maritime boundary, including the unilateral exploitation of the hydrocarbon 
resources in the area of overlapping claims. In such circumstances, it may be in 
their common interest to set aside the negotiations on the maritime boundary 
and consider entering into a jda as a provisional arrangement of a practical 
nature. A jda enables the two States to share the hydrocarbon resources with-
out prejudicing their position on the final maritime boundary.
However, jdas are not an easy solution. They are generally not possible 
unless several essential factors are present. First, the two States must have a 
109 Yusuf, supra note 99, at 133–134.
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certain level of trust in each other. Second, they must have a common desire 
to set aside their competing claims and jointly develop the resources. Third, 
and perhaps most important, they must have the political will necessary to set 
aside their differences and convince their domestic audience that it is in their 
national interest to cooperate by sharing the natural resources. Fourth, they 
must agree on an area for joint development which is politically acceptable to 
both sides.
If these factors are present, the details of the jda can be negotiated. Sev-
eral models are available, and the legal and technical issues which must be 
addressed are fairly well understood. If the necessary trust and political will 
are present, the details can be worked out through negotiations. If they are not 
present, it may be in the best interests of the two States to resolve the maritime 
boundary by referring it to a court or tribunal.
<UN>
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The International Legal Obligations of States 
in Disputed Maritime Jurisdiction Zones and 
Prospects for Co-operative Arrangements in the 
East China Sea Region
David M. Ong
i Introduction
This article will first set out several observations on the politico-legal nature 
of the disputes over (island) territorial and overlapping maritime jurisdiction 
zones claimed from both these islands and mainland territory within the East 
Asian maritime region. It will then present arguments suggesting that the in-
ternational legal implications of such disputes, whether territorial or maritime 
in nature, require the application of several significant international obliga-
tions by all States bordering the East China Sea and its associated maritime 
areas, including the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan/East Sea. For the purposes 
of this article, the East China Sea region will denote all these water bodies and 
the islands/rocks located within them.
ii Territorial and Maritime East China Sea Disputes:  
Legal Implications
Politically, there is a significant difference of perception both internationally 
and especially domestically, between the island and associated maritime juris-
diction disputes within the East China Sea. Specifically, international disputes 
over insular formations are often initially expressed and in time become fix-
ated within the domestic political/social consciousness of littoral States as an 
overriding issue of national pride. Where these disputes concern sovereignty 
over island territories, such as the Dioayutai/Senkaku and Dokdo/Takeshima1 
1 The Japanese perspective on this disputed island (Takeshima/Dokdo) is accessible at the 




disputes, they are significantly more intractable to resolve under international 
law. They also require the application of general public international law prin-
ciples, in addition to those found in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (unclos). The law of the sea and specifically unclos plays a 
role in the delimitation, rights and responsibilities in the maritime jurisdic-
tion zones generated from these insular formations, notably, the territorial sea, 
continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (eez), but not the sovereignty 
over these islands. The unclos, specifically Articles 74(3) and 83(3) are appli-
cable when the unresolved sovereignty issue extends to the maritime jurisdic-
tion zones claimed by the respective States from these islands or rocks,2 as well 
as the overlapping continental shelves and eezs claimed from the mainland 
and (in the case of Japan) the main island coastlines. There is increasing evi-
dence that the political and legal distinctions highlighted above over territorial 
(island) disputes, as opposed to disputes over the maritime jurisdiction claims 
arising from either these islands, or the mainland/main island coastlines of the 
States themselves, are being recognised. For example, Gong has recently noted 
that the Sino-Japanese maritime disputes in the East China Sea concern two 
issues: the territorial sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and maritime 
delimitation, with the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu islands traditionally 
being the key factor in the East China Sea. Thus, he argues that if this dispute 
can be disentangled from the maritime delimitation issue through an agree-
ment to exclude the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands from generating continental shelf 
or eezs, then the maritime delimitation issue might be handled more easily, 
since most confrontations and reciprocal distrust to date are rooted in the sov-
ereignty dispute. According to Gong, resolution to the delimitation issue within 
the East China Sea region will likely take the form of further  negotiations to-
wards a maritime delimitation agreement involving possible joint development 
of resources, or a judicial settlement. While the 2008 China-Japan  Principled 
Consensus on the East China Sea issue is a major step toward cooperation on 
maritime energy resources, further compromise is required. If China and Japan 
cannot reach a consensus on the scope of the disputed waters, a judicial settle-
ment may provide another option for settling disputes. The policy implications 
of Gong’s analysis are, inter alia, if the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/ 
Senkaku islands continues to remain unresolved then confrontations over 
the sovereignty of the islands will very likely escalate. China and Japan should 
therefore agree to exclude the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands from generating eez or 
continental shelf claims to facilitate a resolution of the maritime delimitation 
2 Both Article 121(3) of unclos and recent international jurisprudence indicate that rocks 
which are incapable of sustaining human habitation cannot be allowed to generate maritime 
jurisdiction space further than the 12 nm territorial sea limits.
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issue. If both countries effectively promote the 2008 Principled Consensus, 
then the establishment of joint development zones near the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands could accelerate the process of cooperation. Finally, the two countries 
need to be flexible on the method of dispute settlement. A clearly delimited 
maritime boundary reached through a judicial settlement or further sincere ne-
gotiations would encourage Sino-Japanese cooperation in scientific research, 
environmental protection, and other issues in the East China Sea.3
Given the fact that none of the island territorial sovereignty issues are likely 
to be submitted before any judicial forms of dispute resolution soon,4 the legal 
focus shifts to the overlapping maritime jurisdiction zones, whether claimed 
from the respective mainland territories of the interested States or the disputed 
island territories between them. Specifically, it should be noted that the inter-
national law of the sea makes a distinction between the legal entitlement of 
coastal/ island States to their adjacent seabed or continental shelf jurisdiction, 
and their delimitation as between their equally entitled neighboring States. 
Albeit pursuant to the further question of the entitlement of Bangladesh and 
Myanmar (Burma) respectively, to continental shelves beyond 200-nautical 
miles, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (itlos) has recently 
confirmed that:
A coastal State’s entitlement to the continental shelf exists by the sole 
fact that the basis of entitlement, namely, sovereignty over the land ter-
ritory, is present. It does not require the establishment of outer limits. 
Article 77, paragraph 3, of the Convention, confirms that the existence of 
entitlement does not depend on the establishment of the outer limits of 
the continental shelf by the coastal State.5
Applying this generally to seabed areas beyond the 200-nm limit from coast-
lines, the Tribunal further held that: “Entitlement to a continental shelf 
 beyond 200 nm should thus be determined by reference to the outer edge 
of the  continental margin, to be ascertained in accordance with Article 76, 
3 Gong Yingchun, The Development and Current Status of Maritime Disputes in the East China 
Sea, in The (US) National Bureau of Asian Research, Maritime Energy Re-
sources in Asia: Energy and Geopolitics (December 2011).
4 Following the most recent spate over the sovereignty of the Dokdo/Takeshima islands be-
tween the Republic of (South) Korea and Japan in July-August 2012, the Korean government 
has rebuffed a proposal by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mofa) to submit the 
dispute to the icj. This follows similar proposals by Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, which have 
each time been refused by Korea.
5 Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar 
in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar) itlos Judgment (2011), at para. 409.
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 paragraph 4. To interpret otherwise is warranted neither by the text of Article 
76 nor by its object and purpose.”6
Finally, applying these general analytical determinations to the case before 
it, the itlos made the following observations: “The Tribunal therefore can-
not accept Bangladesh’s contention that, by reason of the significant geological 
discontinuity dividing the Burma plate from the Indian plate, Myanmar is not 
entitled to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm.”7 Summing up the case before 
it, the itlos Judgment stated that the “Tribunal is not convinced by the argu-
ments of Bangladesh that Myanmar has no entitlement to a continental shelf 
beyond 200 nm. The scientific data and analyses presented in this case, which 
have not been contested, do not establish that Myanmar’s continental shelf 
is limited to 200 nm under Article 76 of the Convention, and instead indicate 
the opposite.8 The Tribunal accordingly concludes that both Bangladesh and 
Myanmar have entitlements to a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nm. 
The submissions of Bangladesh and Myanmar to the Commission clearly indi-
cate that their entitlements overlap in the area in dispute in this case.”9
The implications of the above statements for the dispute between China 
and Japan over the significance of the Okinawa Trough as a natural break in 
the seabed prolongation of land territory from both Chinese mainland ter-
ritory and the main Japanese islands are far-reaching. Gao for example has 
noted that there are two aspects to the controversy over the Okinawa Trough 
between the States bordering the East China Sea. The scientific aspect con-
cerns whether the Okinawa Trough disrupts the unity of the continental shelf 
in the East China Sea, and the legal aspect concerns whether geophysical fac-
tors should be considered in the delimitation between opposite States where 
the distance between their coasts is less than 400 nautical miles. He argues 
that if the Okinawa Trough is proved to constitute a fundamental discontinu-
ity between the natural prolongation of China and Korea on the one hand, and 
that of Japan on other hand, the median line between the opposite coasts con-
cerned should not be applied in the continental shelf delimitation, for it can-
not achieve an equitable solution,10 as required by Articles 83(1) and 74(1) of 
unclos. However, China’s long-standing view that the Trough represents the 
furthermost limits of the Japanese legal continental shelf facing the Chinese 
mainland is arguably diminished by the recent itlos finding.
6 Ibid., at para. 437.
7 Ibid., at para. 438.
8 Ibid., at 130, para. 448.
9 Ibid., at 131, para. 449.
10 Jianjun Gao, The Okinawa Trough Issue in the Continental Shelf Delimitation Disputes with-
in the East China Sea, 9 (1) Chinese Journal of International Law 143–177 (2010).
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More generally, the above extracts of the itlos jurisprudence strongly sug-
gest that notwithstanding the continuing island/rock territorial disputes, all 
the interested States in the East China Sea region, namely, North and South 
Korea, as well as China and Japan have legal entitlements to continental shelf 
rights up to at least 200-nm (and possibly further) without needing to rely 
on the ostensible maritime jurisdiction zones generated from the disputed 
islands/rocks themselves. This leads to the conclusion that all the main pro-
tagonists in this scenario have legitimate interests in the seabed between their 
main (land/island) coastlines and around the disputed island territories, not-
withstanding the lack of resolution of the latter disputes. As the law, like na-
ture, abhors a vacuum, the question that then arises is as follows: What are the 
international rights and obligations of the States involved in the East China 
Sea region, both specifically under the unclos as well as general international 
law? Thus, the scene is set for a consideration of these specific procedural and 
substantive rights and obligations, as well as their normative status in relation 
to the States in this region.
iii Procedural Obligations of Notification, Information,  
Consultation and eia
We will begin with the procedural rights and obligations between States in this 
maritime region. Developments in international law and especially interna-
tional environmental law, recently confirmed by relevant international juris-
prudence, arguably point to an increasingly sophisticated set of procedural 
standards of behaviour applicable to the States in this region. This section of 
the article will therefore highlight recent international legal developments on 
shared natural resource issues and/or transboundary environmental prob-
lems, with a view to examining their application to the possible resolution of 
East China Sea maritime disputes.
Here, it has been noted that the evolving standards of State behaviour have 
focused upon requirements of prior notification, information and consulta-
tion (nic) with respect to hazardous activities conducted within their ter-
ritories which may cause damage, either to the territories of other States, or 
areas beyond national jurisdiction.11 Moreover, the procedural obligation to 
11 David M. Ong, Procedural International Environmental Justice? The Evolution of Proce-
dural Means for Environmental Protection: From Inter-State Obligations to Individual-State 




notify, inform and consult (nic) between States, as an accompaniment to the 
substantive obligation not to cause transboundary environmental damage, 
both generally and especially in respect of potentially hazardous activities, 
has arguably been confirmed by the jurisprudence of international tribunals 
as being part of customary international law long before its inclusion with-
in more recent treaty instruments. As Louka notes, for example, “[t]he Lac 
Lanoux case has been heralded as establishing the principle of prior consulta-
tion with another (S)tate before undertaking a project that has transbound-
ary effects. Such a principle has been repeated in a number of international 
instruments, including the (Transboundary) Environmental Impact Assess-
ment (eia) Convention.”12 Further international case law has both confirmed 
and expanded upon these procedural obligations of notification, information 
and consultations on both transboundary environmental concerns and shared 
natural resources issues.
A Malaysia/Singapore Land Reclamation case (2001) before itlos
For example, under the auspices of unclos, the itlos and other related 
(Annex vii) arbitral tribunal decisions have arguably elaborated upon the re-
quirement of notification, information and consultation prior to undertaking 
potentially hazardous activities in frontier areas between States. Thus, in the 
Land Reclamation case between Malaysia and Singapore, the itlos undertook 
to prescribe what has been described as a “constrained bilateral negotiations 
procedure” for both Parties.13
This constrained bilateral negotiations procedure incorporated specific 
notification, information and consultation (nic) requirements with respect 
to the potential impact of large scale land reclamation activities undertaken 
by Singapore within her own territorial waters upon neighbouring Malaysian 
coastal interests and the ecosystem quality of the surrounding marine environ-
ment. The itlos Order unanimously held, inter alia, that Malaysia and Singa-
pore shall first cooperate and enter into consultations to establish promptly a 
group of independent experts with a mandate to conduct a study to determine 
the  effects of Singapore’s land reclamation and to propose, as appropriate, 
measures to deal with any adverse effects of such land reclamation; exchange, 
12 E. Louka, International Environmental Law 42 (2006) 42, citing para. 24 of the 
Lac Lanoux Arbitration case (France v. Spain) 16 November 1957, 12 riaa 281. Convention 
on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe, 25 February 1991, 1989 unts 309 (entered into force 10 
September 1997) [hereinafter, “Espoo Convention”].
13 Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia 
v. Singapore), Request for Provisional Measures, Order, 8 October 2003, itlos Case No. 12.
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on a regular basis, information on, and assess risks or effects of, Singapore’s 
land reclamation works; and implement the commitments noted in this Or-
der, and avoid any action incompatible with their effective implementation. 
Finally, without prejudice to their positions on any issue before the Annex vii 
arbitral tribunal, the Parties were to consult with a view to reaching a prompt 
agreement on such temporary measures.14 More substantively, the Tribunal 
also directed Singapore not to conduct its land reclamation in ways that might 
cause irreparable prejudice to the rights of Malaysia or serious harm to the ma-
rine environment, taking especially into account the reports of the group of 
independent experts.
Subsequently, the Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex vii of unclos 
convened to decide the merits of the above case and was inveighed by the two 
Parties to accept a Settlement Agreement incorporating the Recommenda-
tions by the Group of Experts (goe) established pursuant to the (above) it-
los Order, and adopted by the two States. Within this Settlement Agreement, 
the Parties agreed to expand the terms of reference of the Malaysia-Singapore 
Joint Committee on the Environment (msjce) to exchange information on 
and discuss matters affecting their respective environments in the Straits of 
Johor, as well as undertake monitoring activities in relation to their respective 
environments in the Straits of Johor and address any adverse impacts, if neces-
sary. These monitoring activities were to include: (i) monitoring water quality 
to protect the marine and estuarine environment; and (ii) monitoring ecology 
and morphology.15
B Argentina/Uruguay Pulp Mills case (2007 and 2010) before the icj
The icj has also recently rendered a decision in the Pulp Mills case between Ar-
gentina and Uruguay that is at least in part about the extent of an international 
duty between neighboring States across a common river boundary, to notify, 
inform and consult each other about proposed activities that have potentially 
serious transboundary impacts.16 In the opinion of the Court, “the obligation 
to notify is intended to create the conditions for successful co-operation be-
tween the parties, enabling them to assess the plan’s impact on the river on 
the basis of the fullest possible information and, if necessary, to negotiate the 
14 Ibid. at para. 106 of the itlos Order.
15 Annex to Settlement Agreement in Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in 
and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore). Done in duplicate at Singapore, 26 
April 2005. Available at www.mfa.gov.sg/internet/press/land/Settlement_Agreement.pdf.
16 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) Judgment, 20 
April 2010, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf.
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adjustments needed to avoid the potential damage that it might cause.”17 The 
Court therefore concluded that “the obligation to notify is therefore an essen-
tial part of the process leading the parties to consult in order to assess the risks 
of the plan and to negotiate possible changes which may eliminate those risks 
or minimize their effects.”18
Having established that Uruguay breached its procedural obligations to in-
form, notify and negotiate,19 the Court turned to the relationship between the 
need for an environmental impact assessment, where the planned activity is 
liable to cause harm to a shared resource and transboundary harm.20 Here, the 
icj ruled that “it may now be considered a requirement under general inter-
national law to undertake an environmental impact assessment (eia) where 
there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant risk in 
a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource.”21 The Court not-
ed that “the environmental impact assessments which are necessary to reach a 
decision on any plan that is liable to cause significant transboundary harm to 
another State must be notified by the party concerned to the other party, … to 
enable the notified party to participate in the process of ensuring that the as-
sessment is complete, so that it can then consider the plan and its effects with 
a full knowledge of the facts”.22 The Court observed that this notification must 
take place before the State concerned decides on the environmental viability 
of the plan, taking due account of the environmental impact assessment sub-
mitted to it.23
The Court concluded that Uruguay had failed to fulfil her procedural obli-
gation to notify and allow Argentina to participate in the transboundary eia 
exercise prior to approving the proposed projects.24 It was the opinion of the 
Court that the Parties must, for the purposes of protecting and preserving the 
aquatic environment with respect to activities which may be liable to cause 
transboundary harm, carry out an environmental impact assessment, stating 
that: “In this sense, the obligation to protect and preserve has to be interpreted 
in accordance with a practice, which in recent years has gained so much ac-
ceptance among States that it may now be considered a requirement under 
general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment 
17 Ibid., at para. 113.
18 Ibid., at para. 115.
19 Ibid., at para. 158.
20 Ibid., at para. 203.
21 Ibid., at 60–61, para. 204.
22 Ibid., at para. 119.
23 Ibid., at para. 120.
24 Ibid., at para. 122.
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where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a signif-
icant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared 
resource.”25 Moreover, in the opinion of the Court, as long as the procedural 
mechanism for co-operation between the parties to prevent significant dam-
age to one of them is taking its course, the State initiating the planned activ-
ity is obliged not to authorize such work and, a fortiori, not to carry it out.26 
Consequently, due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention which 
it implies, would not be considered to have been exercised, if a (State) party 
planning works liable to affect the regime of the river or the quality of its wa-
ters did not undertake an environmental impact assessment on the potential 
effects of such works.27
On the other hand, the Court agreed with the Uruguayan assertion that one 
party did not have a “right of veto” over the projects initiated by the other, 
such that there was a “no construction obligation” borne by the State initiating 
the projects until such time as the Court has ruled on the dispute.28 Uruguay 
pointed out that the existence of such an obligation would enable one party 
to block a project that was essential for the sustainable development of the 
other, something that would be incompatible with the “optimum and rational 
utilization of the [r]iver” – the shared natural resource in question here. For 
Uruguay, reference should be made to general international law, as reflected 
in the 2001 draft Articles of the International Law Commission on Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (Yearbook of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two); in particular, draft Article 9, 
 paragraph 3, concerning “Consultations on preventive measures”, states that 
“[i]f the consultations … fail to produce an agreed solution, the State of origin 
shall nevertheless take into account the interests of the State likely to be af-
fected in case it decides to authorize the activity to be pursued.”29
However, on the specific requirements and standard of protection of the ob-
ligation to conduct a transboundary eia, the Court also observed that general 
international law does not specify the scope and content of an environmental 
impact assessment. Moreover, it pointed out that Argentina and Uruguay are 
not parties to the Espoo Convention. Consequently, it is the view of the Court 
that it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation or in the au-
thorization process for the project, the specific content of the  environmental 
25 Ibid., at para. 204.
26 Ibid., at para. 144.
27 Ibid., at para. 204.
28 Ibid., at para. 154.
29 Ibid., at para. 152.
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impact assessment required in each case, having regard to the nature and 
magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the 
 environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting 
such an assessment.30
Finally, the Court noted that the other instrument to which Argentina refers 
in support of its arguments, namely, the 1987 Goals and Principles of Environ-
mental Impact Assessment of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(hereinafter, “unep Goals and Principles”) (UNEP/WG.152/4 Annex (1987), 
document adopted by unep Governing Council at its 14th Session (Dec. 14/25 
(1987)), is not binding on the Parties, but, as guidelines issued by an interna-
tional technical body, has to be taken into account by each Party in accordance 
with Article 41 (a) in adopting measures within its domestic regulatory frame-
work. Moreover, this instrument provides only that the “environmental effects 
in an eia should be assessed with a degree of detail commensurate with their 
likely environmental significance” (Principle 5) without giving any indication 
of minimum core components of the assessment. The Court also considered 
that an environmental impact assessment must be conducted prior to the im-
plementation of a project. Moreover, once operations have started and, where 
necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous monitoring of its ef-
fects on the environment shall be undertaken.31
As the Court had already considered the role of environmental impact as-
sessment in the context of the procedural obligations of the Parties, it then 
dealt with the specific points in dispute with regard to the role of this type of 
assessment in the fulfilment of the substantive obligations of the Parties, inter 
alia, whether the populations likely to be affected, in this case both the Uru-
guayan and Argentine riparian populations, should have, or have in fact, been 
consulted in the context of environmental impact assessment.32 While both 
Parties agree that consultation of the affected populations should form part of 
an environmental impact assessment, Argentina asserts that international law 
imposes specific obligations on States in this regard. In support of this argu-
ment, Argentina points to Articles 2.6 and 3.8 of the Espoo Convention, Article 
13 of the 2001 International Law Commission draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, and Principles 7 and 8 of the 
unep Goals and Principles. Uruguay considered that the provisions invoked 
by Argentina cannot serve as a legal basis for an obligation to consult the af-
fected populations and adds that in any event the affected populations had 
30 Ibid., at para. 205.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., at para. 206.
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indeed been consulted.33 The Court agreed and was of the view that no legal 
obligation to consult the affected populations arises for the Parties from the 
instruments invoked by Argentina.34 In any case, having considered Uruguay’s 
efforts in this regard, the Court held that consultation by Uruguay of the af-
fected populations did indeed take place.35
C State Responsibility for Sponsored Activities in the (Deep Seabed) 
Area: Advisory Opinion by the itlos Seabed Disputes  
Chamber (2011)
Apart from the binding decisions (for the States involved) of the judicial deci-
sions above, the itlos Seabed Disputes Chamber has also recently rendered 
an authoritative, albeit non-legally binding advisory opinion on the applicable 
international law and especially, international environmental law principles 
applicable to the States that oversee the activities of legal persons or enti-
ties within the deep seabed area,36 beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Among the most important of these direct obligations incumbent on sponsor-
ing States are as follows: the obligation to assist the Authority in the exercise 
of control over activities in the Area; the obligation to apply a precautionary 
approach; the obligation to apply best environmental practices; the obligation 
to take measures to ensure the provision of guarantees in the event of an emer-
gency order by the Authority for protection of the marine environment; the 
obligation to ensure the availability of recourse for compensation in respect 
of damage caused by pollution; and the obligation to conduct environmental 
impact assessments.37 The Chamber stressed that the obligation to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment is a direct obligation under the Convention 
and a general obligation under customary international law.38 The Chamber 
then reiterated Article 206 of unclos, which states the following:
When States have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activi-
ties under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution 
of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment, they 
shall, as far as practicable, assess the potential effects of such activities 
33 Ibid., at para. 215.
34 Ibid., at para. 216.
35 Ibid., at para. 219.
36 Responsibilities And Obligations Of States Sponsoring Persons And Entities With Respect To 
Activities In The Area, Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law 
of the Sea, Advisory Opinion, itlos Case List No.17, 1 February 2011.
37 Ibid., at 38, para. 122.
38 Ibid., at 44, para. 145.
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on the marine environment and shall communicate reports of the results 
of such assessments in the manner provided in article 205 (which refers 
to an obligation to publish reports).39
Referring directly to paragraph 204 of the icj Judgment in the Pulp Mills case, 
the Chamber noted the assertion by the icj that “it may now be considered a 
requirement under general international law to undertake an environmental 
impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity 
may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particu-
lar, on a shared resource.”40 Significantly for our purposes in the present article 
arguing for the application of this principle in the East China Sea, the Cham-
ber noted that: “Although aimed at the specific situation under  discussion by 
the Court, the language used seems broad enough to cover activities in the 
Area even beyond the scope of the Regulations. The Court’s reasoning in a 
 transboundary context may also apply to activities with an impact on the envi-
ronment in an area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and the Court’s 
references to “shared resources” may also apply to resources that are the com-
mon heritage of mankind. Thus, in light of the customary rule mentioned by 
the icj, it may be considered that environmental impact assessments should 
be included in the system of consultations and prior notifications set out in 
Article 142 of the Convention with respect to “resource deposits in the Area 
which lie across limits of national jurisdiction”.41
However, the Chamber also observed that, in the view of the icj, general 
international law does not “specify the scope and content of an environmental 
impact assessment” (paragraph 205 of the Judgment in Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay). While Article 206 of the Convention gives only few indications of 
this scope and content, the indications in the Regulations, and especially in 
the Recommendations referred to in paragraph 144, add precision and speci-
ficity to the obligation as it applies in the context of activities in the Area.42 
In light of the above, the Chamber is of the view that the obligations of the 
contractors and of the sponsoring States concerning environmental impact as-
sessments extend beyond the scope of application of specific provisions of the 
Regulations.43
39 Ibid., at 45, para. 146.
40 Ibid., at para. 147.
41 Ibid., at para. 148. (Emphasis added.)
42 Ibid., at para. 149.
43 Ibid., at 45–46, para.150.
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iv Specific Procedural Obligations over Hydrocarbon Deposits in 
Disputed Maritime Areas
A Guyana-Suriname Maritime Boundary Delimitation Award by an 
Arbitral Tribunal established under Annex vii of the unclos (2007)
Within the context of shared natural resources, rather than transboundary 
environmental damage, another unclos Annex vii arbitral tribunal award 
rendered between Guyana and Suriname in 2007 also prescribed a negotiation 
process involving detailed notification, information disclosure and consulta-
tion requirements for the State initiating offshore hydrocarbon exploration 
activities within an overlapping continental shelf claims area of the seabed, 
under Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of unclos.44 A continuing issue in the evolv-
ing international law on offshore joint development of shared hydrocarbon 
resources relates to the scope of the actions that States can undertake when 
it becomes clear that a seabed area the State regards as within its continental 
shelf entitlement is also part of an overlapping claims area. In this context, 
two developments in judicial opinion and State practice may be highlighted. 
First, it is suggested here that the 2007 Guyana/Suriname Award45 deals with 
the procedural elements for co-operation embodied in Articles 74(3) and 83(3) 
of unclos in such a way as to considerably reduce the scope for any  unilateral 
action by interested States in a disputed maritime area, where hydrocarbon 
resources have been detected. This Award first declares that these Articles 
impose two obligations which according to the Tribunal ‘simultaneously at-
tempt to promote and limit activities in a disputed maritime area.’46 The first 
requirement is that pending the final delimitation agreement, States Parties 
are to make “every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature.”47 The second obligation is that the Parties must during this transition-
al period also make every effort not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of 
the final delimitation agreement.48
In relation to the first obligation contained within these Articles, the Tribu-
nal was of the view that it was intended to promote the provisional utilization 
44 See, Guyana v. Suriname, unclos Annex vii Arbitral Tribunal Award (2007) available at 
www.pac-cpa.org.
45 Guyana/Suriname, Award of Arbitral Tribunal established pursuant to Article 287 and 
Annex vii of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) on 17 
September 2007, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/.
46 Ibid., at 152, para. 459.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., at 153, para. 459.
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of natural resources within disputed maritime areas, pending their delimita-
tion. Thus, according to the Tribunal, ‘this obligation constitutes an implicit 
acknowledgement of the importance of avoiding the suspension of economic 
development in a disputed maritime area, as long as such activities do not af-
fect the reaching of a final agreement.’49
Applying these findings to the East China Sea region, while China began 
exploring for oil and gas in 1974, Japan refrained from licensing such activities 
(with the exception of the exploration under the 1974 Japan-rok treaty) until 
2004. China moved ever closer to the median line which Japan proposed after 
both countries had ratified unclos in 1996, and at times even went over to the 
Japanese side of it. According to Drifte, these two countries missed opportuni-
ties to deal with the territorial and boundary disputes while oil and gas interest 
were not yet very important and while Japan had a technological edge over Chi-
na in deep-sea oil exploration. By refraining from any exploration itself, Japan 
sent misleading messages to the Chinese side. The most misleading Japanese 
action was co-financing of Chinese activities in disputed areas of the eez in 
the 1990s: In November 1998, China had begun full operation of its first oil and 
natural gas field in the Pinghu field, about 70 km from the median line, on the 
Chinese side. In 1997/98 Japan co-financed – through its contribution to the 
Asian Development Bank (adb), as well as directly through its Export Import 
Bank (renamed Japan Bank of International Cooperation in 1999) – the two oil 
and gas pipelines from the Pinghu field to the Chinese mainland. The initial 
disbursement by the adb was in February 1997, and the final one was as recent 
as November 2001 (adb 2004). This support of Chinese oil and gas extraction 
activities in the contested area has received heavy criticism in Japan in recent 
years. Today, the Japanese government publicly insists that the Pinghu field is 
within the contested ecs area, as long as no agreement on the  demarcation 
has been reached, because it lies within 200 n.m. from the Japanese mainland 
(YS, 28/4/05, 9/11/06). The Pinghu pipelines have now also come under suspi-
cion because China has connected them with those of the Chunxiao field. Seen 
from a Chinese perspective, however, the long-term Japanese tolerance and 
even financial support must have been interpreted as at least implicit acquies-
cence regarding China’s rights in the area, as long as China’s activities did not 
fall within any area on the Japanese side of the median line.50
The Tribunal also noted that such provisional arrangements would achieve 
one of the unclos objectives, namely, “the equitable and efficient utilization 
49 Ibid., at 153, para. 460.
50 Reinhard Drifte, Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea – From Missed Opportunities to Ne-
gotiation Stalemate (2009), available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Reinhard-Drifte/3156.
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of the resources of the seas and oceans.”51 Focusing on the normative density 
of this first obligation, the Tribunal noted that despite the fact that the phrase 
“every effort” leaves room for interpretation by the interested States or any dis-
pute settlement body, “it is the opinion of the tribunal that the language in 
which the obligation is framed imposes on the Parties a duty to negotiate in 
good faith.”52 The Tribunal buttresses this finding by suggesting that the inclu-
sion of the phrase “in a spirit of understanding and co-operation”, indicates 
the drafters’ intent to require of the parties a conciliatory approach to negotia-
tions, pursuant to which they would be prepared to make concessions in the 
pursuit of a provisional arrangement.”53 This allusion to the intentions of the 
parties to unclos is returned to by the Tribunal later on in the Award when 
it notes that: “Provisional arrangements of a practical nature have been recog-
nized as important tools in achieving the objectives of the Convention, and 
it is for this reason that the Convention imposes an obligation on parties to a 
dispute to make every effort to reach such agreements.”54
Thus, the Tribunal placed a specific obligation upon Guyana to inform Su-
riname directly of Guyanese plans to allow its concessionaire company, cgx, 
to undertake exploratory drilling.55 In an unprecedented move, the Tribunal 
then specified the precise steps that Guyana could have taken that would have 
been consistent with her obligations under the Convention and thus sufficient 
to discharge her duty to make every effort to reach a provisional agreement. 
These steps “include (1) giving Suriname official and detailed notice of the 
planned activities, (2) seeking (the) co-operation of Suriname in undertaking 
the(se) activities, (3) offering to share the results of the exploration and giving 
Suriname an opportunity to observe the activities, and (4) offering to share 
all the financial benefits received from the exploratory activities.”56 By provid-
ing this detailed exposition of the required notification, information-sharing, 
and consultation process that the interested States must enter into, the Tri-
bunal has clearly established the legally authoritative standards of behaviour 
for any State finding itself in a similar situation where it is seeking to initiate 
exploration activities, either in respect of a transboundary deposit or overlap-
ping claims area. In doing so, the Tribunal has also clearly drawn from, and 
analogously applied, the prior notification requirement incumbent upon the 
51 Ibid., citing the Preamble to unclos, where this term can be found in the 4th indent.
52 Ibid., para. 461.
53 Ibid. This term does replicate almost word for word: ‘in a spirit of mutual understanding 
and co-operation,’ the very first indent of the Preamble to unclos.
54 Ibid., at 154, para. 464.
55 Ibid., at 159–160, para. 477.
56 Ibid., para. 477, at 160 of the Award.
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 International Seabed Authority (isa) in similar situations of mineral deposits 
lying across the limits of national jurisdiction and the deep seabed Area, under 
Article 142(2) of unclos.57 Within this context, the Tribunal’s advocacy (in 
step (4), above) of the sharing of any benefits derived from exploration ac-
tivities is both useful as well as arguably establishing a clear legal presumption 
for the joint development (and revenue-sharing) of any hydrocarbon deposits 
found in a disputed maritime area.
Applying these legal standards to the disputes of the East China Sea region, 
it should be noted that in 2003 the Japanese government began to ask the Chi-
nese to hand over data hydrocarbon exploration and production activities in 
the Chunxiao field area. Beijing refused since it considers the area part of its 
eez. In order to enhance its leverage, the Japanese government decided in 
2004 to collect its own geological information. From July to October 2004, a 
private company commissioned by the Energy Agency of Ministry of Energy, 
Trade and Industry (meti) conducted a geological survey on the Japanese side 
of the median line, in order to investigate whether China was tapping into gas 
reserves which straddle the median line. The survey area was a 210 km north-
south strip, with a width of 30 km, the lower end facing the Chunxiao and 
Tianwaitian gas fields on the Chinese side (Map in Kaijō Hōan Repōto 2006: 
38). China reacted immediately after the announcement of the survey and 
warned the Japanese to act with caution in what it considered to be the Chi-
nese eez (fmprc 2004). It was even reported that a Chinese surveillance ves-
sel, and later two warships, tried to chase away the survey ship (AS, 13/10/04; 
YS, 13/4/05). The interim report of the survey, in February 2005, concluded that 
it was highly likely that the Chunxiao and Duanqiao geological structures were 
linked with those on the Japanese side of the median line; this was confirmed 
as definite in the final report in April 2005 (YS, 2/4/05). The Chinese disputed 
any  geophysical link between the two sides, maintaining that the geological 
faults near the two gas fields prevent such a link (YS, 21/2/05).58
B Recent Provisions from Bilateral Boundary Agreements: Norway-
Russia Maritime Delimitation (2010)
These detailed notification and consultation requirements can be also be dis-
cerned in recent State practice, namely, the Treaty between the Kingdom of 
Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
57 See, David M. Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: ‘Mere’ 
State Practice or Customary International Law?, 93 American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 771–804, 785 (1999) and Cameron (2006) op. cit., at 567.
58 Reinhard Drifte, Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea – From Missed Opportunities to Ne-
gotiation Stalemate (2009) available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Reinhard-Drifte/3156.
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Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, adopted in Murmansk 
on 15 September 2010.59 Para. 2 of Article 5, along with Appendix II of this 
Treaty, provides for a specific procedure to deal with transboundary hydrocar-
bon deposits lying across the recently agreed maritime boundary, as follows:
If the existence of a hydrocarbon deposit on the continental shelf of one 
of the Parties is established and the other Party is of the opinion that the 
said deposit extends to its continental shelf, the latter Party may notify 
the former Party and shall submit the data on which it bases its opinion.
If such an opinion is submitted, the Parties shall initiate discussions 
on the extent of the hydrocarbon deposit and the possibility for exploita-
tion of the deposit as a unit.
In the course of these discussions, the Party initiating them shall sup-
port its opinion with evidence from geophysical data and/or geological 
data, including any existing drilling data and both Parties shall make 
their best efforts to ensure that all relevant information is made available 
for the purposes of these discussions.
If the hydrocarbon deposit extends to the continental shelf of each of 
the Parties and the deposit on the continental shelf of one Party can be 
exploited wholly or in part from the continental shelf of the other Party, 
or the exploitation of the hydrocarbon deposit on the continental shelf 
of one Party would affect the possibility of exploitation of the hydrocar-
bon deposit on the continental shelf of the other Party, agreement on 
the exploitation of the hydrocarbon deposit as a unit, including its ap-
portionment between the Parties, shall be reached at the request of one 
of the Parties (hereinafter “the Unitisation Agreement”) in accordance 
with Annex ii.
A summary of the procedural obligations under international law applicable 
to all interested States in the East China Sea region is as follows:
1. Duty to inform and consult other interested States addressing the pos-
sible impacts on freedom of navigation and other user activities, over all 
planned activities that may have implications for sovereignty over the 
disputed islands, and/or sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the disputed 
maritime zones, whether these are military, research and/or exploration 
activities, or building activities on any insular formations.
2. Duty to conduct an eia for such activities, assessing the possible social, 
environmental and ecological concerns;




3. For the specific issue of hydrocarbon fields/deposits found either within 
areas of overlapping seabed claims, or lying across previously delimited 
maritime boundaries, the procedural duties of both negotiation towards 
an interim/provisional (co-operative) agreement and restraint from uni-
lateral drilling of such fields/deposits, even for exploratory purposes, has 
also been confirmed by successive international jurisprudence and re-
cent State practice on this issue.
There is evidence that such procedural standards of notification are being es-
tablished in the East China Sea region. This derives from littoral State practice 
responding to incidents involving research vessels in the Sino-Japanese areas 
of overlapping claims. The two nations agreed on 31 August 2000 to negotiate 
an agreement for advance notification of such “surveys” by either party. The 
first working level meeting was held in Beijing on 15 September 2000. Finally, 
on 13 February 2001 China and Japan agreed on a mutual prior notification sys-
tem. According to Gao and Wu, the Agreement “cleverly” avoids specifying any 
line beyond which advance notification is required. It simply says that China is 
to give Japan at least two months’ notice when its research ships plan to enter 
waters “near Japan and in which Japan takes interest” and that similarly, Japan 
is to inform China before its vessels enter waters “near” China. The notification 
must include the name of the organization conducting the research, the name 
and type of vessels involved, the responsible individual, the details of the re-
search such as its purpose and equipment to be used, the planned length of the 
survey, and the areas to be surveyed.60
v Substantive Obligation for Co-operation: Preferred Models/Types 
of Co-operative Arrangements in the East China Sea Region
A South Korea-Japan Joint Development Agreement, 1974
Between March 1969 and September 1970, altogether 11 seabed petroleum 
blocks were unilaterally staked out by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Oki-
nawa (which was still under United States administration following the end 
of the Second World War). The four Japanese blocks and Okinawa’s one were 
claimed by private oil interests, unlike South Korea’s two and Taiwan’s four by 
the respective governments.61
60 Zhiguo Gao and Jilu Wu, Key Issues in the East China Sea: A Status Report and Recom-
mended Approaches, at 7–8, available at http://wilsoncenter.tv/sites/default/files.
61 Park Choon-Ho, Seabed Boundary Issues in the East China Sea, at 1, available at http://
wilsoncenter.tv/sites/default/files/Choon-Ho_Park_1_.pdf.
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The designated (joint development) area of the Agreement is specified 
in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Agreement, as the sea area surrounded by, 
counter-clockwise from the northern tip, 1) the median line between Japan 
and Korea, 2) the median line between Japan and China, 3) the median line 
between Korea and China (that would be drawn if Japan is ignored), and 4) the 
limit claimed by Korea by reason of the natural prolongation of its continen-
tal shelf. Therefore, the sea area of joint development is only on the Japanese 
side of the median line between Japan and Korea. The designated joint devel-
opment zone is then divided into small zones, each of which is explored and 
exploited by one or more developers approved by both States (Arts. 3 and 4). 
The approved developers of both States conclude a joint venture agreement 
and appoint an operation manager by agreement. The operation is conducted 
only by the operation manager (Arts. 5 and 6). A Japan-Korea Joint Committee 
is established, but is only a body for consultation about matters concerning 
the performance of the Agreement (Arts. 24 and 25). Each approved developer 
of both States is entitled to an equal share of the natural resources exploited 
in the joint development zone as profits earned from the joint development 
(Art. 9, para. 1). Reasonable costs for exploration and exploitation are equally 
allocated to the approved developers of both States. (Art. 9, para. 2).
Both States deem the part of the natural resources to which the approved 
developer of each State is entitled as natural resources exploited on the con-
tinental shelf over which the State has sovereign rights for the application of 
its domestic law (Art. 16), and tax only their respective approved developer 
(Art. 17). Both States apply their respective laws and regulations related to 
the  exploration and exploitation of natural resources to small zones where 
their respective approved developer acts as a designated operation manager 
(Art. 19). It has been confirmed that no provision of this Agreement “shall be 
deemed to settle the issue of sovereign rights over the whole or part of the 
joint development zone or to harm the position of each contracting State with 
respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf” (Art. 28).
B China-Japan Principled Consensus in the East China Sea, 2008
China and Japan have overlapping jurisdictional claims in the East China Sea, 
which include seabed areas allegedly rich in hydrocarbon resources. China 
and Japan both claim sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Sover-
eignty over these islands affects the delimitation of the southern part of the 
East China Sea. China claims jurisdiction in the East China Sea based on the 
natural prolongation of its continental shelf and a 200 nautical mile (nm) eez. 
In 2009 China submitted a claim to the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (UN-clcs) that provided data supporting its claim to an 
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extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm, as far as the Okinawa Trough. Ja-
pan claims an eez as far as a median line that bisects the East China Sea, the 
coordinates of which it has never published. In its eez law, Japan says that in 
the event of an overlap of claims, a median line should serve as the boundary. 
China has never recognized this median line.
Since 2005, some Japanese officials have suggested that Japan actually 
claims a full 200 nm eez, including space beyond the median line in the East 
China Sea. Some Japanese legal scholars have argued that the median line in 
the East China Sea was simply intended to be a provisional boundary until de-
limitation could be negotiated. However, Japan’s stated opposition to China’s 
development of the Chunxiao/Shirakaba field creates some confusion. When 
Japan protested Chinese activities at the Chunxiao/Shirakaba field in 2004 
and 2005, it was on the basis that the gas field extends across the median 
line and, consequently, Japanese resources were being “stolen.” The Japanese 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (meti) commissioned a Norwegian 
survey vessel, the Ramform Victory, to prove this was the case. However, ac-
cording to Manicom,62 if Japan did in fact claim an eez as far as 200 nm, then 
it should have simply protested China’s activities at the Chunxiao/Shirakaba 
field as a violation of Japan’s eez jurisdiction, since the Chunxiao/Shirakaba 
field is within 200 nm of Japan’s coast. Japan did not do this. By implicitly 
recognizing that the Chunxiao/Shirakaba field is at least partially in Chinese 
waters, Japan has undermined somewhat its claim to a full 200 nm eez in 
that area.
In June 2008, Japanese and Chinese media reported that a breakthrough 
had been reached in the four-and-a-half year Chunxiao gas dispute. Rumors 
that an agreement was imminent had been circulating since early 2008 and 
had gained momentum during Hu Jintao’s historic visit to Japan in May. The 
breakthrough followed eleven rounds of director-general level discussions, 
and several ministerial and executive level meetings. The elite commitment 
to arrive at a consensus emerged after a period of significant tension in the 
bilateral relationship. Given this turn around in bilateral relations, the process 
by which the “new consensus” emerged merits investigation as it may hold les-
sons for Sino-Japanese relations as a whole.63
62 See, Chris Acheson, Disputed Claims in the East China Sea (an interview with James Mani-
com), National Bureau of Asian Research, 25 July 2011, available at http://www.nbr.org/
downloads/pdfs/PSA/Interview_Maincom.pdf.
63 James Manicom, Sino-Japanese Cooperation in the East China Sea: Limitations and Pros-
pects, 30 (3) Contemporary Southeast Asia 455–478 (2008).
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Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu announced on 18 June 2008 that 
China and Japan reached a principled consensus on the East China Sea issue 
through consultation on equal footing.
1. Cooperation between China and Japan in the East China Sea
In order to make the East China Sea, of which the delimitation between China 
and Japan is yet to be made, a “sea of peace, cooperation and friendship,” China 
and Japan have, in keeping with the common understanding reached by lead-
ers of the two countries in April 2007 and their new common understanding 
reached in December 2007, agreed through serious consultations that the two 
sides will conduct cooperation in the transitional period prior to delimitation 
without prejudicing their respective legal positions. The two sides have tak-
en the first step to this end and will continue to conduct consultations in the 
future.
2. Understanding between China and Japan on Joint Development
As the first step in the joint development of the East China Sea between China 
and Japan, the two sides will work on the following: (a) The block for joint 
development shall be the area that is bounded by straight lines joining the 
following points in the order listed. (b) The two sides will, through joint explo-
ration, select by mutual agreement areas for joint development in the above-
mentioned block under the principle of mutual benefit. Specific matters will 
be decided by the two sides through consultations. (c) To carry out the above-
mentioned joint development, the two sides will work to fulfil their respec-
tive domestic procedures and arrive at the necessary bilateral agreement at 
an early date. (d) The two sides have agreed to continue consultations for the 
early realization of joint development in other parts of the East China Sea.
3.  Understanding on the Participation of Japanese Legal Person in the 
Development of Chunxiao Oil and Gas Field in Accordance with  
Chinese Laws
Chinese enterprises welcome the participation of Japanese legal person in 
the development of the existing oil and gas field in Chunxiao in accordance 
with the relevant laws of China governing cooperation with foreign enter-
prises in the exploration and exploitation of offshore petroleum resources. 
The governments of China and Japan have confirmed this, and will work to 
reach agreement on the exchange of notes as necessary and exchange them 





Among the now well-known models or types of offshore co-operative arrange-
ments established by neighbouring States around the world, certain common 
characteristics can now be discerned in the State practice in the East China Sea 
region. These common elements are as follows:
1. Unitization of individual fields/deposits appears to be preferred over the 
establishment of joint development zones corresponding to the overlap-
ping claims areas of the interested States;
2. Involvement of domestic/local energy companies (especially national 
oil companies) is preferred over that of foreign-owned international oil 
companies; and
3. Success or failure of such co-operative arrangements is assessed as much 
(if not more) in the political domain as opposed to the economic benefits 
accruing from the development of hydrocarbon resources from these off-
shore wells.
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Joint Development in the South China Sea:  
Is the Time Ripe?
Jianwei Li and Pingping Chen
I Introduction
The South China Sea disputes are very complicated. They involve six parties – 
China (Taiwan), Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam – and concern 
overlapping claims over both land features and maritime zones. Although it is 
recognized that peaceful resolution of these disputes is important to the re-
gion as well as the world, it is unlikely that this aim could be reached in any 
near future. Demand for resources, living and non-living, has pushed claimant 
States to take unilateral activities for resources exploration and exploitation in 
the disputed sea area. These unilateral activities are against the spirit of Dec-
laration of Conduct for the Parties in the South China Sea (doc) which was 
reached between China and the member States of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (asean) in 2002. They have met and will be meeting strong 
protests from other claimant States. With situations in the South China Sea 
being intensified since 2009, various means have been attempted and recon-
sidered to control the disputes from being escalated or even spilling out of 
control. This article discusses the concept of joint development arrangements 
( jda) and its possible application in the South China Sea proper.1
The next section introduces the concept of jda from an international law 
perspective and its evolution. Section iii takes the South China Sea Region2 as 
a site for observation to study the policies of all the claimant countries in rela-
tion to jda, followed by examination of the jda cases in the region to which 
1 For the purpose of this article, the South China Sea proper refers to the sea area which is 
bordered by China to the north, Vietnam to the west, peninsular Malaysia to the southwest, 
Brunei Darussalam and the two Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak to the south, and the 
Philippines to the east. See Jianwei Li and Ramses Amer, Recent Practices in Dispute Manage-
ment in the South China Sea, in Clive Schofield (ed.), Maritime Energy Resources 
in Asia: Legal Regimes and Cooperation 81 (2012).
2 For the purpose of this article, the South China Sea Region includes (1) the sea area of the 
South China Sea proper and adjacent waters such as the Gulf of Thailand and the Gulf of 
Tonkin; and (2) land features of the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Pratas Islands, 
and the Macclesfield Bank as well as four other island groups in the southwestern part of 
the South China Sea—the Anambas, Badas, Natuna, and Tambelan islands. See Li and Amer, 
supra note 1, at 82.
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one or more claimants are parties. Section iv analyzes the potential applica-
tion of jda in the South China Sea, exploring possible areas for jda and ob-
stacles in view. Concluding remarks are offered in Section v.
II Concept and Evolution3
Discussion around joint development (JD) was triggered by the increasing oil 
and gas exploitation activities in the 1960s which happened in the marine ar-
eas where boundaries pass through or where claims overlapped.4 Onorato is a 
pioneer scholar who analyzed in detail the topic of JD from an academic 
perspective.5 In one of his articles published in 1977, Onorato considers that 
“ potential common petroleum deposit” should be preserved as the “unity of 
the deposit” and the several “States holding interests therein” are under obliga-
tion to exploit through “co-operation, good faith negotiation and agreement”.6 
He recognized at that time that international law had not been developed 
which prescribed clear methods for apportionment of an international com-
mon petroleum deposit,7 but there existed a “legally plausible and practically 
implementable regime of law” which governs such an issue.8
The concept of JD first appeared in international law in the 1970s. By defini-
tion of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, the term 
refers to “inter-State cooperation” over the offshore oil and gas in a designated 
sea area that is under dispute among related parties.9 This is a narrow defi-
nition of JD. Judge Gao prefers this definition.10 Other popular definitions 
of JD in the 1980s include those by Townsend-Gault, by Lagoni as well as by 
Fox et al. They all emphasize the rights which all States share to the resources 
in a given area and they should jointly exploit such-said resources. Lagoni di-
vides JD activities into those across boundary and those lying in an area of 
3 Part of this section is drawn from a previous joint research work, Li and Amer, supra note 
1, at 87–89.
4 Binghui Sun, Legal Issues Regarding Joint Development of Marine Resources [Gongtong 
Kaifa Haiyang Ziyuan Falu Wenti Yanjiu], PhD Thesis, China University of Political Science 
and Law, (2000) at 3.
5 Ibid., at 4.
6 William T. Onorato, Appointment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit, 26 The 
 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 326 (1977).
7 Ibid., at 327.
8 Ibid., at 336; Keyuan Zou, Joint Development in the South China Sea: A New Approach, 21 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 89 (2006).
9 Ibid., Zou, supra note 8, at 90.
10 Sun, supra note 4, at 6.
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overlapping claims.11 Zou further clarifies another category of jda which is 
 devised together with maritime boundary delimitation.12
jda may trace its international legal basis as early as the 1958 Geneva 
 Convention on Continental Shelf. The concept of shared resources and co-
operation in developing them are also reflected in the 1982 United Nations 
 Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) and other international soft 
laws such as declarations from the United Nations (UN). Article 2 of the 1958 
 Convention provides that coastal States have exclusive sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting the national resources on the sea-bed.13 
Article 77 of unclos re-emphasizes such rights.14 Regarding resources of 
shared nature among different States, the 1974 UN Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States recognised the duties of relevant countries. Its Article 3 
provides, “…. in the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more 
countries, each state must co-operate on the basis of a system of information 
and prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such resources with-
out causing damage to the legitimate interests of others”.15 (emphasis added)
Here three issues are emphasized. First, States which share natural resourc-
es are strongly required to cooperate with each other. Second, cooperation in 
such a case is for the purpose of optimum use of the resources. Third, the rights 
of other States must be respected such as navigational rights. On 19 May 1978, 
Principle One of the Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment 
for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilisation of 
Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States was adopted in which States 
sharing natural resources are required to “co-operate in the equitable utilisa-
tion of shared natural resources”.16
Predicting the difficulty in reaching boundary delimitation agreements 
in relation to overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (eez) and continental 
11 David Ong, The 1979 and 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agreements: A Model 
for International Legal Co-operation in Common Offshore Petroleum Deposits?, 14 Inter-
national Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 209 (1999).
12 Zou, supra note 8, at 92.
13 Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on Continental Shelf, from the website of the UN, avail-
able at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_con-
tinental_shelf.pdf.
14 Article 77(2) of unclos provides the same wording as that in Article 2 of 1958 Conven-
tion on Continental Shelf, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, from the 
website of the UN, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/con-
ventions/8_1_1958_continental_shelf.pdf.
15 Ong, supra note 11, at 214; UN General Assembly Resolution 3281(xxix), 12 December 1974, 




shelves between countries opposite to each other or with adjacent waters, Ar-
ticles 74(3) and 83(3) provide that pending final agreement, the neighboring 
States:
in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to 
enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during the 
transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the fi-
nal agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final 
delimitation.17
It is analyzed that the obligation reflected in these two articles contains two 
aspects. First, States should make every effort to enter into provisional arrange-
ments of a practical nature. This imposes on parties a “duty to negotiate in good 
faith” and to take “a conciliatory approach to negotiations in which they would 
be prepared to make concessions in the pursuit of a provisional arrangement”.18 
Such a duty is compulsory and States are under obligation not to take concrete 
actions but make every effort to reach provisional arrangements.19 It is further 
observed that States are under no obligation to enter into any provisional ar-
rangement but must only “make every effort” to negotiate in good faith.20 The 
second aspect is about the obligation of the States, during this transitional pe-
riod, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement on delimita-
tion.21 In this regard, “any activity which represents an irreparable prejudice to 
the final delimitation agreement” is a breach of this obligation.22
In regard to what constitute “provisional arrangements”, unclos does not 
offer any clarification or elaboration. One comment is that these measures 
could cover a wide range of activities including, inter alia, “moratoriums on all 
activities in overlapping areas, joint development or cooperation on fisheries, 
joint development of hydrocarbon resources, agreements on environmental 
17 Arts. 74(3) and 83(3), unclos.
18 Tara Davenport, et al, Conference Report on the Conference on Joint Development and the 
South China Sea, organized by Center for International Law, National University of Sin-
gapore, on 16–17 June 2011, Singapore, at 13; Robert Beckman, Recent Development of the 
South China Sea Dispute and Prospects of Joint Development Regime, Paper presented at 
the International Workshop on Legal Framework for Joint Development in the South China 
Sea, hosted by National Institute for South China Sea Studies, 6–7 December 2012, Haikou, 
China, at 5.
19 Sun, supra note 4, at 6.
20 Beckman, supra note 18, at 6.
21 Davenport et al, supra note 18, at 13.
22 Beckman, supra note 18, at 6.
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cooperation, and agreements on allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction”23 
as long as they are not jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement 
on delimitation. Another comment offers a narrow explanation. Since the pur-
pose is to “further the utilization of the area to be delimited” provisional ar-
rangements should be related to exploration and exploitation of the resources 
in the area.24
The doc, signed in 2002, is the first document between China and asean 
countries in relation to the South China Sea issues. The doc also emphasizes a 
spirit of “cooperation and understanding”. Paragraph 5 provides that “pending 
the peaceful settlement of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, the Parties 
concerned undertake to intensify efforts to seek ways, in the spirit of coopera-
tion and understanding, to build trust and confidence”.25 Again Paragraph 6 
encourages the Parties concerned to explore or undertake cooperative activi-
ties.26 Since the list of “cooperative activities” is not exhausted, it is believed 
that jda of natural resources must be in the mind of negotiators during the 
process of negotiations leading to the final version of the doc.
Meanwhile, earlier asean documents encourage member States to cooper-
ate regarding the exploitation of natural resources they share, including those 
in the maritime domain. For example, Article 19(1) of the 1985 asean Agree-
ment on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, provides: “Con-
tracting Parties that share natural resources shall co-operate concerning their 
conservation and harmonious utilization, taking into account the sovereignty, 
rights and interests of the Contracting Parties concerned in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of international law”.27
Joint development is a temporary arrangement in nature, usually motivated 
by the possibility of the presence of natural resources and potential economic 
gains from the exploration and exploitation of concerned resources. In cases 
where the maritime boundary is delimited, the motivation for cooperation is 
for the best utilization of the resources. As for agreements in a disputed area, 
signatories to jdas seem more motivated by the desire to reach a swift agree-
ment for immediate exploration and exploitation. A second motivation may 
be the fear that the resources in question may fall on the “wrong” side of the 
23 Ibid., at 9.
24 Rainer Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 78 The 
American Journal of International Law 354 (1984).
25 Declaration of Conducts of the Parties in the South China Sea, from the website of ase-
an, available at http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration- 
on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea.
26 Ibid.
27 Ong, supra note 11, at 214.
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delimitation line in the absence of knowledge of their exact location.28 The 
shared desire for economic gain leads to mitigation of the potential for con-
flicts such that related parties search for a provisional arrangement for coop-
eration in the disputed area, with the view that resolution of the sovereignty 
issue could be very time-consuming. The cooperative nature reflected in jdas 
helps settle the concerned dispute temporarily by putting potential conflicts 
under control.29 Meanwhile, jdas can been seen as an attempt to fulfill an ob-
ligation under unclos. As to the South China Sea region on which this study 
focuses, jdas also reflect the efforts from claimant States in implementing the 
doc. This approach has been explored in the South China Sea Region where 
bilateral as well as multilateral maritime disputes exist.
III Claimant States and Joint Development Practice
Cooperative relations are very important for neighboring countries to initi-
ate jdas in maritime areas either straddling the boundaries or with overlap-
ping claims. On the other hand, jdas can further promote friendship between 
neighboring countries, and the benefits can spill over to other areas in inter-
State relations.30 The political will reflected from government policies is vital 
to such country-to-country cooperation. To judge possibilities of application 
of jda in the South China Sea region, it is necessary to first analyze policies of 
relevant claimant States.
A Policies of Claimant States
1 China31
To manage maritime disputes with its neighbors, China prefers direct bilat-
eral consultation and negotiation. China has never opted for any form of third 
party involvement, including judicial settlement, good office, mediation, and 
conciliation. On 25 August 2006, China submitted to the United Nations a dec-
laration under Article 298 of unclos, which ruled out the compulsory dis-
pute settlement procedures concerning disputes over maritime delimitations, 
28 Clive Schofield, Unlocking the Seabed Resources of the Gulf of Thailand, 27 Contempo-
rary Southeast Asia 288 (2007).
29 Ibid., at 298–299.
30 Anon, Feasibility and Restraints regarding Application of Joint Development in the Spratlys 
Area [Gongtong Kaifa Shiyong Yu Nansha Zhi Kexingxing Ji Xianzhi], available at http://
nccuir.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/37032/9/301509.pdf.
31 This part is updated and revised from a previous joint research work. Li and Amer, supra 
note 1, at 92–94.
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 historic bays or titles, military activities, or those in which the Security Council 
of the United Nations exercises its functions.32 One earlier Chinese govern-
ment white paper on maritime affairs declares:
In view of the strategy of peace and development, the Chinese Gov-
ernment uphold that the disputes should be resolved through friendly 
consultation, and that pending the final resolution, disputes could be 
put aside while cooperation shall be strengthened for promoting joint 
development.33
Such a declaration indicates China’s basic policy on dispute management. 
First, disputes shall be resolved by peaceful means through friendly consulta-
tion based on the principle of equity and existing international law. Second, 
the reiterated notion of joint development reflects China’s exploration in 
searching for alternative peaceful means in managing its maritime disputes 
before they are finally resolved.
Within China, the concept of joint development, together with “putting 
aside the dispute” (over sovereignty), was initiated by Deng Xiaoping during 
his 1978 visit to Japan when the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands was raised 
at a press conference. He was quoted as saying that the issue of the Diaoyu 
Islands “can be put aside. Maybe our next generation is cleverer than us and 
could find a real resolution to it”.34 Application of this approach to the South 
China Sea issue was also first raised by Deng at his meeting with the Philip-
pine vice president in June 1986. Deng was quoted as saying that the issue of 
the Nansha/Spratly Islands “involves more than one country”. He continued 
by stating that from “a practical view, we opt to put aside this issue. Maybe 
in several years’ time, the Chinese Government could propose a solution ac-
ceptable to all parties concerned”. In his meeting with his Philippine counter-
part Corazon  Aquino on 16 April 1988, Deng reiterated, “After many years of 
32 China’s declaration reads that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China does 
not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section v of Part xv of the Convention 
with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of 
Article 298 of the Convention”, United Nations website, available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China%20Upon%20
ratification.
33 Zhongguo Haiyang Shiye de Fazhan [The Development of China’s Ocean Affairs], People-
Net, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel2/10/20000910/226233.html; and 
Zhang Liangfu, Zhongguo yu Linguo Haiyang Huajie Zhengduan Wenti [Dispute over Mar-
itime Delimitation between China and its Neighboring Countries] 280 (2006).
34 Sun, supra note 4, at 92.
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consideration, we think that to solve the issue [the Nansha/Spratly Islands], 
all parties concerned could explore joint development under the premise of 
admitting China’s sovereignty over them”.35 The meaning of Deng’s words at 
these two occasions can be deduced as, for China putting aside the dispute 
over the Spratlys does not mean that China gives up its sovereignty claim, and 
joint development is the practical choice for all parties concerned to manage 
their sovereignty dispute. This stance is not contradictory with “without preju-
dice” principle in Articles 74(3) and 83(3).
From then on, top Chinese leaders have reiterated China’s proposal on joint 
development at various occasions. In 1990, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, 
during his visit to Malaysia, expressly put forward the joint development pro-
posal as “shelving the disputes and developing jointly” (gezhi zhengyi, gong-
tong kaifa).36 At the 25th asean Ministerial Meeting in Manila in July 1992, 
after Foreign Minister Qian Qichen raised the proposal, he stated that “when 
conditions are ripe, we can start negotiations”. In 2003, when Wu Bangguo, 
Chairman of the National People’s Congress, visited the Philippines, he pro-
posed to his Filipino counterpart joint development of petroleum in the South 
China Sea.
China’s policies of managing maritime disputes with its neighboring coun-
tries by peaceful means, including the application of jda, are consolidated by 
its commitments under international law or regional documents. China rati-
fied unclos in 1996 and signed the doc with asean countries in 2002. The 
latter signifies a further step leading to setting aside the sovereignty and mari-
time boundary disputes and jointly developing the resources.37
In conclusion, China emphasizes peaceful means for dispute settlement re-
garding the South China Sea issues and pending the final settlement, jda and 
cooperation on broader economic issues are proposed as the practical solution 
for dispute management for building confidence among relevant disputants.
2 Vietnam
Oil and gas resources in the South China Sea are very important for Vietnam 
to achieve its goal of building Vietnam into a regional maritime power by 2020 
which was adopted by the Central Committee of Vietnamese Communist  Party 
in January 2007.38 It is expected that Vietnam’s oil output will peak in 2013 
reaching 370,640 b/d and gas production will rise from an estimated 8.6 bcm 
35 Zhang, supra note 33, at 281–285.
36 Zou, supra note 8, at 102.
37 Beckman, supra note 18, at 3.
38 National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Special Report on Re-
sources Development in the South China Sea: Policies and Practices 
(Forthcoming).
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in 2012 to 12.2 bcm by 2016.39 Vietnam moved fast with rapid exploration and 
development of its offshore oil and gas resources to support its industrializa-
tion, but as Valencia and Van Dyke rightly put, “as long as maritime boundaries 
remain in dispute, foreign oil companies will be reluctant to take concessions 
or explore these areas”.40 Finding a practical approach to developing oil and 
gas resources would be one best approach pending the settlement of maritime 
disputes.
In the 1970s, China-Vietnam boundary negotiations in the Gulf of Tonkin 
were triggered by the prospect for oil and gas in the Gulf. In the 1980s, Viet-
nam proposed that the two countries undertake a joint development program 
in the Gulf. After nearly 28 years of negotiation, China and Vietnam reached 
a maritime delimitation agreement for the Gulf of Tonkin in December 2000, 
in which jda is cited as an approach for exploitation of oil and gas resources 
straddling the boundary.41 China and Vietnam also signed a fishery agreement 
at the same time. During the meeting between Chinese and Vietnamese Pre-
miers in October 2004, both assessed highly the value of the two 2000 agree-
ments with emphasis of the importance of cooperation.42 During President 
Hu Jintao’s State visit to Vietnam from 15–17 November 2006, a joint commu-
niqué was released in which jda was raised as a means to keep stability in the 
South China Sea. It was promoted that both sides “shall actively discuss and 
negotiate on the issue of joint development in order to find appropriate mod-
els and areas”.43 During the meetings between top leaders from both coun-
tries in May and October 2008 respectively, two types of cooperation on oil 
and gas resources are emphasized. The first is to “as soon as possible carry out 
joint survey in the sea area outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin”. The sec-
ond is to reiterate active discussion on JD to find out appropriate model and 
area for cooperation.44 Vietnamese President Truong Tang Sang met Chinese 
President Xi Jinping on 19 June 2013. When Xi emphasized China’s willingness 
39 Vietnam Oil and Gas Report Quarter 1, available at http://www.aetin.eu/news/oil-gas- 
vietnam-may-turn-LPG-exporter-by-2015/vietnam-oil-and-gas-report-q1–2013/.
40 Mark J. Valencia and Jon M. Van Dyke, Vietnam’s national interests and the law of the sea, 
25 Ocean Development and International Law 219 (1994).
41 Details are offered in the following case study.
42 China and Vietnam issued a joint communiqué [Zhong Yue Fabiao Lianhe Gonggao], from 
the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t163636.shtml.
43 China and Vietnam issued China-Vietnam Joint Communiqué [Zhongguo he Yuenan Fa-
biao ‘Zhong-Yue Lianhe Shengming’”, from the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_ 
611306/1179_611310/t280705.shtml.
44 China-Vietnam Joint Communiqué, from the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ ziliao_ 
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“to strengthen the frequency of meetings and efforts of the working group to 
concurrently push ahead JD and maritime delimitation in the area outside 
the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin”, Sang responded by emphasizing Vietnam’s 
wish to actively discuss delimitation as well as JD in the sea area outside the 
mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin.45
Vietnam ratified unclos in 1994 and is bound by the obligations under 
unclos, including making every effort to negotiate to reach some provisional 
arrangements, such as jda, in relation to offshore oil and gas resources. Viet-
nam is a signatory to the 2002 doc as well as to the 2011 guiding principles on 
implementation of the doc,46 therefore it is politically bound by the coopera-
tive spirit reflected in these two regional documents.
In conclusion, through the top leaders’ speeches, bilateral communiqués 
and regional and international treaties to which Vietnam is a party, Vietnam 
advocates jdas. The government also came into JD agreement with Malaysia 
in 1992.
3 The Philippines
The Philippines ratified unclos on 8 May 1984 and is also a signatory of the 
doc. As such the Philippines is bound by the obligations stated in unclos 
and should respect the principles of the doc including the principles of “coop-
eration” and “self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate 
or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability”.
The Philippines’ several administrations have openly expressed the willing-
ness to shelve the disputes for the sake of cooperation. On 11 August 1995, China 
and the Philippines reached an eight-point “code of conduct” regarding the is-
sues in the South China Sea, in which both countries emphasized the impor-
tance of building confidence and trust between the two countries47 and the 
readiness of cooperation raised by all claimants in the South China Sea.48 At 
the asean Summit meeting of the same year, President Ramos recommended 
611306/1179_611310/t460818.shtml; China-Vietnam Joint Communiqué, available at http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t519489.shtml.
45 Xi Jinping met Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang and emphasized that China and 
Vietnam shall walk unswervingly along the road of friendship and cooperation, available 
at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t1051627.shtml.
46 Hereinafter referred to as the “2011 Guiding Principles”.
47 Articles 2 and 3 of the Joint Statement of the RP-PRC Consultations on the South China 
Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation, 9–10 August 1995, in Hong Thao Nguyen, Vietnam 
and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, 32 Ocean Development and Inter-
national Law 125–126 (2001).
48 Article 5 of the 1995 China-Philippines “Code of Conduct”, ibid.
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that all parties concerned shelve the dispute over sovereignty to the Spratly 
Islands and withdraw the soldiers stationed in the features.49
Support on jdas has been reflected in several China-Philippines bilateral 
communiqués. During the State visit to China by President Arroyo in 2004, a 
joint communiqué was issued which provides that “pending the final resolu-
tion of disputes over territory and maritime rights, both sides continuously 
explore means of cooperation including joint development”.50 In 2005, when 
Chinese President Hu paid a State visit to the Philippines after the signing of 
the China- Philippines-Vietnam Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking Agreement 
( jmsua), leaders from both countries expressed their welcome to such coop-
eration agreement.51 Even Aquino iii whose administration takes a tougher 
position in their dispute with China expressed their willingness to jdas. Dur-
ing the Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal) Incident in May 2012, Aquino iii 
responded to a question of jda in the disputed area by saying that “resources 
exploration by means beneficial to the whole region will reduce our depen-
dence on oil import from Middle East and nato”.52
In January 2013, the Philippines started arbitral proceedings against China 
requesting the arbitral tribunal to rule on the conformity of China’s U-shaped 
line with unclos and China’s activities on some land features in the Sprat-
lys.53 It was observed that in relation to dispute management in the South 
 China Sea, the Philippines now opted for international arbitration instead of 
 direct means including jdas.54
49 Anon, supra note 30, at 74.
50 Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of the Philip-
pines [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yu Feilubin Zhengfu Lianhe Gonggao], from the 
website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t155753.shtml.
51 China and the Philippines issued a joint communiqué, from the website of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_chn/ziliao_611306/1179_611310/t193789.shtml.
52 Jinlu Zhou, The Philippine President Raised JD in the South China Sea, Saying Impossible to 
compete with China, available at http://news.qq.com/a/20120518/000175.htm.
53 The Secretary of Foreign Affairs on the unclos Arbitral Proceedings against China, avail-
able at http://www.gov.ph/2013/01/22/statement-the-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-
unclos-arbitral-proceedings-against-china-january-22–2013/; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of the Philippines, Notification and Statement of Claim on the West Philip-
pine Sea, available at http://www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/newsroom/dfa-releases.






Malaysia signed unclos on 10 December 1982 and ratified it in 1996. As to the 
disputes in the scs, Malaysia favors peaceful resolution through negotiation. 
In 2005, China’s Premier Wen Jiabao and Malaysia’s Prime Minister Abdullah 
Badawi signed a joint communiqué, in which it is stated that both China and 
Malaysia welcome concrete cooperation in the disputed waters in the scs  
under guidelines of shelving the dispute for joint development.55 In 2011, the 
Malaysia Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Kohilan Pillay stated, “Joint de-
velopment of natural resources may be an interim measure that could be taken 
by countries with overlapping claims over the area”. According to him, Malay-
sia favors negotiation with the concerned States to settle the maritime dispute. 
The third party, however, like the icj, should be the final option.56 Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister Najib also called for the claimants in the South China Sea to 
jointly develop resources to avoid conflict and prevent “extra-regional States”.57
Malaysia holds an open attitude toward jdas and on many occasions its 
leaders expressed their willingness for jdas in disputed waters. Malaysia has 
carried out several jdas with its neighbor countries, such as the 1979/1990 
 Malaysia-Thailand jda, the 1992 Vietnam-Malaysia jda. Recently, when final-
izing the delimitation of maritime boundaries between the two countries, 
 Malaysia proposed joint oil exploration with Brunei.58
5 Brunei
In 1984, after independence, Brunei signed unclos and ratified it in 1996. As 
to the dispute in the South China Sea, Brunei insists that the relevant disputes 
should be resolved through peaceful dialogue and consultations by the con-
cerned sovereign States.
In 2005, during the visit to Brunei, President Hu proposed joint development 
in the South China Sea with Brunei. On 5 April 2013, President Xi and the Sultan 
of Brunei Haji Hassanal Bolkiah signed a joint statement which states that both 
countries and the concerned companies will continue to deepen  cooperation in 
55 The joint communiqué of People’s Republic of China and Malaysia, from the website of Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, available at http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/zt/ywzt/2005year/wjbzlfw/t226666.htm.
56 Parliament: Malaysia Favours Peaceful Resolution To Maritime Boundary Dispute, 6 April 
2011, available at http://maritime.bernama.com/news.php?id=576829&lang=en.
57 Malaysian PM echoes Beijing's call for joint development in South China Sea, available 
at http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1253564/malaysian-pm-echoes-beijings-call- 
joint-development-south-china-sea.
58 Malaysia proposes joint oil exploration, The Brunei Times, 7 August 2009, available at http://
www.bt.com.bn/home_news/2009/08/07/malaysia_proposes_joint_oil_exploration.
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energy sector. As to jdas, “The Leaders agreed to support relevant enterprises of 
the two countries to carry out joint exploration and exploitation of maritime oil 
and gas resources following the principle of mutual respect, equality and mutu-
al benefit. Such cooperation shall not be interpreted as to prejudice the position 
of the respective countries in relation to maritime rights and interests”.59 This 
is the first time that JD is mentioned in the joint statement or communiqué 
between the two countries. Brunei also expressed its openness to jdas.
B Joint Development Cases in the Region
1 Joint Development Arrangements for Resources  
Straddling Boundaries
There are two cases under this category, the 2000 China-Vietnam maritime de-
limitation and fishery cooperation agreements for the Gulf of Tonkin and the 
2009 Brunei-Malaysia maritime delimitation agreement.
a China-Vietnam Agreements60
The maritime delimitation agreement of 25 December 2000 on the Gulf of 
Tonkin61 is the first maritime boundary agreement between China and Viet-
nam. It is also China’s first maritime boundary agreement. The maritime 
boundary agreement uses a single line for both the continental shelf and Ex-
clusive Economic Zone (eez). On the same day, the two countries signed an 
agreement on fishery cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin.62 On 29 April 2004, 
the Supplementary Protocol to the Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the 
Gulf of Tonkin and regulations on preservation and management of the living 
resources in the Common Fishery Zone in the Gulf of Tonkin were signed.63 
On 30 June 2004, both  boundary and fishery agreements entered into force fol-
lowing the completion of the ratification process.64
59 Article 9 and 10 of the joint statement, the full text is available at http://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t1029400.shtml.
60 This part is revised from a joint research in which one author is involved. Li and Amer, 
supra note 1, at 84 and 95–98.
61 Hereinafter, the 2000 Delimitation Agreement.
62 Hereinafter, the Fishery Agreement, Hong Tao Nguyen, Maritime Delimitation and Fishery 
Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf, 36 Ocean Development and International Law 35 – 41 
(2005); Keyuan Zou, The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in 
the Gulf of Tonkin, 36 Ocean Development and International Law 127–148 (2005).
63 Protocol on China-Vietnam agreement on fishery cooperation in Beibu Bay signed, People’s 
Daily Online, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200404/30/eng20040430_142001.
html, accessed on 5 May 2013.




The above agreement shows the spirit of support for jda from both govern-
ments. Article 7 of the 2000 China-Vietnam Agreement reads:
In case that any single geophysical structure of oil and gas or other miner-
al deposits should straddle the demarcation line as provided in Article 2 
of this Agreement, the Parties shall, through friendly consultation, reach 
an agreement on the development of the structure or deposit in a most 
effective way as well as on equal sharing of the profits resulting from the 
development.65
An agreement on joint oil exploration in the Gulf of Tonkin was signed on 16 
November 2006.66
Meanwhile, the Fishery Agreement is an example of a two-step solution 
for settling fishing disputes and delimiting the eez and related arrangements 
aiming for better conservation and utilization of the living resources shared 
by both countries. Coordination and cooperation reflected in the fishery ar-
rangements contribute to reasonable utilization and sustainable development 
of living resources as stated in the Delimitation Agreement.67 The regime of 
the eez with regard to fisheries is to be applied after four years for the Transi-
tory Arrangements (TA) and after fifteen years for the Common Fishery Zone 
(cfz).68 Several mechanisms were included to supervise the implementation 
of the two agreements. The Joint Fishery Committee ( jfc) is in charge of the 
implementation of the Fishery Agreement. The expert-level group organized a 
two-year joint research program in the cfz from 2006 to 2007 which includes 
two phases with seventeen aerial surveys.
65 Appendix: Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic 
Zones and Continental Shelves in the Beibu Gulf between the People’s Republic of China 
and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in Zou, supra note 62, at 22 – 24, Appendix B: 
Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the People’s Republic of Chi-
na on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf between the Two Countries in the Tonkin Gulf, in Nguyen Hong Thao, Maritime 
Delimitation and Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf, 36 Ocean Development and 
International Law 41–44 (2005).
66 Gov’t gives nod to Tokin Gulf oil deal with China, from the website of Viet Nam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/
ns070105093635/newsitem_print_preview.
67 Article 8 of the Delimitation Agreement provides that “the contracting parties agree to 
carry on negotiations on related issues regarding the reasonable utilization and sustain-
able development of living resources in the Beibu Gulf (the Gulf of Tonkin) as well as in 
the eez of both countries in the Gulf”, reproduced in Zou, supra note 62, at 24.
68 For more detail, see Zou, supra note 62, at 30–32.
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The expert-level talks on the delimitation of the area outside the mouth of 
the Gulf of Tonkin were initiated in January 2006 and the fifth meeting was 
held in January 2009.69 Such expert-level talks were renewed in 2012 and the 
latest one, dubbed as the 3rd round, was held in May 2013.70 During the nego-
tiation process, jda has been emphasized together with delimitation.
All these post-2002 arrangements and on-going negotiations are benefi-
cial to effective implementation of relevant agreements. By the Delimitation 
Agreement, both countries are obliged to jointly develop oil and gas resourc-
es straddling the boundary. Discussions on jda have been undergoing since 
the initiation of the negotiation on the area outside the mouth of the Gulf of 
Tonkin. These, together with the jda arrangement on fishery in the Gulf of 
Tonkin, contribute to confidence-building between the two countries, which 
will help China and Vietnam resolve disputes in other parts of the South China 
Sea.
b Brunei-Malaysia Agreement
In March 2009, through exchange of letters Brunei and Malaysia seem to have 
resolved their maritime boundaries. Both countries reached an agreement on 
establishing a “Commercial Arrangement Area” to incorporate both countries’ 
oil blocks for sharing revenue from the exploitation of oil and gas.71 The jda in 
the 2009 Brunei-Malaysia Agreement did not involve sovereignty disputes over 
features. It was observed that Malaysia agreed to give up its claims (and hence, 
its sovereign rights) over blocks of hydrocarbon resources (known as Blocks 
L and M) off Borneo in exchange of participation by Malaysian oil company 
(Petronas) in the development of these blocks. This is an exceptional case in 
State practice on joint development in Asia.72 By this agreement, both coun-
tries agreed to establish a joint commercial arrangement area whereby Petro-
nas will participate in the development of Blocks L and M, although the terms 
of the agreement are reportedly still being negotiated.73
69 Ramses Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach to Managing Border Disputes – Lessons, at 
261.
70 Vietnam and China initiate the 3rd round of talks for the working group for maritime delimi-
tation for sea area outside the mouth of Beibu Bei, available at http://www.qdnd.vn/webcn/
zh-cn/120/365/380/245152.html.
71 Li and Amer, supra note 1, at 89; Joint Press Statement by Leaders on the Occasion of the 
Working Visit of yab Dato’ Seri Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
to Brunei Darussalam on 15–16 March 2009, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in 
Negara Brunei Darussalam, available at http:// bn.china-embassy.org/eng/wlxw/t542877 
.htm.
72 Davenport et al, supra note 18, at 20–21.
73 Ibid., at 25.
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2 Joint Development Arrangements for Resources in Overlapping 
Sea Areas
Under this category, two cases have been studied in detail, the 1979/1990 
Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agreement and the 1992 Malaysia- 
Vietnam Agreement.
a Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development in the Gulf of Thailand
The overlapping area claimed by Malaysia and Thailand lies in the southwestern 
part of the Gulf of Thailand. (See Figure 7.1) It is located about 72 km offshore and 
covers 7,238km2. The area corresponds with the northwestern end of the Malaysia 
Basin, which is estimated to have 14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves.74
74 Ong, supra note 11, at 222.
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Figure 7.1 The area under the 1979 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agreement.
Source: David Ong, The 1979 and 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agree-
ments: A Model for International Legal Co-operation in Common Offshore Petro leum 
Deposits? international journal of marine & coastal law, 14, 207 
(1999), at 224.
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In 1972, Malaysia and Thailand successfully delimitated their territorial sea 
boundary and partial continental shelf boundary in the southwestern part of 
the Gulf of Thailand up to a point 29 nautical miles offshore. However, the two 
countries failed to delimit further continental shelf boundary due to disagree-
ment over the effect of Ko Losin in the delimitation.75 On 21 February 1979, 
 Malaysia and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding (mou) on 
a joint development area. The mou established a Joint Authority which has 
all rights and responsibilities on behalf of the two countries for exploration 
and exploitation of the non-living resource of the seabed and subsoil in the 
overlapping  area.76 However, in the following 11 years, the mou was not imple-
mented. As Ong mentioned, the mou is “anything other than an expression of 
intent between the two State parties”.77 On 30 May 1990, both countries signed 
the Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Thailand on the constitution and other Matters Relating to 
the Establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority.78 The mou, com-
prising eight articles, provides the basic principles for joint development. The 
Agreement follows the basic elements of joint development provided in the 
mou and establishes detailed rules and regulations on implementation.79 On 
24 April 1994, both countries and the relevant companies signed a contract for 
joint development.
Even though the 1990 Agreement builds on the legal framework of the 1979 
mou, two major aspects is worth some attention. First, it established in de-
tail the powers and functions of the Joint Authority, and second, it adopted 
a production sharing contract system.80 The Joint Authority consists of two 
chairmen, one from each country, and an equal number of members from each 
country. The 1979 mou incorporated the Joint Authority, while the 1990 Agree-
ment established its constitution. The production sharing contract system 
was one of the different points from the negotiation process between the two 
countries in 1979. According to Article 8 of the 1990 Agreement, “50% of gross 
75 Ko Losia is a islet, which is 1.5 meters high over the sea level, occupied by Thailand. Ko 
Losia has no economic life. Malaysia believed that the islet should not have effect on the 
delimitation, while Thailand insisted it is a valid basepoint. See Ong, supra note 11, at 223. 
Also see Nguyen Hong Thao, Joint Development in the Gulf of Thailand, ibru Boundary 
and Security Bulletin 79–88, 81 (1990).
76 Ong, supra note 11, at 227.
77 Ibid.
78 Hereinafter, the “1990 Agreement”.
79 Schofield, supra note 28, at 293.
80 Masahiro Miyoshi, The Joint development of offshore oil and gas in relation to maritime 
boundary delimitation”, 2 Maritime Briefing 14 (1999).
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production to be applied by the contractor for the recovery of costs; the re-
mainder of gross production to be profit and divided equally between the Joint 
Authority and the contractor; all cost of operations to be borne by the contac-
tor, any dispute arising out of the contract to be referred to arbitration unless 
settled amicably”.
Both the 1979 mou and the 1990 Agreement provide that the jda has an 
interim nature. Article 3(1) of the mou states that the duration of relevant ar-
rangements is 50 years81 unless the delimitation agreement is reached before 
its expiry of the said date.82 Joint development is only a temporary solution 
before final resolution of delimitation of their maritime boundary.
For the purpose of jurisdiction in the joint development area, the two sides 
draw a criminal jurisdiction line running from north to south. However, this 
line does not indicate the continental shelf boundary nor prejudice the sover-
eign rights of either country in the area.83
The fact that it has taken over ten years for the Joint Authority to be consti-
tuted shows that jda in the disputed area is not an easy step. Even so the suc-
cess of the Thailand-Malaysia jda provides evidence for the possibility of jda 
in the disputed waters between two neighboring countries.
b Joint Development Agreement between Malaysia and Vietnam
According to the claims of South Vietnam in 1971 and Malaysia in 1979, there is 
an overlap of 2,800 km2 in the Gulf of Thailand. The overlapping area is a long 
sliver of sea-bed just south to south-east of the designated Malaysia-Thailand 
Joint Development Area.84 On 5 June 1992, Malaysia and Vietnam signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (mou) for the exploration and  exploitation 
of petroleum in the “defined area” of the Gulf of Thailand.85 (See Figure 7.2) 
81 Article 3(1) reads, “There shall be established a Joint Authority to be known as “Malaysia-
Thailand Joint Authority” (thereafter referred to as “the Joint Authority”) for the purpose 
of the exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the sea-bed 
and subsoil in the overlapping area for a period of fifty years commencing from the date 
this Memorandum comes into force”. 1979 Memorandum of Understanding Between 
Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand on the Establishment of the Joint Authority for 
the Exploitation of the Resources of the Sea Bed in a Defined Area of the Continental 
Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/il/
pdf/1979%20MOU%20between%20Malaysia%20and%20Thailand-pdf.pdf.
82 Ibid., Article 6.
83 Article 5 of the mou, also see Miyoshi, supra note 80, at 14.
84 Ong, supra note 11, at 1999, at 242.
85 Ted L McDorman, Malaysia-Vietnam, Report No.1–19, in J.I. Charney and L.M. Alex-
ander (eds.), Volume iii 2335–2344 (1998). The full text of the mou is available at ibid., 
 2341–2344. For more information on the background of the mou, see Thao, supra note 75, 
at 79–88.
149Joint Development in the South China Sea: Is the Time Ripe?
<UN>
The 1992 mou  provides a framework under which the two countries nomi-
nated their national petroleum companies, Petrovietnam and Petronas respec-
tively, to hold talks directly on a commercial agreement for the purpose of joint 
exploring and exploiting the petroleum resources on basis of equality of rights 
and obligations.86 On 29 July 1997, oil was extracted successfully in the JD area, 
which contributed to enhancing economic development as well as their bilat-
eral relation.87
Ong observed that there are main general principles in this jda:
(1) such co-operation between the two parties for the exploration and ex-
ploitation of petroleum resources in the overlapping claim area has been 
agreed pending final delimitation of the area and is without prejudice to 
the position and claims of either country;
(2) in keeping with the provisional nature of the agreement, the duration 
of the Malaysia-Vietnam Memorandum of Understanding is for 40 years 
subject to any extensions and reviews that both parties may agree at a 
relevant juncture;
(3) all costs and benefits derived from the exploration and exploitation of 
the Defined Area shall be borne and shared equally by both Parties;
(4) in respect of the development and management of the petroleum re-
sources in the Defined Area, Petronas for Malaysia and Petrovietnam 
for Vietnam will undertake exploration and exploitation on behalf of 
the two Governments; these two national oil companies will enter into 
a commercial arrangement between themselves for the exploration and 
exploitation of petroleum in the Defined Area, subject to the approval of 
the respective governments.88
Comparing the 1979/1990 Thailand-Malaysia jda and the 1992 Malaysia- 
Vietnam jda, the defined disputed areas in both agreements are located in 
the Gulf of Thailand. The former agreement took ten years for the constitution 
of a joint authority in charge of the operation in the joint zone; in the latter 
agreement, Malaysia and Vietnam assigned their State-owned oil companies, 
Petronas and PetroVietnam respectively, to undertake petroleum exploration 
and exploitation in 1993, and in July 1997 oil was extracted from the Bunga 
Kekwa field.89
86 Ong, supra note 11, at 240.
87 Manh Dong, Maritime Delimitation between Vietnam and Her Neighboring Countries, pre-
sentation on the UN-Nippon Foundation Alumni Meeting, Tokyo, Japan, 13–16 April 2009, 
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/alumni/to-
kyo_alumni_presents_files/alum_tokyo_dong.pdf.
88 Ong, supra note 11, at 242.
89 Li and Amer, supra note 1, at 85; Schofield, supra note 28, at 290; Zou, supra note 8, at 94; 
and Nguyen, supra note 75, at 83–84.
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The Malaysia-Vietnam model is viewed as more flexible than the Malaysia-
Thailand model because the former is unifunctional and sharply focused on 
facilitating petroleum exploration and exploitation at the earliest opportunity 
with minimal governmental participation or interference.90 More notable 
progress during the 1990s included the initiation of trilateral talks among Viet-
nam, Malaysia, and Thailand regarding an area of the Gulf of Thailand where 
claims of the three countries overlapped. These talks were made possible by the 
signing of the maritime boundary agreement between Vietnam and  Thailand 
in 1997. Although the parties agreed in principle on JD in the overlapping area, 
the modalities for such a trilateral scheme have yet to be agreed on.91
90 Nguyen, supra note 75, at 83; and Schofield, supra note 28, at 299.
91 Ramses Amer, Conflict Management within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(asean): Assessing the Adoption of the ‘Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the Trea-
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Figure 7.2 Illustration of the area under the 1992 Malaysia-Vietnam mou.
Source: David Ong, The 1979 and 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development 
 Agreements: A Model for International Legal Co-operation in Common Offshore Pe-
troleum Deposits? 14 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 207, 241 (1999)
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3 Joint Development Attempts92
Under this category there are three cases, namely, the 1982 Cambodia-Vietnam 
historic water arrangement, the 1999 Malaysia-Thailand-Vietnam agreement 
and the 2005 China-Philippines-Vietnam joint seismic exploration agreement.
a 1982 Cambodia-Vietnam Historic Water Arrangement
On 7 July 1982, Vietnam and the then People’s Republic of Kampuchea (prk) 
signed an agreement on “historic waters” located between the coast of Kien 
Giang Province, Phu Quoc Island and the Tho Chu islands on the Vietnamese 
side and the coast of Kampot Province and the Poulo Wai islands on the Cam-
bodian side. The agreement stipulated that the two countries would hold, “at a 
suitable time”, negotiations to determine the maritime frontier in the “historic 
waters”. Pending such a settlement the two sides would continue to regard the 
Brévié Line drawn in 1939 as the diving line for the islands within the “his-
toric waters” and the exploitation of the zone would be decided by “common 
agreement”.93 On 20 July 1983, the two countries signed a Treaty on the settle-
ment of border problems and an Agreement on border regulations.94 On 27 
December 1985 the Treaty on the Delimitation of the Vietnam-Kampuchea 
Frontier was signed by the two countries.95 On 10 October 2005, the two coun-
tries signed a Supplementary Treaty to the 1985 Treaty.96
Management and Resolution of Inter-State Conflicts in Southeast Asia 
117–118 (2003); and Nguyen, supra note 75, at 86.
92 This part is taken from a joint research report with Ramses Amer. Jianwei Li and Ramses 
Amer, Recent Practices in Dispute Management in the South China Sea, in Clive Schofield 
(ed.), Maritime Energy Resources in Asia: Legal Regimes and Coopera-
tion 83 (2012).
93 For the full text of the Agreement of 7 July 1982, see British Broadcasting Corporation, Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Part Three, Far East, 7074 A3/7–8, 10 July 1982. The text of the 
Agreement has also been reproduced in English as “Appendix 2” in Kriangsak Kittichaisa-
ree, The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in South-East Asia 180–181 
(1987); and in Ted L. McDorman, Cambodia-Vietnam in Jonathan I. Charney and Lew-
is M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries, Volume  iii 
2364–2365 (1998). Interestingly enough, the “full text” of the Agreement transmitted by the 
official Cambodian news agency (spk) on 8 July omitted the sentence: “Patrolling and sur-
veillance in these historical waters will be jointly conducted by the two sides”, which was 
included in Article 3 of the version published by Vietnam News Agency and reproduced 
in Kittichaisaree’s study (BBC/FE/7074 A3/8, 7076/A3/7, 13 July 1982); and Kittichaisaree, 
op. cit., at 180–181.
94 BBC/FE/7393 A3/1 (23 July 1983). See also Quang Nghia, Vietnam-Kampuchea Border Issue 
Settled, 4 Vietnam Courier 8–9(1986).
95 For reports from Vietnam and the prk announcing the signing of the Treaty and for de-
tails, see BBC/FE/8143 A3/1–3, 30 December 1985. See also, Quang, supra note 94, at 8–9.
96 PM Khai holds talks with Cambodian counterpart, from the website of the Ministry of 




In this case, some political actors within Cambodia have opposed the agree-
ments signed with Vietnam in the 1980s, including the 1982 Agreement on 
“historical waters”.97 The effect of the 1982 Cambodia-Vietnam Historic Waters 
Agreement was that Cambodia effectively gave up its claim over Phu Quoc 
 Island although it arguably simply endorsed a situation that had been preva-
lent for some time.98
b 1999 Malaysia-Thailand-Vietnam Agreement
In 1999, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam agreed in principle to undertake joint 
development in the tripartite overlapping area where Vietnam’s 200 eez and 
continental shelf overlap with the Thailand -Malaysian jda of 1979.99 The tri-
partite arrangement is based on two bilateral jdas concluded between Malay-
sia and Thailand in 1979, and Malaysia and Vietnam in 1992 respectively.100 The 
tripartite talks were made possible only by the signing of the maritime bound-
ary agreement between Vietnam and Thailand in 1997. Although the parties 
agreed in principle on joint development in the overlapping area, the modali-
ties for such a trilateral scheme have yet to be agreed on.101 When the tripartite 
accord becomes effective, it will be the first multilateral agreement on joint 
development in the region.102
c 2005 China-Philippine-Vietnam Joint Seismic Undertaking Agreement
The tripartite agreement started from a bilateral agreement which was signed 
between the Chinese oil company (cnooc) and the Philippine National Oil 
Company on 11 November 2003. By this agreement, a joint committee will be 
set up to help select exploring areas in the South China Sea. As a follow-up, 
the two State oil companies signed an agreement on joint seismic work in the 
Sino- Philippine disputed area in the South China Sea. Applauded by the two 
 governments as being important for maintaining peace and stability in the 
South China Sea, this agreement met with some opposition in the Philippines, 
because, put by the Philippine side, “the joint exploration will be conducted in 
the North-West Palawan offshore area, ‘not even close enough to the Spratlys’”.103
97 Kittichaisaree, supra note 93; and Ted L. McDorman, Cambodia-Vietnam, in Jonathan I. 
Charney and Lewis M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Bound-
aries, Volume iii, 2364–2365 (1998).
98 Davenport et al, supra note 18, at 20.
99 Ana Placida D. Espina, Recent Development in the South China Sea and Prospects for Joint 
Development, rcaps Working Paper Series “Dojo”, RPD-12001, at 13.
100 Ibid., at 13–14.
101 Amer, supra note 91, at 117–118. Li and Amer, supra note 1, at 88–89.
102 Nguyen Hong Thao, Vietnam and Joint Development in the Gulf of Thailand, 8 Asian 
Yearbook of International Law 138–139 (2003).
103 Zou, supra note 8, at 103.
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On 14 March 2005, further developments occurred when the national oil 
companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam signed the Tripartite Agree-
ment for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South 
China Sea. It was arranged that all activities in the agreement area must be 
discussed among the concerned parties and the seismic survey and research 
be carried out in a 143,000 km2 area in the South China Sea, including parts 
of the disputed Spratly Islands, for a period of three years. The signing of the 
agreement “would not undermine the basic position held by the Government 
of each party on the South China Sea issue”. The agreement showed the deter-
mination of the involved parties to abide by the doc and the parties expressed 
their “resolve to transform the South China Sea into an area of peace, stability, 
cooperation and development”.104
Although jmsua was within the framework of marine scientific research 
and did not include any arrangements relating to exploitation of resources in 
the area, it is obvious that such activities aim for future exploitation therein.
In conclusion, since all disputant countries have ratified unclos and they 
are signatories to the 2002 doc and the 2011 Guiding Principles, they were 
bound legally or politically to make efforts to cooperate in the disputed wa-
ters pending the final resolution of the maritime disputes. By government 
statements and/or bilateral government-to-government documents between 
the claimant countries, all the countries expressed their willingness to come 
into cooperative arrangements including jda for resources exploitation in 
the South China Sea. There are two successful jda cases in the region, the 
1979/1990 Malaysia-Thailand jda and the 1992 Malaysia-Vietnam jda. Tripar-
tite agreements have been attempted, with one being halted and one still un-
der discussion. The friendly inter-State relations are important for the success 
of any jda, meanwhile domestic attitudes and political will within individual 
claimant countries could never be ignored.
IV Implications for the South China Sea
The South China Sea is believed to be rich in marine resources, including oil 
and gas. According to an estimation from the u.s. Energy Information Admin-
istration (eia), there are approximately 11 billion barrels (bbl) of oil reserves 
and 190 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves in the South China 
Sea.105 These numbers include both proved and probable reserves. Besides 
104 Revised from a joint work, Li and Amer, supra note 1, at 91.




that, the South China Sea may have hydrocarbons in underexplored areas. The 
u.s. Geological Survey (usgs) estimates that the South China Sea may con-
tain between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70 and 290 trillion 
cubic feet of gas in undiscovered resources.106 In the South China Sea, the sea 
area outside the Mouth of Gulf of Tonkin, Reed Bank (Liyue Tan in Chinese) 
and Vanguard Basin (Wan’an Basin) may be potential ideal areas for jdas. (See 
Figure 7.3)
A Area Outside the Mouth of Gulf of Tonkin (Wankou Wai)
As suggested above, after reaching the agreement of the maritime boundaries 
delimitation and fishery cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000, China and 
Vietnam began to negotiate the delimitation of the area outside the mouth of 
Gulf of Tonkin. In February 2012, Vietnam and China’s Deputy Foreign Minis-
ters held talks in Beijing. They agreed to establish working groups at the depart-
ment level to negotiate on the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. They also agreed 
to set up working groups to cooperate in “less sensitive sea domains”. Up till 
mid-2013 three rounds of talks at the department level were held to negotiate 
possible jda in areas outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin.107
Both countries have shown strong political will in pushing ahead with jda in 
this area when negotiations on maritime delimitation are undergoing.108 How-
ever, one comment goes that the existence of different attitudes towards the Par-
acels will continue to haunt their negotiation and cooperation process. In such 
a case, common support for defining an area for jda must be a welcome sign.109
B Reed Bank (Liyue Tan)
Reed Bank, claimed by both China and the Philippines, is reported to be rich 
in hydrocarbon resources, 3.9 million cubic feet of gas, 35 million barrels of oil 
and 21 billion barrels of methane hydrate.110 Recently, the Philippines carried 
106 Ibid.
107 Ramses Amer and Jianwei Li, How to Manage China-Vietnam Territorial Disputes, China & 
US Focus, 18 April 2013, available at http://www.chinausfocus.com/print/?id=27029.
108 See the above-mentioned bilateral joint communiques in 2008 as well as talks between 
top leaders.
109 Anon, Gloomy prospect is observed on China-Vietnam negotiation on the delimitation of 
the area outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin [Zhongyue Beibuwan Wankouwai Haiyu 
 Huajie Tanpan Bei zhi Qianjing Andan] available at http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/ 
2012–07/2884875.html.
110 Chen Bingxian, An Analysis of the South China Sea Policy of Philippines in Recent Years 
[Qiantan Jinnianlai Feilubin de Nanhai Zhengce], 22(5) Journal of Wuzhou University 
34 (2012); Wang Lianhe, On the New Trends and Prospects of the South China Sea Disputes 
[Nanhai Wenti Xinqushi Ji Qianjing Chutan], 4 Southeast Asian Studies 38 (2012).
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Figure 7.3 Illustration of areas of overlapping claims in the South China Sea proper.
Source: Maritime Energy Resources in Asia: Energy and Geopolitics, 




out unilateral exploration activities, which have been met with strong protests 
from China.
In August 2009, the Philippine government gave approval to a UK company, 
Forum Energy, and its partner to carry out oil and gas exploration in the area 
around Reed Bank. Early 2011, Forum Energy was endowed with two years’ con-
tract for oil and gas exploration in Block SC72 which is located in the disputed 
area. On 2 March, two fighters from the Philippine Air Force were dispatched 
to assist the exploration of the UK company and standoff occurred between 
the fighters and China’s maritime patrol vessels.111 On 30 June, the Philippine 
Ministry of Energy issued a commercial bidding of 15 oil blocks, part of which 
are perceived by China as located in the disputed area.112
In 2012, during the period of the “Huangyan Island Incident”, it was reported 
that a Philippine mining company was negotiating with cnooc to pursue jda 
for oil and gas off the Liyue Bank. In response to the report, Chinese spokes-
man stated, “We support more exchanges and cooperation between Chinese 
and the Philippine companies. On the oil and gas development in waters off 
the Liyue Bank, China’s attitude is clear. The Liyue Bank is part of China’s Nan-
sha Islands. It will harm China’s rights and interests if the Philippines engage 
in unilateral development in this area. China is firmly opposed to that. At the 
same time, China is ready to discuss joint development with the Philippines. 
But the key is that they should show sincerity”.113
Since mid-2011, the Philippines and Vietnam have taken measures in which 
it is indicated that they are moving ahead to explore and exploit the hydrocar-
bon resources in areas which they believe to be not in disputed area while Chi-
na believes to be under their jurisdiction.114 Tensions increased due to these 
perceived unilateral exploration activities. It was suggested that the claim-
ant States, at least China, the Philippines and Vietnam, take immediate steps 
111 Ian Lewis, China rattles its sabre over disputed reserves, Petroleum Economist, May 
2011.
112 Ju Hailong, South China Sea Policy of the Philippines: Interest Driven Policy Choice [Feilubin 
Nanhai Zhengce: Liyi Qudong De Zhengce Xuanze], 3 Journal of Contemporary 
Asia-Pacific Studies 86 (2012).
113 China Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2102, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regu-
lar Press Conference on 9 May 2012, available at http://medan.chineseconsulate.org/eng/
fyrth/t930925.htm.
114 Ramses Amer, and Jianwei Li, Recent Developments in the South China Sea – Assessing the 
China-Vietnam and China-Philippines Relationships, Paper prepared for the International 
Conference on Recent Development of the South China Sea Dispute and Prospects of Joint 
Development Regime, Organised by the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, 
Haikou, China, 6–7 December 2012.
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to clarify their claims and define the areas in dispute (and not in dispute),115 
which would be beneficial to initiation of jda.
Zou in 2006 listed three reasons for the claimant countries to take jda in 
the South China Sea. First, political will is strong because all the claimant 
 countries in the South China Sea region need a good environment for their 
social and economic development, and jdas can stabilize the South China Sea 
region. Second, jdas can lead to rational use of the South China Sea resources 
when competition of different kind of uses and among surrounding countries 
are increasing. Third, through jdas confidence can be enhanced among claim-
ant countries, which is conducive to expanding regional cooperation.116 Fur-
thermore, the increasing demand for offshore energy resources coupled with 
the difficulty to do so due to territorial disputes make jdas an attractive choice 
for the claimant countries.117
The advantages of jdas which Zou listed above exist in the South China Sea. 
The two pushing factors, namely, demand for energy and difficulty for unilat-
eral exploration which the cil conference report pointed out are increasing. 
Now maybe the time is coming for the claimant countries to pool together 
their determination and to negotiate through persistence and compromise to 
put jdas from paper to reality. Beckman’s suggestion of finding the disputed 
waters which may be generated from what all agree as disputed land features 
might be a feasible way to start with.
V Conclusion
It may be still true that a customary rule enjoining jdas is ultimately not prov-
en and the concept of jda is still evolving. jdas may expand to cover any coop-
erative arrangements for activities at sea where a boundary passing through or 
delimitation negotiations are undergoing and where rational utilization of the 
marine resources therein requires ignoring those artificial boundaries. jdas 
are attempts to fulfill an obligation under unclos. As to the South China Sea 
region, jdas also reflect the efforts from claimant States in implementing the 
doc.
All claimant States involved in the South China Sea disputes have experi-
enced jdas one way or another, successful ones or ones in principle. There 
are two successful jda cases in the region, the 1979/1990 Malaysia-Thailand 
115 Beckman, supra note 18, at 12.
116 Zou, supra note 8, at 98.
117 Davenport et al, supra note 18, at 34.
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jda and the 1992 Malaysia-Vietnam jda. Tripartite agreements have been at-
tempted, with one joint seismic exploration being halted and the other among 
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam under discussion. The friendly inter-State 
relations are important for the success of any jda, meanwhile domestic at-
titudes and political will within individual claimant countries will also affect 
such practices. Various jdas in the broader South China Sea Region have pro-
vided useful models for international legal co-operation on the exploitation of 
common hydrocarbon deposits, as well as options for the most disputed South 
China Sea proper.
It seems that time has come for some sort of jda to happen in one way or 
another. China, as the largest State in size and economic power, needs to play 
a major role in the search for conflict management measures, including jda, 
before the final resolution of the South China Sea disputes. Once a small step 
forward is made, such as a jda in the area where there are only two claim-
ants – outside the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin between China and Vietnam 
or around Reed Bank between China and the Philippines, the region will be 
moving towards long-term peace and stability.
Part 3
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Peaceful Use of the Sea and Military Intelligence 
Gathering in the eez
Keyuan Zou
I Introduction
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (los Convention)1 
is regarded as a global ocean code governing maritime zones and human activi-
ties therein. According to it, maritime space is divided into several zones either 
under or beyond national jurisdiction of a coastal State: internal waters within 
the baselines are treated the same as the land territory of a State and under the 
full sovereignty of that State; territorial seas are also under the sovereignty of 
the coastal State only subject to the provisions of the los Convention allowing 
foreign ships to exercise the right of innocent passage; exclusive economic zone 
(eez) which extends outward 200 nautical miles from the baselines where the 
coastal State enjoys sovereign rights to natural resources and national jurisdic-
tion over certain maritime activities including marine scientific research; the 
legal status of the continental shelf is similar to that of the eez, but for broad 
continental shelf countries, they may claim it up to 350 nautical miles; high 
seas which are open to all; and the international seabed which is now under the 
governance of the International Seabed Authority.
The concept of the eez is relatively new in the international law of the sea 
in comparison with the territorial sea regime and has some unique character-
istics. Thus, it is defined as a maritime zone sui generis. Article 56 of the los 
Convention provides that a coastal State has “sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources” 
and other activities for the economic exploration and exploitation, as well as 
jurisdiction with regard to “the establishment and use of artificial islands, in-
stallations and structures, marine scientific research, and the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment”. However, some high seas rights, in-
cluding the freedom of navigation and overflight, are preserved in the eez. 
Furthermore, such rights include “other international lawful uses of the sea 
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 21 
ilm 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
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related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, 
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines”,2 which has invited controver-
sial interpretations in terms of military uses including military intelligence 
 gathering in the eez of another coastal State.
Recent maritime incidents having occurred in East Asia, for example, the 
EP-3E Spy Airplane Incident in 2001,3 have raised a number of legal issues in 
the context of the development of the law of the sea, particularly of the eez 
regime. Because the eez regime is relatively new, it is quite understandable 
that many new issues will arise during its implementation after the entry into 
force of the los Convention.
II Peaceful Use of the Seas and Foreign Military Activities in the eez
According to the los Convention, all the seas in the world shall be used peace-
fully, and any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations 
shall be prohibited.4 From this basic legal principle, military activities includ-
ing military intelligence gathering with threatening potentials should not be 
carried out in the eezs of other countries.
2 See Art. 58, los Convention.
3 On 1 April 2001, while a U.S. EP-3E Aries ii airplane was conducting espionage activities near 
the Chinese coast in the South China Sea, it was intercepted by two Chinese F-8 fighter jets 
and then collided with one of the jets. The damaged Chinese jet crashed into the water and 
the pilot died. The damaged American airplane made an emergency landing in China’s Hain-
an Island at Lingshui and all the crewmembers were safe. The incident immediately became 
a diplomatic issue between China and the United States. China accused the United States of 
encroaching on China’s territorial sovereignty and of violation of international law as well as 
of relevant Chinese laws, and demanded an apology and compensation from the American 
side. The United States responded that the reconnaissance airplane operated outside China’s 
territorial waters and that the airplane landed in distress. For that reason, the United States 
refused to render an apology; and instead demanded China to immediately return the Ameri-
can crew and the airplane. After several rounds of diplomatic contacts, the United States 
finally sent a letter to China on 11 April 2001, expressing its sincere regret over the Chinese 
missing pilot and aircraft and used the word “sorry” for their loss. The letter also used the 
word “sorry” for the American airplane’s entering of China’s airspace and landing without 
verbal clearance. On the next day, China allowed all 24 crewmembers to leave China. How-
ever, the American damaged spy airplane did not leave China until 3 July 2001 after it had 
been dismantled and packed. The Chinese side asked for one million US dollars for the costs 
relating to the aircraft but the Americans only offered the amount of 34,567 US dollars which 
was refused by the Chinese. For related information, see, State Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional 
Immunities: Aerial Incident off the Coast of China, 95 ajil 631–633 (2001).
4 See Art. 301, los Convention.
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According to one scholar, military use of oceans consists of two categories: 
movement rights and operational rights. The former embraces the notion of 
mobility and includes such legal rights as transit passage through straits used 
for international navigation, innocent passage in territorial seas and archipe-
lagic waters, and high seas freedom of navigation and overflight, and the lat-
ter includes such activities as task force maneuvering, anchoring, intelligence 
collection and surveillance, military exercises, ordnance testing and firing, and 
hydrographic and military surveys.5 For the purpose of this article, military ac-
tivities refer to those activities in the second category as defined above, i.e., 
other than simple navigation or overflight.
As we know, there is a controversy on whether the conduct of military ac-
tivities in the eez of another country is legitimate. Some States may invoke 
Article 58(1) of the los Convention to justify their military activities in oth-
er countries’ eez. The provision reads: “[i]n the exclusive economic zone, all 
States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions 
of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in Article 87 of navigation and 
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other in-
ternationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those 
associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipe-
lines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention”. Freedoms 
on the high seas provided in Article 87 are thus applicable to the eez as long 
as they are not contrary to other provisions of the los Convention. According 
to maritime powers such as the United States, the term freedoms “associated 
with the operation of ships, aircraft” implies the legality of naval maneuvers 
in a foreign eez.6 One view even considers military exercises, aerial reconnais-
sance and all other activities of military aircraft freedom of high seas if due 
regard is paid to the rights and interests of third States.7 As advocated, since 
the los Convention mainly provides the rights of navigation and overflight, 
while keeping silent on the rights of military activities, maritime superpower 
must defend and enforce such rights for its security interests.
5 Charles E. Pirtle, Military Uses of Ocean Space and the Law of the Sea in the New Millennium, 
31 Ocean Development and International Law 8 (2000).
6 See Boleslaw Adam Boczek, Peacetime Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone of 
Third Countries, 19 Ocean Development and International Law 450 (1988).
7 Kay Hailbronner, Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77 ajil 503 
(1983). A US operational commander opined that the eez regime “does not permit the 
coastal state to limit traditional non-resources related high seas activities in this eez, such as 
task force maneuvering, flight operations, military exercises, telecommunications and space 
activities, intelligence and surveillance activities, marine data collection, and weapons’ test-
ing and firing”. Walter F. Doran, An Operational Commander’s Perspective on the 1982 los 
 Convention, 10 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 341 (1995).
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The los Convention does not mention military use so that it becomes a gray 
area which leads to different interpretations. This no-mention is criticized as 
one of the major defects in the new los Convention. On the other hand, it 
is argued that without an express mention in the Convention, military use is 
hardly regarded as one of such lawful uses. However, such argument may not 
be convincing. According to a fundamental legal principle, nothing is illegal 
if there is no law to make it so. Following this, military use is not prohibited 
since there is no such prohibition in the los Convention. Second, as the los 
Convention affirms that matters which are not regulated under it should be 
continually governed by general international law including customary law. 
If it is traced back to look at history, military activities were consistently al-
lowed under customary international law, though in the implied form. Third, 
it is admitted that there is a difficulty in inferring that the establishment of 
the eez has limited foreign military operations other than pure navigation 
and communication from the text and legislative history of Article 58 of the 
los Convention.8
The allowance of military activities under international law does not mean 
that they can be conducted in the eez without any regulation. It should be 
borne in mind that the circumstances now are fundamentally different from 
those in the past. There was and still remains no controversy regarding the 
military activities conducted in the high seas which was and is open to all. 
The eez is different from the high seas in that it is an area under national ju-
risdiction. While military activities are allowed there, the factor of national 
jurisdiction must be taken into account. There should be some kind of check-
and-balance mechanism for foreign military activities in the eez. It is hard to 
understand the logic of the argument that while marine scientific research in 
the eez is subject to the consent of the coastal State, military activities can be 
conducted freely without any check by the coastal State. On the other hand, 
even if the military use is an internationally lawful use, it can be argued ac-
cording to the los Convention that it is limited to navigation and overflight, 
and other rights as provided in Article 87 of the Convention. This can be seen 
from some domestic eez legislations, such as Suriname’s, as it provides, all na-
tions, with the observance of the international law, enjoy: “… 4. Freedom to 
exercise internationally recognized rights in connection with navigation and 
communication”.9
8 Francesco Francioni, Peacetime Use of Force, Military Activities, and the New Law of the Sea, 18 
Cornell International Law Journal 216 (1985).
9 Art. 5 of Law Concerning the Extension of the Territorial Sea and the Establishment of a 
Contiguous Economic Zone of 11 June 1978, in Division for Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, The Law of 
the Sea: National Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone 351 (1993). 
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In practice, coastal States, including Bangladesh,10 Brazil, Cape Verde, India,11 
Pakistan,12 and Uruguay13 explicitly restrict unapproved military exercises 
or activities in or over their eezs conducted by other countries. According to 
 Brazilian law, military exercises or maneuvers, in particular those that imply 
the use of weapons or explosives, can only be carried out with the consent 
of the Brazilian Government.14 Brazil is perhaps the most adamant country 
which strictly regulates foreign military activities in its eez. As early as Decem-
ber 1982 when Brazil signed the los Convention, it made a statement of this 
kind which was reiterated several times afterwards. The United States reacted 
to it on each occasion by protesting against Brazil’s restrictions and stating its 
reservation of military exercises in Brazil’s eez as internationally lawful uses 
 Honduras’ law contains a similar provision (Art. 2 of Decree No. 921 of 13 June 1980 on the 
Utilization of Marine Natural Resources), see Division for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, ibid., at 129.
10 The Bangladesh Declaration states: “The Government of the People’s Republic of Bangla-
desh understands that the provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to 
carry out in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf military exercise 
or manoeuvres, in particular, those involving the use of weapons or explosives, without 
the consent of the coastal State”. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/convention_declarations.htm.
11 The Indian Declaration states: “The Government of the Republic of India understands 
that the provisions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out in the 
exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres, 
in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives without the consent of 
the coastal State”. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ 
convention_declarations.htm.
12 The Pakistani Declaration states: “It is the understanding of the Government of the Is-
lamic Republic of Pakistan that the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
do not in any way authorize the carrying out in the exclusive economic zone and in the 
continental shelf of any coastal State military exercises or manoeuvres by other States, 
in particular where the use of weapons or explosives is involved, without the consent 
of the coastal State concerned”. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_ 
agreements/convention_declarations.htm.
13 The Uruguay Declaration states: “In the exclusive economic zone, enjoyment of the free-
dom of international communication in accordance with the way it is defined and in 
accordance with other relevant provisions of the Convention excludes any non-peaceful 
use without the consent of the coastal State - for instance, military exercises or other ac-
tivities which may affect the rights or interests of that State; and it also excludes the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity, political independence, peace or security 
of the coastal State”. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_declarations.htm.
14 Article 9 of the Act concerning the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of Brazil and other provisions: Act No. 8617 of 
4 January 1993, in Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office 
of Legal Affairs, United Nations, supra note 9, at 38.
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of the ocean.15 The other typical country is Iran which also lays down laws 
restricting foreign military activities in its eez by stipulating that “[f]oreign 
military activities and practices, collection of information and any other activ-
ity inconsistent with the rights and interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
in the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf are prohibited”. Be-
cause of this legal provision, there was a diplomatic row between Iran and the 
United States. The United States lodged a protest against it by stating that the 
prohibition of military activities contravenes international law and the United 
States reserves its rights in this regard. In reply to the United States protest, 
the Iranian diplomatic note states that due to the multiplicity of economic 
activities, it is possible that such activities, for which the coastal State enjoys 
sovereign rights, could be harmed by military practices and maneuvers; ac-
cordingly, those practices which affect the economic activities in the eez and 
the continental shelf are thus prohibited. It is interesting to note that the Ira-
nian explanation does not deny the right of foreign military activities in the 
eez and the only reason for their prohibition results in their possible harm to 
economic activities there.
Relating to East Asia, it is worthy to mention Malaysia’s position. As stated, 
“the Malaysian Government also understands that the provisions of the Con-
vention do not authorize other States to carry out military exercises or ma-
noeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives in 
the eez without the consent of the coastal State”.16 According to a prominent 
Malaysian scholar, there are three reasons to explain Malaysia’s position. First, 
in Malaysia’s view, there is no law that prohibits coastal State jurisdiction over 
foreign military activities in the eez. Moreover, unauthorized foreign military 
activities can undermine a coastal State’s security, particularly if they are non-
peaceful in nature. Second, the los Convention is a treaty where the provision 
on foreign military activities in the eez is a new and controversial concept, 
rather than customary international law. Third, the provision on military ac-
tivities in the eez is not consistent with the principle of peaceful uses of the 
sea. Malaysia views foreign military activities in its eez as undermining and 
threatening its security as well.17
15 For details, see J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, United States Respons-
es to Excessive Maritime Claims 409–413 (1996).
16 Malaysian Declaration, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agree 
ments/convention_declarations.htm.
17 See BA Hamzah, Military Activities in the eez: Preliminary Views from Malaysia, in Shi-
cun Wu and Keyuan Zou (eds.), Securing the Safety of Navigation in East 
Asia: Legal and  Political Dimensions (2015).
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The regulations above are made under the rationale that military activities 
are inherently potential threats to peace and good order of the coastal States. 
While such regulations are understandable, it should be borne in mind that 
not all military activities are threatening. Contrarily, some military activities, 
such as the activities undertaken by the UN peacekeeping forces, are indis-
pensable to maintain peace and good order. In the same thinking, some civil-
ian activities may be threatening and this can be illustrated by a severe marine 
pollution accident caused by a civilian activity or illegal fishing in the eez. In 
such context, what we should look into is not the form of a certain activity, but 
its nature. If a military activity is threatening in nature and with clear bad in-
tention and/or in a hostile manner, it should be banned in the eez. Otherwise, 
it can be allowed under certain conditions laid down by the coastal State, simi-
lar to the marine scientific research regime under the los Convention. There 
is no reason why the coastal State is prevented from regulating foreign military 
activities in its eez while it is allowed to regulate foreign marine scientific re-
search there.
There is a discrepancy regarding the concept of the eez between the  legal 
term and the operational term. The United States navy divides the ocean 
into two categories: national waters and international waters, for operational 
and mobility purposes.18 The eez is accordingly categorized as “international 
waters”.19 However, it must be pointed out that it is only an expression for 
operational purposes, thus in no way affecting the legal nature of the eez as a 
maritime zone within national jurisdiction under the los Convention.
It is worth mentioning that the East-West Center once organized several 
workshops on “military and intelligence gathering activities in the eez”. The 
launch of this series of workshops was triggered by the EP-3 Incident between 
China and the United States. The first one was held in Bali, Indonesia in June 
18 National waters include internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters, and in-
ternational waters include contiguous zones, eez, high seas and security zones. See De-
partment of the Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations 1–4, 1–6 (1995).
19 The term “international waters” is even questioned by retired naval officials. See Paul 
(Pete) Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Mili-
tary Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 Chinese Journal of Interna-
tional Law 19 (2010), (“continued reliance on the term ‘international waters’ by the 
United States muddies the waters and unnecessarily allows China to divert attention 
from the legitimacy of the US position by arguing that the United States does not know 
the difference between the eez and the high seas. The United States should therefore 




2002, which focused on identifying disagreements and contrasting  positions 
as well as on areas of possible mutual understanding and agreement.20 The 
Tokyo Meeting in February 2003 acknowledged that with the technology 
 advances in the eezs, intelligence gathering activities would increase.21 The 
Honolulu Meeting in December 2003 went further and some guidelines for 
military and intelligence gathering activities in the eezs were drafted, based 
on the  disagreement between maritime powers and developing coastal coun-
tries.22 According to the Guidelines drafted by the study group, “ships and 
aircraft of a State undertaking military activities in the eez of another State 
have the obligation to use the ocean for peaceful purposes only, and to refrain 
from the threat or use of force, or provocative acts, such as stimulating or 
exciting the defensive systems of the coastal State; collecting information to 
support the use of force against the coastal State; or establishing a ‘sea base’ 
within another State’s eez without its consent. The user State should have 
due regard for the rights of others to use the sea including the coastal State 
and comply with its obligations under international law”.23 Furthermore, 
“warships or aircraft of a State intending to carry out a major military exer-
cise in the eez of another State should inform the coastal State and others 
through a timely navigational warning of the time, date and areas involved in 
the exercise, and if possible, invite observers from the coastal State to witness 
the exercise”.24 As for military surveying, the Guidelines provides that “mari-
time surveillance may be conducted by states for peaceful purposes in areas 
claimed by other states as eez and should not prejudice the jurisdictional 
rights and responsibilities of the coastal state within its eez”.25 Unfortunately, 
these constructive guidelines are rejected by the United States despite the 
involvement of American scholars in the drafting process.
20 For details, see East-West Center, Military and Intelligence Gathering Ac-
tivities in Exclusive Economic Zones: Consensus and Disagreement: A 
Summary of the Bali Dialogue (2002).
21 For details, see East-West Center, The Regime of the Exclusive Economic 
Zones: Issues and Responses: A Report of the Tokyo Meeting (2003).
22 See Hasjim Djalal, Alexander Yankov and Anthony Bergin, Draft guidelines for military and 
intelligence gathering activities in the eez and their means and manner of implementation 
and enforcement, 29 (2) Marine Policy 175–183 (2005).
23 See, Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 16 September 
2005, Tokyo, available at http://www.sof.or.jp/en/report/pdf/200509_20051205_e.pdf.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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III Hydrographic Surveying and Military Intelligence Gathering
There is another grey area, which is also related to military intelligence gather-
ing in the eez, i.e., hydrographic surveying when it is undertaken for military 
purposes. The International Hydrographic Bureau defines “hydrographic sur-
veying” as “a survey having for its principal purpose the determination of data 
relating to bodies of water. A hydrographic surveying may consist of the deter-
mination of one or several of the following classes of data: depth of water, con-
figuration and nature of the bottom; directions and force of currents; heights 
and times of tides and water stages; and location of topographic features and 
fixed objects for survey and navigation purposes”.26
Although some wordings like “survey activities” and “hydrographic survey” 
appear in the los Convention, the Convention does not contain any provision 
specifically governing this kind of marine activity. The grey and ambiguous 
area is further widened in the context of the relevant provisions of the los 
Convention regarding marine scientific research (msr).
The los Convention contains a whole part on msr (Part xiii) with 6 sections 
and 28 provisions. It recognises the right of all States and competent inter-
national organisations in the world to conduct msr in accordance with the 
Convention (Art. 238). msr, as a good thing for human beings, should be pro-
moted, and international cooperation in this respect is much appreciated. The 
conduct of msr should follow the four principles below:
(a) msr should be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes;
(b) msr should be conducted with appropriate scientific methods and 
means compatible with the los Convention;
(c) msr should not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the 
sea compatible with the los Convention and should be duly respected in 
the course of such uses; and
(d) msr should be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations 
adopted in conformity with the los Convention including those for the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment (Art. 240).
The los Convention sets forth different regulations regarding msr conducted 
in different sea zones. For the territorial sea and internal waters, the coastal 
State has the exclusive right to regulate, authorise and conduct msr. Without 
the express consent from the coastal State, msr to be conducted by foreigners 




are not allowed therein (Art. 245). Such a provision is understandable since the 
territorial sea is commonly regarded as part of the territory of the coastal State.
For the eez and the continental shelf, the legal governance in the los 
Convention differs from that for the territorial sea. The coastal State, for the 
purpose of exercising its jurisdiction, has the right to regulate, authorise and 
conduct msr in the eez and on the continental shelf. msr should be con-
ducted with the consent of the coastal State (Art. 246). It is noted that the 
word “express” does not appear here in the provisions for the msr in the eez 
and continental shelf. This is because the legal status of the eez and the conti-
nental shelf is different from that of the territorial sea in that the coastal State 
can only exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its eez and continental 
shelf, but not full sovereignty. However, there are still a number of require-
ments contained in the los Convention to protect the interests and respect 
the legitimate rights of the coastal State. The foreign related msr projects in 
the eez and on the continental shelf of a coastal State should be carried out 
“exclusively for the peaceful purposes and in order to increase scientific knowl-
edge of the marine  environment for the benefit of all mankind”,27 and should 
not unjustifiably interfere with activities undertaken by a coastal State in the 
exercise of its sovereign rights and jurisdiction under the los Convention.28
The researching State or international organisation bears the duty to com-
ply with certain conditions to conduct its msr. First, the research conductor 
has the duty to provide to the coastal State detailed information on the msr to 
be conducted in the eez or on the continental shelf of the coastal State not less 
than six months in advance (Art. 248). Second, the conductor has the duty to 
comply with the following conditions: “(a) ensure the right of the coastal State, 
if it so desires, to participate or be represented in the marine scientific research 
project, especially on board research vessels and other craft or scientific re-
search installations, when practicable, without payment of any remuneration 
to the scientists of the coastal State and without obligation to contribute to-
wards the costs of the project; (b) provide the coastal State, at its request, with 
preliminary reports, as soon as practicable, and with the final results and con-
clusions after the completion of the research; (c) undertake to provide access 
for the coastal State, at its request, to all data and samples derived from the 
marine scientific  research project and likewise to furnish it with data which 
may be copied and samples which may be divided without detriment to their 
scientific value; (d) if requested, provide the coastal State with an assessment 
27 Art. 246 (3), los Convention.
28 Art. 246 (8), los Convention.
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of such data, samples and research results or provide assistance in their assess-
ment or interpretation; (e) ensure, subject to paragraph 2, that the research 
results are made internationally available through appropriate national or in-
ternational channels, as soon as practicable; (f) inform the coastal State imme-
diately of any major change in the research programme; (g) unless otherwise 
agreed, remove the scientific  research installations or equipment once the 
 research is completed”.29
The coastal State has the right to require the suspension or cessation of any 
msr activities in case of any non-compliance with the provisions in Articles 
248 and 249 of the los Convention (Art. 253). On the other hand, the coastal 
State should not make excessive measures beyond the authorisation under 
the los Convention, otherwise it may be responsible and liable for them and 
should provide correspondent compensation.30 It should be noted that under 
the los Convention, any msr activity should not constitute the legal basis for 
any claim to any part of the marine environment or its resources (Art. 241). 
This is particularly important for disputed sea areas which are claimed by two 
or more countries. In practice, countries usually tend to maximize their use of 
evidences including msr activities to justify their relevant territorial claims to 
a particular sea area or its resources.
It is clear from the above that the msr regime focuses mainly on the msr in 
the eez and on the continental shelf. The related provisions are most delicate 
and complex in comparison with the provisions on msr in the territorial sea, 
or archipelagic waters. That part of the provisions were mostly debated during 
the unclos iii, reflecting the compromise between the advanced countries 
with strong msr capability and the developing countries which are relatively 
poor and inadequate for sound msr.
The los Convention contains no definition on msr. During the unclos 
iii, the Chairman of the Third Committee included the flowing definition 
in the isnt, Part iii: “Marine scientific research means any study or related 
experimental work designed to increase man’s knowledge of the marine 
environment”.31 However, such a definition was not finally included in the 
adopted Convention. The United States tried to define msr as “the general 
term most often used to describe those activities undertaken in the ocean 
and coastal waters to expand scientific knowledge of the marine environment 
29 Art. 249 (1), los Convention.
30 Art. 263 (2), los Convention.




and its processes”.32 Some scholars have tried to distinguish fundamental msr 
from applied msr in terms of application of the los Convention: whereas the 
former has to be granted in normal circumstances, the latter is subject to the 
coastal State’s full discretion.33 However, such a distinction does not seem to 
provide any help to clarify the unclear situation, and even the distinction it-
self causes problems since there is no clear-cut demarcation to define an msr 
as fundamental or applied. The ambiguity of the msr definition may cause 
problems for researching States, but have little adverse impact on costal States 
since they have a great discretionary power to decide whether an msr is ac-
ceptable  under Article 246 of the los Convention.
It is acknowledged that msr and hydrographic surveying overlap to some 
extent. There is a reference in the los Convention which may help to some 
extent clarify the grey area existing between msr and hydrographic surveying. 
According to Article 19 (2)(j), “the carrying out of research or survey activities” 
is prohibited when a foreign vessel exercises the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea. This legal expression contains the following two 
meanings: on the one hand, it distinguishes “research activity” from “survey 
activity”, but on the other these two activities are given the same treatment.
In State practice, while the United States and the United Kingdom take 
the view that military hydrographic surveying is part of the freedoms of high 
seas related to “international lawful uses of the sea”, Australia and Canada “are 
 understood to seek permission of the coastal State before conducting hydro-
graphic surveying in the eez of that State”.34 Some coastal countries like China 
hold the view that hydrographic surveying is part of msr and have specific 
laws governing both msr and hydrographic surveying.
In 2001, usns Bowditch, an American military surveillance vessel, entered 
into China’s eez in the Yellow Sea three times to carry out hydrographic sur-
veying and was confronted by Chinese Marine Surveillance vessels. Chinese 
monitoring vessels followed the American ship and attempted to disrupt its 
operations. Even in one time a Chinese warship forced the Bowditch to leave 
the Chinese eez.35 After the Bowditch Incident, China has tightened its control 
of hydrographic surveying in the maritime zones of its national jurisdiction. 
32 J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, United States Responses to Exces-
sive Maritime Claims 425 (1996).
33 Wolf Plesman and Volker Röben, Marine Scientific Research: State Practice versus Law of 
the Sea? in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Law of the Sea at the Crossroads: The 
Continuing Search for a Universally Accepted Regime 375 (1991).
34 Sam Bateman, Hydrographic Surveying in the eez: Differences and Overlaps with Marine 
Scientific Research, 29 (2) Marine Policy 170 (2005).
35 See John Leicester, Chinese Chase US Ship; Jet Crash Part of Spy Game, Herald Sun, 4 April 
2001, at 32; cited in Captain George V. Galdorisi and Commander Alan G. Kaufman,  Military 
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One move was to revise the 1992 Law of Surveying and Mapping. The original 
provision governing foreign surveying activities has been revised as “Surveying 
and mapping to be conducted within the territory and other sea areas under 
the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China by a foreign organization 
or individual must be approved by the competent department of surveying 
and mapping administration under the State Council together with the com-
petent department of surveying and mapping administration of the Army, and 
shall comply with relevant laws and administrative rules and regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China. A foreign organization or individual that conducts 
surveying and mapping within the territory of the People’s Republic of China 
must adopt the form of joint venture or of cooperation with a relevant depart-
ment or unit of the People’s Republic of China, and shall not involve any State 
secret and endanger the State security”.36 The new provision contains some 
new changes in comparison with the old provision: (1) the original Article 19 
has been moved ahead to be Article 7; (2) originally, such activity is only sub-
ject to the approval of the competent department of surveying and mapping 
administration under the State Council but now the approval is made by this 
department together with its counterpart in the Army; (3) Originally foreign 
organization or individual may conduct surveying and mapping alone within 
China’s territory, but now such activity must be conducted in cooperation with 
the Chinese counterpart. It is noted that while some more restrictions are im-
posed, surveying and mapping by a foreign organization or individual may still 
be conducted alone after China’s approval. Clearly, in China’s eye,  hydrographic 
surveying is not part of the freedoms of high seas.
The other reason for the revision of the Surveying and Mapping Law is con-
nected to the implementation of the 1996 Regulations on the Management 
of the Foreign-Related Marine Scientific Research, which came into force 
from 1 October 1996.37 The Regulations apply to the conduct of survey activi-
ties by international organizations, organizations and individuals of any for-
eign country within sea areas under China’s jurisdiction. It is recalled that in 
the Bowditch Incident, the Chinese side asked the Bowditch to stop its illegal 
Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing  Conflict, 32 
California Western International Law Journal 294 (2002).
36 Article 7 of the 2002 amended Law of Surveying and Mapping, People’s Daily (in Chi-
nese), 1 September 2002, at 5. The amended Law was adopted on 29 August 2002 and came 
into force on 1 December 2002. The English version of the 1992 Law is available in Office 
of Policy, Law and Regulation, State Oceanic Administration (ed.), Collection of the Sea 
Laws and Regulations of the People’s Republic of China 300–313 (2001).
37 It is reprinted in Gazette of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 




 activities without China’s approval in accordance with the above Regulations, 
but the American vessel only replied that it was doing military hydrographic 
surveying in international waters. When China addressed the issue to the 
American side through diplomatic channel, the United States responded that 
military surveying was not msr so that it was not subject to the los Convention 
and to the approval of the coastal State. Clearly, China leant a lesson from this 
Incident that the relevant laws and regulations governing msr did not work 
in practice with the Americans when they carried out military hydrographic 
surveying in China’s jurisdictional waters.
Finally, if hydrographic surveying, whether military or civilian, was not 
considered part of msr, then there should be a need to establish a new legal 
regime to govern it. As long as the grey area exists, problems regarding survey 
activities in the eez between the coastal State and the conducting State will 
continue to arise. If hydrographic surveying can be regarded as part of msr, 
military surveying could be then considered abuse of maritime rights of the 
law of the sea. It is interesting to note that two Chinese marine law enforcers 
revealed in their article that the Bowditch had applied to the Chinese authority 
for hydrographic surveying but due to some reasons its application was not 
approved.38
The Ministry of Land and Natural Resources adopted the Provisional Mea-
sures on the Management of Surveying and Mapping in China by Foreign Or-
ganizations or Individuals adopted on 20 November 2006 and the Measures 
took effect on 1 March 2007.39 Accordingly, any surveying and mapping in 
China including the sea areas within China’s jurisdiction should be conducted 
through the cooperation with a Chinese partner either in the form of joint 
venture or cooperative project, subject to the prior approval of the Chinese 
competent authorities of both civilian and military surveying and mapping. 
Several surveying and mapping activities are excluded from such Sino-foreign 
cooperation. Ocean surveying and mapping is one of them. There are a few 
points which need to be highlighted: 1. Although the Measures only use the 
term “other sea areas within the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China”, 
it is reasonably assume that China’s eez is included; 2. Unlike the Law of Sur-
veying and Mapping, this Measures for the first time clearly provided that any 
such activity should be approved by the competent authorities from both the 
38 You Zhiyong and Zhang Youfeng, Case Analysis of Foreign-Related Marine Law Enforce-
ment in the East China Sea Zone, in Xiamen University Ocean Law Centre (ed.), 
Collected Papers of the Symposium in Commemorating the 20th Anniver-
sary of the Adoption of the un Convention on the Law of the Sea 85 
(2002)(in Chinese).
39 Text is available at http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-01/22/content_503464.htm.
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government and the army; 3. The exclusion of marine surveying and mapping 
implies that China has further tightened its laws and regulations on marine 
surveying and mapping, particularly in the consideration of military strategy 
as well as of natural resources information.
IV Final Remarks
Military intelligence gathering and military hydrographic survey in the eez of 
another State remains a controversial issue in international law and invites 
hot debates, particularly between China and the United States. The Chinese 
usually argue that military intelligence gathering and military hydrographic 
survey in the eez by foreign vessels and aircraft are not considered peaceful 
and thus violate the relevant provisions of the los Convention.40 But in the 
US view, such activities are lawful, non-aggressive military activities consis-
tent with the UN Charter, and can be conducted in the eez without the con-
sent of the coastal State.41 Their different legal positions are reflected in their 
respective state practice as is once again demonstrated by the 2009 Impec-
cable Incident in the South China Sea. The Sino-American debate is still going 
on and it is hoped that the two sides could reach some degree of common 
 understanding through their military consultation mechanism.42 It is report-
ed that recently Chinese warships entered into the US eez near Guam,43 but 
it is not clear whether such warships simply enjoyed the freedom of naviga-
tion under international law, sailing through the US eez or conducted military 
activities such as intelligence gathering or military hydrographic surveying in 
the eez of the United States. It would be very interesting if the latter was the 
case.
From a legal perspective, two reasons can at least explain the controversy 
concerning military intelligence gathering and military hydrographic survey-
ing in the eez. First, the los Convention is not clear about whether hydro-
graphic survey is part of the msr, and some countries tend to separate it from 
the msr regime. Second, the los Convention grants the eez a unique legal 
40 See Moritaka Hayashi, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Foreign Coastal 
States, 27 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 801 (2012).
41 Hayashi, ibid., at 801.
42 As we know, the two sides concluded an agreement on military maritime safety consulta-
tion in 1998 and hold regular bilateral talks. Text of the agreement is available at http://
www.fas.org/nuke/control/sea/text/us-china98.htm.




status, i.e., a maritime zone within national jurisdiction but subject to the 
 freedoms of high seas, and there are differences in interpreting such freedoms 
in State practice as discussed partly in this article. It is perceived that the world 
community needs to find a way to conciliate different State practices in this re-
spect and enhance peace, security and the rule of law in the ocean. The future 
possible review conference for the los Convention should put this issue on its 
agenda to clarify the issue of military activities including military intelligence 
gathering and military hydrographic surveying in a foreign eez.
<UN>
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Marine Data Collection: US Perspectives
J. Ashley Roach1
i Marine Data Collection
Coastal State jurisdiction over foreign marine data collection activities de-
pends on which type of activity is involved and on the maritime zone in which 
it is conducted. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea2 
(los Convention) does not use the term “marine data collection” which is 
used in this article as a generic term without legal content, as the umbrella 
under which to consider the various data collection activities in the marine 
environment.3
Under “marine data collection” the following five categories, with seven sub-
categories, are considered:
– Marine scientific research (msr);
– Surveys
 – Hydrographic surveys; and
 – Military surveys;
– Operational oceanography
 – Ocean state estimation;
 – Weather forecasting; and
 – Climate prediction;
– Exploration and exploitation4 of
 – Natural resources; and
 – Underwater cultural heritage (shipwrecks); and
– Monitoring and environmental assessment.
1 This article is based upon the revised Chapter (15) on marine data collection in J.A. Roach 
and R.W. Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims (4th edition in preparation). An ear-
lier version of this article appears in Nordquist, Moore, Beckman and Long (eds.), 
Freedom of Navigation and Globalization 285–302 (2015).
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 
(entered into force 10 November 1994), 1833 unts 397 (hereinafter los Convention or 
Convention).
3 The term is also used by the US Navy: “Marine data collection is a general term used when re-
ferring to all types of survey or marine scientific activity (e.g., military surveys, hydrographic 
surveys, and marine scientific research).” US Chief of Naval Operations, opnav Instruction 
3128.9F, Diplomatic Clearance for US Navy Marine Data Collection Activities in Foreign Jurisdic-
tions, 1 July 2014, para. 4.a, available at https://cyrptome.org/dodi/2014/opnav-3128–9f.pdf.
4 The term “exploitation” is used in the sense of resource development and management.
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The los Convention uses, but does not define, the terms “marine scientific 
research,” “hydrographic survey,” “survey activities,” “exploitation” or “explo-
ration” and does not mention “military surveys,” “operational oceanography” 
or their subcategories. Nevertheless, the concepts are distinct, and this article 
seeks to clarify those differences.
The relevant maritime zones where these activities take place are the ter-
ritorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (eez), the con-
tinental shelf, the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (the 
Area), straits used for international navigation, and archipelagic sea lanes.
This article examines what is involved in each of these activities, reviews the 
applicable legal regimes, and demonstrates that surveys, operational ocean-
ography, exploration and exploitation, and monitoring and environmental as-
sessment are not marine scientific research regulated by Part xiii of the los 
Convention; rather they are subject to separate legal regimes.
Even though none of these five categories and seven subcategories is de-
fined in the law of the sea, including the los Convention, it is necessary to un-
derstand what each entails to appreciate the legal regime applicable to each.
ii US Views: What is msr?
The most heavily regulated is the first category, marine scientific research 
(msr). The los Convention devotes a whole part, Part xiii, containing 28 
articles in six sections, to the subject of msr. Although not defined in the 
Convention, “marine scientific research” is the general term most often used 
to describe those activities undertaken in the ocean and coastal waters to 
expand scientific knowledge of the marine environment and its processes.5  
5 Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, U.S. State Department, Marine Scientific Research Authori-
zations, available at https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/rvc/index.htm. Harriet Davies, 
The Regulation of Marine Scientific Research: Addressing Challenges, Advancing Knowledge, 
in Warner and Kaye (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Maritime Regulation 
and Enforcement 212 (2016); Stephens and Rothwell, Marine Scientific Research, in The 
Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea 561–562 (2015); G.K. Walker, General 
Editor, Definitions for the Law of the Sea: Terms Not Defined by the 1982 
Convention 241 (2012), (recounting the unsuccessful attempts to define msr during the 
Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (unclos iii)). Compare los Convention, Ar-
ticles 243 (“scientists … studying the essence of phenomena and processes occurring in the 
marine environment and the interrelations between them” and 246(3) “to increase scientific 
knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all mankind”); A.H.A. Soons, Ma-
rine Scientific Research and the Law of the Sea 124 (1982), [hereinafter, Soons]. 
See generally M. Gorina-Ysern, An International Regime for Marine Scientific 
Research (2003). Japanese law does not define msr. See Takada, Marine Scientific Research 
179Marine Data Collection: US Perspectives
<UN>
The United States accepts this definition.6 msr includes physical oceanog-
raphy, marine chemistry, marine biology, scientific ocean drilling and coring, 
geological/geophysical research, as well as other activities with a scientific 
purpose. It is distinguished from hydrographic surveys, from military activities 
(including military surveys), from operational oceanography, from exploration 
and exploitation of natural resources and underwater cultural heritage,7 and 
in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Japan-China Agreement for Prior Notification (1995–2001), 
Japanese Digest of International Law JD(iii) 3, 44 Japanese Annual of International 
Law 2001 134 (2002).
6 Marine Scientific Research Authorizations, supra note 5; opnav Instruction 3128.9F, supra 
note 3, at para. 4.d.
7 Ibid. The State Department webpage reads:
While the Law of the Sea Convention does not define marine scientific research, the term 
generally refers to those activities undertaken in the ocean to expand knowledge of the 
marine environment and its processes. The United States has identified some marine data 
collection activities that are not marine scientific research. These include prospecting 
for and exploration of natural resources; hydrographic surveys (for enhancing the safe-
ty of navigation); military activities including military surveys; activities related to Part 
xii of the Convention; the collection of marine meteorological data and other routine 
ocean observations – such as those monitoring and forecasting of ocean state, natural 
hazard warnings and weather forecasting, and climate prediction – including through 
the voluntary ocean observation programs of the Joint Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission-World Meteorological Technical Commission on Oceanography and Marine 
Meteorology ( jcomm) and the Argo program; and activities directed at objects of an ar-
cheological and historical nature found at sea.
The opnavinst reads as follows:
activities undertaken per Part xiii of [the los Convention] in territorial seas, archipelagic 
waters, straits for navigation, the eez, high seas, on the continental shelf, or in the Area... 
The purpose of msr is to expand general scientific knowledge of the marine environ-
ment. msr activities undertaken include physical and chemical oceanography,  marine 
biology, fisheries research, scientific ocean drilling and coring, geological/geophysical 
studies, and other activities with a scientific purpose. Data collected as a result of msr 
is made publicly available. msr does not include prospecting and exploration of natural 
resources, hydrographic surveys, or military activities. This includes military surveys and 
environmental monitoring and assessment pursuant to Section 4 of Part xii of [the los 
Convention], to include operational oceanography.
See US State Department, Commentary—The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and the Agreement on Implementation of Part xi, US Senate Treaty Doc. 103–39, at 80, avail-
able at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/treaty-doc-103–39-united- 
nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea. (hereinafter US Commentary) (msr differs from 
hydrographic surveys and resource exploration). In discussing msr for military purposes, 
Professor Soons does not mention military surveys or other military activities. Soons, supra 
note 5, at 135.
More recently, Professors Stephens and Rothwell and Harriett Davies have addressed new 
technologies that were not addressed in Part xiii. Stephens and Rothwell, supra note 5, at 
562, 574–578; Davies, supra note 5, at 223–224.
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from environmental monitoring and assessment pursuant to Section 4 of Part 
xii of the los Convention. Each of these is discussed in the following sections.
iii Surveys
For the purposes of this analysis, there are two forms of surveys, hydrographic 
surveys and military surveys.
1 Hydrographic Surveys
“Hydrographic surveys” are activities undertaken to obtain information for the 
making of navigational charts and for the safety of navigation. Hydrographic 
surveys include the determination of the depth of water, the configuration and 
nature of the sea floor, the direction and force of currents, heights and times 
of tides and water stages, and hazards to navigation. This information is used 
for the production of nautical charts and similar products to support safety of 
navigation, such as Sailing Directions, Light Lists and Tide Manuals for both 
civil and military use.8 Coastal, harbor and harbor approach charts of non-
US waters and other products are published by the US National Geospatial- 
Intelligence Agency and made available to mariners of all countries.9
In many areas of the world, the production of up-to-date charts has had a 
positive impact on economic development in coastal areas, stimulating trade 
and commerce and the construction or modernization of harbor and port 
8 Cf. Definition 46, in International Hydrographic Bureau, A Manual on Techni-
cal Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea–1982, 
1–16 (2006), Appendix 1, available at http://www.iho.shom.fr/publicat/free/files/S-51_Ed4-
EN.pdf, and in opnavinst 3128.9F, supra note 3, at para. 4.c. (“Hydrographic survey refers 
to marine data collection activities undertaken in the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, 
straits for navigation, the eez, high seas, and on the continental shelf for the production of 
nautical charts and similar products to support safety of navigation. Hydrographic surveys 
can include one or more of several classes of data, such as depth of water, configuration and 
nature of the natural bottom, direction and force of currents, heights and times of tides and 
water stages, and hazards to navigation.”). The definition of “hydrographic survey” in Walker, 
supra note 5, is different:
 “the science of measuring and depicting those parameters necessary to describe the pre-
cise nature and configuration of the seabed and coastal strip, its geographical relation-
ship to the land mass, and the characteristics and dynamics of the sea.... Hydrographic 
surveys may be necessary to determine the features that constitute baselines or base-
points and their geographical position.” Ibid., at 227.
9 10 U.S.C. § 451 et seq. Nautical charts of US waters are produced by the Office of Coast Survey, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (noaa), available at https://www.nauti 
calcharts.noaa.gov/.
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 facilities. By helping safety of navigation for ships in transit, up-to-date charts 
also play a role in protecting coastal areas from the environmental pollution 
which results from wrecks of ships carrying hazardous cargoes and freighters. 
Data collected during hydrographic surveys may also be of value in coastal 
zone management and coastal science engineering.
The UN General Assembly in its annual resolution on oceans and the law of 
the sea has recognized the importance of hydrographic surveys and nautical 
charting:
Recognizing further that hydrographic surveys and nautical charting 
are critical to the safety of navigation and life at sea, environmental 
protection, including the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems, 
and the economics of the global shipping industry, and encouraging 
further efforts towards electronic charting, which not only provides sig-
nificantly increased benefits for safe navigation and management of ship 
 movement, but also provides data and information that can be used for 
sustainable fisheries activities and other sectoral uses of the marine en-
vironment, the delimitation of maritime boundaries and environmental 
protection ...
14. Encourages intensified efforts to build capacity for developing 
countries, in particular for the least developed countries and small is-
land developing States, as well as coastal African States, to improve 
 hydrographic services and the production of nautical charts, including 
electronic charts …10
The 2016 resolution, after repeating the preambular paragraph quoted above, 
strengthened its operative paragraph on hydrographic surveys:
155. … urges all States to work with [the International Hydrographic] 
Organization to increase the coverage of hydrographic information on a 
global basis to enhance capacity-building and technical assistance and to 
promote safe navigation, in particular through the production and use of 
accurate electronic navigational charts, especially in areas used for inter-
national navigation, in ports and where there are vulnerable or protected 
marine areas.11
10 unga Resolution A/res/67/78, 11 December 2012. Similar paragraphs appear in ear-
lier resolutions A/res/66/231, A/res/65/37A, A/res/64/71, A/res/63/111, A/res/62/215, 
A/res/61/222, A/res/60/30, A/res/59/24 and A/res/58/240, available at http://www 
.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly/general_assembly_resolutions.htm.
11 unga Resolution A/res/71/271, 23 December 2016, para. 155. Both paragraphs were re-
peated in resolution A/res/72/73, 5 December 2017, at 4–5 and para. 158.
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Survey activities are not msr. The los Convention distinguishes clearly be-
tween the concepts of “research” and “msr” on the one hand, and “hydro-
graphic surveys” and “survey activities” on the other hand. Article 19(2)(j) of 
the los Convention includes “research or survey activities” as being inconsis-
tent with innocent passage in the territorial sea. Article 21(1)(g) authorizes the 
coastal State to adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions 
of the Convention and other rules of international law, relating to innocent 
passage through the territorial sea in respect of “marine scientific research and 
hydrographic surveys.” Article 40, entitled “research and survey activities,” pro-
vides that in transit passage through straits used for international navigation, 
foreign ships, including “marine scientific research and hydrographic survey 
ships”, may not carry out “any research or survey activities” without the prior 
authorization of the States bordering the straits. The same rule applies to ships 
engaged in archipelagic sea lanes passage (Article 54). While Part xiii of the 
los Convention fully regulates msr, it does not refer to survey activities at all.
This conclusion, that msr is distinct from survey activities, is supported by 
other respected publications on this subject.12
12 For example, the UN msr Guide notes that “‘survey activities’ ... are primarily dealt with 
in other parts ... of the Convention” rather than in Part xiii. UN, Marine Scientific 
Research: A Guide to the Implementation of the Relevant Provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1 (1991), (hereinafter 
msr Guide). This could indicate that these activities do not fall under the regime of Part 
xiii. The msr Revised Guide states that “[t]he freedom [of scientific research] envisioned 
in Art. 87 is not limited to marine scientific research but also extends to such activities 
as hydrographic surveys.” UN, Marine Scientific Research: A revised guide to 
the implementation of the relevant provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (2010), at 16 para. 56 (hereinafter msr Revised 
Guide), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/ publicationstexts/
msr_guide%202010_final.pdf. Professor Soons has written: “From articles 19, 21 and 40, 
which use the term “hydrographic surveying” separately from “research,” it follows that 
the term “marine scientific research,” for the purposes of the Draft Convention, does not 
cover hydrographic surveying activities.” (Soons, supra note 5, at 125.) Later in the same 
book, Professor Soons wrote: “With respect to hydrographic surveying (an activity which 
is not to be considered marine scientific research, although it is somewhat similar to it 
...), it is submitted that this activity, when it is conducted for the purpose of enhancing 
the safety of navigation ..., must be regarded as an internationally lawful use of the sea 
associated with the operations of ships ... in accordance with article 58, and can therefore 
be conducted freely in the exclusive economic zone ....” (Soons, supra note 5, at 157). The 
United Kingdom agrees. 68 British Yearbook of International Law 609 (1997). 
See also Davies, supra note 5, at 220 et seq. and Stephens and Rothwell, supra note 5, at 
570–572. A contrary position is taken by an Adjunct Senior Scholar at the National Insti-
tute for South China Seas Studies, Haikou, China, who argues, without supporting docu-
mentation, that the msr consent regime was established in part because the information 
collected “may be used to undermine the security of the state.” Valencia, Some “Scientific” 
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The Convention therefore limits survey activities during passage in the ter-
ritorial sea, in straits used for international navigation and in archipelagic sea 
lanes, but does not limit the activities of survey ships in the eez.
Like msr, survey activities in the territorial sea are expressly subject to 
coastal State consent.13
Again, like msr, survey activities while in transit passage or archipelagic sea 
lanes passage with its concomitant rights are expressly subject to prior autho-
rization of the States bordering straits or the archipelagic State.14
Seaward of the territorial sea, all States remain free to conduct surveys free 
of coastal State regulation or control.15
International law, as reflected in the los Convention, authorizes coastal 
States to claim limited rights and jurisdiction in an eez. The jurisdictional 
rights relate primarily to the exploration, exploitation, and conservation of 
natural resources, msr, and the marine environment. Beyond the territorial 
sea, all States enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight and other related 
uses of the sea within the eez, provided that they do so with due regard to the 
rights of the coastal State and other States.16 The conduct of surveys in the 
eez is thus an exercise of the freedoms of navigation and other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, such as those associated with 
the operations of ships, which Article 58 of the los Convention guarantees to 
all States. However, a hydrographic survey on a foreign continental shelf that 
involves exploration or exploitation of living or non-living resources of the 
continental shelf requires coastal State consent.
2 Military Activities, including Military Surveys
The los Convention recognizes that all States have, within the eez, in contrast 
to the territorial sea, the right to conduct military activities, provided that they 
do so with due regard to the rights of the coastal State and other States (Article 
58(3)). Appropriate activities include normal ship operations, task force ma-
neuvering, launching and landing of aircraft, operating military devices, mili-
tary exercises, intelligence collection, weapons exercises, ordnance testing, 
and military surveys. There is no general competence of the coastal State over 
military activities in the eez. Therefore, military activities, including military 
Surveys a Security Threat in the South China Sea, ipp Review, 9 November 2017, available 
at http://www.ippreview.com/index.php/Blog/single/id/584.html.
13 Arts. 19(2)(j) and 21(1)(g), los Convention.
14 Arts. 40 and 54, los Convention,
15 Arts. 56(1)(b)(ii), 78 and 87(1)(f), los Convention.
16 Art. 58, los Convention.
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surveys, conducted outside foreign territorial seas are not subject to coastal 
State regulation.17
“Military survey” refers to activities undertaken in territorial seas, archipe-
lagic waters, straits used for international navigation, the eez, high seas, and 
on the continental shelf involving marine data collection (whether or not clas-
sified) for military purposes (e.g., not shared with the general public). Military 
surveys can include oceanographic, hydrographic, marine geological, geophys-
ical, chemical, biological, acoustic, and related data.18
Military surveys are not specifically addressed in the los Convention and 
there is no language stating or implying that military surveys may be regulated 
in any manner by coastal States outside their territorial sea or archipelagic wa-
ters. The United States therefore considers it to be fully consistent with the los 
Convention that the conduct of such surveys is a high seas freedom and the 
United States reserves the right to engage in military surveys anywhere outside 
foreign territorial seas and archipelagic waters. To provide prior notice or re-
quest permission would create an adverse precedent for restrictions on mobil-
ity and flexibility of military survey operations. However, a military survey on 
a foreign continental shelf that involves exploration or exploitation of living 
or non-living resources of the continental shelf requires coastal State consent. 
The US Navy requires that coastal State permission be sought if a military sur-
vey or hydrographic survey is planned to be conducted in foreign territorial 
seas, archipelagic waters or straits used for international navigation.19
These definitions thus clearly distinguish between msr, which the coast-
al State can regulate, and hydrographic survey and military survey activities, 
which are freedoms the coastal State cannot regulate outside its territorial sea.
A few States have questioned the activities of military survey and hydro-
graphic vessels in their eezs.20 The United States has explained along the 
17 See Art. 56, los Convention, and Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 Virginia Journal of International Law 
847 (1984).
18 opnav Instruction 3128.9F, supra note 3, at para. 4.b. (“Military survey refers to activities 
undertaken in territorial seas, archipelagic waters, straits for navigation, the eez, high 
seas, and on the continental shelf involving marine data collection (whether or not clas-
sified) for military purposes (e.g., not shared with the general public). Military surveys can 
include oceanographic, hydrographic, marine geological, geophysical, chemical, biologi-
cal, acoustic, and related data.”).
19 opnavinst 3128.9F, supra note 3, at para. 6.b(2).
20 For example, China claims the right to approve all mapping and surveying activities in 
“sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China.” Surveying and Map-
ping Law of the People’s Republic of China, Presidential Order No. 75, 29 August 2002, 
effective 1 December 2002, Art. 2, available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
samlotproc506/.
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foregoing lines why such survey activities are not subject to coastal State 
regulation.21
3 Operational Oceanography
Operational oceanography is the routine collection of ocean observations, 
such as temperature, pressure, current, salinity and wind, in all maritime 
zones. It may be conducted in the oceans, at the air-sea interface, and in the 
atmosphere. This data is used for the monitoring and forecasting of weather 
(meteorology), climate and ocean state (e.g., surface currents and waves). The 
data is transmitted from sensor to shore in near real time and is made available 
to the public in near real time.22
The various operational oceanography programs and data collection instru-
ments are described in Section 15.11 of the third edition of Excessive Maritime 
Claims and need not be repeated here. They are described there to facilitate a 
better understanding why they are, for the most part, conducted in the exercise 
of the high sea freedoms of navigation and overflight, and are not msr gov-
erned by Part xiii of the los Convention. Nevertheless, some coastal States re-
main concerned that some or all of this data collected within their eezs may be 
of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, 
whether living or non-living, within their eezs23 and thus wish to have some 
say as to the collection and use of that data. In that regard, the 2016 unga reso-
lution on oceans and law of the sea stated in one of its preambular paragraphs:
Recognizing that ocean data buoys deployed and operated in accor-
dance with international law are critical for improving understanding of 
 weather, climate and ecosystems, and that certain types of ocean data 
buoys contribute to saving lives by detecting tsunamis, and reiterating 
its serious concern at intentional and unintentional damage to such 
buoys[.]24
21 State Department telegram 092114, 8 April 1994, para. 6; 2001 Digest of United States Prac-
tice in International Law 698–699 (hereinafter Digest); 2003 Digest, at 728, 738; 2007 Di-
gest, at 647–650; 2009 Digest, at 468–469; 2012 Digest, at 420–421; 2015 Digest, at 524–525, 
all available at https://www.state.gov/s/l/c8183.htm.
22 Operational oceanography has also been defined “as the activity of systematic and 
 long-term routine measurements of the seas and oceans and atmosphere, and their rapid 
interpretation and dissemination,” available at http://eurogoos.eu/about-eurogoos/what-
is-operational-oceanography/. See further, Davies, supra note 5, at 222–223.
23 Cf. Arts. 56(1)(a) and 246(5)(a), los Convention.
24 unga Resolution A/res/71/257, 23 December 2016, at 5; repeated in resolution 
A/res/72/73, 5 Dec. 2017, at 5.
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The world’s oceans exhibit wide variability on both spatial and temporal 
scales. While designated by basins (e.g., Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, Southern), 
boundaries used to delineate them are geographical and somewhat artificial 
as the oceans interact on global as well as regional scales. For example, changes 
in overturning circulations (North Atlantic, Southern Ocean) eventually will 
impact all of the ocean basins thereby manifesting changes regionally. Like the 
atmosphere, the oceans do not recognize geopolitical boundaries. Similarly, 
the oceans’ interactions with the atmosphere often manifested through chang-
es in weather and storm patterns are global processes, reflected regionally.
Understanding of the global ocean provides the context for understanding 
and predicting regional and coastal variability. The key to understanding is 
observations, observations of the oceans globally, regionally and locally. The 
operational ocean observing system allows nations to:
– monitor, understand and predict weather and climate;
– describe and forecast the state of the ocean, including living resources;
– improve management of marine and coastal ecosystems and resources;
– mitigate damage from natural hazards and pollution;
– protect life and property on coasts and at sea; and
– enable scientific research.25
In view of the United States, operational oceanography is not msr.26 The 
large-scale programs of oceanographic data collection, described elsewhere,27 
that operate independently from the users of the data distinguish operational 
oceanography from msr.
4 Marine Meteorological Data
It should be recalled that the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea de-
cided that the collection of marine meteorological data is not marine scientific 
research regulated by Part xiii of the Law of the Sea Convention.
25 These six bullets are what goos is designed to do. See available at http://www.ioc-goos.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=26&lang=en. “Enable” 
means observe from which hypotheses are developed and tested, not conduct scientific 
research. See Subramanian et al. (eds.), Impacts of Data Collected and Lessons Learned from 
Ocean Observing Systems Worldwide, 50 Marine Technology Society Journal (2016).
26 Senate Ex. Rep. 110–9, 19 December 2007, at 13, available at https://www.congress.gov/110/
crpt/erpt9/crpt-110erpt9.pdf (“there are other activities, such as operational oceanogra-
phy, that are also not considered marine scientific research”). F.H.Th. Wegelein, Ma-
rine Scientific Research: The Operation and Status of Research Vessels 
and other Platforms in International Law 116 (2005) notes that the procedures 
for advance access request to a coastal State is “impracticable” and the “scientific value of 
their measurements would be significantly impaired if drifters had to be retrieved before 
they enter foreign waters and not be re-released before permission is obtained; converse-
ly, the exact date of entry can usually not be predicted ..., neither which foreign waters it 
may stray into.”
27 See e.g., Roach and Smith, supra note 1, Section 15.11, at 439–437.
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In 1979 the Eighth wmo Congress noted that the Members of the wmo en-
gaged in operational activities, such as the collection of meteorological infor-
mation from voluntary observing ships, buoys, other ocean platforms, aircraft 
and meteorological satellites, as well as meteorological and oceanographic re-
search activities, considered that “adequate marine meteorological data cover-
age from ocean areas, in particular from those areas in the so-called “exclusive 
economic zone,” is indispensable for the issue of timely and accurate storm 
warnings for the safety of life at sea and for the protection of life and prop-
erty in coastal and off-shore areas,” and that solas required States to issue 
warnings of gales, storms and tropical storms and to arrange for selected ships 
to take meteorological observations,28 expressed the hope that the provisions 
on marine scientific research then being negotiated by the Third UN Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea “would not result in restrictions on operational 
 meteorological and related oceanographic observational activities carried 
out in accordance with international programmes such as www and igoss” 
and appealed to its Members to ensure that the Conference was “made aware 
of the vital need for observational data from sea areas for the timely issue of 
weather forecasts and storm warnings.”29
On 20 August 1980, after the completion of the negotiations on the msr ar-
ticles at the Resumed Ninth Session of the Conference, the Chairman of the 
Third Committee announced that he was now in a position to reply to the let-
ter from the wmo forwarding this Resolution. The Chairman stated he agreed 
with the content of the Resolution and that
in his opinion, the provisions on marine scientific research would not 
create any difficulties and obstacles hindering adequate meteorologi-
cal coverage from ocean areas, including areas within the exclusive 
economic zone, carried out both within the framework of existing in-
ternational programs and by all vessels, since such activities had already 
been recognized as routine observations and data collecting which were 
not covered by Part xiii of the negotiating text. Furthermore, they were 
in the common interest of all countries and had undoubted universal 
significance.30
28 solas 1960, regulation V/4, 536 unts 325–328. The current version is solas 1974, regula-
tion V/5 (rev. 2002), quoted in attachment 3 to Roach, Marine Data Collection: Methods and 
Law, in M. Nordquist, T. Koh and J.N. Moore (eds.), Freedom of the Seas, 
Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 205–208 (2009).
29 wmo Res. 16 (Cg-viii), United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, March 1979, Doc. 
A/CONF.62/80, 9 Aug. 1979, xii Official Records of the Third UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, at 56 (hereinafter, Official Records), available at http://legal.un.org/diplomatic-
conferences/1973_los/vol12.shtml.
30 Statement of Mr. Yankov, xiv Official Records, at 103, para. 5.
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Chairman Yankov repeated these comments in his Report of the Third Com-
mittee to the Plenary, without objection,31 and so wrote to the wmo on 25 
 August 1980.
The wmo continues to be committed to the free and unrestricted interna-
tional exchange of basic meteorological data and products which are necessary 
for the provision of services in support of the protection of life and property 
and the well-being of all nations, particularly those basic data and products 
required to describe and forecast accurately weather and climate. Members of 
the wmo are obligated under Article 2 of the wmo Convention, inter alia, to fa-
cilitate worldwide cooperation in the establishment of observing networks.32
The importance of marine meteorological data was recognized in the 2016 
unga resolution on oceans and the law of the sea, as follows:
Also recognizes the importance of navigational warning series based on 
marine meteorological data for the safety of ships and lives at sea and the 
optimization of navigation routes, and notes the collaboration between 
the World Meteorological Organization and the International Maritime 
Organization for the enhancement of these services and their extension 
to the Arctic region.33
iv Exploration and Exploitation
The los Convention contains separate regimes for exploration and exploita-
tion of natural resources and for underwater cultural heritage.
1 Natural Resources
Exploration and exploitation of natural resources involves the searching for 
and removal of living or non-living natural resources found in the oceans or 
beneath the seabed. The term “natural resources” has four separate meanings 
in the law of the sea, depending on the maritime zone where they are located. 
First, the natural resources governed by the eez regime are the living and non-
living natural resources (not further expressly defined) located within the eez.34 
31 Report of the Chairman of the Third Committee, Doc. A/conf.62/L.61, 25 August 1980, para. 
8, xiv Official Records, 133–134; xiv Official Records, at 15, para. 43.
32 wmo 12th Congress resolution 40 (Cg-xii) (1995), available at www.wmo.int/pages/
about/resolution40_en.html.
33 unga Resolution A/res/71/257, 23 December 2016, para. 156; repeated in resolution 
A/res/72/73, 5 Dec. 2017, para. 159.
34 Art. 56(1)(a), los Convention.
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Second, the natural resources governed by the continental shelf regime are 
the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil, together 
with the living organisms belonging to sedentary species.35 Third, the natural 
resources of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (the 
Area) are all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or 
beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules;36 this definition does not 
include living marine resources. Fourth, the natural resources of the high seas 
regime are referred to as “the living resources of the high seas” and include fish 
and marine mammals.37
Part v of the los Convention regulates exploration for and exploitation of the 
living and non-living natural resources located within the eez separately from 
the conduct of msr within the eez.38 Part vi of the Convention governs explo-
ration for and exploitation of the mineral and other non-living resources of the 
seabed and subsoil, i.e., the continental shelf, together with living organisms 
belonging to sedentary species.39 Part vi does not address msr at all.40 Thus it 
follows that, even though exploration and exploitation in both maritime zones 
are subject to exclusive coastal State control, those activities are not msr.41
Part xi of the Convention and its Implementing Agreement regulate explo-
ration for and exploitation of all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in 
situ in the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction at or beneath 
the seabed, including polymetallic nodules. Exploration and exploitation in 
the Area are subject to regulation by the International Seabed Authority. Ar-
ticle 256 provides that msr in the Area is to be conducted in conformity with 
Part xi, particularly Article 143. Hence, exploration and exploitation of mineral 
resources in the Area is not msr regulated by Part xiii.
35 Art. 77(4), los Convention. Sedentary species are those organisms which, at the harvest-
able stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in 
constant contact with the seabed or subsoil. Ibid.
36 Art. 133, los Convention. When recovered from the Area, these resources are referred to 
in the Convention as “minerals.”
37 Part vii, Section 2, Arts. 116–120, los Convention.
38 Compare Arts. 56(1)(a) and 56(1)(b)(ii), los Convention.
39 Art. 77, los Convention.
40 msr in the eez and on the continental shelf is regulated by Part xiii, Article 246 of the 
Convention.
41 Because they directly implicate exploration or exploitation of the natural resources of 
the continental shelf, Article 246(5) permits a coastal State to withhold its consent to the 
conduct of a msr project on its continental shelf, inter alia, if (a) it is of direct significance 
for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether living or non-living, 
(b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, or (c) involves the construction, operation 
or use of artificial islands, installations and structures.
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2 Underwater Cultural Heritage (uch)
Exploration and exploitation of underwater cultural heritage involves the 
search for, recording of, and removal of items of cultural heritage, such as ar-
tifacts from shipwrecks. These items are, of course, not natural but are man-
made resources.
uch is addressed in only two articles of the los Convention, Article 303 
with regard to the contiguous zone, and Article 149 with regard to archaeologi-
cal and historical objects found in the Area. unesco has developed a regula-
tory scheme for uch found at sea that seeks to provide coastal States authority 
to regulate the search for and recovery of uch located landward of the outer 
limit of a declared contiguous zone, and seaward of such a zone contrary to the 
allocation of rights and duties in the los Convention.42
Exploration for and exploitation of uch is also not msr.43
v Monitoring and Environmental Assessment
Section 4 of Part xii on the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment requires monitoring and environmental assessment of the risks or effect 
of pollution of the marine environment. In particular Article 204(1) requires 
States “to observe, measure, evaluate and analyze, by recognized scientific 
methods” these risks or effects. Article 204(2) requires States to keep under sur-
veillance the effects of certain activities in order to determine whether these 
activities are likely to pollute the marine environment. Article 205 requires 
States to publish reports of the results obtained. Article 206 requires States to 
assess certain activities. All of these requirements are inconsistent with the 
msr regime of Part xiii. Accordingly, monitoring and environmental assess-
ment pursuant to Section 4 of Part xii is not msr.44
vi Legal Regimes of msr and Surveys under the  
1958 Geneva Conventions
Prior to unclos iii, each coastal State possessed sovereignty over a narrow 
territorial sea and sovereign rights over its continental shelf for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting its natural resources. High seas freedoms, including 
42 Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, Paris, 2001, available at 
http://unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-heritage/2001-conven 
tion/officialtext. For details, see Roach and Smith, supra note 1, at 549–552.
43 Wegelein, supra note 26, at 218–219.
44 opnav Instruction 3128.9F, supra note 3, para. 4.d.
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the freedom to conduct surveys and msr, appertained in the water column 
seaward of the territorial sea, and on the seabed seaward of the outer limits of 
the continental shelf.
The United States is a party to the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law 
of the Sea, which established a regime—of sorts—for surveys and msr.
The Continental Shelf Convention recognizes coastal State jurisdiction over 
msr involving the continental shelf and physically undertaken there, but is si-
lent regarding surveys. The coastal State is normally expected to give its consent 
if the request is in connection with purely scientific research and is submitted 
by a qualified institution. The coastal State has the right to participate or be 
represented in the research. The results of the research must be published.45
The High Seas Convention, expressly codifying customary international law, 
recognizes the freedom of the seas, including the water column over the con-
tinental shelf, without specifically mentioning msr or surveys among its illus-
trative list of freedoms.46 Nevertheless, the conduct of msr was regarded as an 
exercise of the freedom of the high seas.47
The Territorial Sea Convention is silent on msr and surveys, except to pro-
vide that the territorial sea and subjacent seabed and subsoil are under the 
sovereignty of the coastal State.48 It follows that the consent of the coastal 
State must be obtained for research work in and under its territorial sea.49
The 1958 Fishing Convention is silent on marine scientific research.
Thus, the four 1958 Geneva Conventions contain very little treaty law on 
msr and marine surveys. Nevertheless, prior to the los Convention, freedom 
to conduct msr and marine surveys existed in most of the oceans seaward of 
the narrow territorial sea, and on the seabed seaward of 200 meters depth or 
where the continental shelf could not be exploited.
The 1958 regime is replaced by the detailed regime set out in the los Con-
vention, for States parties to these treaties.50
45 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 unts 311, Arts. 5(1) & (8). Soons, supra note 
5, at 56–58 examines the meaning of these two paragraphs, concluding that the custom-
ary international law rules are essentially the same as those set out in paragraphs 1 and 8 
of article 5.
46 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 450 unts 82, Art. 2.
47 The United Kingdom agreement with the position may be found in 56 British Year-
book of International Law 1985 501 (1986). The United States concurs in this 
 position. Professor Soons came to the same conclusion after reviewing the travaux 
préparatoires, state practice and the views of publicists. Soons, supra note 5, at 47–55.
48 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, 516 unts 205, Arts. 1–2.
49 56 British Yearbook of International Law 1985 501 (1986); Soons, supra note 5, at 
46.
50 Art. 311(1), los Convention. On the msr regimes in the 1958 Geneva Conventions and los 
Convention see also Stephens and Rothwell, supra note 5, at 563–576.
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vii Legal Regime of msr under the los Convention
During the decade-long negotiations that culminated in the opening for sig-
nature on 10 December 1982 of the los Convention, the United States sought 
to maximize the areas in which msr could continue to be conducted free of 
coastal State control, to create a regime that maximized timely and unen-
cumbered access by foreign researchers to areas under coastal State juris-
diction, and to maintain the right to conduct marine surveys seaward of the 
territorial sea free of coastal State control. These negotiations were conduct-
ed in the context of increasing acceptance of a 12-mile territorial sea under 
coastal State sovereignty, of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (eez) 
under coastal State jurisdiction for economic purposes, and of an expanded 
continental shelf that was at least 200 miles wide, and could be even wider for 
the broad-margin States such as the United States.
The results of those difficult negotiations resulted in a diminution of the oce-
anic areas in which there was freedom of msr, coupled with a consent regime for 
msr in the eez and on the subjacent continental shelf,51 as set out in Part xiii of 
the Convention, while the freedom to conduct surveys was largely unchanged.52 
In 1983, the President decided that, Part xi aside, the rest of the los Convention 
supported US interests, including that of encouraging freedom of msr.53
During the decades following adoption of the los Convention, questions 
arose as to the legal status of the non-seabed provisions of the los Convention. 
Some of its provisions—mostly coastal State rights, including the right to con-
trol msr have been widely accepted and thus came to be considered as part of 
international law. However, other provisions—mostly duties, including coastal 
State duties to foreign researchers regarding msr—have not been adequately 
followed and thus are clearly binding only on States party to the Convention.
Within the territorial sea, the coastal State exercises complete sovereignty, 
and msr is now clearly under its exclusive control. The los los Convention 
explicitly provides that the coastal State has “the exclusive right to regulate, 
authorize and conduct” msr in its territorial sea, which may be “conducted 
only with the express consent of and under the conditions set forth by the 
51 Soons, supra note 5, at 261.
52 Annick de Marffy, Marine Scientific Research, in 2 Dupuy & Vignes (eds.), A Hand-
book on The New Law of the Sea 1140 (1991), (“the balance is tipped much more in 
favor of coastal States than in favor of researching States, and this is perhaps harmful to 
scientific research in general”).
53 President’s Ocean Policy Statement of 10 March 1983, available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/USA_1983_Statement.pdf. See further 
Section 10 infra.
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coastal State.”54 Further, the los Convention expressly states that the “carry-
ing out of research or survey activities” makes passage through the territorial 
sea not innocent55 and expressly authorizes the coastal State to enact laws and 
regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea in respect 
of “marine scientific research” as well as “hydrographic surveys.”56
Under the los Convention, the regime of passage through straits used for 
international navigation does not in other respects affect the legal status of the 
waters forming such straits or the exercise by the States bordering the straits of 
their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters.57 Accordingly, Article 40 pro-
vides that during transit passage through such straits, foreign ships, “including 
marine scientific research and hydrographic survey ships,” may not carry out 
any research or survey activities” without the prior authorization of the States 
bordering straits. The same rules apply to archipelagic sea lanes passage.58
International law now recognizes the right of all coastal States to claim eezs 
that may extend seaward 200 miles from their territorial sea baselines. Indeed, 
some 126 coastal States have done so.59 International law further recognizes 
that within its eez a coastal State may exercise “jurisdiction as provided for 
in the relevant provision of [the los] Convention” over msr.60 International 
law also now recognizes the sovereign right of the coastal State to explore and 
exploit the natural resources of its continental shelf, which may, as in the case 
of the United States, extend beyond 200 miles, but in most cases no more than 
350 miles from the territorial sea baseline.61 The Convention provides the legal 
framework for the exercise of msr jurisdiction in the eez62 and on the conti-
nental shelf.63
54 Art. 245, los Convention.
55 Art. 19(2)(j), los Convention.
56 Art. 21(1)(g), los Convention.
57 Art. 34(1), los Convention.
58 Art. 54, los Convention.
59 See Roach and Smith (3rd ed.), supra note 1, Chapter 7, Table 10.
60 Art. 56(1)(b)(ii), los Convention.
61 Art. 76, los Convention. See Roach and Smith (3rd ed.), supra note 1, Chapter 8 for 
details.
62 Arts. 246, 248 and 252–253, los Convention set the conditions for the conduct of msr 
in the eez. In particular, six months advance request is required and the results of the 
research cannot be distributed publicly until the results of the research are compiled and 
shared with the coastal State. Further, the coastal State may, in its discretion, withhold 
consent to the conduct of a msr project of another State in its eez or on its continental 
shelf if the project, inter alia, is of direct significance for the exploration or exploitation 
of its natural resources, whether living or non-living, within its eez. Art. 246(5)(a), los 
Convention.




Seaward of the eez are the high seas, and seaward of the continental shelf 
lies the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Here the los Con-
vention clearly advances the rights of the scientific community by expressly 
recognizing, for the first time, that msr is a freedom of the high seas that may 
be exercised by all States.64 Further, all States, as well as the International Sea-
bed Authority, are permitted to carry out msr on the seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction.65 On the other hand, the los Convention is silent regarding sur-
vey activities seaward of the territorial sea.
1 Conduct of msr under the los Convention
The conduct of msr is fully regulated by Part xiii of the los Convention which 
does not address or apply to marine surveys of any sort. The Convention con-
firms the right of all States and competent international organizations to con-
duct msr66 and the duty to facilitate the conduct of msr in accordance with 
the terms of the Convention.67 The Convention sets forth the rights and obliga-
tions of States and competent international organizations with respect to the 
conduct of msr in different maritime areas.68
1.1 Territorial Sea
Article 245 recognizes the unqualified right of coastal States to regulate, autho-
rize and conduct msr in the territorial sea. Therefore, access to the  territorial 
sea, and the conditions under which a research project can be conducted 
there, are under the exclusive control of the coastal State.69
1.2 Archipelagic Waters
As archipelagic waters are under the sovereignty of the archipelagic State, msr 
there is subject to the consent of that State.70
1.3 International Straits and Archipelagic Sea Lanes
Part xiii contains no provisions specifically targeted to straits used for interna-
tional navigation or archipelagic sea lanes. However, under article 40, during 
transit passage, ships “may not carry out any research ... activities without the 
64 Arts. 87(1)(f) and 257, los Convention.
65 Arts. 143 and 256, los Convention.
66 Art. 238, los Convention.
67 Art. 239, los Convention.
68 See UN, msr Revised Guide, supra note 12, at 3–25 for a detailed summary.
69 See also, Arts. 21(1)(g), 19(2)(j)), 40 and 54, los Convention. There is no appeal if consent 
is refused or unreasonable conditions are imposed. 56 British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law 1985 501 (1986).
70 Soons, supra note 5, at 153.
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prior authorization of the States bordering straits.” The same rule applies to 
such ships exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.71
1.4  eez and Continental Shelf
Under Article 246, coastal States have the right to “regulate, authorize and con-
duct” msr in the eez and on the continental shelf. Access by other States or 
competent international organizations to the eez or continental shelf for a 
msr project is subject to the consent of the coastal State. The consent require-
ment, however, is to be exercised in accordance with certain standards and 
qualifications.
In normal circumstances, the coastal State is under the obligation to grant 
its consent to requests to conduct msr in its eez or on its continental shelf. (It 
is explicitly provided that circumstances may be normal despite the absence 
of diplomatic relations.72) The coastal State, nevertheless, has the discretion 
to withhold its consent if the research project is of direct significance for the 
exploration and exploitation of living or non-living resources; involves drilling, 
the use of explosives or introduction of harmful substances into the marine 
environment; or involves the construction, operation and use of artificial is-
lands, installations or structures.73 (The first of these grounds for withholding 
consent may be used on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles only in areas 
specially designated as under development.74) It may also withhold consent if 
the sponsor of the research has not provided accurate information about the 
project or has outstanding obligations in respect of past projects.75 If request-
ed, the coastal State must state the reasons for denying consent.76 Otherwise, 
the researching State will not be in a position to determine what adjustments 
would be required to enable the project to proceed.
The consent of a coastal State for a research project may be granted either 
explicitly or implicitly. Article 248 requires States or organizations sponsoring 
projects to provide to the coastal State, at least six months in advance of the ex-
pected starting date of the research activities, a full description of the project. 
The research activities may be initiated six months after the request for con-
sent, unless the coastal State, within four months, has informed the State or 
organization sponsoring the research that it is denying consent for one of the 
71 Art. 54, los Convention.
72 Art. 246(3)–(4), los Convention.
73 Art. 246(5)(a–c), los Convention.
74 Art. 246(6), los Convention.
75 Art. 246(5)(d), los Convention.
76 Center for Ocean Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law, 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, 
Volume 4, 519 (1991), at para. 246.17(d).
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reasons set forth in Article 246 or that it requires more information about the 
project. If the coastal State fails to respond to the request for consent within 
four months following notification, consent may be presumed to have been 
granted.77 This provision seeks to encourage timely responses from coastal 
States to requests for consent, which as noted below is not always the case.
Consent may also be presumed under Article 247 to have been granted by a 
coastal State for a research project in its eez or on its continental shelf under-
taken by a competent international organization of which it is a member, if it 
approved the project at the time that the organization decided to undertake 
the project and it has not expressed any objection within four months of the 
notification of the project by the organization to the coastal State.
Article 249 sets forth specific conditions with which a State or competent 
international organization sponsoring research in the eez or on the continen-
tal shelf of a coastal State must comply. These include the right of the coastal 
State to participate in the project, in particular through inclusion of scientists 
on board research vessels; provision to the coastal State of reports and access 
to data and samples; assistance to the coastal State, if requested, in assessing 
and interpreting data and results; and ensuring that results are made inter-
nationally available as soon as practicable. Additional conditions may be es-
tablished by the coastal State with respect to a project falling into a category 
of research activities over which the coastal State has discretion to withhold 
consent pursuant to Article 246.
If a State or competent international organization sponsoring research in 
the eez or on the continental shelf of a coastal State fails to comply with such 
conditions, or if the research is not being conducted in accordance with the 
information initially supplied to the coastal State, Article 253 authorizes the 
coastal State to require suspension of the research activities. If those carrying 
out the research do not comply within a reasonable period of time, or if the 
non-compliance constitutes a major change in the research, the coastal State 
may require its cessation.
1.5  The High Seas and the Area
Article 87 expressly recognizes conduct of msr as a freedom of the high seas. 
Articles 256 and 257 further clarify that msr may be conducted freely by any 
State or competent international organization in the water column beyond 
the limits of the eez, as well as in the Area, i.e., the seabed and ocean floor, 
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.78 Under 
77 los Convention, Art. 252, los Convention.
78 If no eez is claimed, continental shelf restrictions apply only as stated in Article 246.
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Article 143, research in the Area is to be carried out exclusively for peaceful 
purposes.
1.6  Research Installations and Equipment
The conditions applicable to msr set forth in the Convention apply equally 
to the deployment and use of installations and equipment to support such re-
search seaward of the territorial sea baseline.79 Such installations and equip-
ment do not possess the status of islands, though safety zones of a reasonable 
breadth (not exceeding 500 meters) may be created around them, consistent 
with the Convention. They may not be deployed in such fashion as to consti-
tute an obstacle to established international shipping routes. They must bear 
identification markings indicating the State of registry or the international 
organization to which they belong, and have adequate internationally agreed 
warning signals.80
1.7 Responsibility and Liability
Pursuant to Article 263(1), States and competent international organizations 
shall be responsible for ensuring that msr, whether undertaken by them or on 
their behalf and wherever conducted seaward of the territorial sea baseline, is 
conducted in accordance with the los Convention. Pursuant to Article 263(2), 
States and organizations shall be responsible and liable for any measures they 
take in contravention of the Convention in respect of research by other States, 
their natural or juridical persons or by competent international organizations 
and shall provide compensation for damage resulting from such measures. With 
respect to damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out of 
msr undertaken by or on the behalf of States and competent international orga-
nizations, such States or organizations shall be liable pursuant to Article 235.81
viii US Marine Scientific Research Policy
The los Convention solidifies coastal State control over msr in waters sub-
ject to their jurisdiction, waters which now encompass considerably more of 
the globe than in 1958.82 Nevertheless, US policy is to encourage freedom of 
79 Art. 258, los Convention.
80 Arts. 259–262, los Convention. See further Stephens and Rothwell, supra note 5, at 
574–576.
81 Art. 263(3), los Convention.
82 Accompanying Germany’s instrument of accession to the los Convention was a declara-
tion concerning msr, which reads as follows:
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msr. That policy was fostered by the US decision, first stated in the President’s 
Oceans Policy Statement of 10 March 1983,83 and reaffirmed in October 1994, 
in the documents transmitting the los Convention to the US Senate for its ad-
vice and consent to accession,84 not to claim jurisdiction over msr in its eez. 
The United States declined to assert jurisdiction in its eez over msr because 
of its interest in encouraging msr and promoting its maximum freedom while 
avoiding unnecessary burdens. The Department of State is charged with fa-
cilitating access by US scientists to foreign eezs under reasonable conditions. 
Consequently, since 1983 the US requests permission through diplomatic 
channels for US research vessels to conduct msr within 200 miles of a coastal 
State asserting such jurisdiction.85
Although the traditional freedom of research suffered a considerable erosion by the 
Convention, this freedom will remain in force for States, international organizations 
and private entities in some maritime areas, e.g., the sea-bed beyond the continental 
shelf and the high seas. However, the exclusive economic zone and the continental 
shelf, which are of particular interest to marine scientific research, will be subject to a 
consent regime, a basic element of which is the obligation of the coastal State under 
article 246, paragraph 3, to grant its consent in normal circumstances. In this regard, 
promotion and creation of favorable conditions for scientific research, as postulated 
in the Convention, are general principles governing the application and interpretation 
of all relevant provisions of the Convention.
 The marine scientific research regime on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles denies the coastal State the discretion to withhold consent under article 246, 
paragraph 5(a), outside areas it has publicly designated in accordance with the pre-
requisites stipulated in paragraph 6. Relating to the obligation, to disclose information 
about exploitation or exploratory operations in the process of designation is taken 
into account in article 246, paragraph 6, which explicitly excluded details from the 
information to be provided.
UN, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status, available at
 http://treaties.un.org/pages/Participation/Status.aspx. (hereinafter UN, Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited).
83 When claiming its eez in 1983, the United States chose not to assert the right of jurisdic-
tion over msr within the zone. President Reagan explained the rationale for not doing so, 
as follows:
 While international law provides for a right of jurisdiction over marine scientific re-
search within such a zone, the proclamation does not assert this right. I have elected 
not to do so because of the United States interest in encouraging marine scientific 
research and avoiding any unnecessary burdens. The United States will nevertheless 
recognize the right of other coastal states to exercise jurisdiction over marine scien-
tific research within 200 nautical miles of their coasts, if that jurisdiction is exercised 
in a manner consistent with international law.
President’s Ocean Policy Statement, supra note 53.
84 US Commentary, supra note 7, at 80.
85 The United Kingdom similarly acts on behalf of British scientists seeking authorization 
to conduct msr in foreign waters. See, 56 British Yearbook of International law 
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The United States does not require its permission to conduct msr in US wa-
ters unless any portion of the msr is conducted within the US territorial sea, 
any portion of the msr within the US eez is conducted within a national marine 
sanctuary, a marine national monument, or other marine protected areas (16 
US Code § 1436), any portion of the msr within the US eez involves the study 
of marine mammals or endangered species (16 US Code §§ 1371(a)(1), 1374(c), 
1538), any portion of the msr within the US eez requires taking commercial 
quantities of living marine resources (16 US Code § 1857(2) & (4)), any portion 
of the msr within the US eez involves contact with the US continental shelf 
(43 US Code § 1340), or any portion of the msr involves ocean dumping re-
search (33 US Code § 1443). The United States has identified some marine date 
collections activities that are not msr, as discussed in Sections 3–6 above.86
1 Role of the US State Department in msr
Within the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs (oes) is the Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs (opa). opa is responsible 
for assuring that US msr policy is adhered to in acquiring permission from the 
coastal State, when required for such research, and for coordinating and pro-
cessing of the requests, as well as in processing requests from foreign research-
ers to conduct msr in the US territorial sea. All applications for consent must 
be submitted to opa via the Research Application Tracking System (rats), an 
online data management system designed to improve the transparency and 
efficiency of opa’s implementation of the marine scientific research consent 
regime.87
ix Coastal State Practice Regarding msr under the los Convention
Many coastal States are complying with the msr regime of the los Conven-
tion,88 perhaps in no small part with the assistance of a practical guide to 
1985 500 (1986). The United States would similarly request permission to conduct msr on 
a continental shelf seaward of the 200 nm limit.
86 Marine Science Research Authorizations, supra note 5. The requirements of other countries 
may be viewed at http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/oceans/notices.html  (notices to 
research vessel operators 1976–1999). See also http://www.unols.org/publications/index 
.html#foreign.
87 Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs, Research Application Tracking System (rats), available 
at https://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/rvc/rats/index.htm.
88 Between 1983 and 1995, the US Department of State processed over 1600 requests for US 
research vessels to conduct msr in territorial seas and eezs of 140 States. Only 43 were 
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the implementation of the msr provisions first published in 1991 by the UN’s 
Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea89 and revised in 2010.90 The 
Revised Guide “strongly encourage[s]” States to “harmonize their national 
legislation with the provisions of the Convention, and, where applicable, rel-
evant agreements and instruments, to ensure consistent application of those 
provisions.”91
There are, however, a number of States that are not complying with the 
Convention’s msr provisions. Some of them are party to the Convention (e.g., 
 Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Russia); others are not (e.g., Colombia). The problems 
the United States has encountered include the following:
– delays in responding to requests for ship clearances;92
– last minute denial of permission to conduct the research;93
– requiring all data, regardless of format, be provided immediately prior to 
departure from last port of call;94
 denied, and 148 were cancelled, principally because of the researchers non-compliance 
with the msr regime. The various legislative enactments were briefly summarized in UN 
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Af-
fairs, The Law of the Sea: Practice of States at the time of entry into 
force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 18, 37–
38, 75–76, 83–84, 97–98, 134–135 and 182 (1994). National legislation is collected in UN 
Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The Law of the Sea: 
National Legislation, Regulations and Supplementary Documents on 
Marine Scientific Research in Areas under National Jurisdiction (1989).
89 UN, msr Guide, supra note 12. This pamphlet also suggests standardization of the forms 
for seeking consent and for granting permission to conduct msr in areas of national 
jurisdiction.
90 UN, msr Revised Guide, supra note 12.
91 Ibid., at 37, para. 129, citing the general call for harmonization of national legislation in 
the annual oceans and law of the sea resolution, A/res/63/111, para. 5 (2008).
92 The last sentence of Article 246(3) requires coastal States to establish rules and proce-
dures ensuring that consent will not be delayed or denied unreasonably. The UN msr 
Guide states the coastal State “should therefore respond as quickly as can reasonably be 
expected to requests for consent.” UN, msr Guide, supra note 12, at 11, para. 52. The Revised 
Guide states “it would be helpful of the coastal State could respond as quickly as can rea-
sonably be expected to requests for consent.” UN, msr Revised Guide, supra note 12, at 41, 
para. 150.
93 Ibid.
94 Article 249(1)(b) sets no fixed time-limits for providing the preliminary reports, final re-
sults and conclusions of the research to the coastal State. Providing even a preliminary re-
port prior to the ship”s departure is not practicable. Soons, supra note 5, at 190. Common 
practice is to provide the preliminary report 30 days after completion of the field portion 
of the research.
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– requiring the data to be provided within a fixed time after leaving the coast-
al State’s waters, rather than after completion of the cruise;95
– requiring copies of data collected in international waters, or in waters under 
another’s country’s jurisdiction;96
– requiring data to be held in confidence and not placed into the public 
domain;97
– requiring the cruise reports to be submitted in other than English;98
– requiring more than one observer to be on board;99
– requiring the observer to be on board during non-research legs of a voyage;100
– requiring research and port call requests to be submitted other than through 
the Foreign Ministry;101
95 The UN msr Guide states that “[a]ll efforts should be made to supply the final results and 
conclusions within a reasonable period of time” noting that the “time span between the 
end of the cruise and the availability of the final results can vary substantially depending 
upon the nature of the research.” UN, msr Guide, supra note 12, at 19 para. 92; UN, msr 
Revised Guide, supra note 12, at 45, para. 170. Final reports usually take a year or longer to 
prepare.
96 The coastal State has no right under the Convention to receive such data until it is made 
public.
97 Article 249(1)(e) requires the data be made internationally available, unless it is of direct 
significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. US law requires 
that US government-funded data must become part of the public domain unless clas-
sified or restricted for national security reasons. 44 US Code §§ 3501(2) & 3506(d)(1), as 
amended by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104–113.
98 The Convention is silent on this question. The UN msr Guide recommends that consid-
eration be given to providing the coastal State with reports “written in a language which 
can be read by scientists of the coastal State.” UN, msr Guide, supra note 12, at 19, para. 93; 
UN, msr Revised Guide, supra note 12, at 45 para. 171.
99 The right to participate under article 249(1)(a) is qualified to the extent that it must be 
“practicable.” The UN msr Guide notes that, if the right to participate is to be meaningful 
at all, the researching State “must always reserve space for at least one coastal State scien-
tist on board,” while recognizing only in extreme situations would that be impracticable, 
such as on a two- or three-man submersible. The Guide also cautions that “excessive de-
mands should not be made.” UN, msr Guide, supra note 12, at 16, para. 78. Consistent 
with the UN msr Guide’s conclusion that “[t]he coastal State may be able to claim more 
than one participant only if, and to the extent that, there is space available,” two scien-
tific participants are generally permitted on board US research vessels when space allows. 
However, there may be occasions when participation is not practical, or, conversely, when 
more than two may participate. Soons, supra note 5, at 189. Similar advice is not con-
tained in the msr Revised Guide.
100 This is not authorized by Article 249.
101 Under Article 250, all communications concerning msr projects “shall be made through 
appropriate official channels, unless otherwise agreed.” Soons states that it is always most 
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– Foreign Ministry’s failing to forward cruise reports to cognizant organiza-
tion;102 and finally
– Slow or incomplete staffing and coordination among interested coastal 
State bureaucracies.103
x Arctic Scientific Agreement
At the Arctic Council’s Fairbanks Ministerial in May 2017, the eight Arctic coast-
al States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, 
Sweden and the United States) signed an agreement on enhancing internation-
al Arctic scientific cooperation.104 The purpose of the agreement is to enhance 
cooperation in scientific activities in areas where a Party exercises sovereignty, 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction, including land and internal waters and adja-
cent territorial sea, eez and continental shelf, and areas beyond national ju-
risdiction in the high seas north of 62oN, in order to increase effectiveness and 
efficiency in the development of scientific knowledge about the Arctic.
By its terms, the Agreement is similar to the 2011 Arctic search and res-
cue agreement.105 Although legally binding, the obligations are merely to 
“facilitate,” defined in the agreement as “pursuing all necessary procedures, 
 including giving timely consideration and making decisions as expeditiously 
safe to use diplomatic channels. Soons, supra note 5, at 193. The msr Revised Guide con-
curs. UN, msr Revised Guide, supra note 12, at 39, para. 139.
102 To avoid problems the UN msr Guide recommends also sending a copy directly to the 
coastal State scientists involved. UN, msr Guide, supra note 12, at 19, para. 90; this advice 
is not repeated in the msr Revised Guide. The Guide also recommends the researching 
State expressly inform the coastal State involved, after final results and conclusions of a 
research project have been provided to it, that all obligations related to a specific research 
project have in its opinion been fulfilled, to avoid invocation of Article 246(5) by the 
coastal State to withhold consent to future projects because of outstanding obligations 
to it from a prior research project. UN, msr Guide, supra note 12, at 20, para. 99; UN, msr 
Revised Guide, supra note 12, at 47, para. 178.
103 The UN msr Guide points out the need for the coastal State to have a single office to pro-
cess applications for consent and be able to coordinate the request among the relevant 
government agencies. UN, msr Guide, at 9, paras. 42, 43, 46; UN, msr Revised Guide, supra 
note 12, at 41, para. 147.
104 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, with appendices, 11 
May 2017 (entered into force May 23, 2018), tias 18-523, available at https://www.state 
.gov/e/oes/rls/other/2017/270809.htm.
105 Agreement on Aeronautical Search and Rescue in the Arctic, signed at Nuuk 12 May 2011 
(entered into force 19 January 2013), tias 13–119, available at https://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/205770.pdf.
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as possible.” Settlement of disputes is “through direct negotiations.” Coopera-
tion with non-Parties is at the Parties discretion.
The agreement entered into force for five years, and automatically renews 
for further periods of five years.106
xi Value of the los Convention Today for msr
The foregoing assessment naturally casts doubt on the value today of the los 
Convention to the marine scientific research community. That need not be the 
case because the Convention is approaching universal acceptance. The Con-
vention is now in force for 167 States and the EC.107
President Clinton submitted the Convention to the Senate for advice and 
consent in 1994. Regarding msr, the President’s Letter of Transmittal stated: 
“In light of the essential role of marine scientific research in understanding 
and managing the oceans, the Convention sets forth criteria and procedures 
to promote access to marine areas, including coastal waters, for research 
activities.”108 The Secretary of State’s Report expanded on the importance of 
the Convention to msr:
The essential role of marine scientific research in understanding and 
managing the oceans is also secured. The Convention affirms the right 
of all States to conduct marine scientific research and sets forth obliga-
tions to promote and cooperate in such research. It confirms the rights 
of coastal States to require consent for such research undertaken in ma-
rine areas under their jurisdiction. These rights are balanced by specific 
criteria to ensure that coastal States exercise the consent authority in a 
predictable and reasonable fashion to promote maximum access for re-
search activities.109
In his 2003 testimony on the Convention before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Legal Adviser Taft said:
106 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, supra note 104.
107 See, Chronological lists of ratification, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/refer 
ence_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%20
Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea.
108 Sen. Treaty Doc. 103–39, supra note 7, at iv.
109 Ibid., at vii; ii Digest 1991–1999, at 1559–1560. See further Davies, supra note 5, at 214–215, 
224–225. See also Stevenson and Oxman, The Future of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 88 American Journal of International Law 488, 498 (1994).
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The essential role of marine scientific research in understanding and 
managing the oceans is also secured. The Convention affirms the right 
of all States to conduct marine scientific research and sets forth obliga-
tions to promote and cooperate in such research. It confirms the right 
of coastal States to require consent for such research undertaken in ma-
rine areas under their jurisdiction. These rights are balanced by specific 
criteria to ensure that coastal States exercise the consent authority in 
a predictable and reasonable fashion to promote maximum access for 
research activities. More U.S. scientists conduct marine scientific re-
search in foreign waters than scientists from almost all other countries 
combined.110
The 2004 and 2007 US Senate Executive Reports state regarding msr:
Part xiii of the Convention recognizes the critical role of marine sci-
entific research in understanding oceanic processes and in informed 
decision-making about uses of the oceans. Following a maritime zone 
approach, it provides coastal States with greater rights to regulate marine 
scientific research in their territorial seas than in the eez and on the con-
tinental shelf. All States have the right to conduct such research freely in 
high seas areas. Part xiii also provides for international cooperation to 
promote marine scientific research.111
So how can those coastal States be convinced to accept and carry out their 
new duties? More than a decade’s experience before the Convention entered 
into force suggested little hope for doing so outside the Convention regime. 
However, in at least three ways the Convention helps make real the balance of 
interests reflected in the Convention’s terms.
First, States party to the Convention are legally bound by their treaty rela-
tionships to comply with the Convention’s provisions, which by their nature 
are more explicit than customary law.
Second, US accession to the Convention would finally place it on a level 
playing field with other countries. Coastal States would no longer have the ex-
cuse that they were bound by the Convention and the United States was not—
a significant political improvement.
Third, the Convention provides a scheme for resolving msr disputes with 
coastal States. This, in and of itself, is an improvement over the present situation. 
110 2003 Digest, at 718.
111 Quoted in Roach and Smith (3rd ed.), supra note 1, Appendix 9.
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Further, the dispute settlement regime, discussed next, is a major accomplish-
ment. Indeed, it may provide the only way to restrain–and roll back–excessive 
coastal State constraints on the conduct of msr.
1 msr Dispute Settlement Regime
With regard to msr, the Convention provides that “disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of the provisions of this Convention with regard 
to marine scientific research shall be settled” by the compulsory dispute settle-
ment procedures (cds).112 The Convention also provides that
[a] dispute arising from an allegation by the researching State that with 
respect to a specific project the coastal State is not exercising its rights 
under articles 246 and 253 in a manner compatible with this Convention 
shall be submitted, at the request of either party, to [compulsory non-
binding] conciliation under Annex v, Section 2, provided that the con-
ciliation commission shall not call in question the exercise by the coastal 
State of its discretion to designate specific areas as referred to in article 
246, paragraph 6, or of its discretion to withhold consent in accordance 
with article 246, paragraph 5.113
1.1 Exemptions from cds
Article 297(2)(a) carves out two substantial exceptions:
– the exercise by the coastal State of a right or discretion under Article 246 
concerning msr in the eez and on the continental shelf; and
– a decision by the coastal State to order suspension or cessation of a research 
project in accordance with Article 253, because the research activities are 
not being conducted in accordance with the information communicated 
to the coastal State under which the consent was based; or the State fails 
to comply with the conditions established by the State under Article 249 
regarding participation, receipt of preliminary results, access to all the 
data and samples derived from the research, assessment of that data when 
 requested by the coastal State, ensuring international availability of the re-
search results, informing the coastal State immediately of any major  changes 
in the research program, or removal of the scientific research installations 
or equipment once the research is completed.
msr exempted from cds thus includes the following:
112 Arts. 264 and 297(2)(a), los Convention.
113 Art. 297(2)(b), los Convention.
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– the general right to regulate, authorize and conduct msr in the eez or 
on the continental shelf,114 and
– the discretion to withhold consent for msr in its eez or on the continental 
shelf if that project:
(a)  is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natu-
ral resources, whether living or non-living. However, Article 246(6) 
precludes a coastal State from exercising its discretion to withhold 
consent if the project is to be undertaken on the continental shelf 
beyond 200 miles, and outside specific areas the coastal State has at 
any time publicly designated as “areas in which exploitation or de-
tailed exploratory operations focused on those areas” are occurring 
or will occur within a reasonable period of time;
(b)  involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explo-
sives or the introduction of harmful substances into the marine 
environment;
(c)  involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, in-
stallations and structures for economic purposes, and installations 
and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of 
the coastal State in the eez or on the continental shelf; or
(d)  contains inaccurate information communicated to the coastal 
State, or if the researching State has outstanding obligations to the 
coastal State from a prior research project.
1.2 Interim Measures
Two other provisions favor the coastal State:
– Article 265, Interim Measures, provides that pending settlement of a dis-
pute, authorized msr will not begin or continue “without the express con-
sent of the coastal State concerned.”
– Further, the provisions of Article 292 authorizing a tribunal or court to or-
der the prompt release of vessels and crews applies by its terms only to de-
tentions for fishing and pollution violations.115 Thus there is no guaranteed 
right of prompt release if a foreign research vessel were detained by the 
coastal State for violating its msr laws and regulations.
1.3 Opting Out of cds for msr
Article 264 provides that “disputes concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of the provisions of [the los] Convention with regard to marine  scientific 
114 Art. 246(1), los Convention.
115 See Arts. 73(2), 220(7) and 226(1)(b), los Convention.; cf. Art. 27(3), los Convention.
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research shall be settled” in accordance with the sections on “compulsory 
 procedures entailing binding decisions” and the limitations and exceptions 
thereon, set out in Part xv, Settlement of Disputes, Parts 2 [Articles 286–296] 
and 3 [Articles 297–299], respectively.
For parties to the los Convention, Article 286 provides that any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention shall, where no 
settlement has been reached by recourse to the general provisions in Section 1, 
Articles 279–285, of Part xv on the Settlement of Disputes, be submitted at the 
request of any party to the dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction 
under Section 2, Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions. There is 
an exception to this provision pertaining to certain law enforcement activities.
Article 298(1)(b) permits a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to the 
Convention or at any time thereafter, to declare in writing that it does not accept 
the procedures in Section 2 with respect to “disputes concerning law enforce-
ment activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction exclud-
ed from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under Article 297, paragraph 2 or 3”.
Article 297(3) relates to fishing. Article 297(2) provides regarding msr:
2. (a) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provi-
sions of this Convention with regard to marine scientific research shall 
be settled in accordance with Section 2, except that the coastal State shall 
not be obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute 
arising out of:
(i)  the exercise by the coastal State of a right or discretion in accor-
dance with article 246; or
(ii)  a decision by the coastal State to order suspension or cessation of 
a research project in accordance with article 253.
(b) A dispute arising from an allegation by the researching State that with 
respect to a specific project the coastal State is not exercising its rights 
under articles 246 and 253 in a manner compatible with this Convention 
shall be submitted, at the request of either party, to conciliation under 
Annex v, Section 2, provided that the conciliation commission shall not 
call in question the exercise by the coastal State of its discretion to desig-
nate specific areas as referred to in article 246, paragraph 6, or of its dis-
cretion to withhold consent in accordance with article 246, paragraph 5.
Thus the Convention provides that all disputes regarding msr are subject to 
compulsory binding dispute resolution except those disputes regarding the 
coastal State’s (a) discretion to grant or deny msr applications in its eez or 
on  its continental shelf, and (b) decision to order suspension of a research 
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project. However, the situations in these two exceptions are subject to com-
pulsory non-binding conciliation.
As of November 2017, the following 17 States have exercised this right under 
article 298(1)(b): Belarus, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, 
France, Greece, Mexico, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, Thailand, Tunisia, 
United Kingdom and Uruguay.116 Upon accession, the United States intends to 
exercise this option.117
1.4 Remedies for Improper Exercise of Discretion
What aspects of msr then are subject to dispute resolution? Two important 
coastal State duties come to mind: (1) the duty of the coastal State to grant 
consent, in normal circumstances, for msr projects in the eez or on the con-
tinental shelf; and (2) the duty to establish rules and procedures ensuring that 
such consent will not be delayed or denied unreasonably. Although these may 
not appear to be that significant, it seems that the very existence of these areas 
should provide the researching State leverage over the coastal State that is not 
implementing the msr regime consistent with the terms of the Convention.
The United States now has very little leverage over recalcitrant coastal 
States, and there is little incentive for those States to change their laws, regula-
tions or procedures. The mere fact that if the United States were party their 
non-compliance can be brought to compulsory dispute settlement can only 
be an improvement in the present situation, and should lead to greater confor-
mity with the msr regime in the Convention.
Thus, US accession to the los Convention would provide it the opportu-
nity to use the cds procedures, an opportunity not available while the United 
States remains outside the treaty regime.
Finally, US accession to the Convention would enable the United States 
to consider establishing a Freedom of msr Program analogous to the nsc- 
directed State-Defense Freedom of Navigation Program that since 1979 has 
helped conform state practice to the navigational provisions of the Conven-
tion.118 Similar results should be sought for msr.
xii Conclusions
This article has demonstrated that not all methods of collection of data about 
the oceans are marine scientific research regulated by Part xiii of the Law of 
116 UN, Multilateral Treaties Deposited, supra note 82.
117 US Commentary, supra note 7, at 87.
118 See Roach and Smith (3rd ed.), supra note 1, Chapter 1.
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the Sea Convention. The means of data collection are often the same, and may 
appear indistinguishable from msr. The data collected may be the same or dif-
ferent. The parameters collected, their intended use, and the detailed controls 
on foreign msr in the eez distinguish msr from surveys, operational oceanog-
raphy, exploration and exploitation of resources, and monitoring and environ-
mental assessment.119
The article has also demonstrated that proposals that all forms of marine 
data collection should be under coastal State control120 would deprive the peo-
ple of all nations of the benefits of free and open access to data that enhance 
safety and environmental protection.
While the lack of agreed definitions of the various methods for marine data 
collection has resulted in differences of views on the legal regimes governing 
them, this article has sought to provide clarification and further understanding.
119 See the discussion in ibid., at 82–83 and the text preceding, supra note 5.
120 See, e.g., Julia Xue, Marine Scientific Research and Hydrographic Surveys in the eezs: Clos-
ing up the Legal Loopholes?, in Nordquist, Koh and Moore, supra note 28, at 209–225; 
and Sam Bateman, Hydrographic Surveying in the Exclusive Economic Zones – Is it Marine 
Scientific Research?, in Nordquist, Koh and Moore, supra note 28, at 105–131.
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Voluntary Observing Ship and Marine Scientific 
Research under the Law of the Sea
Hong Chang
i Factual Background
Historical introduction. Vessel observation, as a significant part of stereoscopic 
monitoring of marine environment, has gained wide recognition and plays a 
crucial role in marine scientific research for centuries. In the beginning, the 
safety of navigation was the focal point of weather observing at sea. As early as 
1853, Matthew Fontaine Maury of the u.s. Navy proposed the conveying of an 
international conference to coordinate the establishment of uniform observa-
tion systems at sea.1 After that, most attending countries arranged their ship 
to transmit the observations to shore. However, during the past decades, with 
the further development of marine science and marine technology, combined 
with the threat of global warming and other environmental disasters, the 
requirements of large scale and real-time observations were more and more 
expanded.2 A well-organized system for collecting observations at sea is gener-
ally considered as being necessary today. The Joint Technical Commission for 
Oceanography and Marine Meteorology (jcomm), an expert intergovernmen-
tal organization, which is co-organized by the World Meteorological Organi-
zation (wmo) and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (ioc), 
consolidates and coordinates the observations, data management and service 
system of oceanography and marine meteorology.3 jcomm is composed of the 
Observations Programme Area, the Data Management Programme Area (opa) 
and the Services Programme Area plus two Cross Cutting Task Teams on Satel-
lite Data Requirements and Capacity Building.4 The opa is primarily respon-
sible for the development, coordination and maintenance of the multi-mode 
marine observations by the means of global cooperation. The Ship  Observation 
1 For further details, see http://www.bom.gov.au/jcomm/vos/vos.html.
2 For more information, see http://www.bom.gov.au/jcomm/vos/documents/vos_brochure.
pdf.
3 For information on the work of jcomm, see http://www.jcomm.info/index.php?option=com_ 
frontpage&Itemid=1.
4 For further details, see http://www.jcomm.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view
&id=89&Itemid=97.
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Team (sot) is a subdivision of the opa. Its main component is the Voluntary 
Observing Ships (vos) Scheme.5
How the vos scheme works. The data collected by vos are used for the prepara-
tion of forecasts and warnings to help route ships and avoid severe weather 
conditions, to monitor the state of the oceans, for climatological data banks 
serving many purpose, and to build long-term records to monitor changes in 
the climate of the earth.6 These data pertains to the atmosphere above the sea 
(temperature, dew point, cloud, weather, visibility and pressure) and to the 
surface of the sea (temperature, waves, currents and ice).7
The members of the wmo recruit all the ships of the vos scheme. The rep-
resentative responsible for recruiting is the Port Meteorological Officer (pmo) 
who plays a critical role in the running of the vos scheme. The functions of 
the pmo also comprise maintaining accurate records of the ships, regularly 
visiting the ships, providing relevant service regardless of the ship’s national-
ity and country of recruitment, and so on.8 All the members of the vos Fleet, 
no matter what are the nationalities of the ships and the country of recruit-
ment, could share the observations around the related routes. It means that 
vessels offer their observations in return for obtaining the forecasting, warning 
service, and instrumentations. Besides, there are no direct costs for attending 
vessels. Communication charges for the transmission are exempt.9
Data management. Traditionally, Voluntary Observing Ships have measured 
and reported the atmospheric and sea surface conditions which are needed 
for meteorological forecasting.10 There are two ways how the vos data flows: 
observations are transmitted in real time, and observations are recorded in 
5 For further details, see http://www.jcomm.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=vi
ew&id=21&Itemid=38.
6 See J. Ashley Roach, Defining Scientific Research: Marine Data Collection, in Myron H. 
Nordquist, Law, Science & Ocean Management 541–574, 557 (2008).
7 Ibid.
8 For more introduction and detailed functions of pmo, see, http://www.bom.gov.au/
jcomm/vos/pmo.html.
9 For the general information, see, http://www.bom.gov.au/jcomm/vos/vos.html; and 
http://www.bom.gov.au/jcomm/vos/vos.html, at 3. For the situation of usa, on the of-
ficial website, available at http://www.vos.noaa.gov/us_vos.shtml, it is said that, “vos op-
erates at no cost to the vessel, with communication charges, observing equipment and 




paper or electronic logbooks.11 In the first one, real time observations are trans-
mitted to the National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (nmhss) by 
using Geostationary Technology Satellite (gts). Some nmhss keep an archive 
of the data extracted from the gts.12 In regards to the latter, marine meteo-
rological observations are recorded on board in special registers (logbooks), 
which are provided by national meteorological services. Then the pmo of the 
recruiting country collects the logbooks, transfers the observations from the 
logbooks to a magnetic media in a standard format, sends the data to global 
collecting centers in Germany and the United Kingdom, approximately once 
every three months. The two centers provide data to eight members who are 
responsible for the preparation of climatological summaries.13
New situation. The variables observed by vos originally regard to the air or the 
sea surface, like dry-bulb temperature, dew-point temperature, sea surface 
temperature, air-sea temperature difference, visibility, weather, wind direction 
and speed, pressure, cloud, and waves.14 Later, with the development of sci-
ence, awareness grew that the most challenging scientific problems encom-
pass two or more of the environmental sciences. Development of a theory of 
climate will require treating the oceans and atmosphere as a thoroughly inter-
acting system,15 since the atmospheric circulation cannot be understood apart 
from considering the ocean, and vice versa.16 Practically, it is far from enough 
to conduct climate research only by considering the atmosphere. A new situ-
ation therefore developed that the scientists began to do climate research by 
using marine factors, say, taking some marine data and sea water samples from 
the ocean on vos, like sea surface salinity, dissolved oxygen and seawater CO2 
partial pressure (pCO2).17 In this regard, the most prominent activities are the 
underway CO2 measurements which now is conducted by many ocean research 
institutions. The oceans are the largest sustained sink of anthropogenic carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere. Therefore, understanding the physical, chemical 
11 See, Elizabeth C. Kent, et al., The Voluntary Observing Ship Scheme, available at
https://abstracts.congrex.com/scripts/jmevent/abstracts/FCXNL-09A02a-1664333-1cw-
p4a07_rev1.pdf, at 1. See the data flow diagram on http://www.bom.gov.au/jcomm/vos/
dataflow.html.
12 Kent, et al., supra note 11, at 2.
13 For more detailed information about data management, see, http://www.bom.gov.au/
jcomm/vos/vos.html; and http://gosic.org/gcos/vos-program-overview.htm.
14 See http://gosic.org/goos/VOS-data-flow.htm#Voluntary%20Observing%20Ships
15 Thomas A. Clingan, The Law of the Sea: Ocean Law and Policy 435 (1994).
16 Ibid., at 435.
17 Research details see T. Steinhoff and A. Körtzinger, vos-based pCO2 measurements in the 
North Atlantic Ocean - does the DpCO2 change?, available at http://ioc3.unesco.org/ioccp/
pCO2_workshop/Posters/Steinhoff_SOCOV.ppt.
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and biological processes involved, feedback effects, and the future of this sink 
is critical for reducing uncertainty of climate change. Scientists normally outfit 
those vos with automated carbon dioxide analyzers as well as thermosalino-
graphs (tsgs) to measure the temperature, salinity and partial pressure of CO2 
(pCO2) in surface water and air in order to determine the carbon exchange 
between the ocean and atmosphere.18
The way that the scientists or the equipment can get on the vessel is quite 
simple: negotiating with the shipping company and the captain. This means no 
one would apply for the consent of the likely coastal States (according to the 
shipping routes) before the scientists and the equipment getting on the vessel 
to take measurements from the ocean.19 This practice has already existed for 
decades and not too much attention has been paid to it. If the company or 
the captain agrees, the scientists are allowed to embark or they contact with 
the chief engineer to emplace the equipment. The measurements would be 
conducted along the shipping routes. With respect to the shipping company, 
some advanced clients require the commercial ships to wear a “green label,” 
which means, in some circumstances, friendly environmental ships are more 
popular. Even more important, captains and engineers who care about the 
research of climate change are willing to promote and facilitate the develop-
ment of climate research. All these make the measurements from ocean on 
the vos more and more common. However, the way of data collection varies 
from the meteorological data collection as described in the foregoing. Neither 
the pmo nor transmitting the data to the National Meteorological and Hydro-
logical Services (nmhss) gets involved. The scientists who deploy the equip-
ment have their own system of receiving the data from satellite.20 If the data 
received is not continuous, scientists would know that something is wrong 
with the equipment. Either then they fix the problem or they can inform the 
chief engineer to deal with it. In plain terms, the shipping company or the cap-
tain voluntarily carry scientists or equipment for conducting measurements in 
the ocean. They provide necessary assistance to the scientists or keep an eye 
on the running of the automatic equipment, however, they have nothing to do 
with the data collection.21
The marine environment, which is both important for marine science and 
the law of the sea, is defined by Soons “as covering the water column, the 
18 See http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/Volunteer+Observing+Ships+%28VOS%29.
19 Conversation with Professor Arne from IFM-Geomar.





 seabed and subsoil, and the atmosphere immediately above the sea.”22 As stated 
above, the variables, both relevant to the ocean and meteorology are collected 
on vos from the water surface, the underwater, the atmosphere immediately 
above the sea as well as the atmosphere non-immediately above the sea. The 
former ones, according to the definition, are the components of the marine 
environment. That is to say, these variables are collected in the marine environ-
ment. As long as the marine environment is involved, the situation might be 
complicated because of the existence of the “Constitution for the Oceans”23 – 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (los Convention) which is 
an important contribution to the law of the sea. Traditionally, the law of the 
sea deals with the activities on and in the oceans, which were tied to the envi-
ronment in which they take place. The los Convention sets out principles and 
norms for regulating the conducts that are relevant to maritime issues. In the 
Convention’s preamble, it is expressly stated that “Recognizing the desirability 
of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of 
all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international 
communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of seas and oceans, …” 
Thus it can be seen that the goal of the los Convention is to provide the legal 
order for the uses of the seas and oceans. Since taking measurements on vos 
from the oceans constitutes an ocean use which may affect maritime areas 
within and beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, legal issues therefore 
should be analyzed on the basis of the los Convention.
ii Relationship between the Ocean Measurements on vos 
and Marine Scientific Research
It should be noted, firstly, that the newly emerging practice of ocean measure-
ments on vos are distinguished from traditional data collection activities on 
vos in terms of legal status. With respect to the vos scheme, during the los 
Convention negotiations of the third committee, the Secretary-General of the 
22 A.H.A. Soons, Marine Scientific Research and the Law of the Sea 124 (1982). 
Also see, Katharina Bork, et al., The legal regulation of Floats and Gliders-In quest of a new 
regime? 39 Ocean Development and International Law 303 (2008).
23 Statement of Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, President of the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea, at the final session of the Conference at Montego 
Bay, Jamaica, on 11 December 1982; reprinted in UN Pub. Sales No. E.83.V.5, 1983, at xxxiii. 
Excerpted from Satya N. Nandan, An Introduction to the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, in Davor Vidas et al., (eds.) Order for the Oceans at the 
Turn of the Century (1999).
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World Meteorological Organization expressed the concern that some provisions 
on marine scientific research might have direct consequences on activities con-
ducted by the World Meteorological Organization over the oceans. Specifically, 
the vos Scheme was pointed out. The chairman of the Third Committee, real-
izing that the adequate marine meteorological data coverage, including that 
from areas within the exclusive economic zone, was indispensable for timely 
and accurate storm warnings for the safety of navigation and for the protection 
of lives and property in coastal and offshore areas, expressed that
the pertinent provisions of the second revision of the text on marine sci-
entific research would not create any difficulties or obstacles hindering 
adequate meteorological coverage from the ocean areas, including areas 
within the exclusive economic zone since such operational and research 
activities have already been recognized as routine activities within the 
terms of reference of the World Meteorological Organization and are of 
common interest of all countries with undoubted universal significance.24
While it is decided that the collection of marine meteorological data is not 
marine scientific research regulated by Part xiii of los Convention,25 this 
newly emerging practice of ocean measurements on vos may face a different 
situation.
1 What is Marine Scientific Research
Since there is no definition of the term “marine scientific research” in the los 
Convention, various views toward the definition therefore are expressed and 
most of them can be sorted into two categories that focus on distinct perspec-
tives. Whereas one considers the term under the context of the legal regime 
whose purpose is indicating which activities are governed by the regime of msr 
and which are not,26 the other one stresses the peculiarities from the scientific 
point of view27 that places more weight on the nature and essence of the rel-
evant activities in abstract terms. According to the first category, it is stated:
Marine scientific research is the general term most often used to describe 
those activities undertaken in the ocean and coastal waters to expand 
24 See Official Records of the United Nations Third Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, Volume xiv, at 102–103, 133–134. Excerpted from Roach, supra note 6, at 
203.
25 Ibid.




scientific knowledge of the marine environment. It includes oceanogra-
phy, marine biology, fisheries research, scientific ocean drilling and cor-
ing, geological/geophysical scientific surveying, as well as other activities 
with a scientific purpose.28
Thus, it can be seen that the disciplines constitute marine scientific research 
contain marine biology,29 chemistry,30 physics,31 geology,32 meteorology,33 
hydrograph34 and oceanography.35
Turning then to the second one, the definition has been based on the gen-
eral notion of research, which means diligent and systematic inquiry or inves-
tigation into a subject in order to discover facts or principles.36 The ordinary 
meaning of the term “scientific research” is the investigation of a phenome-
non, question, or problem conducted by the means and methods of science.37 
Marine scientific research may be regarded as such investigation concerned 
with the marine environment which is commonly understood as covering 
the water column, the seabed and subsoil, and the atmosphere immediately 
above the sea.38 Therefore, marine scientific research can be defined as “any 
28 J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, Excessive maritime claims 248 (1994).
29 Marine biology is concerned with the living organisms of the sea, such as marine mi-
crobes, plankton, benthic organisms, …, marine reptiles and marine mammals. Excerpted 
from Florian H. Th. Wegelein, Marine Scientific Research 12 (2005).
30 Marine chemistry deals with the chemical properties of the sea water. Ibid.
31 Marine physics or physical oceanography is concerned with the physical characteristics 
of sea water. Ibid.
32 Marine geology is concerned with the tectonic situation of the sea floor, with submarine 
topography, terrestrial magnetism and paleomagnetism, gravity, quake and elastic wave, 
and sedimentation. Ibid.
33 Marine meteorology is concerned with the interactions and mutual influence between 
the oceans and the atmosphere. Ibid.
34 Hydrography is concerned with the aspects of navigation of the sea. Mapping of the sea 
floor, depth soundings, wreck search and tide schedules are the most prominent services 
for navigators. Ibid.
35 Oceanography, in the scientific community, denotes the holistic study of the marine 
environment, namely, the system of oceans and atmosphere from possible views of the 
marine sciences: “ the scientific studies of ocean, its boundaries and bottom topography, 
its physics and chemistry and of its marine organisms, including the interrelations and 
interactions.” Ibid. See Wegelein, supra note 29, at 12–17.
36 Mirjam Skrk, The Prospects of Marine Scientific Research in the Contemporary Practice of 
States, in Budislav Vukas, (ed.), Essays on the New Law of the Sea 340–368, 
344 (1990).
37 Katharina Bork, The legal regulation of Floats and Gliders-In quest of a new regime? 39 
Ocean Development and International Law 303 (2008). Also see, Soons, supra 
note 22, at 124.
38 See Soons, supra note 22, at 124.
217Voluntary Observing Ship and Marine Scientific Research
<UN>
 investigation of a phenomenon occurring in the seabed or the subsoil, the 
water column, or the atmosphere directly above the water.”39
2 Do the Ocean Measurements on vos Constitute Marine 
Scientific Research?
As the foregoing analyzed, the emerging practice of ocean measurements on 
vos has nothing to do with the framework of the wmo. Neither the data col-
lection purpose nor the data management is as the same as the vos Scheme, 
other than the use of vos fleets. Based on the ordinary meaning of scientific 
research,40 these vos measurements and observations can fall within the 
scope of scientific research. Furthermore, in light of the definition of marine 
environment,41 the conduct of measuring the parameters and taking samples 
from the ocean or from the atmosphere immediately above the sea42 can be 
considered as activities in marine environment. In that case, consequently, the 
ocean measurements and observations on vos can be deemed as marine sci-
entific research.43
iii Factual Analysis
Compared with the research vessel (R/V), vos offers a simple and convenient 
platform for scientists to conduct marine scientific research.
Research vessel. Under the los Convention, other than the consent regime, 
Articles 248, 249 and 250 made extremely clear the duties of the research party. 
39 Bork, supra note 37, at 304.
40 See Skrk, supra note 36.
41 See Bork, supra note 37.
42 A research result shows these kinds of measurements. It is stated: [T]he following param-
eters are measured in continuous underway mode: Sea surface temperature, Sea surface 
salinity, Dissolved oxygen, Chlorophyll (fluorescence), Atmospheric and seawater pCO2. 
Discrete water samples are taken for measurement of the following parameters (approx. 
7 cruises annually): Dissolved inorganic carbon (dic), Alkalinity, Nutrients, Total organic 
carbon and nitrogen (ton, TN), δ13C-DIC, Salinity (for calibration of the tsg unit), Chlo-
rophyll-a (for calibration of the fluorescence probe), Particulate organic carbon and ni-
trogen, 17O-O2 for productivity estimates (cooperation with Paul Quay, Univ. Washington, 
Seattle/USA, start in 2007). More details, see Steinhoff and Körtzinger, supra note 17.
43 Some parameters, like surface wind speed and direction, air temperature, cloud, wave, 
weather and visibility information, which measured by vos are not in the marine envi-
ronment. Therefore, the conduct cannot be deemed as marine scientific research. In this 
thesis, only the part, which is deemed as marine scientific research, will be analyzed. The 
details about what other parameters can be achieved by vos see Kent et al, supra note 11, at 1.
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Article 248 is about the duty to provide information to the coastal State,44 
combined with Article 249 that specifies the duty to comply with certain con-
ditions.45 Article 250 makes reference to the communications concerning 
marine scientific project, which should be made through appropriate official 
channels, unless otherwise agreed.46 It can be seen that conducting marine 
scientific research in the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf 
of a coastal State, the procedures and the requirements are highly complicated 
and sometimes extra requirements have been put forward as well, like two 
cruises in two years.47 It is said that “not less than six months in advance of the 
expected starting date of the marine scientific research project”48 to provide 
the full description of the project. Practically, at least one or two years before 
the starting date, researchers have to prepare for the cruise, including applying 
for the funding.49
Voluntary Observing Ship. As the foregoing analysis show how vos scheme 
works, the most attractive consideration for scientists is that there is no need 
to secure the consent from the coastal State for the measurement in the ocean 
during the vos cruise. This means it is much easier for scientists to take mea-
surements from the ocean on vos rather than a research vessel. Leaving all the 
application processes out makes scientists more than happy to conduct marine 
44 See unclos, supra note 1, Myron H. Nordquist (ed.), United Nations Conven-
tion on The Law of The Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volume iv Articles 192 
to 278 Final Act, Annex vi 526 (1989), Article 248. It is included that the nature and 
objectives of the project, the method and means to be used, the precise geographical 
areas in which the project is to be conducted, the expected date of first appearance and 
final departure of the research vessels, the name of the sponsoring institution, its director 
and the person in charge of the project, and the extent to which it is considered that the 
coastal state should be able to participate or to be represented in the project.
45 Ibid., at 537. These conditions including, ensuring, if requested, the right of the coastal 
state to participate or represented in the project without any payment or obligation to 
contribute towards the costs of the project; providing the coastal state, if requested, with 
preliminary report, final results and the conclusions after the completion of the research; 
providing the coastal state, if requested, access to all data and samples and the data which 
may be copied and samples which may be divided without detriment to their scientific 
value; providing the coastal state, if requested, the assessment of such data, samples and 
research results or assistance in their assessment; ensuring the research results are made 
internationally available; informing the coastal state immediately of any major change in 
the research program; and the last one is removing the scientific research installations or 
equipment once the research is completed, unless otherwise agreed.
46 Ibid., at 554.
47 Conversation with Professor Arne.
48 Art. 248, los Convention.
49 Conversation with Professor Arne.
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scientific research on the vos if it could meet their research  requirements. 
 Furthermore, there are some other advantages which make the vos scheme 
more attractive for scientists as well, like most of the vos are commercial 
ships,50 the sailing routes are comparatively regular and frequent. This is ben-
eficial to some kinds of marine scientific measurements, like seawater tempera-
ture, salinity and ocean current. Additionally, cutting the cost, this may be not 
the primary factor to attract scientist, however, this can sometimes make a little 
impact.
As the los Convention is silent on the definition of marine scientific 
research as well as what it is constituted, it thus denotes that the los Con-
vention is incapable of clarifying what activities should be subject to the legal 
regime of marine scientific research. Moreover, within the vos scheme, there 
is another way of operation that is totally different from the legal regime of 
marine scientific research established in los Convention. Therefore, there 
must be a vacuum zone where marginal case happens there. That would be, 
on the one hand, for the sake of climate research, scientists would like to do all 
the kinds of observation including in the ocean on vos while there are no legal 
norms regulating those activities. On the other hand, the original intention of 
vos scheme is mainly for atmospheric weather forecasting and climate change 
studies51 which could conduct research in the atmosphere freely without the 
limitation of borders. All of these make it possible to lead the marine scientific 
research that is conducted on vos into an awkward position. Is it legal or ille-
gal? How can it be protected?
The los Convention, in Articles 245 and 246 make it extremely clear that 
marine scientific research in the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and 
on the continental shelf should be conducted under the consent of the coastal 
States. In a literal sense, the ocean measurements on vos that are taken along 
the shipping routes cannot be seriously argued that the conduct is legal by vir-
tue of the los Convention. The consideration about the feasible consequences 
becomes applicable since the los Convention in Articles 27–32 codify differ-
ent rules between merchant ships and government ships which are operated 
for non-commercial purposes. While government-owned vessels that are oper-
ated for non-commercial purposes enjoy immunities from boarding by other 
States on the high seas or other marine zones of coastal States,52 the mer-
chant or civilian vessels may not enjoy these immunities to the same extent.53 
50 Kent et al, supra note 11, at 1.
51 Available at http://gosic.org/gcos/VOS-program-overview.htm
52 Art. 32, los Convention.
53 Arts. 27 and 28, los Convention. See Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, An Internation-
al Regime for Marine Scientific Research 16 (2003).
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 Similarly, the u.s. Coastal Guard issues that while oceanographic vessels so des-
ignated are exempt from most of the inspection laws of the u.s., as merchant 
vessels, they are subject to manning requirements under u.s. law.54 Namely, for 
commercial ships, as the majority composition of vos fleet, the factor of non-
immunities is important to bear in mind. In some cases, it is horrible that the 
coastal States’ domestic implementation of the international law applicable to 
foreign vessels for breaching of coastal State’s regulations. The measures are 
beyond the purport of Article 253 which requires the coastal State to order 
the suspension or cessation of the msr activities, including the impounding 
of the vessel and its scientific equipment, very large fines, and imprisonment 
of the chief scientist or the master of the vessel.55 That make ocean measure-
ments on vos extremely dangerous. It happens sometime that coast guards 
get aboard to do routine inspection, whereas they may go for whether there 
is marine pollution, drug smuggling or other breach of regulations since they 
have no idea about the use of the scientific instruments and none of the crews 
or the scientists would mention it.56 It is therefore concluded that a thorough 
protection from the legal ground is demanded. Some regulations are supposed 
to be worked out and make it black and white to ensure that there are legal 
basis for both research States and coastal States.
iv Legal Analysis
1 Ocean Measurements Conducted on vos are Pure Scientific Research
It is well known that research that is “in accordance with this Convention (los 
Convention) exclusively for peaceful purposes and in order to increase sci-
entific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all mankind” 
can be considered as pure scientific research, which is promoted by the los 
Convention. In the case of ocean measurement on vos, the measurement of 
marine data and the analysis of marine sample are effective means to investi-
gate the climate change that is for the benefit of all mankind. It has come to 
light that climate change is more and more close to the lives of all the mankind. 
As the United Nations Secretary General has said, it is the major, overriding 
environmental issue of our time,57 and represents one of the greatest social 
54 Excerpted from Gorina-Ysern, supra note 53.
55 See Gorina-Ysern, supra note 53, at 17–18.
56 Conversation with Professor Arne.
57 See http://www.unep.org/climatechange/Introduction/tabid/233/language/en-US/De 
fault.aspx.
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and economic threats facing the planet as well.58 In terms of the research pur-
pose though, it is a subjective criterion. What make the coastal States most 
worried about are the exploration of nature resource and the territory security.
A Unrelated to Natural Resources Exploitation
Marine natural resources include living resources and non-living resources. 
Among the living resources, the costal State is more alert to fish catches which 
is threatened by Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (iuu) fishing and over 
fishing whenever an unknown vessel shows up whether for research or not. 
With respect to the non-living resources which are constituted, most impor-
tantly, by the mineral resources that are either dissolved in sea water, resting 
on the ocean floor, or found underneath it.59 The initial period of non-living 
resources exploration that concerns the coast State most is to investigate the 
geographical and geological conditions of the ocean floor to obtain detailed 
information on offshore resources.60 Learning the geographical and geological 
information of the ocean floor is a sophisticated research process,let along that 
surveys of potential resources need to be carried out for a considerable time 
and the technologies have already gone so advanced that the extra precision 
instruments are required. Against this background, the variables frequently 
taken on vos, like sea surface salinity, dissolved oxygen and seawater CO2 
partial pressure (pCO2),61 are far from meeting the technical requirements of 
those forgoing applications. Other than that it is obvious that the emphasis 
of the measurements on vos is just the marine data and sample, rather than 
catching fishes. Therefore, in this view of perspective, anxious of the coastal 
State seems superfluous.
B Not Endanger the Coastal State’s National Security
Every country regards the maintenance of its military security as a matter of 
highest national priority. It is hard to image that oceanographic research has 
58 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/home_en.htm.
59 Roger H. Charlier and Constance C. Charlier, Ocean Non-Living Resources: Historical Re-
spective on Exploitation, Economics and Environmental Impact, 40 International Jour-
nal of Environmental Studies 123–134 (1992). It is said that the dissolved minerals 
include salt, bromine and magnesium, iodine, potassium, brines, and suspended matter. 
The minerals from the sea floor include sand, gravel, shells, tin, phosphorus, sulphur, and 
polymetallic nodules. The minerals beneath the ocean floor include hydrocarbons, coal 
and others.
60 Teruhis Tsujino, Exploration Technologies for the Utilization of Ocean Floor Resources: 
Contribution to the Investigation for the Delineation of Continental Shelf, 24 Quarterly 
 Review 68 (2007).
61 For research details, see Steinhoff and Körtzinger, supra note 17.
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no potential military application.62Whenever an oceanographer measures 
depth, water temperature, pressure or salinity anywhere in the ocean, the 
collected data could be of some possible use to navies.63 Even worse, some 
conducts of military intelligence or subversive activities under the guise of, or 
along with, marine scientific research.64 It is thus highly understandable that 
the most secure action for a coastal State would appear, such as restricting 
or preventing the access of the information about nearby waters. As for the 
respect of marine measurement on vos, it should be born in mind that the 
purpose is for climate change studies, even though some of the variables taken 
by vos may seem suspicious. However, it should not be ignored that there is, 
as mentioned before, a data management system in vos scheme as well as 
the marine measurements on vos. In terms of the marine data collected on 
vos, each time after one research program on vos, mostly one or two years, 
researchers would make the data open to public through various channels,65 
like putting the data on internet66 which is beneficial to whole science circles 
or publishing papers67 which is considered as scientific literature that as an 
important source of conducting marine scientific research.68 Whereas admit-
tedly, military intelligence data would not go to public field and still further 
unlikely to born published articles that are accessible to the whole world. It 
is generally regarded that “publication of the research findings in the open 
scientific literature is one indication of the distinction between open and pro-
prietary research.”69
62 See Warren S. Wooster, Freedom of Oceanic Research 161 (1973).
63 Ibid.
64 See Soons, supra note 22, at 32.
65 Conversation with Professor Arne.
66 For examples, see http://www.ioccp.org/UW.html and http://www.carboocean.org. The 
former one offers coordination service for the ocean carbon community. The latter one is 
for marine carbon sources and sinks assessment.
67 Such as, Steinhoff and Körtzinger, supra note 17, and Assessment of the current ocean car-
bon sink and its implications for climate change and mitigation, available at http://www 
.oceanobs09.net/plenary/files/Koertzinger_CarbonSink_3Ac_vfinal.pdf. The authors both 
conduct marine scientific research on voluntary observing ships which are named M/V 
Falstaff (Wallenius Lines, Sweden) and M/V Atlantic Companion (Atlantic Container 
Lines, usa).
68 There are two phases which constitute marine scientific research: collecting data on the 
one hand and interpretation of those data on the other. In many cases, data that already 
exist can be made use of conducting marine scientific research and the important source 
of already existing data is the scientific literature. For more information, see Soons, 
 supra note 22, at 16.
69 See Wooster, supra note 62, at 168. For the same view, also see Soons, supra note 22, at 
7. It is said that “Like is the case with fundamental marine scientific research, the results 
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Still everything has an exception. It is however irrational that uses denial 
to safeguard the uncertain “endangered” interests even though it is of doubt 
whether the contributions of researchers are all for science’s sake. A set of legal 
regime about vos marine scientific research is supposed to protect the “sci-
ence sake” and prevent from coast States’ interests getting dangerous. Further-
more, as for the conduct of ocean measurements on vos, all the requirements 
and qualifications by virtue of los Convention will be observed. Under the 
view that the tendency towards promoting marine scientific research and ben-
efiting all the human beings is overwhelming, the potential exceptional case 
should not be the excuse of holding up the pace of science development.
2 Notifying Regime
Under unclos Article 246, it is expressly provided that marine scientific 
research shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal State in the exclu-
sive economic zone and on the continental shelf. Nevertheless one thing 
should still be bore in mind that the consent regime is only applicable to the 
circumstance that when the research is conducted in eez or on the continen-
tal shelf of the coastal State. In the territorial sea, the coastal State enjoys sov-
ereignty which denotes the legal status of the territorial sea is almost alike the 
internal waters (except for the innocent passage regime). As a consequence of 
sovereignty, access of foreign vessels to the territorial sea and internal waters 
specifically for the purpose of conducting marine scientific research is subject 
to the complete authority of the coastal State.70 The coastal State may enact 
any regulation, either requires of prior consent or impose any condition, at 
its own discretion.71 It would be thus much more complex to conduct marine 
scientific research in the territorial sea or internal waters. Furthermore as men-
tioned before, the commercial vessels are exempt from the immunities. The 
reason why this consideration should be made is that the commercial ships, 
which in most cases constitute the vos fleet, normally would enter the respec-
tive Ports of the coastal State that means those ships not only go across the 
territorial sea but go into the internal water as well.
According to Soons, notifying regime was defined as “Consent of the coastal 
State would not required, but those conducting the research would have 
to notify the coastal State and comply with certain internationally agreed 
of such research are generally published or made generally available in another way.” And, 
at 17, the same view is readdressed that, “A basic characteristic of open scientific research 
is the fact that the results are made generally available by publishing them.”




condition.”72 With the case of ocean measurements on vos as foregoing men-
tioned, it is suggested that the notifying regime can be used to substitute for the 
consent regime for several reasons. Firstly, it can be regarded that the measure-
ments are conducted “exclusively for peaceful purpose and in order to increase 
scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all mankind. 
Secondly, those measurements can hardly be counted as a large-scale marine 
scientific research project, which needs long time elaborate preparative work. 
They are merely the incidental products while those commercial vessels pass-
ing through the marine area. Thirdly, if conducting those measurements on 
the basis of coastal State’s domestic law or los Convention, the application 
procedure would be so prolonged and complicated that does no good for the 
sake of science development. Furthermore, once the delay of clearance request 
interferes with the research cruise, the quality of observation results would be 
definitely impaired since the cruise of the vos is usually regular and the obser-
vations are persistent as well. Viewed from these perspectives, accordingly, 
the clearance procedures probably can be omitted in order to saving time and 
increasing efficiency. Still, notifying must be given in advance because the 
coastal State is entitled to be acquainted with the situation.
In the meanwhile, other obligations and regulations those are fit for marine 
scientific research should be applied to the conduct of marine measurements 
on vos alike. In the light of los Convention Article 248, the coastal State is 
entitled to be provided the full description of the name of the voluntary observ-
ing ship; the nature and objectives of the project; the method and means to be 
used; the precise geographical areas; the expected date of conducting research; 
the deployment of the equipment and its removal; the name of the sponsoring 
institution and the person in charge of the project; and the extent to which the 
coastal state is considered to be able to participate or to be represented in the 
project. Other than that, Article 249 addresses the duty to comply with certain 
conditions imposing on the research State, involving the right of coastal State 
to participate or be represented in the research project, and even more impor-
tant is regarding the management of the research data, samples and results. 
These conditions are essential elements that could achieve balance between 
the interests of the coastal States and the international marine scientific com-
munity.73 In this respect, it is submitted that it may be more reasonable for the 
conduct of ocean measurements on vos that using notifying regime replaces 
the consent regime while all the other duties, guidelines and criteria are still as 
same as the regime of marine scientific research codified in los Convention.
72 See Soons, supra note 22, at 160.
73 See Nordquist, supra note 44, at 540.
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3 Jurisdiction Issue
In terms of vessels’ jurisdiction issue on the sea, the allocation could be detected 
in reference to the functions of the State in the maritime context. Three players 
thus should be brought in mind which are respectively: flag State, whose flag 
is flown; coastal State along whose coasts shipping routes pass by; and port 
State, at whose ports or anchorages shipping calls. Combined then with the 
legal regime provided in the los Convention in view of different marine areas, 
the jurisdiction issue, thus, would be considered in a comprehensive and rea-
sonable way.
A High Seas – Flag State Jurisdiction
Flag State jurisdiction is the oldest expression of maritime jurisdiction. It is 
also coincidental to the jurisdiction that is exercised on the basis of national-
ity since ships are considered as a part of the national territory.74 Churchill 
and Lowe addressed that “the ascription of nationality to ships is one of the 
most important means by which public order is maintained at sea. As well as 
indicating what rights a ship enjoys and to what obligations it is subject, the 
nationality of a vessel indicates which State is to exercise flag State jurisdic-
tion over the vessel.”75 In view of Article 91 of the los Convention, “[e]very 
State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the 
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag” and “There 
must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.”76 Furthermore, the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (itlos) clarified in the case of 
the M/V “Grand Prince” that if the domestic law of a State provides that the 
right of a ship to fly its flag is directly connected to the act of registration of the 
ship in that State, registration is the decisive factor with regard to the national-
ity of that ship.77 The extent of jurisdiction exercised by the flag State is sum-
marily set out in Article 94 of los Convention. It comprises the obligation to 
74 Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea 34 (2007). 
However, there is some debate as to the nature of flag State jurisdiction. Some authors 
regard that view that flag State jurisdiction is the jurisdiction of territoriality tends to be 
obsolete. The assertion what is more acceptable is that flag State jurisdiction should be 
considered a kind of jurisdiction sui generis. Excerpted from Haijiang Yang, Jurisdic-
tion of the coastal State over Foreign Merchant Ships in International 
Waters and the Territorial Sea 26 (2005).
75 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 205 (1999).
76 The Convention, however, does not impart any solution to the basic problem concerning 
the definition of genuine link nor does it give any guidance on what conditions of reg-
istration would satisfy the “genuine link” requirement. See Rainer Vogel, Flag States and 
New Registries, in The Marine Environment and Sustainable Development: 
Law, Policy and Science (1993), at 421.
77 The M/V “Grand Prince” (Belize v. France), itlos Reports 2001, 17 (paras. 83)
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effectively exercise jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and 
social matters,78 including the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of 
ships;79 the manning of ships, labor conditions and the training of crews;80 as 
well as the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the preven-
tion of collisions.81 In the meanwhile, by virtue of paragraph 5 of Article 94 los 
Convention,82 “[I]t becomes thus clear that the standards, which the State is 
called to uphold, are international rather than domestic – and consequently 
the ample facility to regulate the ship flying one’s flag is in actual practice 
severely curtailed by globally agreed rules and regulations.”83
Having established the freedom of high seas (Article 87, los Convention), it 
is clear that the order of the high seas was entrusted primarily to the flag State. 
Pursuant to Article 92, “[S]hips shall sail under the flag of one State only and, 
save in exceptional cases expressly provided for international treaties or in 
this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.” 
The flag State jurisdiction accordingly becomes “the cornerstone on which the 
public order of the high seas is erected. Consequently, the strength of the over-
all regulatory system would necessarily rest upon the effectiveness of flag State 
jurisdiction.”84 The so-called “exclusive jurisdiction,” however, could be chal-
lenged by the circumstances of slave trafficking85 and piracy,86 which are both 
offences under universal jurisdiction.87 Any other intervention on a vessel on 
the high seas is strictly depended upon the primacy of flag State jurisdiction.88
In view of ocean measurements on vos on the high seas, the flag State juris-
diction is applied equally. The vos is protected on the high seas under interna-
tional law by the flag State whose flag it is entitled, by registration, to fly. It is 
stated, “A vessel which is so registered and controlled enjoys a large degree of 
78 Art. 94, para. 1, los Convention.
79 Art. 94, para. 3(a), los Convention.
80 Art. 94, para. 3(b), los Convention.
81 Art. 94, para. 3(c), los Convention.
82 It is provided that, “In taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is 
required to conform to generally accepted in international regulations, procedures and 
practices and to take any steps which may be necessary to secure their observance.”
83 Gavouneli, supra note 74, at 35.
84 Ibid., at 162.
85 Art. 99, los Convention.
86 Art. 105, los Convention.
87 Gavouneli, supra note 74, at 159. Other than slave trade and piracy, the stateless ves-
sels are assumed to be equated to pirate or slave vessels, which are subject to universal 
jurisdiction as well. For the same view, also see A.W. Anderson, Jurisdiction over Stateless 
Vessels on the High Seas: An Appraisal under Domestic and International Law, 13 Journal 
of Maritime Law and Commerce 336 (1982).
88 Gavouneli, supra note 74, at 161.
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immunity on the high seas from interference by the vessels of other States.”89 
Furthermore, under los Convention, the freedom of high seas comprises con-
ducting scientific research as well as marine measurements on the high seas. 
It is therefore submitted that while vos passes through the high seas, the con-
duct of ocean measurements is under the exclusive jurisdiction of flag State. 
In the meanwhile, since it is under the freedom of high seas as well, no other 
States could exert intervention therein as long as the conduct is exercised with 
due regard for the interests of other States and also under the conditions laid 
down by the los Convention and other rules of international law.
B Exclusive Economic Zone – Concurrent Jurisdiction
Concurrent jurisdiction denotes that the competence is shared between the 
coastal State and other State.90 With respect to further grasp its connotation, 
the legal status of the eez should be first ascertained under the sight of inter-
national law, specifically the los Convention. It is generally agreed that the 
exclusive economic zone constitutes a sui generis zone, neither a part of the 
high seas nor of the territorial waters.91 The “sui generis” legal character of eez 
has three principle elements, which are respectively (1) the rights and duties 
that los Convention accords to the coastal State; (2) the rights and duties that 
los Convention accords to other State; (3) residual rights or jurisdiction that 
are not fall within either of the two previous categories.92
Under Article 56 of los Convention, the coastal State has acquired “sover-
eign rights” on the one hand and “jurisdiction” on the other. Rather the “sov-
ereign right” and “jurisdiction” are exercised in a functionally limited way.93 
While the sovereign rights are exercised with regard to exploring, exploiting, 
conserving and managing natural resources and other economic activities, the 
jurisdiction was granted over certain activities, namely the establishment and 
use of artificial island, installation and structures; marine scientific research; 
and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Furthermore, 
89 See Anderson, supra note 87, at 335.
90 For the sake of addressing the legal issue regarding vos, analysis that is relevant to “other 
State” would mainly focus on the “flag State.”
91 The term “sui generis zone” was first used by the Chairman of the Second Committee of 
unlos iii. See unclos iii, Official Records, Volume v 153 (1976). The terminology 
has been accepted by the leading textbooks on the field. See E.D. Brown, The Inter-
national Law of the Sea, Volume i 218 (1994); Churchill and Lowe, supra note 
75, at 166. The note excerpted from Alexander Proelss, The Law on the Exclusive Economic 
Zone in the Perspective: Legal Status and Resolution of User Conflicts Revisited, 26 Ocean 
Yearbook 87–112 (2012).
92 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 75.
93 See Proelss, supra note 91.
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whereas the notion of “sovereign rights” signifies something less than sover-
eignty since it could only be exercised once an eez was proclaimed,94 “jurisdic-
tion” denotes an even more restricted exercise of competence.95 It is addressed 
that “[t]he existence of sovereign rights creates a presumption of sovereignty 
for the coastal State which would supersede a jurisdiction claim by another 
State whereas claims of jurisdiction operate on the same level of equality and 
must be resolved through the standard dispute settlement procedures.”96
The rights and duties of other States are set out in Article 58 of los Conven-
tion, which was described by Maria Gavouneli as “less specific and certainly 
more comprehensive.”97 They are primarily concerned with those freedoms 
expressly provided in Article 87 (freedom of high seas), namely the freedom 
of “navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipe-
lines, and other internationally lawful uses related to these freedom,” with 
the exception of the freedom of fishing, which has become a sovereign rights 
of the coastal State and other related topics, including conduct marine sci-
entific research as well as construct artificial islands and other installations. 
The “other internationally lawful uses,” which are demanded to be “compatible 
with other provisions of this Convention,” include, inter alia, “those associated 
with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines.”98 
It is notable that, however, these freedom exercised by other State in eez are 
subject to measures relating to sovereign rights of the coastal State99 as well as 
the general limitation governing all freedoms of the high seas.
As for the concurrent jurisdiction in the eez, which strikes a balance 
between the coastal State and other States, signifies the true nature of the eez. 
The coastal State and flag State which are endowed respectively with varied 
rights and duties can be assumed as two parallel players in maintaining the 
order of the eez. The fact that certain activities in the eez either fall within 
the jurisdiction of the coastal State or the flag State justifies the consent regime 
with regard to marine scientific research conducted in eez and the naviga-
tion freedom of foreign commercial vessels, which are engaging maritime 




98 Nordquist, supra note 44, Volume ii, at 564.
99 Ibid., at 565. Article 58, para. 3 of the los Convention stipulated that “In exercising their 
rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, 
States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply 
with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part.”
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 commerce whilst passing through the coastal State’s eez. With respect to the 
conduct of ocean measurements on vos, as stated earlier, it constitutes marine 
scientific research and thus is theoretically subjected to the coastal State’s 
jurisdiction. Due to the measurements are conducted during the course of pas-
sage through the coastal State’s eez, those vessels, mostly commercial vessels, 
who have the freedom of navigation therein practically exercise real control 
over the conduct. Additionally, the consent regime has limited enforcement 
power in terms of the ocean measurements on vos since it is not, as forego-
ing, necessarily applied to those measurements. Under the notification regime, 
other than the duties which are contained in the los Convention in Part xiii, 
which includes, providing information to the coastal State as well as comply-
ing with certain conditions, the researching State still needs to give advance 
notice to the coastal State. It is no other than the particular peculiarity, namely, 
incidental measurements, which do not constitute complex research project, 
combined with the freedom of navigation as well as the application of notify-
ing regime, signifies that the vessels could exercise, to a certain degree, control 
over the measurements on vos. That is to say, in the light of the flag State juris-
diction theory, the flag State is entitled some jurisdiction as well. Neverthe-
less, such category of jurisdiction can only be deemed as a complement to the 
coastal State jurisdiction when it cannot be exercised promptly or effectively. 
In that case, the flag State complements the coastal State in exercising jurisdic-
tion over the ocean measurements on vos, together constitute the essence of 
concurrent jurisdiction in the regime of the eez.
C Territorial Sea – Coastal State Jurisdiction
Pursuant to los Convention Article 2, the sovereignty of a coastal State 
extends to the territorial sea, which refers to the maritime waters stretching 
seaward from the baseline. The concept of coastal State sovereignty over the 
territorial sea was accepted, for the first time, at unclos I, which was held in 
Geneva in April 1958,100 as conventional international law.101 At unclos iii, 
the debates were more on the limits than on the legal status of the territo-
rial sea.102 Eventually, under los Convention, the coastal State’s sovereignty 
over the territorial sea was retained as well as the breadth of the territorial 
sea up to the maximum limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles even though 
in State practice the diversity of the breadth still exists.103 Furthermore, the 
exercise of coastal State’s sovereignty over its territorial sea is subject to the 
100 unclos i, Official Records, Vol. i, at 1.
101 Yang, supra note 74, at 121.
102 Ibid., at 123.
103 Ibid., at 124.
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right of innocent passage, which assumed as the main restriction, compared 
with sovereignty over the land territory, imposed by international law. It can 
be asserted therefore that the right of innocent passage has been introduced to 
dilute the sovereignty of the coastal State in order to facilitate the navigational 
right of all other States. Nevertheless, the right of innocent passage can never 
be taken as equivalent to the freedom of navigation in the eez or on the high 
seas, either in content or extent. It is conferred the right to the coastal State 
that “take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which 
is not innocent.”104 And any contravention of the laws and regulations of the 
coastal State would expose the ships to potential punishment.105 As far as the 
definition of “innocence” is concerned, the los Convention in Article 19, Para. 
1 provided that so long as the passage “is not prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State” as well as “take place in conformity with 
this Convention and with other rules of international law,” it is then innocent. 
Rather, Article 19, Para. 2 goes further to enumerate twelve types of conduct 
which would be “prejudicial” to the peace, good order or security of the coastal 
State and therefore render the passage non-innocent.106
Having clarified the denotation of “innocent,” the meaning of “passage” 
attaches more weight to analyze the legal issues of ocean measurements on 
vos. The los Convention provides the definition of passage in Article 18, 
which consists of two categories: lateral passage and passage to or from a call 
at port facility either inside or outside internal water, within the context of the 
right of innocent passage.107 Both of these two forms of passage are of great 
relevance to the analysis of measurements conducted on vos. While the lat-
eral passage signifies the passage without entering internal waters, which is 
the typical and traditional type in the context of innocent passage, the pas-
sage to or from a port facility either inside or outside internal waters might be 
aroused by “the desire to facilitate international navigation and trade on the 
one hand, and correspondingly, to contain coastal State jurisdiction over such 
passage operation on the other.”108 It is thus, compared with lateral  passage, 
104 See Art. 25 para.1, los Convention.
105 Yang, supra note 74, at 147.
106 With respect to the list of activities in Para.2 of Article 19, the US and the former ussr 
hold the connotation in an agreement that “Article 19 of the Convention of 1982 sets out 
in paragraph 2 an exhaustive list of activities that would render passage not innocent. A 
ship passing through the territorial sea that does not engage in any of those activities is in 
innocent passage.” It is believed, contrarily, by Haijiang Yang that Para.2 only purported to 
exemplify the vague expression of the concept of innocent passage. By no means is Para. 
2 designed to exhaust all cases in which passage would be rendered non-innocent. Yang, 
supra note 74, at 159–160.
107 Yang, supra note 74, at 151.
108 Ibid., at 151.
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more  vulnerable.109 In respect of coastal State jurisdiction, passage to or from 
a port facility depends completely upon the permission of the coastal State 
and therefore is more likely to be susceptible of the interference by the coastal 
State.110 It is consequently submitted that, in the territorial sea, the coastal 
State jurisdiction always maintains the primacy; even under the regime of 
innocent passage it is still highly subjected to the coastal State’s jurisdiction.
On account of the ocean measurements on vos, it can fit both two catego-
ries of passage, either lateral passage or the passage to or from port facility. In 
the case of passage to or from port facility, it will become relevant to the issues 
of internal waters jurisdiction and port State jurisdiction, which will be dealt 
with later. In pursuance of Article 19 para.2 of the los Convention, carrying out 
survey activities or research would render the passage non-innocent. More-
over, under Article 25 the coastal State may take the necessary steps to prevent 
passage, which is not innocent. Due to that the Convention is keeping silent on 
declaring what “the necessary steps” should be, it is completely within the dis-
cretion of the coastal State to decide what steps should be taken.111 Given that 
the foreign ships would fully fall under coastal State’s jurisdiction if the pas-
sage is not innocent anymore,112 the conduct of carrying out ocean measure-
ments on vos while the vessels are passing through the territorial sea, either 
in lateral passage or heading to the port facility, will fully fall within the coastal 
State’s jurisdiction. The proposed “notifying regime” could mitigate in no way 
the obligation to observe the coastal State’s jurisdiction, except only simplify-
ing the clearance procedure, which for the sake of promoting science devel-
opment as well as the benefit of all the mankind. Consequently, the conduct 
of ocean measurements on vos should comply with the laws and regulations 
that adopted by the coastal State and that in the meantime fully subject to the 
administrative jurisdiction of coastal State.
D Internal Waters and Port – Coastal State Jurisdiction
Compared with the territorial sea, the absence of the right of innocent pas-
sage comprises the principal distinction of the internal waters.113 Pursuant to 
 Article 8 of los Convention, waters, except as provided in Part iv (Archipelagic 
109 Ibid., at 151.
110 Ibid., at 151.
111 Ibid., at 217.
112 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 75, at 87.
113 With the exception of the case that, according to Article 8 para.2, however, where the es-
tablishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in Article 7 has 
the effect of enclosing as internal waters area which had not previously been considered 




States), on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of 
the internal waters, which normally comprises different kinds of waters, like 
bays, estuaries and ports, rivers and lakes.114 They are deemed as an integral 
part of the territory of a coastal State and subject to the same legal regime as 
its land territory. The coastal State enjoys full territorial sovereignty over them. 
The issues with regard to the right of access to ports and the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over foreign ships in ports have been always surrounded by severe contro-
versies. Nevertheless, coastal State, in practice, generally admits foreign ships 
to their maritime ports and waterways that are open to international trade and 
navigation.115 Whereas there is no general right of entry exists in customary 
law,116 it is granted under treaty laws, which are most commonly bilateral trea-
ties or multilateral Convention and Statute on the international level.117 Under 
los Convention, it is implied that land-locked State enjoys the right of access 
to ports in Part x as well as Article 211 (3) provides that the coastal State shall 
give due publicity to those requirements, which are considered as conditions 
for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports or internal waters or for a call 
at their off-shore terminals.118 With respect to the jurisdiction issue in internal 
waters, it is settled since the moment that the vessels enter coastal State’s port 
and internal waters because they put themselves within the territorial sover-
eignty of the coastal State. The coastal State is entitled to enforce its laws and 
regulations against foreign vessels,119 even though coastal State commonly 
enforce their laws and regulations only when its interests are endangered.120
A port State is always a coastal State, although the reverse is not always 
true.121 “The creation of a separate port State jurisdiction is the direct 
consequence of the expansion of the coastal State’s jurisdiction over the exclu-
sive economic zone, especially in view of the enhanced environmental protec-
tion provisions included in the los Convention.”122 It can be seen thus that the 
port State jurisdiction, as the innovation of the enforcement system within the 
context of Convention,123 was introduced on account of the increasing impor-
tance of marine environmental protection. With respect to the innovational 
114 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 75.
115 Yang, supra note 74, at 48.
116 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 75.
117 Ibid. See also Yang, supra note 74, at 56–60.
118 Yang, supra note 74, at 59.
119 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 75.
120 Ibid.
121 Gavouneli, supra note 74, at 44.
122 Ibid.
123 Nordquist, supra note 44, at 260.
233Voluntary Observing Ship and Marine Scientific Research
<UN>
feature of port State jurisdiction, it is stated that “[t]he big difference lies in 
the “voluntary” character of the ship’s presence in port. Whereas the principle 
of innocent passage shields the seagoing vessel from the jurisdiction of the 
coastal State, port State jurisdiction strengthens compliance with national 
rules and regulations without any interference with the freedom of navigation 
since entry into a port constitutes a voluntary submission of the vessel to the 
jurisdiction of the port State – either and both running concurrently with the 
original jurisdiction of the flag State.”124
Coming then back to the ocean measurements on vos, as those vessels vol-
untarily enter a port or internal waters of the coastal State, they accordingly 
put themselves under the jurisdiction of the coastal State. Given the practice 
that coastal State enjoys the discretion to leave the matters relating purely to 
internal affairs of the vessel to the authorities to the flag State,125 foreign ves-
sels are, to a certain extent, still subject to the jurisdiction of flag State. Never-
theless, local jurisdiction will be exercised when the activities affect the peace 
or good order of the port.126 Ocean measurements conducted within the inter-
nal waters without consent, which is normally deemed as holding a prejudice 
against the peace and good order of the port cannot be allowed in any country, 
unless otherwise regulated by treaty between the coastal State and the flag 
State. Despite the application of notifying regime to the special case, namely 
ocean measurements on vos when the vessels bound for the ports of coastal 
State passing through the territorial sea, coastal State jurisdiction still will be 
asserted over the measurements, as much as within the territorial sea.
4 Other Emphasis
In view of marine scientific research under los Convention, a lot of efforts have 
been made to strike a balance between the interests of the coastal State and the 
marine scientific community, which is primarily in Article 249. It provides access 
for the coastal State to all data, samples and research results as well as the assess-
ment concerned and make the publication, and dissemination of information 
and knowledge through appropriate national or international channels. While 
the los Convention actively promotes the flow of scientific data and informa-
tion and the transfer of knowledge resulting from marine  scientific research,127 
it still should be noted that regarding the research results of a project which is 
of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, 
124 Gavouneli, supra note 74, at 44.
125 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 75. See also Yang, supra note 74, at 84.
126 Churchill and Lowe, supra note 75.
127 See Art. 244, los Convention.
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the prior agreement for making the results internationally available should be 
required.128
It is also guided by the general provision that States and competent interna-
tional organizations shall promote and facilitate the development and conduct 
of marine scientific research in accordance with the los Convention.129 In 
order to do so, all States shall promote international cooperation as well as cre-
ate favorable conditions for the conduct of marine scientific research.130 Ocean 
measurements on vos, which are conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes 
and for the benefit of all humankind, therefore should be promoted. Other than 
that though, the researching State should, if requested so, provide access of the 
research data, sample and result to the coastal State. Meanwhile, technical assis-
tance through meaningful cooperation should be encouraged as well.
v Summary
In light of the ever-increasing degree of ocean uses, which specifically point 
to ocean measurements on vos, this article intends to review the legal status 
of the conduct by analyzing the fundamental legal regime of marine scien-
tific research under the los Convention. More importantly, it re-examines the 
implementation of the los Convention and the potential ways for the reso-
lution of conducting ocean measurements on vos, which constitute marine 
scientific research, while the vessels are passing through the eez, territorial 
sea and internal waters where the coastal State enjoys jurisdiction, sovereign 
rights and sovereignty, respectively. Based on the special peculiarity of ocean 
measurements on vos, compared with the consent regime that applies in 
Part xiii (marine scientific research) of the los Convention, the notification 
regime is suggested to introduce on account of practical considerations and 
convenient clearance procedures. In spite of the simplified clearance proce-
dures, the rights and obligations that are vested due to the establishment of 
various marine areas by the los Convention and the legal regime of jurisdic-
tion therein are still bound to be observed. Furthermore, as far as marine sci-
entific research is concerned, legal regulations, which are provided in the los 
Convention in Part xiii, are likewise applicable.
128 See Art.249, los Convention.
129 See Art. 239, los Convention.
130 See Arts. 242 and 243, los Convention.
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The development of the modern international law of the sea regime has 
 allowed States to extend their territorial claims and exercise of sovereignty 
beyond the traditional spatial domain. However, this has also led to overlap-
ping maritime territorial or boundary claims among countries, resulting in an 
increase in the number of international disputes. States which face such kinds 
of situations often take unilateral measures to consolidate their own legal posi-
tions and safeguard important national interests, as international law imposes 
a certain disadvantage to a State who does “nothing” in response to another 
State’s claim of rights that may challenge or prejudice its own. Interactions be-
tween the unilateral actions by two or more States involved in a certain dispute 
could lead to an escalation of the dispute; sometimes even armed conflict. In 
other words, unilateral actions are relevant to maintaining rule of law as well 
as peace and security in the international system. In relation to the manage-
ment of maritime disputes, the governance of unilateral actions is arguably no 
less important than peaceful settlement of disputes. In fact, the former could 
be an indispensable component of the latter.
More recently, maritime disputes in some parts of the world have resurged 
and escalated, for example, in the South China Sea; in the East China Sea (par-
ticularly over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands), or between Israel and Lebanon in 
the East Mediterranean Sea. The range of actions States undertake vis-à-vis 
their rival claimants have not only proliferated but also diversified. The legality 
of some of those actions may also be questioned. Nonetheless, the issue con-
cerning how international law and the law of the sea regulate a State’s unilat-
eral conducts in maritime dispute seems to have received much less attention 
in scholarly writings. This article will be a preliminary attempt to fill this gap. 
Apart from Introduction and Conclusions, the main body of the article will be 
divided into the following sections. The first section will provide a general cat-
egorization of unilateral actions in maritime boundary disputes, and explores 
their possible conceptual natures under international law. The second and 
third sections try to identify rules and principles relevant to States’  unilateral 
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actions under international law and the law of the sea regime, respectively. 
Although the article does not aim to address the problem of the conduct of 
States which arises in a maritime area where one party has an undisputed 
claim – for example, whether or not a coastal State’s reaction to another State’s 
certain activities in its undisputed maritime space is legal – the rules and prin-
ciples discussed herein may be applied to those situations analogously, and 
vice versa.
II Categorization of Unilateral Actions in Maritime  
Boundary Disputes
Under the existing international law of the sea, different issues can arise in 
maritime boundary disputes. Most often the disputes occurring between two 
or more States with adjacent or opposite coasts involve competing claims of 
sovereignty or sovereign rights in areas where these States’ maritime claims 
overlap, including contention over jurisdiction and exclusive rights over living 
resources or non-living resources within an overlapping exclusive economic 
zone (eez) or a continental shelf. Sometimes the disputes may be associated 
with the problems of sovereignty over some land features in the maritime 
area in question. Since maritime spaces are projected on the basis of “land 
dominates the sea”, and a land feature that forms an “island” under the 1982 
UN Law of the Sea Convention (unclos) may be entitled to have a 200-mile 
eez and continental shelf (Art. 121(2)), the legal status of such land features 
and implications of their status may pose additional questions in some of the 
maritime disputes. Here it is not necessary to provide a comprehensive review 
of all the activities performed by States in the variety of disputes just men-
tioned. Suffice is to identify the common types of actions that State undertake 
in order to assure their legal claims and interests, by reference to relevant 
State practice.
The first relevant set of actions is associated with those acts that are particu-
larly relevant to the test of “effectiveness” in determining a question of title to 
territory. The International Court of Justice, which has increasingly been called 
upon to adjudge territorial sovereignty and boundary disputes between States, 
has helped identify the general types of such actions. As the court stated in the 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Columbia) judgment: “[A]cts 
and activities considered to be performed a titre de souverain are in particular, 
but not limited to, legislative acts or acts of administrative control, acts relat-
ing to the application and enforcement of criminal or civil law, acts regulating 
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immigration, acts regulating fishing and other economic activities, naval pa-
trols as well as search and rescue operations”.1
States may conduct these actions as an exercise of their sovereignty or rights 
granted under international law. Or, these acts may represent the attempts by 
one State to establish or consolidate a territorial claim. When a State takes one 
of the measures in an area also claimed by another State, the measure may also 
constitute its response to those acts that have been carried out by that State.
The second set of State actions are related to the settlement of dispute. Un-
der international law, a “dispute” is commonly understood as “a disagreement 
on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests”,2 and “it must 
be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other”.3 The 
most common action States take at the start of a dispute is to issue a diplomatic 
protest. In a situation where one State believes that its legal rights or interests 
have been violated by another State, the aggrieved State may pursue one of the 
following avenues to protect its rights or interests from further damage, and to 
seek remedy from the perceived harm-doing State: first, by initiating the peace-
ful dispute-settlement mechanisms under customary international law or ac-
cording to particular treaty regimes that are applicable to both States; secondly, 
by adopting unilateral measures vis-à-vis the perceived violating State. In State 
practice, unilateral measures adopted in relation to a perceived unfriendly act, 
a violation or to a dispute take many forms. In territorial or boundary disputes, 
such measures range from non-coercive measures to coercive or even forc-
ible measures. Non-coercive actions include: formal protest or condemnation; 
some legislative or administrative acts not involving forcible enforcement. 
Coercive and forcible actions include: limited trade or economic embargo; 
forcible enforcement such as arresting or expelling ships that are considered 
as conducting illegal activities in an area claimed by the enforcing State; con-
ducting air or sea patrol or surveillance or military exercise in disputed waters; 
attempts to establish or “regain” control over territory under dispute by force.
The normal justification for the two sets of unilateral actions is associated 
with concept of “self-help”, “self-protection”, or “self-preservation”. From the in-
ternational law perspective, the concept of “self-help” has been founded on the 
assumption of international law being a horizontal legal system that lacks a 
supreme authority, the centralization of the use of force, and a  differentiation 
1 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Columbia), icj Judgment, 19 November 2012, 
para. 80.
2 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, P.C.I.J, Series A, No. 2, at 11.
3 South West Africa, Preliminary Objections, icj Judgment (1962), at 328.
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of the three basic functions of law-making, law determination, and law 
 enforcement typically entrusted to central organs.4 Historically, it was com-
mon for States to resort to self-help to enforce their rights and protect their 
interests. Unilateral actions of self-help were intended to compel the targeted 
State to cease a perceived wrongful act, whether or not in the political, moral 
or legal sense, and offer reparation. The means of self-help could be any kind of 
measures, which had been generally divided into two conceptual forms: retor-
sion and reprisal. Retorsion refers to any lawful acts of retaliation by one State 
against another State’s unfriendly or unlawful acts. Reprisal involves retalia-
tory acts that would normally be illegal but which may be rendered lawful by a 
prior illegal act committed by the targeted State.5
International law prior to 1945 had imposed very few restrictions on State’s 
acts of self-help, like the experiences of humanity and good faith in the case 
of reprisal,6 and aggressive war may be regarded as the extreme form of self-
help. Consequently, it was inevitable that means of self-help were prone to 
abuse by politically, economically or militarily more powerful States in their 
bilateral relations with the weaker States. Since 1945, more restrictions have 
been imposed on reprisals, as a result of progressive developments in interna-
tional law, particularly the limitations on self-defense and the rules concerning 
countermeasures under the law of State responsibility. Even though interna-
tional law has remained largely a decentralized legal system, and acts of self-
help continue to be a reality of life, States no longer enjoy the same degrees of 
liberty as before in undertaking any forms of self-help. To put it differently, a 
State cannot use self-help as a pretext for every action it decides to take against 
another State even though the latter might have committed an internationally 
wrongful act. Those rules concerning the lawfulness of “self-help” in interna-
tional law are significant to the governance of State’s unilateral actions in in-
ternational relations including maritime boundary disputes, and they will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section.
III International Law Relating to the Governance of Unilateral Actions
One of the main roles international law plays is to maintain stability of inter-
national relations. Under the UN Charter, several norms have been developed 
4 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 3 
(2009).
5 Cf Malanczuk, ibid., at 4; Thomas Giegerich, Retorsion, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, available at www.mpepil.com.
6 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law: As Applied by International Courts 
and Tribunals, 97 (1953).
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that are fundamental to the governance of unilateral actions by States in their 
relations with others. The first of such norms is the principle of peaceful settle-
ment of disputes. As Article 2(3) of the UN Charter stipulates: “All Members 
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”. Arti-
cle 33(1) further provides methods for settling a dispute: “The parties to any 
dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotia-
tion, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort 
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice. Paragraph 2 of the article entrusts the UN Security Council the power 
to call upon the parties to settle their dispute peacefully whenever necessary.
Corresponding to the obligation for States to settle their disputes by peace-
ful means is the obligation for one State to refrain from the threat or use of 
force against another State. This obligation is stated in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations”. The only exceptions to this rule are either in a situation 
of self-defense against an “armed attack”, as provided in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter; or military enforcement actions authorized under Chapter vii of the 
UN Charter. The set of rules prohibiting the threat or use of force is generally 
regarded as reflecting customary international law,7 as well as having acquired 
the status of jus cogens or peremptory norm.8
Within the context of general prohibition of threat or use of force, there 
are certain aspects that are very pertinent to the conduct of State in territorial 
disputes. First, the rules concerning the prohibition of threat or use of force 
are applicable to acquisition of territory. In the icj Wall advisory opinion of 9 
July 2004, the court referred to UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (xxv) 
of 1971, entitled Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, which states that “No ter-
ritorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized 
as legal”. According to the court, as it had stated in the Nicaragua v. u.s. judg-
ment of 1986, “the principles as to the use of force incorporated in the Charter 
reflect customary international law … the same is true of its corollary entailing 
7 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
u.s.), Judgment (1986), paras. 187–190.
8 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force 29 (2004).
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the illegality of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force”.9 
In addition, force can not be used to settle territorial dispute. In particular, 
self-defense cannot be invoked as a means to “regain” control of a piece of ter-
ritory which the initiating State believes that it has a valid claim. Thus, in the 
Jus Ad Bellum partial award of 19 December 2005, the Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims 
Commission, in rejecting such an argument forwarded by Eritrea in justifying 
its taking of the Badme town that was administered by Ethiopia on 12 May 
1998, held the view that even though the parties were in dispute concerning 
the boundary in the Badme area,
However, the practice of States and the writings of eminent publicists 
show that self-defense cannot be invoked to settle territorial disputes. 
In that connection, the Commission notes that border disputes between 
States are so frequent that an exception to the prohibition of the threat or 
use of force for  territory that is allegedly occupied unlawfully would create 
a large and dangerous hole in a fundamental rule of international law.10
Secondly, in the icj’s dictum in Nicaragua v. u.s. case, it considered the rel-
evant conditions that render a lawful self-defense. One is the existence of an 
“armed attack”. The court took the view that an “armed attack” is to be un-
derstood as meaning not merely action by regular armed forces across an in-
ternational border, but also the sending by a State of armed bands on to the 
territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, 
would have been classified as an armed attack had it been carried out by regu-
lar armed forces.11 The other is that a response in self-defense must meet the 
criteria of necessity and proportionality.12 Since an “armed attack” refers to use 
of force of more grave scale and effects, the question may arise as to whether 
or not a State can justify the initiation of a threat or use of force in response to 
another State’s prior forcible actions which do not amount to “armed attacks”. 
With a strict reading of the UN charter or icj’s dicta, no actual use of force may 
be justified except for self-defense against an “armed attack”. This has been 
reflected in other legal regimes such as international law concerning State 
responsibility in relation to the use of countermeasures.13 However, in some 
extreme situations, “threat” of force by a State as a response to limited use of 
9 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 
July 2004, para. 87.
10 Jus Ad Bellum partial award, para. 10.
11 Nicaragua v. u.s., paras. 187–190.
12 Ibid., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, 
paras. 41–42.
13 More discussions below.
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force by another State might not be entirely ruled out. A case in point may be 
the British responses to the firings of Albania at two of its warships in the Corfu 
Channel case. In response to the firings on 15 May 1946, the United Kingdom 
sent warships through the North Corfu Strait on 22 October 1946. Albania con-
tended, among others, that the passage of the British warships “was not an or-
dinary passage, but a political mission”, because of reasons including: the ships 
were maneuvering and sailing in a combat formation with soldiers on board; 
the numbers of the ships and their armaments surpassed what was necessary 
in order to attain their object and showed an intention to intimidate and not 
merely to pass, etc.14 The court observed that the UK had admitted that the 
object of sending the warships through the channel was not only to carry out a 
passage for purposes of navigation, but also to test Albania’s attitude and assert 
its right of innocent passage. Also, the ships were at action stations so that they 
might retaliate quickly if fired upon again by Albania again, and they passed 
through the narrow channel close to the Albanian coast. The court held that 
the intention of the UK “must have been, not only to test Albania’s attitude, 
but at the same time to demonstrate such force that she would abstain from 
firing again on passing ships”, and concluded that the measures taken by UK 
did not violate Albanian sovereignty.15 It appears that threat of force might be 
justified if a State which has been a victim of limited force by another State 
resorts to this means to deter the latter State from committing another act of 
force. That said, it should be stressed that even if an aggrieved State might be 
justified in resorting to “threat” in response to another State’s use of force dur-
ing peace time, such an option must be taken with extreme caution, and the 
established criteria for lawful self-defense should also apply.
The development of jus ad bellum has brought about serious limitations on 
State’s use of force as a means of self-help. In addition, the issues concerning 
certain forms of self-help, namely “countermeasures”, have attracted consider-
able attention in relation to the development of the law of State responsibil-
ity. During the long-running work of the International Law Commission on 
State responsibility, one of its most important tasks has been to establish a 
satisfactory regime for the settlement of dispute. Within the context of dis-
pute settlement, the issue of disputes over countermeasures was regarded as 
of particular significance.16 The Draft Articles Responsibility of States for In-
ternationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International Law Commission 
14 The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Judgment of 9 April 1949, at 30.
15 Ibid., at 31.
16 James Crawford, Counter-measures as Interim Measures, 5 European Journal of In-
ternational Law 65 (1994).
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in 2001 contains a provision (Article 22)17 that permits a State to take non-
forcible means of reprisal, i.e., countermeasures, towards another State which 
has first committed a wrongful act under international law against itself, 
provided such measures meet certain condition. The first condition is that 
such measures are confined to non-forcible means of reprisal. The ilc has 
excluded belligerent reprisals from the scope of countermeasures under the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility. It also distinguishes countermeasures 
with retorsion, namely unfriendly conduct which is not inconsistent with any 
international obligation of the State engaging in it, such as the prohibition 
of or limitation upon normal diplomatic relations or other contacts; embar-
gos of various kinds or withdrawal of voluntary aid programs.18 Permissible 
countermeasures are subjected to a number of requirements and limitations: 
First, the nature of the acts concerned must be non-forcible. They preclude 
the threat or use of force. (Draft Article 50(1)(a); Secondly, countermeasures 
should be directed at the responsible State and not at third parties. (Draft 
Article 49 (1) & (2)). Thirdly, countermeasures are instruments used to bring 
about cessation of and  reparation for the internationally wrongful act and not 
a means of punishment. Therefore, they are temporary in nature and must 
be as far as possible reversible in their effects in terms of future legal rela-
tions between the two States concerned. (Draft Articles 49 (2), (3) and 53). 
Fourthly, countermeasures must be proportionate. (Draft Article 51). Fifth, 
countermeasures should not involve any breach of fundamental obligations 
under international law, particularly refraining from the threat or use of force; 
protection of fundamental human rights; refraining from reprisals based on 
humanitarian considerations; other peremptory norms of general interna-
tional law. (Draft Article 50 (1).19 Sixthly, countermeasures should meet the 
requirement of necessity. (Draft Article 25) The state of necessity arises under 
exceptional circumstances where the only way a State can protect an essen-
tial interest threatened by a “grave and  imminent peril” is to take an action 
that is in breach of one of its international obligations. In icj’s decision on 
17 Article 22 reads as follows:
“Countermeasures in respect of an internationally wrongful act. The wrongfulness of an 
act of a state not in conformity with an international obligation towards another state is 
precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure takes against the 
latter state in accordance with Chapter ii of Part Three”.
18 James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries 281 (2002).
19 Cf. Crawford, supra note 18, at 283.
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Gabcikovo – Nagymaros Project case of 1997,20 the court considers that the 
state of necessity is a ground recognised by customary international law for 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international 
obligation. Such ground for preclusion can only be accepted on an exception-
al basis. The conditions for establishing such an exception need be strictly de-
fined, which must be “cumulatively satisfied”, and the State concerned would 
not be the sole judge of whether those conditions have been met.21 The court 
drew from earlier ilc drafts the following conditions which reflect customary 
international law and were relevant to the identification of the existence of an 
“exceptional case”: First, the State authoring the response otherwise in breach 
of one of its international obligations must have been occasioned by one of its 
“essential interests” being threatened by a “grave and imminent peril”. Second-
ly, the act being challenged must have been the “only means” of safeguarding 
that interest. Thirdly, that act must not have “seriously impair[ed] an essential 
interest” of the State towards which the obligation existed; and finally, the 
State which is the author of the countermeasure must not have “contributed 
to the occurrence of the state of necessity.22 These conditions have been con-
sistently reflected in Draft Article 25 adopted by ilc in 2002.23 All of the six 
requirements have been drawn from relevant State practice and are supported 
by the jurisprudence of major international cases.24 Hence, they may be re-
garded as general principles of international law.
Finally, certain rules concerning the acquisition of territory may also play a 
role in determining the legal effect of unilateral actions of States in territorial 
disputes. One example may be the test of “critical date”. The icj has consis-
tently held that “it cannot take into consideration acts having taken place after 
the date on which the dispute between the parties crystallized unless such acts 
are a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken for the purpose 
of improving the legal position of the Party which relies on them”.25
20 Gabcikovo – Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), I.C.J. Judgment of 25 September 
1997.
21 Ibid., para. 51.
22 Ibid., para. 52.
23 Crawford, supra note 18, at 183.
24 More recently in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, icj Rep 136, (2004) 43 ilm 1009, 9th July 2004, Inter-
national Court of Justice, at para. 140.
25 Columbia v. Nicaragua, judgement, para. 68; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Si-
padan (Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, para. 135.
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IV Relevant Rules under International Law of the Sea Regime
unclos has incorporated the main basic rules and principles of international 
law. The general principles of good faith and abuse of rights are stipulated in 
Article 300 of the convention. State parties are bound to fulfill their obligations 
under unclos in good faith, and shall exercise their rights, jurisdiction and 
freedom recognized under the convention in a manner without unnecessarily 
or arbitrarily harming the rights of other States or the interests of the interna-
tional community as a whole, or amounting to the misuse of power.26 The lan-
guage of Article 300 shows the inter-linkage between the two principles. The 
principle prohibiting the threat or use of force is embodied in Article 301 of 
the convention. The principle of peaceful settlement of dispute has been given 
significant weight in the unclos. In particular, Part xv (Articles 279 – 299) 
of the convention is entirely devoted to the principles and mechanisms con-
cerning the settlement of disputes. Article 279 provides that “State parties shall 
settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application 
of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 
3, of the Charter of the United Nations, and to this end, shall seek a solution by 
means indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter”.
In addition to those provisions that reflect existing rules of international 
law, special rules have also been developed under unclos to deal with the 
relationship between and the unilateral conduct of State parties in maritime 
boundary disputes. For example, Article 123 requires States bordering an en-
closed or a semi-enclosed sea to cooperate with each other. The most relevant 
provisions may be found in Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention. The two ar-
ticles contain identical terms that deal respectively with the delimitation of 
eez and continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. 
According to these articles, States concerned shall resolve the problem of de-
limitation by agreement in accordance with international law. (Paragraph 1) In 
the case that no agreement can be reached with a reasonable period of time, 
the States concerned shall resort to the dispute settlement procedures under 
Part xv of the unclos. (Paragraph 2) Pending agreement on delimitation, 
“[T]he States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall 
make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature 
and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching 
of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the 
final delimitation”. (Paragraph 3)
26 Cf. Nordquist, et al (Eds.), Commentary of the United Nations Law of the 
Sea Convention, Volume v 150–152 (1989).
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Finally, where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, 
questions relating to the delimitation of eez/continental shelf shall be deter-
mined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement. (Paragraph 4)
Controversies over the legality of unilateral actions or countermeasures of 
two or more States with opposite or adjacent coasts can easily arise in the ar-
eas of overlapping eez or continental shelf claims. Until the maritime bound-
ary is finally delimited, whether by agreement between the States concerned, 
or through third-party decisions, in theory the claimant States concerned are 
entitled to claim equal rights and jurisdiction within the overlapping areas.27 
As a result, whenever a State, in accordance with unclos, exercises its rights 
or competence in relation to the overlapping eez or continental shelf, such as 
enforcing jurisdiction or exercising exclusive rights over living or non-living 
natural resources, those acts will have an impact on the rights and interests 
of other States that also make claims to the same area. Accordingly, Articles 
74 and 83 of the unclos lay down basic principles and procedures for States 
facing overlapping eez or continental shelf claims to conduct themselves and 
manage their disputes in accordance with the convention. However, Articles 74 
and 83 have some notable limitations. First, while paragraph 2 imposes State 
parties the duty to resort to the dispute settlement mechanism in Part xv, if no 
agreement on delimitation can be reached within a reasonable period of time, 
the provision does not define what “reasonable” means. Also, Part xv concerns 
mainly the settlement of disputes regarding the interpretation or application 
of unclos. (Article 279); and the means of settling a dispute primarily still 
depend on the agreed choices between the State parties concerned. The com-
pulsory procedures entailing binding decision provided under Section 2, Part 
xv are subjected to limitations in Section 3, under which disputes relating to 
maritime boundary delimitations (Articles 15, 74, 83) can be excluded from the 
binding compulsory procedures by a declaration of the States concerned. The 
issues of territorial sovereignty are also excluded. Consequently, it is possible 
that negotiations on boundary delimitations can go on for a long time without 
any prospect for solution, particularly if States concerned are not willing to 
submit their dispute to a third-party decision.
Secondly, while paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 has offered a progres-
sive approach28 for States to manage their legal relations before the issue of 
27 David M. Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: Mere Sate 
Practice or Customary International Law?, 93 American Journal of International 
Law 771–804, 773. (1999).
28 According to Rainer Lagoni, the drafting history of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 con-
firms that “it is in no way a codification of customary international law but represents 
an example of its progressive development”., Rainer Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending 
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 delimitation is resolved, the terms of the paragraph seem so vague that diffi-
culties can arise in regard to its interpretation. Paragraph 3 of Article 74 and 83 
imposes dual obligations on States involved in either an eez or a continental 
shelf boundary delimitation dispute pending an agreed settlement. On the one 
hand, States concerned have a positive duty to make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature. On the other hand, during the 
transitional period, States concerned have a negative (or restrictive) duty not 
to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. However, the ar-
ticle provides no direct guidance for assessing issues such as when a State can 
be said to have fulfilled its obligation of “making every effort”; or whether or 
not a certain measure or situation amounts to “jeopardizing or hampering” the 
reaching of a final agreement, which can result in more disputes.
The drafting history of Articles 74 and 83, as well as a few international 
 judicial cases has helped providing some clarifications to paragraph 3. To be-
gin with, the draft history reveals that the article was not intended to impose 
a general moratorium on all activities in the overlapping eez or continental 
shelf. Rather, paragraph 3 was a negotiated compromise that allows continued 
utilization of the area to be delimited by the States concerned without jeop-
ardizing or hampering the reaching of the final delimitation agreement and 
without prejudice to the existing claims or positions of the parties concerned. 
It is suggested that the provision reflects the general principle of “good faith”. In 
regard to the positive duty, it has been widely supported that the basic duty of 
States concerned is to enter into negotiation in good faith. This applies to both 
delimitation in paragraph 1 and “provisional arrangements” in paragraph 3. In 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the icj described the obligation to ne-
gotiation in good faith as “a principle which underlines all international rela-
tions”, and stressed that such an obligation must be “meaningful”. According to 
the court: “the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with 
a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a formal pro-
cess of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic application of 
a certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement; they are under 
an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, 
which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position 
without contemplating any modification of it”.29
Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 78 American Journal of International Law 
345–368, 354 (1984).
29 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Demark/Germany v. the Netherlands), 
Judgment of 20 February 1969, para. 85(a).
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With regard to the negative duty, namely the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper the reaching of the final agreement during the transitional period, the 
drafting history shows that the proposals to prohibit a State concerned from 
unilaterally undertaking all economic activities in a disputed maritime area, 
particularly exploration or exploitation of natural resources, were not adopted. 
Instead, this part of the article has created a duty to exercise mutual restraint 
for States involved in a boundary delimitation challenge. Such restraint is nec-
essary since the unilateral use of the overlapping area by one State concerned 
will inevitably affect the rights and position of other States which also claim 
the area. According to a more pragmatic interpretation, States concerned 
should be free to exercise their rights and jurisdiction in an area of overlapping 
claims so long as they pay due regard to the rights of the other coastal States.30 
The crucial consideration for prohibiting certain unilateral actions will be 
whether or not those actions threaten to cause “irreparable prejudice” to the 
rights of the parties concerned or to the reaching of a final agreement. Thus, 
unilateral exploitation of oil or gas resources on a disputed continental shelf is 
generally regarded to be prohibited, while unilateral exploratory activities may 
raise some uncertainties.
The exact issue has come before the icj in 1976 in the disputes over Aegean 
Sea Continental Shelf between Greece and Turkey. Among others, Greece re-
quested the court to indicate interim measures of protection under Article 41 
of the icj Statute,31 with regard to Turkey’s alleged violations to its exclusive 
sovereign rights in the continental shelf which it claimed. Greece claimed that 
Turkey had violated its exclusive sovereign rights over its continental shelf in 
the Aegean Sea and caused irreparable prejudice to its exclusive rights to ac-
quire information concerning the availability, extend and location of natural 
resources of the areas by granting permits in 1973 to Turkish State petroleum 
company for oil exploration and conduct seismic research during 1976, in an 
area over the continental shelf claimed by Greece based on certain Greek is-
lands in the Aegean Sea. It also claimed that the activities complained would, 
if continued, aggravate or extend the dispute. Greece asked the court to direct 
both governments to (1) unless by mutual consent and pending the final judg-
ment of the court in this case, refrain from all exploration activity or any sci-
entific research in certain designated areas of the continental shelf; and (2) to 
30 Lagoni, supra note 28, at 365.
31 In particularly, Article 41, paragraph 1 of the Statute provides: “The Court shall have the 
power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures 
which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party”.
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refrain from taking further military measures or actions which may endanger 
their peaceful relations.32
The court considered that its power to indicate interim measures ought to 
be exercised when the rights of the parties concerned “might not be restored 
in full measures in the event of a judgment if that judgment is anticipated”33 
In the court’s view, the Turkish activities complained by Greece had taken 
place in “an area in dispute”, with respect to which Turkey also claims sover-
eign rights of exploration and exploitation.34 The court stressed that “neither 
concessions unilaterally granted nor exploration activities unilaterally under-
taken by either of the interested States concerned with respect to the disputed 
areas can be creative of new rights or deprive the other States of any rights 
to which in law it may be entitled”.35 The court also carefully examined the 
seismic operation conducted by Turkey. It found that the type of method used 
in the research had not been alleged to involve “any risk of physical damage to 
the seabed or subsoil or to their natural resources”. The Turkish activities were 
all of the “transitory character”, and “do not involve the establishment of instal-
lations on or above the seabed of the continental shelf”. Neither had Turkey 
conducted any operations involving the actual appropriation or other use of 
natural resources of the areas of the continental shelf under dispute.36 Based 
on these findings, the court did not think that there existed a risk of an “irrepa-
rable prejudice” to the rights at issue to justify recourse to its power to indicate 
interim measures of protection under Article 41.37 The icj also rejected the 
request by Greece to order both States to refrain from military measures, by 
the reason that the request did not fall within the scope of Article 41. How-
ever, it did emphasize that the mutual obligations of Greece and Turkey under 
 Article 2 (4) and Article 33 “are clearly imperative in their mutual relations, 
and in particular in regard to their present dispute concerning the continental 
shelf in the Aegean”.38
The icj’s deliberations of the “irreparable prejudice” of rights of parties 
concerned, and particularly the test of “any risk of physical damage to seabed 
or subsoil or their natural resources” for determining prohibitive actions in 
overlapping continental shelf are instructive. They are supported and supple-
mented by the unclos and judicial decisions under the aegis of the treaty. 
32 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Order of 11 September 1976, para. 2.
33 Ibid., para. 27.
34 Ibid., para. 28.
35 Ibid., para. 29.
36 Ibid., para. 30.
37 Ibid., paras. 32–33.
38 Ibid., para. 35.
251Unilateral Actions and the Rule of Law
<UN>
Article 290 of unclos endows a court or tribunal with prima facie jurisdiction 
over a dispute submitted to it under Part xv or Part xi, section 5, with the com-
petence to prescribe any provisional measures which it considers appropriate 
under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the 
dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending final 
decision. It appears that the test of “irreparable damage” may analogously ap-
ply to a dispute arising in an overlapping territorial sea area, as suggested in the 
Land Reclamation case of 2003 between Malaysia and Singapore.39
More significantly, the Guyana/Suriname arbitral award of 200740is the first 
case where an international tribunal provides a detailed and authoritative in-
terpretation and analysis of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the unclos, 
taking account of both general international law and the relevant rules under 
the law of the sea. The case involves, inter alia, disputes between Guyana and 
Suriname, with regard to the lawfulness of certain unilateral actions and coun-
termeasures conducted by each State over an area where the two States’ claims 
of eez and continental shelves overlapped, in relation to an incident taking 
place on 3 June 2000. In the award, the arbitral tribunal established under Ar-
ticle 287 and Annex vii of the unclos, made several points that are directly 
relevant to the present discussion:
First, the general principle prohibiting the threat or use of force under inter-
national law is applicable in a maritime delimitation dispute. Whether or not a 
particular situation constitutes the illegal threat or use of force depends on the 
merits of each case. In the Guyana v. Suriname case, the tribunal considered 
that the issuance of warning by the Suriname naval patrol boats to Guyana 
licensed foreign ships operating exploratory activities in the disputed area “to 
leave or face consequences” on 3 June 2000 amounted to unlawful threat of 
force. (para. 439) As a result, the court rejected Suriname’s argument that the 
actions were lawful exercise of “law enforcement”, even though it did recognize 
that under international law, force may be used in law enforcement activities, 
provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary. (para. 445) 
39 Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor, (Malay-
sia v. Singapore), Order of 8 October 2003, paras. 23, 72. The International Law of the Sea 
Tribunal did not find that there was a situation of urgency or that there is a risk that the 
rights claimed by Malaysia with respect to an area of territorial sea would suffer “irrevers-
ible damage” pending consideration of the merits of the case by an arbitral tribunal estab-
lished under Annex vii of the unclos to render the court’s prescription of provisional 
measures appropriate, para. 73.
40 Guyana and Suriname, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal Constituted pursuant to Article 287 
and in accordance with Annex vii of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 17 September 2007.
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It also rejected its argument that those measures were lawful countermeasures 
in response to Guyana’s internationally wrongful act in order to achieve cessa-
tion of that act. The tribunal held that peaceful means of addressing Guyana’s 
alleged breach of international law were available to Suriname under unclos 
(Part xv, Section 2 or recourse to provisional measures under Article 290). 
However, instead Suriname quickly resorted to measures involving threat of 
force, which could not have been lawful. (para. 446.)
Secondly, with regard to the positive duty contained in paragraph 3 of Ar-
ticles 74 and 83, the arbitral tribunal opined that this obligation implicitly 
acknowledges the importance of avoiding the suspension of economic de-
velopment in a disputed maritime area, as long as such activities do not af-
fect the reaching of a final agreement. (para. 460) In addition, the language 
of the obligation imposes upon the parties a duty to negotiate in good faith, 
in the pursuit of a provisional arrangement. (para. 461) In this case, the tribu-
nal found that Suriname did not fulfill its obligation to make every effort to 
enter into provisional arrangement with Guyana before or after the relevant 
disputes arose. In particular, after Suriname became aware of Guyana’s con-
cession holder’s planned exploratory drilling in disputed waters, it decided to 
resort to self-help by issuing threat, instead of actively trying to engage Guyana 
in negotiation, or at least could have accepted Guyana’s last minute invitation 
and negotiated in good faith and insisted during negotiation on the immediate 
cessation of the drilling plan as a condition to participation in further talks. 
(para. 476) Conversely, the tribunal also ruled that Guyana violated its posi-
tive duty by its conduct leading up to the incident on 3 June 2000. In the tri-
bunal’s opinion, Guyana should have been preparing exploratory drilling for 
some time before the incident. It should have informed Suriname directly of 
its plans instead of merely a press notification from the license holder and only 
tried to discuss about the modalities of it’s the activities in the last minute. In 
short, Guyana should have tried to engage Suriname at a much earlier stage. 
Steps that it could have taken in accordance with the positive duty include (1) 
give Suriname official and detailed notice of its planned activities; (2) seeking 
cooperation of Suriname in undertaking the activities; (3) offering to share the 
results of the exploration and giving Suriname an opportunity to observe the 
activities, and (4) offering to share all the financial benefits received from the 
exploratory activities. (para. 477)
Thirdly, with regard to the negative duty contained in paragraph 3 – the duty 
not to hamper or jeopardize the reaching of a final agreement – the tribunal 
followed a similar line of reasoning as the icj did in its 1976 order in regard to 
the Aegean Sea. It made a legal distinction between two types of exploratory 
activities – seismic testing and exploratory drilling, and considered that only 
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those unilateral exploratory activities that “might cause permanent damage to 
the marine environment” in the area in dispute will lead to a violation of this 
duty, like exploratory drilling. Such activities should be “frozen in absence of a 
provisional arrangement” entered into by the parties concerned. By contrast, 
seismic activity41 should be permissible in a disputed area. (para. 481) In case 
of an alleged violation to the negative obligation, and if bilateral negotiations 
failed to resolve the issue, a remedy is set out in the options for peaceful settle-
ment under Part xv and Annex vii of unclos, and States parties concerned 
should make use of such mechanism. (para. 482)
V Conclusions
In the light of the above investigation, it is clear that international law and the 
law of the sea regime do not prohibit all unilateral actions in maritime bound-
ary disputes. However, unilateral actions do not exist in a “lawless” domain, ei-
ther. Even though States may be the “masters of their own affairs”, their power 
of discretion and resultant actions are expected to be guided and sanctioned 
by the existing principles and rules of international law, such as good faith, 
prohibition of threat or use or force, and peaceful settlement of disputes. This 
applies equally to States’ unilateral actions in relation to territorial or bound-
ary disputes, either land or maritime. Therefore, threat or actual use of force 
cannot be used except in the strictly defined contexts of self-defense or self-
help. It cannot be initiated by States to regain territory or resolve territorial or 
boundary disputes. Under the unclos regime, special rules have also been 
formulated that require States involved in eez or continental shelf delimita-
tion disputes to actively cooperate with each other and to pay due regard to 
each other’s rights and interests. The relevant obligations of States concerned 
include: to engage with one another in “meaningful negotiation” with regard 
to delimitation and related disputes, or concerning provisional arrangements 
to utilize resources in the overlapping areas, such as joint development or 
 information – or profit – sharing; to conduct themselves in a manner consistent 
with relevant rules of international law, and without causing “irreparable dam-
age” to the legal rights and interests of other State concerned or to the marine 
environment. Excessive enforcement actions and arbitrary or unreasonable 
41 Seismic exploration is carried out by vessel traversing the surface of the high sea and 
causing small explosions to occur at intervals under water. These explosions will send 
sound waves through the seabed so as to provide information regarding the geophysical 
structure of the earth beneath it, Aegean Sea, icj Order of 1976, para. 30.
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unilateral measures in overlapping maritime areas may constitute violations 
of good faith or abuse of rights, and could incur international responsibility. 
On the other hand, there also seems to be a trend towards gauging the le-
gitimacy of countermeasures by taking into account whether the aggrieved 
State has first resorted to options of dispute settlement of disputes available 
to it to address the other State’s perceived violation or protect its rights or 
interests before adopting those measures. With consistent interpretation by 
international courts and tribunals, those rules may be gaining importance. 
Consequently, while unilateral actions will continue to be an indispensable 
instrument for States demonstrate effectiveness or to address legal violation 
or  non-compliance by other States in the foreseeable future, including acts of 
retorsion and legitimate countermeasures, international law and the law of the 
sea regime have provided some useful guidance that could help States avoiding 
the risk of aggravating disputes and law-breaking as a result of their arbitrary 
and excessive actions, and increasing the possibility of mutual confidence and 
cooperation.
<UN>
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Search and Rescue as an Enabler to Stimulate 
Cooperation in Areas of Tension
Erik Franckx*
I Introduction1
In early August 2012, President Ma of the Republic of China (Taiwan) proposed 
an East China Sea peace initiative at the occasion of the 60th anniversary of 
the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China 
and Japan. His main proposal concerned a plea for cooperation on the explora-
tion and exploitation of the resources in the area, but he also listed a few other 
areas by means of which the East China Sea could turn into a zone of peace 
and cooperation, one of them being search and rescue.2
The use of an agreement on search and rescue as vehicle for enhancing co-
operation in the East China Sea, as proposed by President Ma, is certainly not 
new. Indeed, China and Japan had already started working on the conclusion of 
such an agreement.3 At a high level meeting between the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of both countries on 22 May 2011 both sides were in agreement that the 
work, which had apparently already been started, should be expedited in or-
der to reach an early conclusion.4 When the Prime Ministers of both countries 
met in December 2011, it was stated that an agreement in principle had been 
1 Editors’ Note: This article was selected from papers presented at two international confer-
ences held in Hangzhou, China in 2012 and 2013, sponsored by the Centre for Ocean Law 
and Governance of Zhejiang University. The status of ratifications of treaties has not been 
updated and reflects the date of the conference to which it was submitted.
2 President Ma Proposes the East China Sea Peace Initiative, Taiwan In Depth, 5 August 
2012, available at http://taiwanindepth.tw/ct.asp?xItem=194468&CtNode=1915.
3 The idea to start negotiations on this topic was apparently taken in 2010. Overview of Japan-
China Summit Meeting, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 31 May 2010, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/summit_meet1005.html.
4 Overview of the Japan-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Website of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan, 22 May 2011, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/
sm1105.html. This was confirmed a few months later when both Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
met again. Overview of the Japan-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Website of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 4 July 2011, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/
china/fmm1107.html.




reached between the parties.5 When the rumor spread during the month of 
January 2012 that the conclusion of the agreement was imminent, the Japanese 
Chief Cabinet Secretary emphasized that discussions were still going on and 
that “some form of conclusion in the not too distant future” was to be expect-
ed, without however any precise deadline having been set.6
A few months later, moreover, at the occasion of the Fifth Trilateral Sum-
mit Meeting Among the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and 
Japan a Joint Declaration on the Enhancement of Trilateral Comprehensive 
Cooperative Partnership was adopted in which the parties, in order to enhance 
political mutual trust, welcomed the recent agreement in principle reached 
between China and Japan, and reaffirmed7 the importance of enhancing coop-
eration in the field of search and rescue between the three parties.8
The above tour d’horizon clearly indicates that search and rescue coopera-
tion has been on the agenda in the East China Sea for some time, either on 
a bilateral or trilateral basis. The present contribution intends to have a look 
at the manner in which cooperation in this field can enhance cooperation 
between States in this dispute prone region. After having defined the spatial 
extent of this study, the contemporary international legal framework govern-
ing search and rescue will be analyzed in general, followed by its  application 
to the East China Sea more particularly. Based on a comparative approach 
with some other regions where search and rescue has been an issue be-
tween the parties, the final part will try to draw some conclusions for the East 
China Sea.
5 Japan-People’s Republic of China Summit Meeting, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs of Japan, 25 December 2011, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/
meeting1112.html.
6 Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Website of the Prime Minister of Japan 
and His Cabinet, 11 January 2012, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyoukanpress 
/201201/11_p.html.
7 During the previous summit, held on 22 May 2011 right after the serious earthquake in Ja-
pan, closer cooperation in this domain had already been envisaged. See Summit Declaration, 
Website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 22 May 2011, available at http://www 
.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201105/22jcke.html. Such trilateral cooperation based 
on the establishment of bilateral mechanisms had already been addressed in 2008. Action 
Plan for Promoting Trilateral Cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, Japan and 
the Republic of Korea, Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 13 December 2008, 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit0812/action.html.
8 The Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting Among the People’s Republic of China, the Repub-
lic of Korea and Japan: Joint Declaration on the Enhancement of Trilateral Comprehen-
sive Cooperative Partnership, Website of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 13 
May 2012, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/diplomatic/201205/13jck3_e 
.html.
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II Spatial Extent
The focus of this article is on the East China Sea as defined by the Interna-
tional Hydrographic Organization in 1953 as Area 50.9 It should be noted in this 
 respect that the specific nomenclature used in this publication to describe the 
sea area in question, namely “Eastern China Sea (Tung Hai)”,10 has no juridi-
cal implications whatsoever as to the legal ownership of these water areas,11 
irrespective of the multiple references to China it may contain.12 The present 
contribution has therefore no difficulty in using this official nomenclature in 
a paper focusing on rules of international law applicable to this area, because 
the use of this nomenclature, no matter how widespread, can never on its own 
merits be relied upon in order to attribute to China any legal rights over this 
maritime expanse.13
9 International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas (Special Publica-
tion No. 28) 30–31 (1953), available at https://www.iho.int/iho_pubs/standard/S-23/S-23_
Ed3_1953_EN.pdf. The limits of Area 50 are defined as follows: “On the South. The Northern 
limit of the South China Sea (49), thence from Santyo the Northeastern point of Formosa 
to the West point of Yonakuni Island and thence to Haderuma Sima (24°03’ N, 123°47’ E). 
On the East. From Haderuma Sima and thence to Okinan Kaku, the Southern extremity of 
Okinawa Sima, through this island to Ada-Ko Sima (Sidmouth Island) on to the East point 
of Kikai Sima (28°20’ N) through Tanegra Sima (20°30’ N) to the North point thereof and 
on to Hi-Saki (31°17’ N) in Kyusyu. On the North. From Nomo Saki (32°35’ N) in Kyusyu to 
the South point of Hukae Sima (Goto Retto) and on through this island to Ose Saki (Cape 
Goto) and to Hunan Kan, the South point of Saisyu To (Quelpart), through this island to 
its Western extreme and thence along the parallel of 33°17' North to the mainland. On the 
West. The mainland of China”.
10 Also Area 49 follows a similar pattern and is named “South China Sea (Nan Hai)”. The 
only difference is that Area 50 has been labeled “Eastern” instead of “East”. Because East 
China Sea is today the commonly used geographical name, this denomination has been 
preferred in the present contribution.
11 See more generally on this point, E. Franckx, M. Benatar, N. Joe, and K. Van den Bossche, 
The Naming of Maritime Features Viewed from an International Law Perspective, 11 China 
Oceans Law Review 1–40 (2011) [Chinese translation, ibid., at 41–69].
12 Such as the express reference to China in the denomination as well as the Chinese name 
in square brackets following it.
13 In this respect a further argument ex abundanti can be found in the express statement in 
the preface to the third edition of this 1952 publication, contained in its third paragraph, 
where it is stated that “[t]hese limits have no political significance whatsoever” (Inter-
national Hydrographic Organization, supra note 9, at 2). Similar caveats are to be found 
on the accompanying maps (ibid., sheet 1–3, notes on top of the map in fine). Neverthe-
less, making such an argument with respect to the South China Sea denomination, see F. 
Wu, Historical Evidence of China’s Ownership of the Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, in 
China Institute for Marine Development Strategy (ed.), Selected Papers 
of the Conference on the South China Sea Islands 111 (1992) [in Chinese], 
as mentioned by K. Zou, Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice, 32 
Ocean Development and International Law 149, 161 (2001) at note 98.
Franckx258
<UN>
The spatial extent of the East China Sea in other words corresponds grosso 
modo with the normal indication of this sea area on maps, excluding the Yel-
low Sea located to the North of it. The countries bordering this sea are conse-
quently China, Japan and South Korea.
Taiwan, forming part of the southern boundary of Area 50, deserves special 
attention. Since its status as a State under contemporary international law is 
debated,14 one could argue that it does not belong in the group of States bor-
dering the East China Sea as defined above. On the other hand it cannot be 
denied that Taiwan has not only many ships in the area but also a developed 
Coast Guard Administration responsible for search and rescue.15 Not including 
Taiwan in a paper on search and rescue in the East China Sea would there-
fore seem rather odd. With respect to fisheries the international community 
has tackled this specific problem by introducing the new notion of “fishing 
entities”.16 Even though the application of this new concept in practice is far 
from perfect, it has allowed Taiwan to become bound by certain multilateral 
treaty obligations with respect to fisheries, and sometimes even to draw rights 
from them.17 It is with these caveats in mind that the present contribution will 
include Taiwan in the discussion.
14 This is not the place to treat this issue in any detail. Suffice it to say that its status has 
been described as “a non-State territorial entity which is capable of acting independently 
on the international scene, but is most probably de jure part of China”. See M. Shaw, 
International Law 235 (2008). Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, and 
the chances of it ever becoming a member are rather slim, as indicated by failed past 
attempts. As stressed by P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to 
International Law, 372 (1997). Because many multilateral international conventions 
are only open to members of the United Nations, specialized agencies thereof, or States 
in general, Taiwan has not been able to become a party to most multilateral instruments 
relating to the law of the sea, unless specific provisions have been provided for to that 
extent in the agreements themselves.
15 See the official website of this administration, available at http://www.cga.gov.tw/Gip 
Open/wSite/ct?xItem=10850&ctNode=1354&mp=eng>).
16 This denomination in itself is interesting, for in international law the notion of entity 
has been defined in the following manner: “Élément dont la qualification juridique est 
douteuse, non précisée – souvent à dessein – par le locuteur ou sur laquelle il ne veut pas 
se prononcer”. J. Salmon, (ed.), Dictionnaire de droit international public 
432 (2001).
17 For a succinct overview with recommendations for improvement, see E. Franckx, Fish-
eries Enforcement. Related Legal and Institutional Issues: National, 
Subregional or Regional Perspectives 161–167 (2001), available at <http://www 
.fao.org/3/Y2776E/y2776e.pdf>). See also A. Serdy, Bringing Taiwan into the International 
Fisheries Fold: The Legal Personality of a Fishing Entity, 75 British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law 183–221 (2004).
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III Legal Framework
The duty to assist persons found at sea in danger of being lost stems from an 
old maritime tradition that already formed part of the early British Common 
Law,18 a nation that, given its predominant interest in the formation of the 
law of the sea, believed that no new rule of international law could possibly 
emerge unless it was accepted by Great Britain.19
Belgium played a crucial role in the codification of this duty to render assis-
tance. Even though the early attempts of the International Law Association20 
to codify the whole international maritime law failed,21 it was through the Co-
mité Maritime International, established in 1897 as a result of a purely Belgian 
initiative,22 that finally the Convention of Salvage was adopted in Brussels in 
1910, in which the following provision was for the first time incorporated in an 
international legal instrument:
Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to 
his vessel, her crew and her passengers, to render assistance to everybody, 
even though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost. The owner 
of a vessel incurs no liability by reason of contravention of the above 
provision.23
18 C.J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea 345 (1967).
19 Ibid., at 10.
20 About the Belgian involvement in the establishment of the International Law Association, 
see for instance E. Franckx, De werkzaamheden van de International Law Association inzake 
marien milieurecht, in E. Van Hooydonk (ed.), Zeeverontreiniging : preventie, 
bestrijding en aansprakelijkheid. 19, 22–23 (2004). See also by the same author 
in English: The Work of the ila Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction Relating to Marine 
Pollution and Its Implications for the Aegean Sea, in B. Ötztürk, (ed.), The  Aegean 
Sea 2000 221, 221–222 (2000) and The ila Survey on Coastal State Jurisdiction with Special 
Reference to Regional Rules, in H. Ringbom (ed.), Competing Norms in the Law of 
Marine Environmental Protection 59, 60–61 (1997).
21 Two conferences, sponsored by the Belgian government, were held in 1885 (Antwerp) and 
1888 (Brussels). They failed however in their main objective.
22 As described in some detail in the historical section of the website of the Comité Maritime 
International, available at http://comitemaritime.org/History/0,273,1332,00.html.
23 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law respecting Assistance and Salvage 
at Sea, signed on 23 September 1910 (entered into force 1 March 1913), Art. 11, available at 
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/salvage1910.html. This is an English transla-
tion of the original French text, which reads:
Tout capitaine est tenu, autant qu’il peut le faire sans danger sérieux pour son navire, 
son équipage, ses passagers, de prêter assistance à toute personne, même ennemie, 
trouvée en mer en danger de se perdre. Le propriétaire du navire n’est pas responsable 
à raison des contraventions à la disposition précédente.
Franckx260
<UN>
Even though this convention did not stand the test of time, mainly because of 
its lack to take into consideration environmental concerns, the duty to assist 
persons found at sea in danger of being lost substantially remained unchanged 
in the follow-up convention24 adopted this time under the auspices of the In-
ternational Maritime Organization.25 In the meantime, this obligation had 
also been incorporated in the Convention on the High Seas26 and the so-called 
solas Convention.27 At present, this rule also forms part of the Constitution 
for the Oceans, i.e. the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and 
reads as follows:
Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he 
can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being 
lost;
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in dis-
tress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action 
may reasonably be expected of him;
(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and 
its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the 
name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at 
which it will call.28
24 International Convention on Salvage, signed on 28 April 1989, 1953 unts 193 (entered 
into force 14 July 1996), Art. 10, available at http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/
salvage1989.html. Hereinafter, 1989 Salvage Convention. The article now counts three 
paragraphs:
1.  Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his vessel and 
persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost at sea.
2.  The States Parties shall adopt the measures necessary to enforce the duty set out in 
paragraph 1.
3.  The owner of the vessel shall incur no liability for a breach of the duty of the master 
under paragraph 1.
25 The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, as it was originally called, 
was established in 1948. In 1982 the name of the organization was changed into Interna-
tional Maritime Organization. Hereinafter, imo.
26 Convention on the High Seas, signed on 29 April 1958, 450 unts 11 (entered into force 30 
September 1962), Art. 12, available at untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/con 
ventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf.
27 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, signed on 1 November 1974, 1184 unts 277–453 
(entered into force 25 May 1980), Chapter v, Regulation 10, available at http://www.austlii 
.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1983/22.html. Hereinafter, 1974 solas Convention.
28 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed on 10 December 1982, 1833 unts 
397 (entered into force 16 November 1994), Art. 98, para. 1, available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. Hereinafter, 1982 Conven-
tion. It should be noted that the 1958 Convention on the High Seas (supra note 26) and 
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But, as has been stressed in the legal literature, the obligation to render assis-
tance should be distinguished from the obligation to rescue.29 The former is a 
notion which has been purposefully kept vague in the different instruments 
leaving sufficient leeway to the master of the ship to fulfil this obligation.30 The 
latter is an obligation only imposed on States and has been defined in a much 
more detailed way as will be demonstrated below.
The legal framework of search and rescue operations has to be found mainly 
in two international conventions. In chronological order they are the Interna-
tional Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, adopted under the aus-
pices of the imo in 1979,31 and the 1982 Convention. Both documents will be 
addressed in turn.
A 1979 sar Convention
The 1979 sar Convention was the first international legal instrument dealing 
with the subject matter in any detail.32 At present there are 103 States parties 
the 1982 Convention, contrary to most other legal documents mentioned in this respect 
above, do not attribute the obligation to render assistance directly to the master of the 
ship, but only indirectly though the flag State, which in turn must require the master of 
the vessel to act according to the obligation. The ultimate bearer of the obligation, never-
theless, always remains the master of the ship. The 1989 Salvage Convention is special in 
that it combines both approaches (supra note 24) because it places the main obligation 
on the master of the ship and reinforces it by requiring the State parties to adopt the nec-
essary measures to enforce that obligation resting on the master of the vessel.
29 F.J. Kenney, and V. Tasikas, The Tampa Incident: imo Perspectives and Responses on the 
Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea, 12 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 143, 
151–159 (2003).
30 Ibid., at 151–152.
31 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 27 April 1979, 1985 unts 118 
(entered into force 22 June 1985), available at http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/con 
ven/searchrescue1979.html; 2004 amendments available at http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/
pdf/marcomms/imo/msc_resolutions/MSC155(78).pdf. Hereinafter, 1979 sar Convention.
32 The general obligation for States to maintain adequate search and rescue services along 
their coasts was already to be found in the predecessor of the 1974 solas Convention 
(supra note 27), namely the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, signed on 10 June 
1948, 164 unts 113 (entered into force 19 November 1952), Chapter 5, Regulation 15, avail-
able at http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofSOLAS/
Documents/SOLAS%201948%20UK%20Treaty%20Series.pdf. This regulation reads:
(a)  Each Contracting Government undertakes to ensure that any necessary arrange-
ments are made for coast watching and for the rescue of persons in distress at sea 
round its coasts. These arrangements should include the establishment, operation 
and maintenance of such maritime safety facilities as are deemed practicable and 
necessary having regard to the density of the seagoing traffic and the navigational 




to the convention representing about 62.45 percent of the gross tonnage of the 
world’s merchant shipping.33 The convention itself is very short, consisting of 
only eight articles, of which six moreover concern the so-called final clauses 
of  international agreements, namely those provisions dealing with amend-
ments, the manner to become a party, entry into force, denunciation, deposit 
and registration, and languages. There is only one substantial article entitled 
“General Obligations Under the Convention”, stating: “The Parties undertake to 
adopt all legislative or other appropriate measures necessary to give full effect 
to the Convention and its Annex, which is an integral part of the convention. 
Unless expressly provided otherwise, a reference to the Convention consti-
tutes at the same time a reference to its Annex”.34
The remaining provision, Article 2, has to do with the particular timeframe 
in which this convention has been negotiated, namely at the time that the law 
of the sea was being completely overhauled by means of the Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973–1982). It represents a standard 
clause which was often literally, or at least substantially, reproduced in many 
other agreements that touch upon law of the sea issues and that were con-
cluded during this period of high uncertainty, which characterized this specific 
branch of international law at that time.35
The essence of the legal obligations of this convention is therefore to be 
found in the Annex attached to the Convention. Each State party is obligated 
to ensure that adequate search and rescue services are available in its coastal 
waters.36 State parties are moreover encouraged to enter into search and res-
cue agreements with neighboring countries in the region.37 After the  adoption 
(b)  Each Contracting Government undertakes to make available information concerning 
its existing rescue facilities and the plans for changes therein, if any.
33 International Maritime Organization, International Convention on Search and Rescue, 
1979, as Amended: Accession by Indonesia, imo Doc. SAR.1/Circ.91, 30 August 2012, avail-
able at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Circulars/Pages/IMODOCS.aspx.
34 1979 sar Convention, supra note 31, Article 1.
35 Art. 2 reads as follows: “1) Nothing in the Convention shall prejudice the codification and 
development of the law of the sea by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea convened pursuant to resolution 2750(xxv) of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations nor the present or future claims and legal views of any State concerning the law 
of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag State jurisdiction. 2) No provi-
sion of the Convention shall be construed as prejudicing obligations or rights of vessels 
provided for in other international instruments”. For a more elaborate analysis of this 
particular clause, see Erik Franckx, the Relationship Between Cites, Fao and 
Related Agreements: Legal Issues, Rome, Food and Agriculture Organization 
29–35 (2011), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1976e/i1976e00.pdf.
36 1979 sar Convention, supra note 31, Annex, 2.1.1.
37 Ibid., Annex, 2.1.3 to 2.1.6.
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of the convention, the Maritime Safety Committee of the imo divided the 
world into thirteen search and rescue areas.38
In these annexes one can also find for the first time a detailed definition of 
what has to be understood by search, namely “[a]n operation, normally co-
ordinated by a rescue coordination center or rescue sub center, using avail-
able personnel and facilities to locate persons in distress”, and rescue, namely 
“[a]n operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial medical 
or other needs, and deliver them to a place of safety”.39 The latter is not nor-
mally the ship rendering assistance.40
It has therefore been argued that if the duty to render assistance is required 
of the shipmaster,41 the obligation to rescue rests only with the State.42
38 Information available at http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/
pages/international-convention-on-maritime-search-and-rescue-(sar).aspx. Because the 
convention initially had difficulty in ensuring a sufficient amount of ratifications, a re-
vised Annex was consequently adopted in 1998. A second amendment was adopted in 
2004 in order to specify in some more detail the notions of “persons in distress” and 
“places of safety” (ibid.). This second amendment was a direct result of the M/V Tampa 
incident of 2001, when Australia refused the disembarkation of more than 400 persons 
rescued from a sinking Indonesian ferry. K. Gustafson Juras, J.E. Noyes, and E. 
Franckx, Law of the Sea in a Nutshell 41–42 (2010) and D.R. Rothwell and T. 
Stephens, The International Law of the Sea 162 (2010). The present analysis is 
based on the text of the 1979 sar Convention including both amendments, which entered 
into force in January 2000 and July 2006 respectively.
39 1979 sar Convention, supra note 31, Annex, 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.
40 Ibid., Annex, 3.1.9, which reads: “Parties shall coordinate and cooperate to ensure that 
masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at sea are released 
from their obligations with minimum further deviation from the ships’ intended voyage, 
provided that releasing the master of the ship from these obligations does not further 
endanger the safety of life at sea. The Party responsible for the search and rescue region in 
which such assistance is rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such 
coordination and cooperation occurs, so that survivors assisted are disembarked from 
the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety, taking into account the particular 
circumstances of the case and guidelines developed by the Organization. In these cases, 
the relevant Parties shall arrange for such disembarkation to be effected as soon as rea-
sonably practicable”.
41 As indicated supra note 28, it is only the enforcement of compliance with this duty to 
render assistance that can be delegated to States. See also M. Davies, Obligations and Im-
plications for Ships Encountering Persons in Need of Assistance at Sea, 12 Pacific Rim Law 
and Policy Journal 109, 141 (2003).
42 Kenney & Tasikas, supra note 29, at 157. According to these authors only Art. 98, para. 
1, sub b of the 1982 Convention (as reproduced supra note 28 and accompanying text) 
does at first sight not seem to follow this logic, unless one reads into “in so far as such 
action may be reasonably expected of them” the hypothesis that the vessel rendering 





The purpose of the drafters of the 1982 Convention was not to replace all 
pre-existing international conventions relating to the law of the sea. On the 
contrary, the 1982 Convention only deals with the general rules determining 
competences but leaves all technicalities to the relevant conventions already 
existing or still to be elaborated.43 Even though the 1982 Convention, which is 
a document largely adhered to by the international community,44 does touch 
upon the issue of search and rescue, it only states the general principle:
Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and main-
tenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding 
safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so require, by way 
of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with neighbouring States for 
this purpose.45
The details of the search and rescue regime, therefore, are still governed in es-
sence by the 1979 sar Convention today.46
IV Application to the East China Sea
In order to fully appreciate the application of the above-mentioned legal 
framework to the East China Sea, one has of course first to ascertain the man-
ner in which the countries surrounding this area have been willing to subscribe 
to the relevant international legal instruments just mentioned. As indicated in 
Table 1, with the exception of Taiwan for obvious reasons explained above, all 
countries are a party to both documents. This stands in contrast to the South 
43 C. Douay, Le droit de la mer et la préservation du milieu marin, in: Daniel Bardonnet 
and Michel Virally (eds.), Le nouveau droit international de la mer 231, 
248 (1983).
44 At present 163 States and the European Union are legally bound by this international 
instrument.
45 1982 Convention, supra note 28, Art. 98, para. 2. This particular provision of the 1982 Con-
vention moreover does not excel in clarity for it combines the words “promote”, which 
seems to allow the coastal state a large margin of flexibility, with the words “adequate and 
effective”, which on the other hand seem to restrict the leeway granted to that same State. 
For a detailed analysis, see A.E. Moen, For Those in Peril on the Sea: Search and Rescue 
under the Law of the Sea Convention, 24 Ocean Yearbook 377, 384–403 (2010).
46 Stressing this more specific nature of the 1979 sar Convention when compared to the 
1982 Convention and the 1974 solas Convention, see International Maritime Organiza-
tion, Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, imo Doc. leg/misc.7, 19 January 2012, at 38.
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China Sea where until recently the majority of coastal States were not a party 
to the 1979 sar Convention.47 Moreover, the countries in the East China Sea 
signed and ratified these two conventions at around the same time, with the 
exception of South Korea with respect to the 1979 sar Convention, which only 
did so a decade after China and Japan.
The East China Sea forms part of the North-West Pacific search and rescue 
area as determined by the imo,48 where search and rescue operations are con-
ducted by China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philip-
pines, the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. As stated in a note 
under this particular search and rescue area, however, “Areas of responsibility 
have not yet been defined by the above States. However, each country in the 
area has undertaken, on receipt of a distress alert, to ensure that action will be 
taken to coordinate [search and rescue] in the most expeditious manner”.49
On the same map it is moreover indicated that Japan has limited the area 
for which this country is responsible as far as search and rescue is concerned 
in the east and the south by a line connecting the coordinates 52° 30' N / 165° 
47 As stressed by S. Bateman, Good Order at Sea in the South China Sea, in S. Wu, and K. 
Zou (eds.), Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implica-
tions and International Cooperation 15, 21 and the table on 23 (2009). Since 
then, the convention has also entered into force for Indonesia on 23 September 2012. 
International Maritime Organization, International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue, 1979, as Amended: Accession by Indonesia, imo Doc. sar.1/Circ.91, 30 August 2012, 
available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Circulars/Pages/IMODOCS.aspx.
48 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
49 Information available at http://www.oceansatlas.com/unatlas/issues/emergencies/gmd 
ss_sar/SARMAP.PDF.
Table 1 Status of Ratification
1982 Convention 1979 sar Convention
Signature Ratification Signature Ratification
China 10 December 1982 7 June 1996 24 June 1985a 24 June 1985a









Taiwan /b /b /c /c
a Applies to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region with effect from 1 July 1997 and to 
the Macao Special Administrative Region with effect from 24 June 2005.
b Excluded from becoming a party according to Article 305 (1) of the 1982 Convention.
c Excluded from becoming a party according to Article 4 (1) of the 1979 sar Convention.
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E, 17° N / 165° E, and 17° N / 130° E. Because this line is totally located outside 
the East China Sea, the latter is rather covered by the last sentence of the same 
note on the map, which states that the search and rescue region of Japan is 
subject to bilateral discussions with the countries involved.50
Because this article is limited to the East China Sea, the following supple-
mentary information can be added concerning that region proper. Japan has 
established 11 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers, of which primarily two 
are responsible for the East China Sea region, namely the one located in Ka-
goshima, responsible for the Kagoshima area, and the other in Naha, respon-
sible for the Okinawa area.51 China has a central Center in Beijing, but also 18 
associated coast radio stations.52 Of the latter four are mainly responsible for 
the East China Sea as defined above, namely Fuzhou, Ningbo, Shanghai and 
Wenzhou.53 The Republic of Korea, finally, had initially five main Maritime 
Rescue Coordination Centers, each of which had two sub Centers except for 
the Jeju Maritime Rescue Coordination Center, which had none. It was this 
last Center that was mainly responsible for the East China Sea.54 However, in 
2010 this country rearranged its Rescue Coordination Centers with the Jeju 
Rescue Coordination Center receiving a Rescue Sub Center, namely Seowipo 
50 Ibid.
51 Japan submitted its search and rescue plan in 2005. See International Maritime Organiza-
tion, Global sar Plan Containing Information on the Current Availability of sar Services, 
imo Doc. SAR.8/Circ.1/Corr.3, 20 October 2005, at 11–22, available at http://www5.imo.
org/SharePoint/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=16608&filename=1-Corr-3.pdf. The correc-
tions introduced by this country in 2010 do not change this basic structure. International 
Maritime Organization, Availability of Search and Rescue (sar) Services, imo Doc. SAR.8/
Circ.3, 17 June 2011, at 160–172, available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Circulars/Pages 
/IMODOCS.aspx. Hereinafter, SAR.8/Circ.3.
52 For a description of the Chinese search and rescue structure, see for instance S. Hao, 
Maritime Aspects of China’s Humanitarian Operations Policy, in A.S. Erickson, Gold-
stein, and N. Li (Eds.), China, the United States and 21st Century Sea 
Power:  Defining a Maritime Security Partnership 236–251 (2010) and J. Zhang, 
Commentary: Search and Rescue in the South China Sea and Regional Cooperation, in 
 Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and 
International Cooperation, supra note 47, at 255–261.
53 China submitted its search and rescue plan in 2006. International Maritime Organization, 
Global sar Plan Containing Information on the Current Availability of sar Services, imo 
Doc. SAR.8/Circ.1/Corr.4, 21 April 2006, at 6–7, available at http://www5.imo.org/Share 
Point/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=14518&filename=1-Corr-4.pdf. Hereinafter, SAR.8/
Circ.1/Corr.4. This plan has not been substantially changed since then. Compare with 
SAR.8/Circ.3, supra note 51, at 58–59.
54 The Republic of Korea submitted its search and rescue plan in 2006. SAR.8/Circ.1/Corr.4, 
supra note 53, at 39–41.
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on the southern part of the island Jeju facing the East China Sea.55 The Repub-
lic of Korea is moreover the only country giving the exact limits of the areas 
for which each of the five main Centers is responsible. For the Jeju Center this 
zone covers about the northwestern part of the East China Sea starting from 
30° N in the south.56 Since it covers that area in the east up to the Chinese 
mainland, a note adds that foreign territorial waters lying on the inside of the 
polygon are to be excluded.57 It is to be noted that the northeastern part of 
the East China Sea is not covered in a similar way up to the coast of Japan, but 
rather splits the area roughly in two.58
In this far from perfect framework, the parties have felt the need to start 
cooperating in the field, i.e. by organizing joint search and rescue activities in 
the East China Sea. By way of examples, mention can be made of the 1999 joint 
operation between Japan and South Korea59 or the joint exercise held between 
55 There are still five Rescue Coordination Centers, of which two are new. The two that were 
replaced form part today of the 12 Rescue Sub Centers. SAR.8/Circ.3, supra note 51, at 
239–242. Jeju, the capital of Jeju Island, faces the Korean peninsula.
56 SAR.8/Circ.1/Corr.4, supra note 53, at 41. The area is a polygon of which the outer bound-
ary is determined by a line connecting the following nine points: a) 34° 00’ 00” N / 126° 
15’ 00” E; b) 34° 00’ 00” N / 127° 00’ 00” E; c) 33° 15’ 00” N / 128° 00’ 00” E; d) 33° 12’ 00” N / 
128° 05’ 00” E; e) 32° 30’ 00” N / 127° 30’ 00” E; f) 30° 00’ 00” N / 125° 25’ 00” E; g) 30° 00’ 00” 
N / 121° 00’ 00” E; h) 32° 14’ 00” N / 121° 00’ 00” E; and i) 34° 00’ 00” N / 126° 15’ 00” E. This 
polygon was slightly changed in 2010 with the addition of two more points, namely: a) 34° 
00’ 00” N / 126° 15’ 00” E; b) 34° 00’ 00” N / 126° 00’ 00” E; c) 33° 56’ 00” N / 126° 30’ 00” E; 
d) 33° 56’ 00” N / 127° 13’ 30” E; e) 33° 15’ 00” N / 128° 00’ 00” E; f) 33° 12’ 00” N / 128° 05’ 00” 
E; g) 32° 30’ 00” N / 127° 30’ 00” E; h) 30° 00’ 00” N / 125° 00’ 00” E; i) 30° 00’ 00” N / 121° 00’ 
00” E; j) 32° 14’ 00” N / 121° 00’ 00” E; k) 34 00’ 00” N / 126° 15’ 00” E. See SAR.8/Circ.3, supra 
note 51, at 242. The part south of Seju Island, however, remained largely unchanged. The 
northeastern part of the polygon only reaches up to parallel 32° 14’ N, meaning that the 
area up to parallel 33° 17’ N, i.e. the northern boundary of the East China Sea as defined 
for present purposes (see supra note 9) is not covered by the Jeju Coordination Center. 
In 2006 this zone was instead covered by the Mokpo Maritime Rescue Coordination Cen-
ter, but after the changes introduced in 2010 this particular area appears no longer to be 
covered.
57 SAR.8/Circ.3, supra note 51, at 242. By means of the changes introduced in 2011 a new Res-
cue Coordination Center was established at Namhae, the field of operation of which cov-
ers the same area south of Seju already covered by the Seju Rescue Coordination Center. 
A note under the limits of the Namhae Center, however, reads “the area except for foreign 
territorial water and Jeju within a line connecting the above points”.
58 See attached map in Annex 1.
59 M.J. Valencia, Conclusions and Lessons Learned, in M.J. Valencia (ed.), Maritime Re-




the Chinese Shanghai and the Japanese Kagoshima Center.60 This kind of co-
operation seems to have been increasing over the years.61
It will be clear from the above analysis that the present-day unilateral imple-
mentation of the search and rescue obligations in the East China Sea under the 
1979 sar Convention is in urgent need of coordination by the coastal States. As 
the situation now stands, it is easily imaginable that this situation may at any 
time raise the tension instead of diminishing it. It should not be forgotten that 
the whole 1995 Imia/Kardak crisis in the Aegean Sea62 started as a search and 
rescue incident, where the captain of a Turkish vessel in difficulty contested 
the competence of Greek vessels to intervene.63 People lost their lives during 
the course of this incident, not because of being lost at sea, but rather by the 
manner in which this crisis was handled by the Greek and Turkish authori-
ties in the aftermath of the incident. Moreover overlapping search and rescue 
regions in other parts of the Mediterranean have also given rise to increased 
tension,64 indicating that this stepping stone for developing cooperation can 
easily lead to an adverse effect, if not properly managed.
60 Hao, supra note 52, at 244–245.
61 S.K. Kim, Korean Peninsula Maritime Issues, 41 Ocean Development and Interna-
tional Law 166–185 (2010). See for more recent examples, see Defense Ministry: South 
Korea Working to Forge Military Cooperation Pact with China, Indonesia Katakami, 21 May 
2012, available at http://indonesiakatakami.wordpress.com/2012/05/21/defense-ministry 
-south-korea-working-to-forge-military-cooperation-pact-with-china, mentioning such 
joint exercises between China and the Republic of Korea, and B. Kligner, Washington Should 
Urge Greater South Korean-Japanese Military and Diplomatic Cooperation, The  Heritage 
Foundation, 24 September 2012, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/re-
ports/2012/09/washington-should-urge-greater-south-korean-japanese-military-and 
-diplomatic-cooperation, mentioning joint exercises between Japan, the Republic of Ko-
rea and the United States in 2012.
62 For more background on this crisis, see for instance M. Pratt and C. Schofield, The Imia/
Kardak Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea, 4 Boundary and Security Bulletin 62–69 
(1996); C.P. Economidès, Les îlots d’Imia dans la Mer Egée: un différend créé par la force, 101 
Revue Générale de Droit International Public (1997); and E. Raftopoulos, The 
Crisis over the Imia Rocks and the Aegean Sea Regime: International Law as a Language of 
Common Interest, 12 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 427–
446 (1997).
63 T. Korontzis, The Competence of Hellas on Search and Rescue Items in the Aegean Area, 4 
Review of European Studies 89, 90 (2012).
64 S. Trevisanut, Search and Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean: Factor of Cooperation 
or Conflict?, 25 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 523–542 
(2010).
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V Conclusions
Search and rescue could easily become a building block for regional coopera-
tion in the East China Sea because all States are a party to the most relevant 
international treaties, namely the 1982 Convention and, foremost, the 1979 sar 
Convention.65 Besides punctual joint exercises at sea, as confidence building 
measures,66 it is submitted that the States surrounding the East China Sea 
should try to conclude agreements between them clearly dividing their respec-
tive fields of operation. Incidents occurring in disputed or overlapping areas 
can easily deteriorate the general climate between the parties changing what 
appeared to be a building bloc to foster interstate cooperation into a slippery 
slope easily leading to an increased interstate animosity instead.
Very often it is thought that search and rescue cooperation is not very well 
suited in regions, such as the East China Sea, where maritime areas are disput-
ed between the coastal States and established maritime boundaries are rather 
the exception than the rule. This, however, is not a fatality as illustrated by 
the recently concluded search and rescue agreement in the Arctic, an area of 
high tension where much of the maritime boundaries still have to be fixed in 
a definitive manner.67 By means of a few simple lines on the map and a ditto 
savings clause68 the Arctic rim countries were able to enter into a joint legally 
binding instrument.69
65 About the possibilities of search and rescue in southeast Asia generally and recommen-
dations to develop cooperation in this respect, see S. Bateman, J. Ho, and J. Chan, Good 
Order at Sea in the Southeast Asia, rsis Policy Paper 4, 38 and 45–46 (2009), available 
at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-%20
Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf.
66 China and the United States have been using this approach in order to try to alleviate 
their strained relations at sea. Y. Yi, A PLA Navy Perspective on Maritime Security Coopera-
tion, in China, the United States and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a 
Maritime Security Partnership, supra note 52, at 488, 497.
67 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arc-
tic. Multilateral, signed on 12 May 2011. As of 7 September 2012 this agreement had not yet 
entered into force (personal communication to the author by Ambassador A. Vasiliev, one 
of the two co-chairs that headed this Arctic Council Task Force), available at http://library 
.arcticportal.org/1474/.
68 Art. 3 (2) reads: “The delimitation of search and rescue regions is not related to and shall 
not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between States or their sovereignty, sov-
ereign rights or jurisdiction”.
69 This is the first legally-binding instrument adopted under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council, a high level intergovernmental forum established in 1996, in a region governed 
primarily by a non-legally binding regime. As stressed by S.M. Kao, N.S. Pearre, and J. Fire-
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Annex 1 IMO Availability of Search and Rescue (SAR) Services IMO Availability of Search 
and Rescue (SAR) Services
Source: International Maritime Organization, Availability of 
Search and Rescue (sar) Services, imo Doc. sar.8/Circ.3, 17 June 2011, 
Annex 4, at 15.
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There is no reason why a similar approach could not be applied to the East 
China Sea, especially in view of the fact that China, Japan and the Republic of 
Korea are all legally bound by the 1979 sar Convention, and consequently also 
by its Annex containing a similar savings clause.70 China moreover repeated 
this provision, with a specific reference to the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf, in a declaration made at the time of submitting its instru-
ment of approval to the 1979 sar Convention.71
How Taiwan has to be involved in such closer cooperation is not obvious at 
present. Different options nevertheless exist, ranging from associate member-
ship in the imo, which could open the possibility to become a party to the 1979 
sar Convention, to ad hoc solutions worked out by China, Japan and the Re-
public of Korea, as has happened in the field of fisheries. Leaving Taiwan out 
of the picture might be a sensible solution in the short run, when countries are 
trying to overcome their own difficulties first, but seems to be a self-defeating 
proposition in the longer run.
stone, Adoption of the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement: A Shift of the Arctic Regime 
Toward a Hard Law Basis?, 36 Marine Policy 832, 832 (2012).
70 1979 sar Convention, supra note 31, Annex, 2.1.7, which reads: “The delimitation of search 
and rescue regions is not related to and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any bound-
ary between States”.
71 At that time China made the following declaration: “The delimitation of search and res-
cue regions, as stipulated in the Annex to the Convention 2.1.7, is not related to and shall 
not prejudice the delimitation of any boundary between States, either is not related to 
and shall not prejudice the delimitation of any exclusive economic zone and continen-








China’s Air Defence Identification Zone: Towards 
the Crystallization of a New International Custom
Matthias Vanhullebusch*
I Introduction
The establishment of China’s Air Defence Identification Zone (adiz) above 
the East China Sea in November 2013 has triggered many questions as to its 
legality under international law, including the law on the use of force, avia-
tion law and the law of the sea.1 Under the latter framework, the law has been 
ambivalent and has resulted in two distinctive practices in favour of the free-
dom of overflight on the one hand and the residual rights thesis on the other 
hand. A divergence persists in respect of the adizs that are established by de-
veloped and developing nations. Such division may prove to be an important 
factor for China to leverage support for its adiz in this grey area of interna-
tional law. The common right to development of developing countries, which 
is tied to their respective exclusive economic zone (eez), can be a convincing 
argument for China to engage with these countries to secure their economic 
growth.
Furthermore, such potential support of numerous developing countries 
goes beyond China’s foreign and security policies in the East China Sea. Their 
support can result in the crystallization of a new international custom in the 
long-term, namely one that constrains the freedom of overflight above the eez 
1 Jaemin Lee, China’s Declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea: 
Implications for Public International Law, 18 Proceedings of the American Society 
of International Law (2014); Jae Woon Lee, Tension on the Air: The Air Defense Identi-
fication Zones on the East China Sea, 7 Journal of East Asia and International Law 
274 (2014); Jinyuan Su, The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone and International 
Law, 14 Chinese Journal of International Law 271 (2015); Matthias Vanhullebusch 
and Wei Shen, China’s Air Defence Identification Zone: Building Security through Lawfare, 16 
The China Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Greater China 121 (2016); 
Suk Kyoon Kim, Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia: Regional Challenges 
and Cooperation 63–64 (2017).
* Associate Professor of Law, Executive Director of the Asian Law Center, KoGuan Law School, 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University (PhD, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London); Series Editor of Brill’s Asian Law Series and the Routledge Studies on Asia in the 
World. Contact: matthias.vanhullebusch@gmail.com.
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when the coastal State extends its jurisdiction in the airspace above its eez 
instead. This note will examine two different practices that can crystalize into 
a new international custom favouring the freedom of overflight ( Section 2) or 
the residual rights thesis (Section 3). Consecutively, it will explore the condi-
tions that are necessary to increase the normative basis of an emerging custom 
advanced by China (Section 4). It will make use of the Theory on the Relational 
Normativity of International Law (tornil) that argues that norms, values and 
relationships are interdependent sources from which an international custom 
(in the making) derives its binding force.2 From the perspective of relational 
governance, China will seek to manage its relationships with other (develop-
ing) countries in such a manner to draw support in defence of its own adiz 
practice and away from the other one.
II Practice One: adiz and the Communitarian Freedom of Overflight
According to the (Chicago) Convention on International Civil Aviation, an adiz 
is a “special designated airspace of defined dimensions within which aircraft are 
required to comply with special identification and/or reporting procedures ad-
ditional to those related to the provision of air traffic services”.3 The Rules of Air 
adopted by the Council the International Civil Aviation Organization (icao) 
empower States to request compliance with “the rules and regulations relating 
to the flight and manoeuver of aircraft there in force” – even above the high seas.4 
Pursuant to the law of the sea, such measures have to balance with the commu-
nitarian freedom of overflight enjoyed above the high seas as well as above the 
eez of the coastal State.5 Coastal States that establish an adiz above their eez 
must respect these freedoms as long as they are exercised peacefully6 and pay 
due regard to the other States’ interests.7 Therefore, foreign aircraft – civilian 
2 Matthias Vanhullebusch, Governing Asymmetries on the Battlefield: Towards a Relational Nor-
mativity, 9 Chinese Journal of International Politics 307, 318 (2016); Matthias 
Vanhullebusch, Global Governance, Conflict and China 51 (2018).
3 Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature 7 December 1944, 61 Stat. 
1180, 15 unts 295 (entered into force 4 April 1947), Annex 15.
4 Ibid., Art. 12, annex 2, Rules of the Air, 2.1.1.
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos), opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994), Arts. 87(1)(b), 58(1).
6 Art. 88, unclos.
7 Art. 87(2), unclos.
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and military alike – of third States have to comply with those identification and 
reporting regulations adopted by the coastal State.8
The liberal perspective advanced by the u.s. acknowledges such equilib-
rium of communitarian and sovereign interests. However, it advocates that 
every nation has the right to exercise its freedom of overflight – especially for 
military purposes including surveillance – above the eez of the coastal State 
in a peaceful manner.9 As a result, it opposes the extended jurisdiction of the 
coastal State to regulate all (military) activities of third States in the airspace 
above its eez. It refutes the transplantation of the restrictive domestic regula-
tions on the overflight of aircraft over the landmass and above the territorial 
sea of the coastal State to the entire airspace above the latter’s eez.10 Such 
encroaching jurisdiction renders the communitarian freedom of overflight as 
applicable above the high seas11 and enjoyed above the eez12 of a coastal State 
from the beginning obsolete. The actual nature of the eez, a sui generis regime 
before the law of the sea, would, from this perspective, not justify extended 
jurisdiction on the basis of the sovereign rights that a coastal State exercises 
within its eez, namely related to the exploration and exploitation of living and 
non-living resources in the subsoil and the waters above.13
These nations favour the peaceful exercise of the freedom of overflight of 
aircraft above the eez of the coastal State, on the one hand, and the lim-
ited sovereignty of the coastal State to regulate such airspace, on the other 
hand. From this liberal perspective, at least eight countries have established 
such adizs that are currently still in force. Amongst those eight countries, 
six of them are developed (i.e., Canada, Japan, Norway, UK, US and South 
Korea) and two developing countries (i.e., India and Pakistan). Taiwan has 
also its own adiz that is still enforced and so had France and Italy respective-
ly during the Algerian war for independence (1950s-1960s) and Balkan Wars 
(1990s-2000s).14
8 Art. 58(3), unclos.
9 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 (1983).
10 Art. 17, unclos. Unlike aircraft, an innocent passage for ships is permitted within the 
territorial sea of the coastal State and does not require the latter’s consent.
11 Art. 87(1)(b), unclos.
12 Art. 58(2), unclos.
13 Art. 56, unclos. See also Elizabeth Cuadra, Air Defense Identification Zones: Creep-
ing Jurisdiction in the Airspace, 18 Virginia Journal of International Law 485 
(1978).
14 Peter A. Dutton, Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign Air-
space, 103 American Journal of International Law 1, 10, 13, 17 (2009).
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III Practice Two: adiz and the Sovereign Residual Rights Thesis
Unlike the first adiz practice, other coastal States have argued that they have 
complete jurisdiction to regulate the airspace above their eez. While unclos 
defines explicitly the sovereign rights of the coastal State in its eez with par-
ticular reference to the economic exploitation and environmental protec-
tion of natural resources in the waters and subsoil thereof,15 it also includes 
“other rights and duties”.16 Yet, the exercise of those sovereign residual rights – 
 including the regulation of military activities in the airspace above the coastal 
State’s eez – must equally pay “due regard to the rights and duties of other 
States” – especially those who claim their peaceful freedom of overflight.17
Amongst those countries that accept the residual right thesis, 10 nations 
have official positions on their right to and/or domestic laws that regulate mili-
tary activities in their eez (i.e., Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Iran, Malay-
sia, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan and Uruguay). Five countries have actu-
ally asserted such right (i.e., Cape Verde, Kenya, the Maldives, Mauritius and 
Portugal). China and Guyana are the only countries that regulate all civilian 
and military overflight activities.18 As a result, at least seven countries have in 
fact exercised their residual rights in the eez – in the waters and/or airspace 
above. Amongst those countries, only one is a developed Western nation (i.e., 
Portugal).
IV Crystalizing a New International Custom: Towards a  
Relational Normativity
Despite a scholarly view that all 168 countries who are a party to unclos also 
adhere to the u.s. claim,19 there remains uncertainty if their membership to 
this treaty substitutes for their opinio juris in order to consolidate an interna-
tional custom to that effect. In fact, the actual practice of a limited number 
of States supporting either practice (8 in favour of the freedom of overflight 
and 7 in favour of the residual rights thesis) may not represent a so-called “ap-
preciable section of the international community” – as once observed in the 
context of the legality of nuclear weapons by the Chinese Judge Jiuyong Shi in 
15 Art. 56(1)(a), unclos.
16 Art. 56(1)(c), unclos.
17 Art. 56(2), unclos.
18 Dutton, supra note 14, at 7.
19 Ibid., at 7. Dutton, however, only supports this claim on the basis of the number of parties 
to unclos.
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the icj’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion. In this respect, he continued that 
the limited practice and “material power” of nuclear weapons States might not 
constitute the foundation to establish an international custom on the use of 
such weapons since that would violate the principle of sovereign equality.20
Nonetheless, in the absence of greater participation of States in support 
of either practice of adizs, leading States – the US and China in particular – 
have sought to turn their positions and interests into customary international 
law. In the present study of China’s adiz, it is therefore necessary to identify 
the techniques which China has pursued to advance its normative practice 
through military, economic and diplomatic strategies.21 The u.s. Department 
of Defense reported as early as 2007 that Chinese “military strategists have 
taken an increasing interest in international law as an instrument to deter ad-
versaries prior to combat” and that China “is shaping international opinion in 
favor of a distorted interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
by moving scholarly opinion and national perspectives away from long-accept-
ed norms of freedom of navigation and toward interpretations of increased 
sovereign authority over the eez, the airspace above it”.22
China’s legal strategy, however, goes beyond such mere lawfare.23 In ad-
dition, its relational governance aims at instilling trust through a long-term 
process of negotiating political and security arrangements between the par-
ticipants on the international plane (globally and regionally alike) to reach a 
synthesis on their initial opposing interests.24 So far, in 2014, China and the u.s. 
have reached a Memorandum of Understanding to avoid potential conflicts 
between both militaries though they did not reach an agreement regarding 
their fundamental divergent interpretations on the law of the sea.25  Regionally 
20 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Reports 226 (July 8) (Declara-
tion of Judge Jiuyong Shi).
21 Stanley Hoffmann, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International Rela-
tions, 57 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 26 
(1963).
22 u.s. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China 2007, available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/070523-China 
-Military-Power-final.pdf, at 13.
23 Ibid.; Eric Heginbotham, China’s adiz in the East China Sea, Lawfareblog, available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/08/the-foreign-policy-essay-chinasadiz-in-the-east 
-china-sea/.
24 Yaqing Qin, Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance, 
4 Chinese Journal of International Politics 133 (2011).
25 Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United 
States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China 




too, in 2017, China and asean member States adopted the Framework for the 
Code of Conduct that could ensure more peace, prosperity and stability in the 
South China Sea.26 The latter departs from the earlier distrust that reigned 
amongst the conflicting littoral states on the South China Sea ever since the 
Philippines had initiated arbitral proceedings against China and after the neg-
ative arbitral outcome against it.27 Moreover, in 2017, India and Pakistan have 
joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (sco), another regional secu-
rity body headquartered in Beijing.
Such confidence-building measures could be a first step for China to realign 
support for its adiz practice – at least with a regional section of the interna-
tional community in these other but more certain areas of (maritime) security 
governance. Also in the economic realm, all asean coastal States as well as 
other countries, including Bangladesh, India, Iran and Pakistan, along the Mar-
itime Silk Road have joined China’s One Belt One Road (obor) initiative and 
are members of its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (aiib) since 2015.28 
Each of these various security, economic and diplomatic forms of cooperation 
between China and other coastal member States bilaterally or within a  regional 
setting – institutional (aiib, asean and sco) and non-institutional (obor) 
alike – have a common denominator whose content is sufficiently shared by 
each partner: security and development. Both values are inextricably linked 
and have been the basis for (re)new(ed) cooperation between China and vari-
ous Asian coastal nations (with the exception of Japan and South Korea). They 
underscore the rationale behind the practice of extended jurisdiction over the 
airspace above the eez of those nations whose economic development has 
26 Christian Shepherd and Manuel Mogato, asean, China Adopt Framework for Crafting 
Code on South China Sea, Reuters, 6 August 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-asean-philippines-southchinasea-idUSKBN1AM0AY. The final adoption of the 
Code of Conduct as once envisaged in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea (Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002) aims to advance such common secu-
rity and economic objectives.
27 The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic 
of China), pca Case No. 2013–19, Award (12 July 2016). See also Lowell Bautista, The Philip-
pines and the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award: A Sombre Victory and Uncertain Times Ahead, 38 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 349 (2016).
28 People’s Republic of China, Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce, Vision and Actions on Jointly 
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (Information 
Office of the State Council, March 2015); Matthias Vanhullebusch, China’s Develop-
ment Banks in Asia: A Human Rights Perspective, in Yumiko Nakanishi (ed.), Cross- 
Fertilization in Human Rights Law: European and Asian Perspectives 207 
(2017).
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an intimate security component. Without security at sea and in the air, the 
economic prosperity of Asia’s emerging economies would be compromised.
On the long-term and from the perspective of tornil, China’s promotion 
of the sovereign right of the coastal State to deny access of overflight to civilian 
and military aircraft of third States in the airspace above its eez – pursuant 
to its own domestic regulations that called into being an adiz to that effect, 
relies on three interdependent sources. Firstly, the norm itself that finds its 
origin in the residual rights thesis defined in Article 56(1) of unclos that has 
been supported by the practice of 7 States. Secondly, the values that under-
pin the exercise of such sovereign prerogatives, namely the right to (peaceful) 
development, that has been gradually internalised amongst the developing 
countries along the Maritime Silk Road. Thirdly, the various sets of harmoni-
ous relationships based on trust and reconciliation of opposing interests that 
provide the fertile soil in which such new international custom can gain root.
Here, China’s relational governance does not only have to manage a conver-
gence of expectations within those relationships – in particular with (Asian) 
developing coastal States – on the binding force of its adiz practice based on 
shared security and economic values on the one hand. It must also seek to 
engage with the US not necessarily to align its position with its own but avoid 
conflict that would inevitably compromise all of China’s relationships within 
its neighbourhood and beyond – thus, denying the fertile soil. Yet, the u.s. 
global role to promote its version of the international rule of law is diminishing 
which leaves a vacuum that China can exploit to project its normative projects 
including but not limited to its adiz practice.29 In the long-term, China can 
convince more (Asian) developing coastal States to establish or readjust (in the 
case of India and Pakistan) their own adiz following Chinese characteristics 
that can outweigh the number of supporters to the u.s. practice.
V Conclusion
The crystallization of a new international custom in favour of extended juris-
diction of the coastal State over the airspace above its eez to deny overflight 
activities – civilian and military alike – has met different challenges that 
more than ever has exposed a deep divide between developed and develop-
ing countries. China has sought indirectly to pull support of the former adiz 
practice through its relational governance, namely by establishing  trustworthy 
29 Endangered: American Influence Has Dwindled under Donald Trump. It Will Not Be Simple 
to Restore, The Economist, 11 November 2017.
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 relationships with its allies and (former) enemies through economic and 
 security cooperation. Regardless of the form of the latter’s governance, it can 
provide a fertile soil for those coastal States – Asian developing countries in 
particular – to lend their support to China’s adiz model. Without their support, 
the residual rights thesis and the shared security and development  values that 
underpin the emerging custom cannot give the new norm its binding force. 
Given the split practice amongst a small proportion of the members of the 
international community, reaching such common understanding will be dif-
ficult and fragile to sustain in particular as China would use the new ( regional) 
custom to bolster its territorial claims in the disputed waters.
<UN>
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Oceans are notorious for being immeasurable, if not for the arbitrary delinea-
tions laid down by people and human-made institutions. The rules governing 
the use and utilization of the sea are one of the main focuses of international 
law. The law of the sea is a mixture of agreements and established or emerging 
customary international law developed over centuries. In considering a partic-
ular situation, one must thus consider carefully the legal position of the States 
involved2 – and nowhere is this better exemplified than in the issue of illegal 
fishing. Illegal fishing practices often occur in developing countries that have a 
shortage in capacity and resources to implement effective measures of moni-
toring, control, and surveillance. Its impact is felt throughout the globe, from 
off the Western coast of Africa to archipelagos such as Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, and Italy’s coastal regions of Naples and Sicily.3 Illegal fishing can occur 
in areas that are not under the jurisdiction of any country (i.e., the high seas), 
and can occur in areas that are under the jurisdiction of a country (i.e., the 
State’s exclusive economic zone (eez), the territorial sea, and internal waters). 
In many regards, often the former is easier to regulate compared to the latter: 
illegal fishing done on the high seas primarily violate international standards – 
that is, provisions relating to the conservation and management established by 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, among other things. If illegal 
fishing is instead carried out in territory under State jurisdiction, not only is it 
1 Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia. The author would like to thank Andrea C. 
Purwandaya, Research Assistant at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia, for her help 
with the initial research needed for this article.
2 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law 279–302 (2010).
3 Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, Illegal Southern Ocean Fishing and Prompt Release: Bal-
ancing Coastal and Flag State Rights and Interests, 53(2) International and Compara-
tive Law Quarterly 171–187 (2004). See also, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
Report of the Expert Workshop to Estimate the Magnitude of Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Globally (2015); and Emily Andrews-
Chouicha and Kathleen Gray, Why Fish Piracy Persists: The Economics of 
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (2005).
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done without that particular State’s consent, thereby a violation of internation-
al norms; it also raises other questions given the transnational nature of the 
affair.4 In the case of Indonesia, illegal fishing has been a long-time national is-
sue which has had little significant improvement in the last decades.5 Impacts 
of illegal fishing have significantly affected the livelihood of Indonesian fisher 
communities and industries.6 With a new strongly backed policy in securing 
natural resources of Indonesian waters, the government of Indonesia has taken 
a tougher action, sinking ships of illegal fishers in combatting illegal fishing.7
Various reactions have been directed to this policy especially from stake-
holders affected by this policy.8 Notably, some have argued that this action may 
violate the rules of international law and render Indonesia responsible for its 
internationally wrongful acts in sinking (foreign) ships.9 In contrast, this paper 
argues that the Indonesian policy of sinking the ships of illegal fishers is actu-
ally in accordance with relevant international and national policies and legal 
instruments. Indonesia as a sovereign State has the prerogative to institute a 
new national policy in combatting illegal fishing which is in accordance with 
relevant international rights and duties as a coastal State. Such policy has been 
triggered by the negative impacts of illegal fishing to the Indonesian people. In 
addition, Indonesia’s focus on maritime resources has revealed another prob-
lem in the fishing labour industry.
This article describes and analyses the practice of Indonesia in combatting 
iuu fishing, starts with the Global Maritime Fulcrum, a presidential policy 
which enjoys popular support amongst Indonesians. The state of Indonesia’s 
fishing resources is discussed together with its rights and obligations as a 
coastal State under international law. Then, it considers the negative impacts 
of illegal fishing to Indonesia, which lead to the adoption of the new policy of 
sinking ships of illegal fishers. As additional information, the recent case of 
Benjina will be explored as it illustrates the complex issues surrounding the 
4 Rothwell and Stephens, supra note 3.
5 Michael Heazle, John G. Butcher, Fisheries Depletion and the State in Indonesia: Towards a 
Regional Regulatory Regime, 31 Marine Policy 276–277 (2007).
6 Ibid., at 278–281.
7 Steve Herman, Indonesia Declares War on Illegal Foreign Fishing Vessels, VOANEWS, 23 
 December 2014, available at http://www.voanews.com/a/indonesia-declares-war-on-illegal-
foreign-fishing-vessels/2570346.html.
8 See for example, Vietnam Concerned about Indonesia’s Sinking of Fishing Boats, Thanh Nien 
News, 20 August 2015, available at http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/vietnam- 
concerned-about-indonesias-sinking-of-fishing-boats-50429.html.
9 Sunan J. Rustam, A Legal Review of the “Sink the Vessel” Policy, Jakarta Post Online, 6 
December 2014, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/12/06/a-legal-re-
view-sink-vessel-policy.html; and Aaron L. Connelly, Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko 
Widodo’s Foreign Policy Challenges, 37(1) Contemporary Southeast Asia 1–28 (2015).
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fishing resources in Indonesia. The paper concludes with some of the current 
issues on illegal fishing within Indonesia’s eez.
II The Widodo Administration and Global Maritime Fulcrum  
(Poros Maritim) Policy
Indonesia has long been dubbed as the epitome of an archipelagic nation. 
Situated in the middle of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Indonesia exercises 
control over strategic points of sea-lanes of communication through several 
significant number of straits. A point that is often espoused is that Indonesia’s 
geographical position offers opportunities for the State to play a significant role 
as a maritime power.10 To this end, Indonesian President Joko Widodo took 
time in his inaugural speech to emphasize the need for Indonesians to work 
hard, “[and] restore Indonesia as a maritime power. The oceans, the seas, the 
straits and the bays are the future of our civilization. For far too long, we have 
turned our backs on the seas, the oceans, the straits and the bays to restore 
Jalesveva Jayamahe (at sea we are victorious), the motto of our forefathers. We 
should return back to sailing the seas.” Most notably, the speech ended by quot-
ing the nation’s first President, Soekarno, who “…once said that to make Indo-
nesia a great, strong, prosperous and peaceful nation, we need to have the spirit 
of the cakrawarti (brave sailors), who confronted the great tides and the mighty 
rolling waves.” Through the use of seafaring metaphor, President Widodo had 
painted himself as, “the captain entrusted by the people,” and his speech ap-
pealed to the people to, “come on board the Republic of Indonesia vessel and 
together we will sail toward Great Indonesia. We will roll open the stout sails. 
We will face all the ocean tides and waves with our own strength.” In the same 
vein, he further emphasized the State’s status and demography, “[a]s the third-
largest democracy in the world, as the country with the largest Muslim popula-
tion, as an archipelagic State, and as the largest country in Southeast Asia, will 
continue to pursue its independent-active foreign policy, dedicated to national 
interests, and to taking part in creating an international order that respects 
independence, eternal peace and social justice.”11 For the remainder of his 
10 David Willis, Indonesia’s New Geopolitics: Indo-Pacific or pacindo? in Priya Chacko 
(ed.), New Regional Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: Drivers, Dynamics 
and Consequences 74–94 (2016). See also, Dino P. Djalal, The Geopolitics of 
Indonesia’s Maritime Territorial Policy (1996).
11 Indonesia’s President Remarks to the Ninth East Asian Summit, Naypyidaw, Myanmar, 
Rappler, 13 November 2014, available at http://www.rappler.com/world/regions/ 
asia-pacific/indonesia/74928-pidato-jokowi-indonesia-poros-maritim-dunia/. See also, 
Rene L. Pattiradjawane and Natalia Soebagjo, Global Maritime Axis: Indonesia, China, and 
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administration,  President Joko Widodo seems committed to a vision of a, “sov-
ereign, independent Indonesia with character based on the principle of ‘gotong 
royong.’” – mutual assistance.12 Though in foreign policy terms, this is yet to be 
clear, gotong royong remains a central characteristic of Indonesian society – or 
at least, in political vocabulary. It is no wonder Joko Widodo wants to revive 
it as a principal ideal – hence his consistent usage of this rhetoric in Indone-
sia’s foreign policy.13 The suggestion – and perhaps currently, the creation – 
of a Global Maritime Fulcrum is one based primarily on an understanding and 
vision of the global geopolitical map. Current events and trends undeniably 
show an economic shift from Europe and America, to Asia: with Indonesia right 
in the midst of it. From a domestic perspective, it is clear that the Maritime Ful-
crum consciously tries to emulate the Nusantara, particularly the 7th century 
era of Sriwijaya and the 14th century era of Majapahit. It is meant to encourage 
a sense of nationalism for Indonesia as a maritime State and to capitalize on 
the geopolitical reality that Indonesia spans between the Indian and the Pacific 
Oceans. Its nationalistic strain has made many draw parallels to Chinese Presi-
dent Xi Jinping’s idea to create a Maritime “Silk Road,” which seems similarly in-
spired by historical precedent.14 Both have been characterized as reactions that 
allow the respective States to ward off external pressure, particularly for the 
Chinese vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. Its rose-tinted view of the past cleverly makes 
way for modern economic, trade, and financial cooperation –  including devel-
oping marine natural resources.15 In achieving these ideals, Indonesia faces 
tremendous challenges. By underlining her nature as an archipelagic nation in 
international cooperation, and using the concept of the Global Maritime Ful-
crum as the center of domestic and regional development policies, studies have 
noted the difficulty of implementing modern foreign policy of the 21st century 
based on gotong royong.16 Similar to what basic international relations theo-
ries would suggest, Indonesia’s foreign policy implementation would likely be 
a New Approach to Southeast Asian Regional Resilience, 6(2) International Journal 
of China Studies 175–185 (2015).
12 Gotong royong is frequently defined as mutual cooperation. This type of cooperation 
is unique because it is conducted without reservations in which issues and goals are 
 elaborated before implemented through informal meetings and common interests. In 
Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia, gotong royong is seen when people contrib-
ute in togetherness of goods and labor to build common infrastructures such as schools, 
houses of worship, bridges, and roads without government involvement and budgetary 
assistance. See, T. Pranadji, Penguatan Kelembagaan Gotong Royong dalam Perspektif So-
sio Budaya Bangsa, 27(1) Jurnal Forum Penelitian Agro Ekonomi 61–72 (2009).
13 Pattiradjawane and Soebagjo, supra note 11.
14 Ibid.
15 At the same time, it is a concept which aims to mitigate the disputes with small countries. 
Pattiradjawane and Soebagjo, supra note 11, at 180.
16 Ibid.
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constrained by the interaction of geopolitical changes of big power national 
interests expanding their spheres of influence.17 If the sole pillar of argument 
and central rallying point of the policy is based on Indonesia’s nature as an ar-
chipelago, Indonesia must enable herself to achieve and ensure the economic 
development of its many islands. In addition, such development aims to proj-
ect regionally and globally is supported by what is achieved domestically. In 
other words, better interconnectivity between Indonesia’s many islands that 
will help enable Indonesia to take benefit of the implementation of the ase-
an community.18 Recognized by the administration and ambitiously set to be 
achieved by 2025, it will provide a prospect for Indonesia to actively play an 
important role both in the regional and global arenas. Thus, the future of mari-
time connectivity is extremely essential for the economy, trade, food and en-
ergy security in the asean region.19 The strategic position Indonesia occupies 
between two oceans, along with the current administration’s formulation of a 
maritime State identity, widens opportunities for the State to build a modern 
maritime industry and for maritime security. Deserting the view of Indonesia 
as an archipelagic nation and instead of seeing her as a maritime nation, able 
to connect and defend its many islands, and to sustainably utilize its marine 
resources, requires a change in mind-set as well as a change in strategy.20
III Issues on Indonesia’s Marine Resources and Existing  
Legal Frameworks
Change of any kind are most effective when started at the top-level, and in 
 bureaucracy, especially so.21 This is exemplified by how quickly the  presidential 
Maritime Fulcrum/Poros Maritim policy was put into action. Shortly after tak-
ing office, President Widodo instructed his Minister for Fisheries and Mari-
time Affairs, Susi Pudjiastuti, to seize and sink any foreign vessels found fish-
ing  illegally in Indonesian waters. Since then, the navy has sunk Chinese, 
Vietnamese, Thai, Malaysian and Papua New Guinean vessels.22 Pudjiastuti’s 
17 Willis, supra note 10.
18 See Seng Tan, Indonesia among Powers: Will asean Still Matter to Indonesia? in 
 Christopher Roberts, et al (eds.), Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership, 
and the Regional Order 287–307 (2015).
19 Leonard C. Sebastian, et al., Beyond the Archipelagic Outlook: The Law of the Sea, Maritime 
Security, and the Great Powers, in Roberts, et al (eds.), supra note 18, 308–334.
20 Ibid.
21 Avinash Dixit, Democracy, Autocracy, and Bureaucracy, available at https://www.princeton.
edu/~dixitak/home/DeAuBu04.pdf/.
22 Penenggelaman Kapal (Vessel Sinking), Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan (Ministry 




execution of the policy has not been without controversies, and has become 
one of the administration’s most well-known policies. While the program 
violates no international laws per se, it has upset Indonesia’s neighbors, who 
have privately argued that Indonesia could enforce its laws in a less showy 
manner.23
Yet this ostentatiousness may be explained by the abundance of resources 
Indonesia has at its disposal. Indonesia has the world’s biggest tuna fishery – it 
is also one of the least regulated. Tuna remains a highly migratory species that 
is deeply regulated in international frameworks.24 Article 64 of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos),25 as well as the 1995 Strad-
dling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement (Fish Stocks Agreement)26 
together provide that, where the species is found in an eez, the coastal State 
and other States fishing in the eez, or on the high seas beyond it, have a duty 
to cooperate in the conservation and management of the species.27 The tuna 
regional fisheries management organizations attempt to manage tuna fisher-
ies by strengthening conservation of stocks. To enhance international coop-
eration, Indonesia ratified unclos in 1985 and the Fish Stocks Agreement in 
2005. Throughout the decade, Indonesia became a member of numerous inter-
governmental organizations mandated to manage tuna, including the  Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission (iotc),28 the Commission for the  Conservation of 
23 Connelly, supra note 9.
24 Robin Allen, International Management of Tuna Fisheries: Arrange-
ments, Challenges and a Way Forward (2010).
25 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – also called the Law of the Sea 
Convention or the Law of the Sea treaty – is the international agreement that resulted 
from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (unclos III), which took 
place between 1973 and 1982. The Convention, concluded in 1982, replaced four 1958 trea-
ties. unclos came into force in 1994. Text of the treaty, available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm/.
26 The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to Conservation and Manage-
ment of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish. Text of the treaty, available 
at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/fish_stocks_agreement/
CONF164_37.htm/.
27 Aust, supra note 2, at 299.
28 The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (iotc) is an intergovernmental organization man-
dated to manage tuna and tuna-like species in the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas. The 
objective of the Commission is to promote the conservation and optimal utilization of 
tuna and tuna-like stocks covered by the iotc Agreement, and to encourage sustainable 
development of fisheries. See http://www.iotc.org/ and also http://www.fao.org/fishery/
rfb/iotc/en/.
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Southern Bluefin Tuna (ccsbt),29 and a cooperating non-member of the 
 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (wcpfc).30
Aside from international norms and commissions, there are other concerns 
more practical in nature. For centuries, fishermen have used the traditional pole-
and-line method for catching tuna. The method is quite simple: hooked bait is 
used to attract fish which are then caught one by one. Once a fish is hooked, the 
fisherman pulls the line to swing the fish on the deck. It is considered the most 
environmentally friendly means of fishing that ensures sustainability of tuna 
for future generations.31
However, many fishermen no longer practice this method. Dangerous fish-
ing techniques that include using fish aggregation devices (fads) are used to 
harvest more and more fish.32 These are the primary reasons for the decline in 
tuna stocks.33 These devices attract not just tuna but other creatures such as 
dolphins, sharks, whales, rays, turtles, sea birds, as well, thereby causing much 
destruction to marine life in the area.
Aside from that, research shows that around eezs, another method – 
purse seining – is used to catch tuna.34 In this method, entire schools of fish 
are caught through large nets called purse seines. These nets catch whatever 
comes their way, resulting in ample by-catch. This is yet another cause in the 
noticeable decline in tuna stocks in the ocean. Overfishing with these harm-
ful, unsustainable methods to meet the growing demand for tuna is reducing 
the number of tuna in and around Indonesian waters.35 The entire ecosystem 
29 The objective of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (ccsbt) 
is to ensure, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utiliza-
tion of the global Southern Bluefin Tuna (sbt) fishery. The Commission is responsible for 
setting a total allowable catch (tac) and its allocation among the members; takes deci-
sions to support and implement fishery management; and acts as a coordination mecha-
nism for member’s activities in relation to the sbt fishery. See https://www.ccsbt.org/ and 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/ccsbt/en/.
30 The objective of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migra-
tory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (wcpfc) is to ensure, through 
effective management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migrato-
ry fish stocks in the western and central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. See 
https://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc and http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/wcpfc/en/.
31 See Allen, supra note 24.
32 See Amber Anwar, The Tuna Question, 17(12) Southasia 60–61 (2013).
33 Ibid., see also Allen, supra note 24.
34 Uwe Tietze et al, Fishing with Beach Seines (2011). See also Peter K.J. Hahn et al, Beach 
Seining, in David H. Johnson et al (eds.), A Salmonid Field Protocols Hand-
book, Techniques for Assessing Status and Trends in Salmon and Trout 
Populations 267–323 (.2007).
35 Food and Agriculture Organization (fao), Present and Future Markets 
for Fish and Fish Products from Small-scale Fisheries – Case Studies 
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is also at stake due to overexploitation that is causing total chaos in the tropic 
chain. Due to the rise in temperature of the ocean’s surface, fish are moving 
deeper into the ocean, away from the reach of the traditional fishermen whose 
methods are not designed to catch fish in the deep waters of the ocean.36
IV Indonesia’s International Rights and Duties within the eez
First, it must be noted that in true transnational form, several international 
instruments, both binding and non-binding, provide guidance as to the pre-
vention of illegal fishing:
1. Binding instruments: unclos, the 1993 fao Compliance Agreement,37 
the 2009 fao Port State Measures Agreement,38 and other relevant inter-
national agreements such as the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement.39
2. Non-binding instruments: the fao Code of Conduct for Responsible Fish-
eries (fao Code of Conduct 1995),40 and the International Plan of Action 
to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
Fishing (ipoa-iuu).41
from Asia, Africa, and Latin America (2008), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-
i0230e.pdf/.
36 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Increasing 
the Contribution of Small-scale Fisheries to Poverty Alleviation and 
Food Security (2005).
37 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. Text of the agreement available at http://
www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/003/x3130m/X3130E00.HTM/.
38 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing. Text of the agreement available at http://www.fao.org/docu-
ments/card/en/c/915655b8-e31c-479c-bf07-30cba21ea4b0/. See also http://www.fao.org/
fishery/psm/agreement/en for more information.
39 The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to Conservation and Manage-
ment of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish. Text of the treaty: Text of the 
agreement available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/fish_
stocks_agreement/CONF164_37.htm/.
40 To promote long-term conservation and sustainable use of fisheries resources, following 
a call from the International Conference on Responsible Fishing (1992) to strengthen the 
international legal framework for more effective conservation, management and sustain-
able exploitation and production of living aquatic resources, the 1995 fao Conference 
adopted the fao Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Text and information avail-
able at http://www.FAO .org/fishery/code/en/.
41 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Un-
regulated Fishing (fao IPOA-IUU), available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/ipoa-iuu/en/.
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Despite this, unclos remains the only instrument to explicitly regulate law 
enforcement against illegal fishing practices conducted by foreign vessels in 
the eez. Article 73 states that:
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, ex-
ploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive econom-
ic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and 
judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the 
laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the 
posting of reasonable bond or other security.
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in 
the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the ab-
sence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other 
form of corporal punishment.
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall 
promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the ac-
tion taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.
There are two interests identified by the provision – that of the coastal State to 
take the actions needed to ensure compliance with their national laws; and that 
of the flag State to obtain the “prompt release,” of the vessel and its crew follow-
ing “reasonable bond” payment to the coastal State.42 As a coastal State, Indo-
nesia has implement those international rights and obligations into a number 
of national laws. Some of them are quite relevant to the legal enforcement for 
Indonesia’s sovereign rights in the area of eez. They are:
– Law No. 5 Year 1983 on Indonesia’s Economic Exclusive Zone;
– Law No. 17 Year 1985 on unclos Ratification;
– Law No. 6 Year 1996 on Indonesian Waters;
– Law No. 17 Year 2008 on Navigation;
– Law No. 45 Year 2009 on Fisheries;
– Law No. 32 Year 2014 on Maritime Affairs (Ocean);
– Government Regulation No. 54 Year 2002 on Fisheries Activities;
42 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (itlos) case Monte Confurco case (France 
v. Seychelles), Prompt Release. Available at https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/
case-no-6/. See also Yoshifumi Tanaka, Prompt Release in the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea: Some Reflections on the itlosJurisprudence, 51(2) Netherlands 
International Law Review 237–271 (2004); Heiki Lindpere, Prompt Release of De-
tained Foreign Vessels and Crews in Matters of Marine Environment Protection, 33(2) In-
ternational Journal of Legal Information 240, 241 (2005) and Usmawadi Amir, 
Penegakan Hukum iuu Fishing menurut unclos 1982 (Studi Kasus: Volga Case) [Legal En-
forcement against iuu Fishing under unclos 1982 – Case Study: Volga Case] 12 Jurnal 
Opinio Juris, 68–92 (2013).
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– Presidential Regulation No. 16 Year 2017 on Indonesia’s Ocean Policy;
– Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (mmaf) Decree No. Kep.60/Men/ 
2001 on the Management of Fishing Vessels on Indonesia eez;
– mmaf Decree No. Per.16/Men/2010 on Fishing License for Fishing Vessels 
above 30 Gross Tonnage;
– mmaf Decree No. Kep/50/Men/2012 on the Implementation of the ipoa-
iuu Fishing;
– mmaf Decree No. 17/Permen-KP/2014 on Special Investigator of Fisheries 
Crimes; and
– mmaf Decree No. 56/Permen-KP/2014 on the Moratorium Foreign Fish-
ing Licensing on Indonesian Waters.
With these main rules and regulations, it can be argued that Indonesia has a 
sufficient legal basis to enforce its laws and to combat illegal fishing within its 
jurisdiction.
V Impacts of Illegal Fishing to Indonesia
Research has grouped the economic impact of illegal fishing into two inter-
linked categories, direct and indirect/secondary economic losses.43 An exam-
ple of direct losses is a reduction in catches, which significantly impacts the 
national income of coastal countries. A myriad of other examples of economic 
loss includes revenue from the boat landing, license fees, taxes evasion and oth-
er charges – all of which should have been paid to the State if the entire affair 
was conducted via legal means. Secondary losses include loss of income and 
jobs in the fishing industry, which would result in reduced demands for fish-
ing equipment and vessels as well as product processing, packaging, marketing, 
and transportation.44 To put it in more tangible terms, the Ministry of Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries of Indonesia has estimated in various press statements 
over the years that illegal fishing has cost the country 30 trillion idr (about 
3.11 billion US$) per year.45 Social impacts include loss of employment in the 
fishing industry, which in turn is caused by a depletion of stocks and reduced 
catches, and deficits for coastal communities whose lives depend heavily upon 
the sea: such as fishing communities and those who live on the shoreline.46 
Furthermore, said depletion can often lead to the import of fish – in Indonesia 
43 Rothwell and Stephens, supra note 3, at 140.
44 Ibid.
45 Illegal Fishing, tempo, (18 March 2017), available at https://www.tempo.co/topik/
masalah/1022/illegal-fishing/.
46 fao, supra note 36.
293Indonesia’s Practice in Combatting Illegal Fishing
<UN>
especially – which ruffles nationalistic feathers;47 or at least pique interest in 
supply chain management as to why States of origin (as in, originally possessing 
the raw materials/resources) are yet to be able to benefit without  outsourcing 
processing and quality control to foreign States.48
The tangle with foreign States does not end with matters of trade, however. 
Given the transnational nature of oceans and maritime territory, impacts of 
illegal fishing can also spill over into the international arena and relations with 
other/neighboring States.49 This is especially true in cases where illegal fish-
ers and/or their vessels are of another country – either by nationality for the 
former, or flags for the latter; to name clearest examples. One of the most com-
mon fears articulated that attempts to explain aversion to foreign fishing ves-
sels are non-regulation – that is, loopholes (legal or otherwise) that exist that 
may allow foreign vessels and crew to disavow the regulations where they fish – 
which may lead to unsustainability as well as over-exploitation.50
Besides the problems related to competition over the exploitation of re-
sources, concerns over environmental degradation have also increasingly en-
gaged the attention of governments and civil societies in Asia Pacific.51 Threats 
to the marine ecosystem, among others, come from pollution, overfishing and 
destructive fishing practices.52
Overfishing,53 in particular, is also a serious problem in the Asia Pacific. 
 Unsustainable exploitation of resources is common throughout the region, as 
countries compete against each other to have the highest economic growth. 
The economic progress in the region has mostly depended on natural resource 
mining, living and non-living, on land and at seas. Environmental concerns have 
often been sacrificed for the sake of economic competitiveness. The econom-
ic crisis has worsened pressure on the environment as countries fall back on 
47 See Connelly, supra note 9, at 23.
48 Enos Kabu and Deviarbi Sakke Tira, Value Chain Analysis Towards Sustainability: A Case 
Study of Fishery Business in Kota Kupang, Indonesia, 5(1) International Journal of 
Economics and Financial Issues 150–154 (2015). See also Erna M. Lokollo et 
al., Status and  Prospects of Feed Crops in Southeast Asia: An Integrated 
Report (2006).
49 Andrews-Chouicha and Gray, supra note 3.
50 Melda K. Ariadno, What Is the Indonesian Responsibility for High Seas 
Fisheries? (2011). See also Commonwealth Expert Study Group on Maritime 
Issues, Ocean Management, A Regional Perspective: The Prospects for 
Commonwealth Maritime Cooperation in Asia and Pacific (1984).
51 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Resource Issues and Ocean Governance in Asia Pacific: An Indonesian 
Perspective, 28(3) Contemporary Southeast Asia 466–489 (2006).
52 Ibid.




natural resources to outgrowth exports. As one analyst points out, “environmen-
tal and natural resource friendly regulatory and enforcement regimes, even if 
they exist, are likely to be abandoned or ignored in an attempt to cut costs, in-
crease production and expand exports.”54 Simply put; at seas, the unmaintainable 
policy of States in their territorial waters and eez has been compounded by the 
illegal fishing activities carried out by fishing boats registered to other countries.
VI Indonesia’s National Policies and Campaigns to Combat  
Illegal Fishing
It remains one of Indonesia’s national targets to bring the national fish stocks 
back to sustainable levels. This is even more so given the current administra-
tion’s foreign policy, along with action plans formulated during the campaign: 
Nawacita. It is unsurprising to note that a good number of Indonesian  nationals 
expect to hold the government to its promises.55
Minister Pudjiastuti has implemented a tougher policy against illegal fish-
ing. Repeatedly characterized as being explosive,56 and the highly publicized 
nature of some law enforcements (e.g., the sinking of illegal fishers’ vessels) in 
Indonesia’s eez are clearly hoped to have a deterrent effect. As of April 2017, 
the Ministry has seized and blown up around 317 foreign vessels operated 
 illegally in Indonesian waters.57 Additionally, the Ministry have also issued 
moratoriums of fishing license for foreign States.58
54 Ibid.
55 Marcus Mietzner, Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi’s Rise, Democracy, 
and Political Contestation in Indonesia 54–61 (2015).
56 Liz Chong, At Work with the FT: Susi Pudjiastuti, Indonesia’s Fisheries Chief, Financial 
Times (22 September 2016), available at https://www.ft.com/content/08164102-6849-11e6- 
a0b1-d87a9fea034f. Avantika Chilkoti, Indonesian Fisherman Back Explosive Clampdown, 
Financial Times, 8 April 2016, available at https://www.ft.com/content/507e9648-fbb0- 
11e5-b3f6-11d5706b613b.
57 Sara Schonhardt and I Made Sentana, Indonesia Takes Explosive Approach to Illegal Fish-
ing, Wall Street Journal, 15 April 2016, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/
indonesia-takes-explosive-approach-to-illegal-fishing-1460704409. See also Iwan Supri-
yatna, Menteri Susi: 236 Kapal Pencuri Ikan Ditenggelamkan Sepanjang 2016 [Minister 
Susi: 236 Foreign  Vessels Sinked over 2016], Kompas.Com, 17 January 2017, available at 
http://bisniskeuangan.kompas.com/read/2017/01/17/165433626/menteri.susi.236.kapal 
.pencuri.ikan.ditenggelamkan.sepanjang.2016. Fabian Januarius Kuwado, Lagi, 81 Kapal 
Pencuri Ikan Ditenggelamkan di Penjuru Indonesia [Again, 81 Illegal Fishing Vessels were 
Sinked in Indonesia], Kompas.Com, 1 April 2017, available at http://nasional.kompas.
com/read/2017/04/01/12003881/lagi.81.kapal.pencuri.ikan.ditenggelamkan.di.penjuru 
.indonesia.
58 The moratorium, regulated by Permen-KP No. 56/2014 (Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
Ministerial Regulation No. 56/2014) not only prevents new fishing licenses from  being 
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The campaign has been media focus since President Jokowi took office in 
2014, and may very well become a noted practice in the international arena. 
Considering how well received it is by domestic constituents,59 it is unlike-
ly that the campaign will stop any time soon; including the prohibition of 
transhipment.60
Even so, there remains a split between the debate of the pros and cons of the 
policy, especially on the question of whether or not it actually improved the 
lives of the (small-scale) fishing communities. Said communities arguably con-
tinue to be focus of the campaign, which leads to larger, industrialized busi-
ness to have much to contend to as well. The transnational nature of the issue 
has also caused Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs scrambling to ease any 
diplomatic complaints from flag States of the sunken vessels; especially during 
the beginning of the campaign. There has been a debate over (il)legality of the 
campaign especially legal enforcement on the eez. Most notably, there has 
been diplomatic tension with China over Natuna, and the Chinese assertion of 
the “nine-dash line.”61
VII Letting That Sink In: The (I)llegality of Indonesia’s  
Ship-sinking Policies 
In Indonesia, the basis for law enforcement measures against illegal fishing 
is primarily UU No. 45 Year 2009 (amendment of UU No. 31/2004). Sanctions 
against foreign vessels perpetrators of illegal fishing include:
1. Fines/financial penalties;
2. Confiscation of fishing gear, catch, along with vessels used;
3. Detention of the vessels’ crews and captains; and
4. The burning and/or sinking of said vessel.62
issued to large fishing operations; it also outlaws the extension of licenses expiring with-
in the six-month period. Regulation text available at http://www.astuin.org/content/
permen-kp-no56-2014-moratorium-usaha-perikanan-tangkap-di-wpp-nri/ See also Tama 
Salim, With Moratorium in Place, Susi Begins Massive Restructuring, The Jakarta Post, 
12 November 2014, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/12/with- 
moratorium-place-susi-begins-massive-restructuring.html/.
59 Chilkoti, supra note 56.
60 The act of off-loading a container from one ship and loading it onto another ship. Regulation 
text available at http://www.astuin.org/content/permen- kp-no-57-2014-menghentikan- 
kegiatan-transhipment-di-laut-wpp-nri/.
61 Evan Laksamana, The Domestic Politics of Indonesia’s Approach to the Tribunal Ruling and 
the South China Sea, 38(3) Contemporary Southeast Asia 382–388 (2016).
62 Rothwell and Stephens, supra note 3.
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Indonesia does not impose criminal sanctions for (individual) foreign 
 perpetrators of illegal fishing in Indonesian eez, as provided in Article 102 of 
UU No. 31/2004. Article 104 stipulates the conditions for prompt release – as 
per international norms – of a detained and its crew after the payment of a 
 reasonable bond.63
The last of which – that is, ship sinking – remains the form of law enforcement 
that attracts hype and exposure, and seems to be especially administered by In-
donesia in an effort to combat illegal fishing. Data from the Ministry of Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries shows that the number of ships sunk increased dramati-
cally over the last two years64 – since President Widodo was inaugurated and 
took office.
The sinking of foreign vessel that committed illegal fishing has its own sets 
of standard operating procedures (sop), namely:
1. Securing the crew;
2. Inventory of the equipment on the vessel, as well as emptying the vessel 
of fuel;
3. Documentation;
4. Setting aside (part of) the illegal catch for evidentiary purposes; and
5. Prepare and enclose minutes (berita acara).
Officials and institutions authorized to conduct such enforcement include the 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (mmaf), the Indonesian Navy (TNI-
AL), and the Indonesian National Police (Polri). The same three institutions 
are also authorized to pursue and halt vessels suspected of illegal fishing along-
side another institution: the Coast Guard (Badan Keamanan Laut – Bakamla), 
the last of which was formed in 2013.
Ship sinking remains an effective means of Indonesian law enforcement to 
reduce the practice of illegal fishing by foreign vessels in Indonesian waters, 
especially in an area as vast as the eez. The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 
115/2015,65 which also put forward the establishment of Indonesia’s Task Force 
on Illegal Fishing, aims to reinforce rule of law and the effort to bring together 
the strengths of the various aforementioned maritime institutions.
Despite its seemingly grandiose and highly-publicized nature, this particu-
lar policy of Indonesia does not run contrary to Article 73 of unclos – rather, 
it can be argued that it is still in accordance with the provisions set forth by 
63 Ibid.
64 Penenggelaman Kapal, supra note 22.
65 Peraturan Presiden No. 115 Year 2015 Tentang Satuan Tugas Pemberantasan Penangka-
pan Ikan secara Ilegal [Presidential Regulation No. 115 Year 2015 concerning Special Task 
Force against Illegal Fishing]. Regulation text available at http://kkp.go.id/wp-content/
uploads/2016/10/PERPRES_NO_115_2015.pdf/.
297Indonesia’s Practice in Combatting Illegal Fishing
<UN>
Article 73(1) of the Convention. The sinking of foreign vessels that commit il-
legal fishing is a form of law enforcement; to ensure (State) compliance both 
to existing Indonesian domestic law as well as international standards. It is not 
done arbitrarily. Implicit agreement by the international community is also ar-
guably shown, as there has yet to be a State that submits the practice or used it 
as grounds to bring Indonesia to tribunals responsible under the international 
regime (i.e., the International Tribunal for the law of the Sea (itlos)).
Fishing is far from the only maritime activity regulated under said interna-
tional regime. It also boasts several other conventions that govern problems 
such as drug trafficking, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, marine pollution, 
shipping, containers, trade, biodiversity and human trafficking.
VIII Slavery within the Fishing Industry: Violations of Human Rights  
in Indonesian Waters
It is then despairing that human trafficking can still be seen in the fishing in-
dustry as recently as 2016. The transnational nature of the human rights  regime 
submits that slavery and forced labour – for that is what has happened – 
so prejudicial to the interests of all States, that it allows any State to exercise 
 jurisdiction over them, wherever they take place and whatever the nationality 
of the alleged offender or victim.66 An especially poignant case for Indonesia, 
that includes the island village Benjina in its territory, and lists the offending 
company (Pusaka Benjina Resources) as an Indonesian business entity.
In 2015, more than 300 slaves forced to work fishing in Indonesia were res-
cued in an effort of investigation.67 The small harbor in the Island occupied by 
Pusaka Benjina Resources, whose five-story office compound stands out and 
includes the cage with the slaves. The company is the only fishing operation 
on Benjina officially registered in Indonesia, and is listed as the owner of more 
than 90 trawlers. However, the captains are Thai, and the Indonesian govern-
ment is reviewing to see if the boats are really Thai-owned. The Arafura Sea 
provides some of the world’s richest and most diverse fishing grounds, teeming 
with mackerel, tuna, squid and many other species. Although it is Indonesian 
territory, it draws many illegal fishing fleets, including from Thailand.
66 Aust, supra note 2, at 44. See also Andrew Clapham, Human Rights: A Very Short 
Introduction (2007).
67 AP Explore: Seafood from Slaves, Associated Press, available at https://www.ap.org/ 
explore/seafood-from-slaves/. See also Martha Mendoza et al., Fishermen Slaves: 
Human Trafficking and the Seafood We Eat (2016).
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The Associated Press (AP)68 revealed a report that thousands of workers 
were being held against their will on an isolated island in often-brutal condi-
tions. Slavery runs rampant in the industry, the AP investigation found, and 
some of the fish caught by slaves makes its way to grocery stores and markets 
throughout the world.69
Many of the slaves were originally from Myanmar and were trafficked 
through Thailand to the Indonesian fishing companies.70 In response to the 
AP report,71 officials from three countries went to a remote island of Indonesia 
to investigate how thousands of foreign fishermen wound up there as slaves 
and were forced to catch seafood that could eventually end up being exported 
to various countries.72
To further demonstrate the interlinking between States, businesses, and 
their dealings with international norms,73 it must be noted that even before 
the publicizing of slavery in Benjina, the Thai government has promised a new 
national registry of illegal migrant workers, including more than 100,000 work-
ers in the seafood industry. However, policing has now become even harder 
because decades of illegal fishing have depleted stocks close to home, pushing 
the boats farther and deeper into foreign waters.74
Meanwhile, the Indonesian government has continued to aim to clear out 
foreign poachers who take billions of dollars of seafood from the country’s wa-
ters. As a result, more than 50 boats were docked in Benjina, leaving up to 1,000 
more slaves stranded onshore and waiting to see what would happen next.75 
68 Robin McDowell and Margie Mason, Over 300 Slaves Rescued from Indonesia Island After 
AP Investigation Into Forced Labor, Associated Press, 4 April 2015, available at https://
www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/over-300-slaves-rescued-from-Indonesia 
-island-after-ap-investigation.html.
69 Associated Press, supra note 67.
70 Indonesia: Burmese Workers in Slave-like Conditions to Catch Seafood Supplying US 
 Businesses, Business and Human Rights Resource Center, 24 June 2015, avail-
able at https://business-humanrights.org/en/indonesia-burmese-workers-in-slave-like 
-conditions-to-catch-seafood-supplying-us-businesses/.
71 AP Investigation: Men Forced to Work as Slaves to Catch Seafood for Global Supply, us news, 
24 March 2015, available at https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/03/24/
ap-investigation-are-slaves-catching-the-fish-you-buy.
72 Claudia Koerner, More than 300 Slaves Rescued in Indonesia after AP Investigation, 
Buzzfeed News, 6 April 2015, available at https://www.buzzfeed.com/claudiakoerner/
more-than-300-slaves-rescued-in-indonesia-after-ap-investiga?utm_term=.xnOQN-
R0vL#.qvAXEpG0e/.
73 Elena Shih, The Price of Freedom: Moral and Political Economies of the 
Global Anti-Trafficking Movement (2015).
74 fao, supra note 3.
75 International Organization for Migration, Final Group of Fisheries “Slaves” to be Repa-
triated from Indonesia, iom, (22 March 2016), available at http://www.iom.int/news/
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Indonesian officials are trying to enforce laws that ban cargo ships from pick-
ing up fish from boats at sea. This practice forces men to stay on the water for 
months or sometimes years at a time, essentially creating floating prisons, and 
given the common practice of faking or duplicating licenses.
As of this article’s writing, it has been almost two years since the AP report 
revealed deaths and slavery aboard fishing boats in Indonesian waters and 
sparked a mass rescue of men in Benjina and Ambon.
The testimony of more than 1,100 of these fishermen, as well as more than 280 
returned Indonesian fishers, has since been pieced together by the Internation-
al Organization for Migration (iom) to form a detailed account of how those in-
volved in iuu fishing on foreign vessels in Indonesia go about their business.76 
It has since been concluded that when compared to trafficking in persons in 
other sectors, exploitation in the fishing industry is among the most severe.77
On more lofty and quantifiable terms, it is safe to say that national laws were 
breached, fraudulent front companies established, different flags raised aboard 
vessels, and catch changed hands at sea until the fish entered the global supply 
chain where people were ignorant of its provenance and the human toll. The 
case, and the harrowing stories of the slaves contained within, is symptomatic 
of the insidious trade in people,78 not only in the Indonesian and Thai fishing 
industries, but globally.
On the private side of things, it seems high time that businesses and con-
sumers educate themselves and disavow, “criminal activity and exploitation 
potentially underpinning their profits or the fish on their plate.”79 In the pub-
lic arena, recommendations have been made for the Indonesian government, 
including that investigators be trained to spot the signs of human trafficking. 
Minister Pudjiastuti has also announced that fisheries businesses must now 
comply with a “human rights audit,” as part of the licensing process.80
final-group-fisheries-slaves-be-repatriated-indonesia/.
76 International Organization for Migration, Crimes at Sea Focus of New Indonesian Research, 
Maritime Security Forum Told, iom, 11 March 2016, available at http://www.iom.int/news/
crimes-sea-focus-new-indonesian-research-maritime-security-forum-told/.
77 International Organization for Migration, Human Trafficking in the Fishery Sector: The 
Benjina Case, iom, 15 June 2015, available at https://indonesia.iom.int/human-trafficking- 
fishery-sector-benjina-case/.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid. See also Shih, supra note 73.
80 Peraturan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan (Permen-KP) No. 2/2017 tentang  Mekanisme 
Sertifikasi Hak Asasi Manusia pada Usaha Perikanan [Ministerial Regulation of Ma-
rine Affairs and Fisheries No. 2 Year 2017 concerning Human Rights Certification 
Mechanism for Fishing Industries]. Regulation text available at http://www.huku 
monline.com/pusatdata/detail/lt589c3f91867c0/node/534/peraturan-menteri-kelautan 




Illegal fishing is an act that is tremendously ecologically unsustainable, leading 
to overfishing and a myriad of issues – including slavery, taking into account of 
the Benjina case – if the lax nature of fishing regulations remains unabated. At 
first glance, the posture Indonesia’s current administration has taken, especial-
ly when it comes to maritime matters, seems to be in accordance with the law. 
Though the notorious law enforcement measures may ruffle diplomatic feath-
ers, it is inseparable from national politics and approach favoured by President 
Widodo. In fact, it would be easy to argue that it is an expression of sovereignty.
A great body of international instruments and conventions as well as bilat-
eral and regional arrangements has been adopted to deal with various mari-
time issues. The problem may lie in the lack of ability in implementing many of 
these conventions and agreements, particularly among developing countries 
that have limited capacity and resources. As maritime issues are usually trans-
national in nature, it is imperative that countries cooperate with each other in 
overcoming most of these problems. Indonesia, as an archipelagic State with 
a vast area of waters upholding its tougher policy against illegal fishing, is in-
deed in accordance with both national and international law. Despite foreign 
diplomatic concern, Indonesia needs to consistently implement its policy due 
to its positive impact on fish stocks and the livelihood of fishing communities.
On the other hand, although non-State actors are increasingly taking an ac-
tive part in ocean governance – such as the Associated Press exposé that re-
vealed the distressing conditions of slavery in Benjina – ultimately, States bear 
the primary responsibility in ensuring the security of the waters under their 
national jurisdiction and in protecting their marine environment. Developing 
countries need financial support as well as technological and technical assis-
tance from each other as well as other countries so that they can enhance their 
ability to protect their marine environment and prevent illegal acts in their 
national waters. At the same time, however, regional and international coop-
eration should not be seen to be overstepping on the sovereignty of particular 
States, especially on issues related to law enforcement at sea.
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Karin Arts*
 Editorial Introduction
This section records the participation of Asian states in open multilateral 
law-making treaties which mostly aim at world-wide adherence. It updates 
the treaty sections of earlier Volumes until 31 December 2016. New data are 
preceded by a reference to the most recent previous entry in the multilateral 
treaties section of the Asian Yearbook of International Law. In case no new data 
are available, the title of the treaty is listed with a reference to the last Volume 
containing data on the treaty involved. For the purpose of this section, states 
broadly situated west of Iran, north of Mongolia, east of Papua New Guinea 
and south of Indonesia will not be covered.
 Note
• Where no other reference to specific sources is made, data were derived 
from Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, https://
treaties.un.org/pages/participationstatus.aspx or, when not available there, 
from the United Nations Treaty Series Online, https://treaties.un.org/pages/
UNTSOnline.aspx?id=2&clang=_en
• Where reference is made to the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law (HccH), data were derived from https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
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data were derived from http://ola.iaea.org/ola/treaties/multi.html
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tion (ilo), data were derived from http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:1:0
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• Where reference is made to the International Maritime Organization (imo), 
data were derived from http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Status 
OfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202018.pdf
• Where reference is made to the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (unesco), data were derived from http:// 
portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=12024&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL 
_SECTION=201.html
• Where reference is made to wipo, data were derived from http://www.wipo.
int/treaties/en
• Where reference is made to the Worldbank, data were derived from www.
worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members#4 and www.worldbank.org/
en/about/leadership/members#5
• Reservations and declarations made upon signature or ratification are not 
included.
• Sig. = Signature; Cons. = Consent to be bound; Eff. date = Effective date; E.i.f. = 
Entry into force; Rat. = Ratification or accession.
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 Antarctica
Antarctic Treaty, Washington, 1959: see Vol. 21 p. 237.
 Commercial Arbitration
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
1958: see Vol. 20 p. 194.
 Cultural Matters
Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Audi-
tory Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, 1949: see 
Vol. 7 pp. 322–323.
Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materi-
als, 1950: see Vol. 12 p. 234.
Convention concerning the International Exchange of Publications, 1958: see 
Vol. 6 p. 235.
Convention concerning the Exchange of Official Publications and Govern-
ment Documents between States, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 235.
International Agreement for the Establishment of the University for Peace, 
1980: see Vol. 16 p. 157.
Regional Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diploma’s and Degrees in 
Higher Education in Asia and the Pacific, 1983: see Vol. 14 p. 227.
Asia-Pacific Regional Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications in 
Higher Education, 2011: see Vol. 20 p. 195.
 Cultural Property
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict, 1954: see Vol. 13 p. 263.
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
1954: see Vol. 13 p. 263.
Second Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, 1999: see Vol. 19 p. 178.
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Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 238)
(Status as provided by unesco)
State Sig. Cons.
Timor Leste 31 Oct 2016
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, 1972
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 100)
(Status as provided by unesco)
State Sig. Cons.
Timor Leste 31 Oct 2016
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003
(Continued from Vol. 20 p. 196)
(Status as provided by unesco)
State Sig. Cons.
Thailand 20 Jun 2016
Timor Leste 31 Oct 2016
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, 2005
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 100)
(Status as provided by unesco)
State Sig. Cons.
Timor Leste 31 Oct 2016
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 Development Matters
Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 1982: see Vol. 7 
pp. 323–324.
Agreement to Establish the South Centre, 1994: see Vol. 7 p. 324.
Amendments to the Charter of the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, 
1998: see Vol. 10 p. 267.
Multilateral Agreement for the Establishment of an International Think Tank 
for Landlocked Developing Countries, 2010: see Vol. 21 p. 239.
 Dispute Settlement
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, 1965: see Vol. 11 p. 245.
Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court: see 
Vol. 21 p. 239.
 Environment, Fauna and Flora
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, as 
amended, 1954: see Vol. 6 p. 238.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969: see 
Vol. 15 p. 215.
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969: see Vol. 9 p. 284.
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat, 1971: see Vol. 18 p. 103.
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971: see Vol. 12 p. 237.
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, 1972, as amended: see Vol. 7 p. 325.
Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by 
Substances Other Than Oil, 1973: see Vol. 6 p. 239.
Protocol to the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage, 1976: see Vol. 10 p. 269.
Protocol Relating to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships 1978, as amended: see Vol. 15 p. 225.
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Protocol to amend the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Impor-
tance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1982: see Vol. 13 p. 265.
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985: see Vol. 15 p. 215.
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987: see Vol. 16 p. 161.
Amendments to Articles 6 and 7 of the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of Inter-
national Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 1987: see Vol. 13 p. 266.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1990: see Vol. 15 p. 216.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1992: see Vol. 18 p. 103.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992: see Vol. 13 p. 266.
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992: see Vol. 14 p. 229.
Protocol to Amend the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage, 1992: see Vol. 16 p. 161.
Protocol to Amend the 1972 International Convention on the Establishment of 
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992: see 
Vol. 19 p. 181.
UN Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing 
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 1994: see Vol. 11 
p. 247.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1997: see Vol. 19 p. 182.
Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997: see Vol. 19 
p. 182.
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 1998: see Vol. 19 
p. 182.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 1999: see Vol. 19 p. 182.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2000: see Vol. 19 p. 183.
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001: see Vol. 19 
pp. 183.
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 
2001: see Vol. 20 p. 199.
International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast 
Water and Sediments, 2004: see Vol. 21 p. 241.
Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 2010: see Vol. 21 p. 242.
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, 1989
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 241)
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State Sig. Rat.
Tajikistan 30 Jun 2016
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Co-
operation, 1990
(Continued from Vol. 20 p. 199)
(Status as provided by imo)
State Cons. E.i.f.
Myanmar 15 Dec 2016 not yet
Amendment to the Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 1995
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 238)
State Sig. Cons.
Iran 12 Jan 2016
International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems 
on Ships, 2001
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 242)
(Status as provided by imo)
State Cons. (dep.) E.i.f.
Vietnam 27 Nov 2015 27 Feb 2016
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, 2010




China 8 Jun 2016
Minamata Convention on Mercury, 2013
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 243)
Entry into force: not yet
State Sig. Rat.
China 10 Oct 2013 31 Aug 2016
Japan 10 Oct 2013    2 Feb 2016
 Family Matters
Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, 1956: see Vol. 11 p. 249.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations Towards Chil-
dren, 1956: see Vol. 6 p. 244.
Convention on the Conflicts of Law Relating to the Form of Testamentary Dis-
positions, 1961: see Vol. 7 p. 327.
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registra-
tion of Marriages, 1962: see Vol. 8 p. 178.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, 1973: see Vol. 
6 p. 244.
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Inter-
country Adoption, 1993
(Continued from Vol. 19 p. 184)
State Sig. Cons.
Kyrgyzstan 25 Jul 2016
 Finance
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, 1965: see Vol. 7 p. 327.
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 1988: 
see Vol. 19 p. 184.
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 Health
Protocol Concerning the Office International d’Hygiène Publique, 1946: see Vol. 
6 p. 245.
World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 2003: 
see Vol. 19 p. 185.
Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products
Seoul, 12 November 2012
Entry into force: not yet
State Sig. Rat.
China 10 Jan 2013
Iran    7 Jan 2014
Korea (Rep.) 10 Jan 2012
Mongolia 1 Nov 2013    8 Oct 2014
Myanmar 10 Jan 2013
Sri Lanka    8 Feb 2016
Turkmenistan 30 Mar 2015
 Human Rights, Including Women and Children
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1953: see Vol. 10 p. 273.
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957: see Vol. 10 p. 274.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966: see Vol. 
14 p. 231.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966: see Vol. 16 p. 165.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
1966, see: Vol. 15 p. 219.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, 1966: see Vol. 21 p. 245.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Wom-
en, 1979: see Vol. 11 p. 250.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, 1984: see Vol. 21 p. 245.
International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, 1985: see Vol. 6 p. 248.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 251.
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 1989: see Vol. 18 p. 106.
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International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Work-
ers and Members of Their Families, 1990: see Vol. 18 p. 106.
Amendment to article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1992, see Vol. 12 p. 242.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women, 1999: see Vol. 7 p. 170.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 2000: see Vol. 20 p. 202.
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 2002: see Vol. 21 p. 245.
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960
(Continued from Vol. 16 p. 164)
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 15 Apr 2016
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In-
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 245)
State Sig. Cons.
Brunei 17 May 2016
Pakistan 26 Sep 2001 17 Nov 2016
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2008
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 246)
State Sig. Cons.
Brunei 18 Dec 2007 11 Apr 2016
Korea (dpr)      3 Jul 2013   6 Dec 2016
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
 Disabilities, 2008
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 107)
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State Sig. Cons.
Thailand 2 Sep 2016
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, 2010
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 246)
State Sig. Cons.
Sri Lanka 10 Dec 2015 25 May 2016
 Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict
International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, i-iv, 1949: see 
Vol. 11 p. 252.
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, see: Vol. 
18 p. 107.
Protocol ii Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1977, 
see: Vol. 12 p. 244.
Protocol iii Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
 Relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem, 2005: see Vol. 
17 p. 171.
 Intellectual Property
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 1883 as amended 1979: see 
Vol. 12 p. 244.
Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: see Vol. 6 p. 251.
Protocols 1, 2 and 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright Convention, 1952: see 
Vol. 6 p. 251.
Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Ser-
vices for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, 1957 as amended in 1979: 
see Vol. 13 p. 271.
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International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Pho-
nograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 1961: see Vol. 18 p. 109.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 1967: 
see Vol. 12 p. 245.
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms against Unauthor-
ized Duplication of their Phonograms, 1971: see Vol. 18 p. 109.
Multilateral Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Copyright 
Royalties, 1979: see Vol. 6 p. 252.
Trademark Law Treaty, 1994: see Vol. 15 p. 222.
wipo Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 1996: see Vol. 18 p. 109.
wipo Copyright Treaty, 1996: see Vol. 18, p. 109.
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886 as 
 amended 1979
(Continued from Vol. 12 p. 244).
(Status as provided by wipo)
State Party Latest Act to which 
State is party
Turkmenistan 29 May 2016 Paris
Madrid Union Concerning the International Registration of Marks, includ-
ing the Madrid Agreement 1891 as amended in 1979, and the Madrid Protocol 
1989
(Continued from Vol. 16 p. 168 and corrected from Vol. 21 p. 247)
(Status as provided by wipo)
State Sig. Rat.
Cambodia 5 Jun 2015
Laos 7 Mar 2016
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 1970 as amended in 1979 and modified in 1984 
and 2001
(Continued from Vol. 15 p. 221)
(Status as provided by wipo)
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State Sig. Rat.
Cambodia 8 Sep 2016
Patent Law Treaty, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 17 p. 172)
(Status as provided by wipo)
State Sig. Rat.
Japan 11 Mar 2016
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, 2006
(Continued from Vol. 20 p. 204)
(Status as provided by wipo)
State Sig. Rat.
Japan 11 Mar 2016
Korea (dpr) 13 Jun 2016
Korea (Rep.)   1 Apr 2016
Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, 2012
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 247)
(Status as provided by wipo)
State Sig. Rat.
Korea (dpr) 26 Jun 2012 19 Feb 2016
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to published Works for Persons who 
are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2013
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 247)
Entry into force: 30 September 2016




Korea (dpr) 28 Jun 2013 19 Feb 2016
Sri Lanka   5 Oct 2016
 International Crimes
Slavery Convention, 1926 as amended in 1953: see Vol. 15 p. 223.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
1948: see Vol. 21 p. 249.
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956: see Vol. 14 p. 236.
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 
1963: see Vol. 9 p. 289.
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity, 1968: see Vol. 6 p. 254.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970: see Vol. 
8 p. 289.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, 1971: see Vol. 8 p. 290.
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid, 1973: see Vol. 7 p. 331.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, 1973: see Vol. 14 p. 236.
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979: see Vol. 20 
p. 206.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Mari-
time Navigation, 1988: see Vol. 18 p. 111.
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988, see Vol. 12 
p. 247.
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Train-
ing of Mercenaries, 1989: see Vol. 11 p. 254.
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
1991: see Vol. 15 p. 224.
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Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 1994: 
see Vol. 11 p. 255.
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997: see 
Vol. 20 p. 206.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998: see Vol. 16 p. 171.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
1999: see Vol. 17 p. 174.
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplement-
ing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
2000: see Vol. 21 p. 250.
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2001: see Vol. 21 
p. 250.
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Plat-
forms Located on the Continental Shelf, 2005: see Vol. 18 p. 112.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 249)
State Sig. Rat.
Korea (dpr) 17 Jun 2016
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especial-
ly Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000
(Continued from Vol. 20 p. 207)
State Sig. Rat.
Maldives 14 Sep 2016
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 2003




Bhutan 15 Sep 2005 21 Sep 2016
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
2005
(Continued from Vol. 20 p. 207)
State Sig. Rat.
Vietnam 23 Sep 2016
 International Representation
(see also: Privileges and Immunities)
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations 
with International Organizations of a Universal Character, 1975: see Vol. 6 
p. 257.
 International Trade
Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States, 1965: see Vol. 17 p. 176.
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, 1974: 
see Vol. 6 p. 257.
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980: see Vol. 
21 p. 251.
UN Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in Inter-
national Trade, 1991: see Vol. 6 p. 257.
United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in In-
ternational Contracts, 2005: see Vol. 21 p. 251.
 Judicial and Administrative Cooperation
Convention on Civil Procedure, 1954: see Vol. 20 p. 208.
Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public 
Documents, 1961: see Vol. 17 p. 176.
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Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents 
in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1965
(Continued and corrected from Vol. 9 p. 291)
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 15 Oct 2015
Vietnam 16 Mar 2016
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, 1970
(Continued from Vol. 16 p. 173)
State Sig. Cons.
Kazakhstan 26 Sep 2016
 Labour
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (ilo Conv. 29): see Vol. 19 p. 192.
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (ilo Conv. 98): 
see Vol. 19 p. 193.
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (ilo Conv. 105): see Vol. 19 p. 193.
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (ilo Conv. 138): see Vol. 19 p. 193.
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (ilo Conv. 182): see Vol. 19 
p. 194.
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Conven-
tion, 1948 (ilo Conv. 87)
(Continued from Vol. 19 p. 192)
(Status as provided by the ilo)
State Rat. Registered
Uzbekistan 12 Dec 2016
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Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (ilo Conv. 100)
(Continued from Vol. 19 p. 193)
(Status as provided by the ilo)
State Rat. Registered
Timor Leste 10 May 2016
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (ilo 
Conv. 111)
(Continued from Vol. 19 p. 193)
(Status as provided by the ilo)
State Rat. Registered
Timor Leste 10 May 2016
Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (ilo Conv. 122)
(Continued from Vol. 8 p. 186)
State Rat. Registered
Sri Lanka 3 Feb 2016
Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 
2006 (ilo Conv. 187)
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 252)
(Status as provided by the ilo)
State Rat. Registered
Thailand 23 Mar 2016
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 Narcotic Drugs
Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic 
Drugs, concluded at The Hague on 23 January 1912, at Geneva on 11 February 
1925 and 19 February 1925 and 13 July 1931, at Bangkok on 27 November 1931 and 
at Geneva on 26 June 1936, 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture of, Internal Trade 
in, and Use of, Prepared Opium and amended by Protocol, 1925, amended 1946: 
see Vol. 6 p. 261.
International Opium Convention, 1925, amended by Protocol 1946: see Vol. 7 
p. 334.
Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, 1931, amended by 
Protocol, 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 261.
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of 
Narcotic Drugs, 1931, and amended by Protocol, 1946: see Vol. 7 p. 334.
Protocol bringing under International Control Drugs outside the Scope of the 
Convention of 1931, as amended by the Protocol of 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 1936, 
amended 1946: see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the 
Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, 1953: 
see Vol. 6 p. 262.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961: see Vol. 13 p. 276.
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as Amended by Protocol 1972: see 
Vol. 21 p. 253.
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971: see Vol. 13 p. 276.
Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1972: see Vol. 15 
p. 227.
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
chotropic Substances, 1988: see Vol. 20 p. 210.
 Nationality and Statelessness
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954: see Vol. 17 p. 178.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concern-
ing Acquisition of Nationality, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning 




Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963: see Vol. 17 p. 179.
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention (and the 
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy), 1988: 
see Vol. 6 p. 265.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 1986: see Vol. 19 p. 196.
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological 
Emergency, 1986: see Vol. 19 p. 196.
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management, 1997: see Vol. 19 p. 196.
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 1997: see 
Vol. 16 p. 178.
Protocol to Amend the 1963 Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
1997: see Vol. 17 p. 180.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1980
(Continued from Vol. 21 p. 254)
(Status as provided by iaea)
State Sig. Cons. (deposit)
Myanmar 6 Dec 2016
Amendment to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material, 2005
(Continued from Vol. 20 p. 212)
(Status as provided by iaea)
State Sig. Cons. (deposit)
Kyrgyzstan  26 Sep 2016
Myanmar    6 Dec 2016
Pakistan 24 Mar 2016
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Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994
(Continued from Vol. 18 p. 117)
(Status as provided by iaea)
State Sig. Cons. (deposit)
Myanmar 6 Dec 2016
 Outer Space
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of the States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967: 
see Vol. 16 p. 178.
Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial 
Bodies, 1979: see Vol. 10 p. 284.
Convention on Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space, 1974: see Vol. 
15 p. 229.
 Privileges and Immunities
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946: see 
Vol. 19 p. 197.
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, 
1947: see Vol. 7 p. 338.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961: see Vol. 19 p. 197.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concern-
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1961: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963: see Vol. 19 p. 197.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning 
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Convention on Special Missions, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on Special Missions concerning the Com-
pulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1969: see Vol. 6 p. 269.
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 




Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
 Road Traffic and Transport
Convention on Road Traffic, 1968: see Vol. 12 p. 254.
Convention on Road Signs and Signals, 1968: see Vol. 20 p. 213.
 Sea
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Convention on the High Seas, 1958: see Vol. 7 p. 339.
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 271.
Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Dis-
putes, 1958: see Vol. 6 p. 272.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: see Vol. 19 p. 198.
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part xi of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 1994: see Vol. 19 p. 199.
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (…) relating to the Conservation and Man-
agement of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995: see 
Vol. 20 p. 214.
 Sea Traffic and Transport
Convention Regarding the Measurement and Registration of Vessels employed 
in Inland Navigation, 1956: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960: see Vol. 6 p. 273.
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965 as amended: 
see Vol. 12 p. 255.
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966: see Vol. 15 p. 230.
International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969: see Vol. 15 
p. 231.
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Special Trade Passenger Ships Agreement, 1971: see Vol. 6 p. 275.
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
1972: see Vol. 19 p. 200.
International Convention for Safe Containers, as amended 1972: see Vol. 20 p. 
215.
Protocol on Space Requirements for Special Trade Passenger Ships, 1973: see 
Vol. 6 p. 275.
Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 1974: see Vol. 6 
p. 276.
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974: see Vol. 15 p. 231.
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
1974 as amended 1978: see Vol. 12 p. 256.
UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978: see Vol. 6 p. 276.
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-
keeping for Seafarers, as amended, 1978: see Vol. 19 p. 200.
Protocol Relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1988: see Vol. 
17 p. 183.
Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 
1988: see Vol. 18 p. 120.
Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007
(Continued from Vol 21 p. 256)
(Status as provided by imo)
State Cons. (dep.) E.i.f.
China 11 Nov 2016 Not yet
 Social Matters
International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 1904, 
amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, 1910, 
amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications, 
1910, amended by Protocol 1949: see Vol. 6 p. 278.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and 
Children, 1921: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Arts326
<UN>
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, 1921, 
amended by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic 
in Obscene Publications, 1923: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of, and Traf-
fic in, Obscene Publications, 1923, amended by Protocol in 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full 
Age, 1933: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full 
Age, 1933, amended by Protocol, 1947: see Vol. 6 p. 277.
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploita-
tion of the Prostitution of Others, 1950: see Vol. 12 p. 257.
Final Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons 
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 1950: see Vol. 12 p. 257.
International Convention Against Doping in Sports, 2005: see Vol. 20 p. 217.
 Telecommunications
Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, 1976: see Vol. 13 p. 280.
Convention on the International Mobile Satellite Organization (inmarsat), 
1976 (as amended): see Vol. 19 p. 202.
Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Develop-
ment, 1977: see Vol. 10 p. 287.
Amendment to Article 11, Paragraph 2(a), of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacif-
ic Telecommunity, 1981: see Vol. 8 p. 193.
Amendments to articles 3(5) and 9(8) of the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific 
Telecommunity, 1991: see Vol. 9 p. 298.
Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for 
Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, 1998: see Vol. 15 p. 232.
Amendments to the Agreement establishing the Asia-Pacific Institute for 
Broadcasting Development, 1999: see Vol. 10 p. 288.
Amendments to the Constitution of the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, 2002: see 
Vol. 13 p. 280.
 Treaties
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969: see Vol. 19 p. 203.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and Internation-
al  Organizations or Between International Organizations, 1986: see Vol. 6 
p. 280.
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 Weapons
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
other Gases, and of Bacteriological Warfare, 1925: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, 1963: see Vol. 6 p. 281.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968: see Vol. 11 p. 262.
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the 
Subsoil Thereof, 1971: see Vol. 6 p. 282.
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, 1976: see Vol. 21 p. 259.
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Convention-
al Weapons which may be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscrimi-
nate Effects, and Protocols, 1980: see Vol. 11 p. 263.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpil-
ing and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1992: see Vol. 21 
p. 259.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 1997: see Vol. 13 
p. 281.
Amendment of Article 1 of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed Exces-
sively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 2001: see Vol. 12 p. 259.
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008: see Vol. 19 p. 204.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
 Destruction, 1972
(Continued from Vol. 20 p. 220)
(Status as provided by icrc)
State Sig. Cons.
Nepal 10 Apr 1972 1 Dec 2016
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1996
(Continued from Vol. 19 p. 204)
State Sig. Cons.
Myanmar 25 Nov 1996 21 Sep 2016
Arms Trade Treaty, 2013
(Continued from Vol. 20 p. 220)
State Sig. Cons.
Korea (Rep.) 3 Jun 2013 28 Nov 2016
<UN>
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 Plantation Workers’ Welfare – Grants – Financial 
Assistance
Bangladesh Tea Workers’ Welfare Fund Act 2016 (Act No.1 of 2016)
Drawing on the spirit of ilo Convention concerning Conditions of Employ-
ment of Plantation Workers 1958 (C110) and Recommendation concerning 
Welfare Facilities for Workers 1956 (R102), the Bangladesh Parliament enacted 
the Bangladesh Tea Workers’ Welfare Fund Act 2016 (Act No.1 of 2016) on 9 
February 2016 applicable to all permanent tea plantation workers working in 
tea gardens of Bangladesh (Section 1). The Act directs the government to form 
a Management Board, whose membership includes, inter alia, representatives 
from the Bangladesh Tea Workers Union (Section 4). The Board shall have the 
power to grant funds for government projects of workers and their families and 
invest in profitable schemes (Section 6). Money for the Board Fund may be 
received from grants or donations given by the government; grant or donation 
given by tea gardens, or any local authority or any organization and person; 
income from the money invested in the fund; and any other legitimate source 
(Section 7).
The Board may grant tea plantation workers financial assistance on vari-
ous grounds. For example, if a worker is declared permanently disabled by a 
medical authority and hence retired, withdrawn or exempted from service; or 
if he retires from service; or if he dies within five years from the date of retire-
ment (Section 8). Grants are available for the marriage of a daughter of a dead 
or disabled worker or who is in a particularly distressing situation (Section 9) 
and education of children of unemployed, dead or disabled worker (Section 
11). Section 11 of the Act provides for special grants for any medical assistance 
including blood transfusion; purchase spectacles and other medical accesso-
ries for the body; burial or funeral; assistance for physical injury or accidental 




 Money Laundering – Proceeds of Crime – Corruption – 
Principle of Territoriality – Doctrine of 
International Double Jeopardy – iccpr – Application 
of International Law in Domestic Court
Robin Chowdhury @ Misba Uddin v. Anti-Corruption Commission and others 
[Writ Petition No. 13488 of 2015, Judgment of 21 July 2016, High Court Division 
of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (Special Original Jurisdiction)]
A Deputy Director (Special Enquiry and Investigation-1) of Anti-Corruption 
Commission, Respondent No. 2 in this case, lodged a First Information Report 
(fir) on 20 May 2015, with the police implicating the writ Petitioner and oth-
ers for committing offence under specific provisions of the Money Launder-
ing Prevention Act 2012. It was alleged in the fir that on 6 June 2012, the UK 
Home Office sent a Letter of Request for Legal Assistance in the matter of Rob-
in Choudhury @ Misba Uddin to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of 
Bangladesh. The letter stated that the Petitioner worked for the flp Solicitors 
(a law firm) in London from September 2007 to February 2008. During this 
period, the Petitioner made 13 fraudulent applications for mortgage, through 
which he obtained more than five million pounds and eventually, he remitted 
160 million taka to Bangladesh through different bank accounts. Apart from 
this, he transferred large amounts of money in both British and Bangladeshi 
currencies from a joint account with his wife from London to Bangladesh. He 
deposited the said money in 50 accounts in 10 different banks in Sylhet in the 
name of his father, wife, uncle and brother-in-law. He also invested some por-
tion of the money in the shares market and purchased land, flats, and furni-
ture, the details of which were mentioned in the fir. These facts signify that 
the writ Petitioner has committed an offence under the Money Laundering 
Prevention Act 2012.
It was also alleged that the Petitioner changed his name to Robin Chowd-
hury in London and obtained a driving license and a British passport in that 
name. The London Police arrested the Petitioner in August 2011 and charged 
him under relevant provisions of the Fraud Act 2006 for fraudulent mortgages 
and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for money laundering. On 11 April 2013, 
the Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for eight years. A 
confiscation order was issued under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, whereby 
the Southwark Crown Court in the UK asked the Petitioner for details of his 
income, property, motor vehicles, bank accounts, etc. The Proceeds of Crime 
Act of the UK is essentially similar to the Money Laundering  Prevention Act 
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of Bangladesh. The Petitioner provided all requisite information to the Crown 
Prosecution Service (cps) and the concerned Court. On appeal, the Petition-
er’s sentence was reduced to six years and four months, which he is serving. 
The Petitioner was subsequently released on license.
The Anti-Corruption Commission (acc) of Bangladesh (Respondent No. 1) 
initiated inquiries into the matter in lieu of which it obtained an order from 
Respondent No. 4, Senior Metropolitan Special Judge Dhaka on 2 January 
2014 to freeze the bank accounts of the Petitioner and his wife and lodged an 
fir as mentioned above against the Petitioner and four others. The learned 
counsel for the Petitioner maintained that the offence of money laundering 
is a transnational crime and the Petitioner had already faced prosecution 
for the same in the UK and awaiting the outcome. As such, he could not be 
prosecuted again in Bangladesh for the same offence. Alluding to the prin-
ciple of “double jeopardy” as enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh 
and the Criminal Procedure Code 1898, which provide that no person shall 
be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once, the coun-
sel for the Petitioner argued that the legal proceedings initiated against the 
Petitioner was unlawful and of no legal effect. The Petitioner’s counsel also 
drew the attention of the Court to similar provisions enshrined in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr) to which Bangladesh 
is a signatory.
The acc responded that, the investigating officer investigated the case with 
permission of the acc in accordance with law and due process. On finding 
prima facie evidence of infringement of relevant provisions of the Money 
Laundering Prevention Act, the acc lodged this fir. The learned counsel for 
the Respondent pointed out that it was a settled decision of the Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh that criminal proceeding or investi-
gation process cannot be challenged invoking Article 102 of the Constitution. 
Besides, the Petitioner being a fugitive from justice had no locus standi to file 
any application/petition before any court of law including this Court. He also 
explained that the offence of money laundering in the UK for which the Peti-
tioner was convicted and the act of transferring money into different accounts 
in the names of his relatives were separate and distinct; as such, the principle 
of “double jeopardy” did not apply in this context.
The moot questions that confronted the Court were two-fold: firstly, wheth-
er Article 14(7) of the iccpr or any other provisions of the same prohibit suc-
cessive prosecution for the same conduct in which an accused was prosecuted 
and convicted in another sovereign country under its own law; and secondly, 
whether the principle of “international double jeopardy” doctrine would be 
applicable in this particular case.
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The Court affirmed that the Bangladesh Constitution (Article 25(2)) con-
tains provisions similar to Article 14(7) of the iccpr which states that no one 
shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has 
already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with law and penal 
procedure of each country. As such, there has not been any deviation from the 
Covenant. The doctrine reflected in Article 35(2) of the Bangladesh Constitu-
tion does not extend to any offender prosecuted and convicted in a country of 
distinct sovereignty, under its own statute.
The Court observed that the Petitioner essentially committed two offences 
by one act—one committed in the UK and the other in Bangladesh. The Court 
maintained that as a sovereign entity, Bangladesh has the power to determine 
independently what act shall constitute offences and to punish them under 
its laws in the same way UK prosecuted and convicted the Petitioner under its 
own laws.
The Court noted that:
[The] territoriality principle is the most common basis of jurisdiction and 
is widely regarded as a manifestation of state sovereignty. At its simplest, 
the territoriality principle denotes that a sovereign state has jurisdiction 
over conduct or act or omission that occurs within its territorial borders. 
The ‘separate sovereigns’ doctrine allows for two states to prosecute for 
the same offence [that] occurred within [the] jurisdiction of both loca-
tions. Thus, [sic] [the] iccpr does not prohibit successive prosecution of 
the offence committed by same course of conduct under a distinct law of 
a sovereign country.
The Court emphasized that prosecuting and convicting a Bangladeshi national 
for an offence committed beyond the territory of Bangladesh creates no bar for 
his or her successive prosecution for the “same act” in the exercise of power 
given under Bangladeshi laws. The money brought into Bangladesh by the Peti-
tioner was eventually possessed, transferred and converted knowing that such 
property constituted the proceeds of crime. As such, the Petitioner committed 
a new and distinct offence of money laundering in Bangladesh. In the circum-
stances, the Court disagreed with the claim that the accused was being pros-
ecuted twice for the “same offence” merely because he was convicted for the 
same act under the law of UK. The Court held that the Petitioner allegedly by 
a single act violated laws of two sovereign States and thereby committed two 
distinct offences and therefore, there has not been any breach of the doctrine 
of “double jeopardy”.
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In conclusion, the Court reiterated that the principle of “international dou-
ble jeopardy” is not enforceable in domestic courts unless specifically incorpo-
rated in the domestic law. Since the principle has not been incorporated in the 
Prevention of Money Laundering Act of 2012, there was no scope to enforce it 
directly. That said, the Court recognized the significance of the “international 
double jeopardy” doctrine and noted that its decision in this particular case 
may have an impact on the development of the principle.
International Agreements
Bangladesh Signs Paris Agreement, New York, 22 April 2016
Bangladesh signed the Paris Agreement at the United Nations on 22 April 2016. 
The Minister for Environment and Forests of Bangladesh signed the Agreement 
at the General Assembly Hall in the presence of delegations from 171 countries.
The Paris Agreement, alternatively referred to as the Paris Climate Accord or 
Paris Climate Agreement, is an agreement within the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (unfccc), addresses issues of green-
house gas emissions mitigation, adaptation and finance. Building upon the 
unfcc, the Paris Agreement urges all nations to pursue the common cause 
of combating climate change and to take appropriate measures to help de-
veloping countries adapt to its effects. One of the fundamental aims of this 
Agreement is to strengthen global efforts to keep the increase in global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to aim to limit 
the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce the risks and the 
impacts of climate change. To this end, the Agreement recommends adequate 
financial flows and frameworks for new technology framework, capacity devel-
opment, and transparency of action and support for vulnerable and develop-
ing countries.
Highlighting Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s personal commitment to com-
bating climate change, the Bangladesh Statement reaffirmed her  Government’s 
readiness to continue to support the comprehensive implementation of the 
Paris Agreement. The Statement reiterated that “collective wisdom and com-
mitments are essential to implement the Paris Climate Agreement … We all 
must consider the urgency of acting now”. It further observed that, “all coun-
tries need to be united in our collective journey, keeping in mind that one’s 
non-compliance may threaten the existence of all. However, developed coun-
tries have to take lead in this case”. Bangladesh flagged various pro-active initia-
tives undertaken by the Government to adapt to the effects of climate change 




Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of 
the Government of the State of Kuwait, 04 May 2016, Dhaka, Bangladesh
The Governments of Bangladesh and Kuwait entered into a bilateral agree-
ment on 4 May 2016 in Dhaka, Bangladesh. The purpose of the agreement is 
to “create favorable conditions for the development of economic coopera-
tion between both Parties and in particular for investments by investors of 
one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party” through 
“promotion and reciprocal protection of such investments”. The Contracting 
Parties recognized that this would stimulate business initiative and increase 
prosperity in both countries. Appropriate measures must be taken to ensure 
that investment activities are implemented in consonance with the laws of 
each Contracting Party (Article 13).
Each Contracting Party will ensure that investments are accorded fair and 
equitable treatment with full protection and security consistent with recog-
nized principles of its laws and provisions of the Agreement (Article 3(2)) 
at par with its own investors (Article 4(1)). No unreasonable or discrimina-
tory measure will be taken that is likely to impair the management, mainte-
nance, use, enjoyment or disposal of the investments (Article 3(3)). Article 
6 of the Agreement prohibits the nationalization or expropriation of invest-
ments except in the public interest on a “non-discriminatory basis and in ac-
cordance with due process of law and against prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation”.
The Agreement has provisions for compensation for losses incurred by 
any Contracting Party due to war, armed conflict, revolution, state of na-
tional emergency, riot, revolt or insurrection (Article 7(1)). Contracting Par-
ties shall ensure that such compensation is prompt, adequate and effective 
(Article 7(2)). Investors of each Contracting Party shall be entitled to free 
transfer of all payments in connection with the investment into and out of its 
territory (Article 9(1)). However, such transfer may be prevented or delayed in 
good faith and consistent with laws and regulations in the event of bankruptcy, 
insolvency or protection of the rights of creditors; criminal or penal offences; 
in compliance with judicial orders or judgements or administrative proceed-
ings; taxation; social security, retirement and compulsory savings schemes 
( Article 1(4)(5)).
In the event of any dispute between the Contracting Parties, the matter shall 
be settled amicably, failing which it will be referred to international arbitra-
tion (Article 11(1)(2)). The arbitral tribunal shall take its decision by majority of 
votes (Article 11(5)).
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Promotion of Economic and Technical Cooperation between Bangladesh and 
China, 14–16 October 2016
The Presidents of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the People’s Re-
public of China signed 27 deals worth billions of dollars during the latter’s 
visit to Bangladesh on 14–16 October 2016. Significant among these are an 
agreement for increasing investment and production capacity building, un-
der which 28 development projects will be supported with $21.5 billion in 
foreign aid; an economic and technical cooperation agreement for $80.3 
million grant; a loan agreement of $700 million for Karnaphuli tunnel con-
struction; a credit construction of $280 million for Dashekandi Sewerage 
 Treatment Plant project; and four more loan deals with regards to purchase of 
six ships.
The Memoranda of Understanding (mou) signed by both countries include 
mous on: China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative in which Bangladesh has 
joined, maritime cooperation, joint feasibility study on a free-trade area, new 
ict framework, counter-terrorism collaboration, capacity building and shar-
ing of information, tackling climate change risks, regional and international 
cooperation, and cooperation on power and energy sectors, river management 
including dredging and land reclamation, and culture.
Both countries announced 2017 as the Year of Friendship and Exchanges 
between China and Bangladesh.
Promotion of Economic Ties and Connectivity between Bangladesh and 
India, 9 March 2016
There has been notable progress in the bilateral relationship between Bangla-
desh and India as both countries stepped up initiatives to develop economic 
ties and connectivity. On 9 March 2016, Bangladesh signed an agreement with 
the Exim Bank of India to fund US$2 billion in low-cost loans for a number of 
social and development projects. This is the largest credit line that India has 
extended to any country.
The two countries have also signed key partnerships in the energy and pow-
er sectors pursuant to which Bangladesh will receive 100 megawatts of power 
from the 726-megawatt thermal power plant in Palatana, Tripura. The State-
owned Indian electrical company, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, has signed 
an mou on a US$1.6 Billion Power project in Khulna, Bangladesh.
Beyond this, Bangladesh and India have taken some important measures 
to enhance connectivity between the two countries. Bus services linking In-
dia and Bangladesh have been established and multiple agreements have been 
signed to enhance trade by improving maritime cooperation. This includes an 
mou on the use of Chittagong and Mongla ports in Bangladesh to facilitate the 
movement of goods to and from India.
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Promotion of Bilateral Trade between Bangladesh and Nepal,  
11–12 May 2016
The Senior Commerce Secretary of Bangladesh and the Commerce Secretary 
of Nepal met at a bilateral meeting in Dhaka, Bangladesh on 11–12 May 2016 
to discuss the promotion of bilateral trade, improvement of trade facilita-
tion procedures, development of trade-related infrastructure, and reduction 
of non-tariff barriers. To this end, both countries entered into a number of 
joint agreements including an mou between the Bangladesh Standard Test-
ing Institute and the Nepal Bureau of Standards and Metrology for removal 
of technical barriers to trade; Agreement to harmonize sanitary and phytos-
anitary measures in agricultural products; Agreement to enhance facilities of 
land Customs stations, to facilitate increased trade between the two countries; 
Agreement to simplify visa and immigration process to promote tourism in 
both countries; and Agreement to participate in trade fairs of both countries.
Additionally, connectivity issues were discussed. Nepal requested for broad 
gauge conversion of the Radhikapur-India-Birol-Bangladesh rail line. Both 
countries agreed to bring the Singhabad, India-Rohanpur, Bangladesh rail 
transit facility into operation. Bangladesh committed to improve connectiv-
ity through Jamuna Bridge to enable Nepal to access the Mongla Port in Ban-
gladesh. The delegation agreed to strengthen Bangladesh-Nepal connectivity 
through cooperation with India.
The countries further agreed to form a technical committee for the devel-
opment of implementation modality of preferential market access for each 
other’s goods and endorsed the final list of the products that was granted pref-
erential market access, including 108 Nepali goods and 50 Bangladeshi goods.
Statements, Joint Conclusions, Resolutions
Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the People’s 
Republic of China on Establishing Strategic Partnership of Cooperation, 
Dhaka, 14 October 2016
His Excellency Mr. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, paid 
a State visit to the People’s Republic of Bangladesh on 14–15 October 2016 at the 
invitation of His Excellency Mr. Md. Abdul Hamid, President of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh. This visit marked an important milestone in promot-
ing bilateral relationship between China and Bangladesh as both countries 
reached a broad consensus on international and regional issues of common 
interest.
The two sides agreed that cooperation between China and Bangladesh, two 
developing countries with large populations, and their common development 
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and prosperity would contribute to the welfare of the two peoples and would 
promote the development of the region and their self-reliant growth. Both 
sides agreed to elevate the bilateral relations to the Strategic Partnership of 
Cooperation.
The two countries reiterated their adherence to the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence, respecting and supporting each other in choosing the 
paths of development according to the national conditions, and respecting 
and supporting each other’s core interests and major concerns. Both countries 
appreciated each other’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The two sides agreed to enhance high-level exchanges, maintain frequent 
contacts between leaders of the two countries on the sidelines of multilateral 
fora, strengthen exchanges and cooperation at various levels between the two 
governments, legislative bodies, political parties, and peoples to deepen mu-
tual trust at all levels.
The two countries agreed to enhance the alignment of their respective de-
velopment strategies, fully tap the potentials of cooperation in various areas, 
work on the “Belt and Road Initiative” for sustainable development and com-
mon prosperity of the two countries.
The two sides agreed to expand and deepen trade and investment coopera-
tion and identified infrastructure, industrial capacity cooperation, energy and 
power, transportation, information and communication technology, agricul-
ture for mutual benefit. The relevant departments of the two governments will 
enhance policy exchanges in the above-mentioned areas and provide planning 
and guidance for the bilateral cooperation, increase investment and human 
resources development.
The two countries agreed that the Framework Agreement for Developing 
Cooperation on Production Capacity between Bangladesh and China would 
enhance the capacity of companies and financial institutions to improve in-
vestment and cooperation between them, in particular with respect to con-
struction and operation of infrastructure, metallurgy and material, resource 
processing, equipment manufacturing, light industry, electronics and textiles, 
semiconductors and nanotechnology, industry clusters, and other areas. Both 
agreed to cooperate for developing and investing in the ict sector and to con-
tinue their cooperation on river management, including dredging with land 
reclamation.
The two sides agreed to continue to promote balanced development of 
bilateral trade and to start feasibility studies on the establishment of China- 
Bangladesh Free Trade Area. The two sides believed that there are extensive 
potentials for cooperation in maritime affairs between the two countries, 
and agreed to establish a dialogue mechanism for maritime cooperation. 
Khair338
<UN>
The  Chinese side is willing to assist the Bangladeshi side in developing Blue 
Economy and strengthening its capacity in relevant areas.
Both sides believed that China and Bangladesh are important partners in 
South-South cooperation among developing countries and agreed to enhance 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the South-South cooperation 
Framework for effective implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. China will provide support and assistance to Bangladesh in 
strengthening the capacity for disaster management, seeking waste manage-
ment and water treatment solutions for both urban and industrial areas and 
developing earthquake resilient infrastructure.
The two countries agreed to provide more training opportunities for human 
resources and skills development for Bangladesh in areas of public administra-
tion, science and technology, agriculture, health care, and arts.  China will con-
tinue to provide government scholarships for Bangladeshi  students to study in 
China, and fund the outstanding young Bangladeshi scientists to work in China.
The two sides agreed to strengthen cultural and people-to-people exchang-
es and expand exchanges and cooperation in culture, education, tourism and 
other fields, and to promote interactions between the media, think tanks, 
youth, women organizations, non-governmental groups and local authorities 
of the two countries.
The two countries agreed to maintain military cooperation and exchanges 
at various levels and deepen cooperation in areas such as personnel training, 
equipment and technology and UN peacekeeping missions.
The two sides condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.  China 
agreed to support Bangladesh’s efforts in combating terrorism and maintaining 
national security and stability and expressed its readiness to cooperate by shar-
ing of information, capacity building and training. They agreed to explore the 
possibility of establishing a dialogue mechanism on countering terrorism.
Both sides are ready to enhance communication and coordination to pur-
sue the establishment of bcim Economic Corridor and to push for early con-
sensus on the Joint Study Report and establish the governmental cooperation 
framework between the four parties to launch early harvest program.
The two countries reiterated that they would abide by the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter and enhance their cooperation in UN and other 
international organizations, including enhancing coordination and coopera-
tion in global issues such as sustainable development, energy, food security 
and other challenges and appeals of developing countries. They will work to-
gether to promote peace, stability, development and prosperity of the region 
and the world.
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Statement under the Thematic Discussion on “Other Disarmament Measures 
and International Security” at the First Committee of the 71st Session of the 
UN General Assembly, 24 October 2016
In a statement underpinning its support for multilateralism in the pursuit 
of general and complete disarmament, Bangladesh emphasized the need for 
reinvigorating the UN Disarmament Machinery to add further impetus to 
inter-governmental negotiations on outstanding disarmament and nonprolif-
eration issues. To achieve this, it underscored the importance of expansion of 
disarmament education and research and the mobilization of the use of social 
media tools to spread disarmament education and awareness to the wider pub-
lic, including students at different levels. Appreciating the learning resources 
developed by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (unoda), Bangladesh 
flagged the importance of facilitating enhanced inter-operability of such re-
sources with national education curricula online, as appropriate. It also put 
on record its appreciation for the useful work continually being done by the 
UN Institute for Disarmament Research (unidir), and stressed the need for 
ensuring enhanced and predictable resources for it to deliver on its mandates 
and help expand and manage its knowledge base for the genera l consumption 
of all Member States.
Bangladesh attached great importance to mainstreaming and preserving 
relevant environmental norms in the international legal regime concerning 
disarmament and arms control and asserted that the applicability or relevance 
of such legal norms to disarmament in the seabed and outer space should be 
studied and analyzed in depth.
Bangladesh expressed its concern over the potential misuse of the infor-
mation and communication technology (ict) to the detriment of interna-
tional peace and security. It emphasized on the need to promote international 
cooperation to ensure information security, including through appropriate 
transparency and confidence building measures. In this context, Bangladesh 
acknowledged the contribution of the Group of Governmental Experts (gge) 
established by the Secretary General pursuant to GA Resolution 70/237, and 
recommended the development of a comprehensive legal instrument through 
inter-governmental negotiations.
In conclusion, Bangladesh reiterated the importance of factoring in poten-
tial threats in the cyber-sphere, including new developments in artificial intel-
ligence and other related fields, into the ongoing review of the implementation 
of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent ict platform from being 




Statement under the Thematic Discussion on “Regional Disarmament 
and Security” at the First Committee of the 71st Session of the UN General 
Assembly, 25 October 2016
In a statement under the theme regional disarmament and security, Bangla-
desh acknowledged the critical importance of regional disarmament and 
 security in the maintenance of international peace and security and stat-
ed that the notion of “strategic stability” that influenced the security doc-
trines of the nuclear weapon States in the region continues to be a major 
concern.
Bangladesh encouraged concerned stakeholders to push for a nuclear weap-
on-free zone in South Asia and the Middle East in the interest of sustainable 
peace, security and stability in the region. It attached great priority to uncondi-
tional and legally binding assurances to non-nuclear weapon states against the 
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons states. Bangladesh 
acknowledged that peaceful dialogue and diplomacy are best tools for promot-
ing regional security and for creating conditions conducive to sustained and 
meaningful dialogues on disarmament and security issues.
Bangladesh recognized the useful role of the UN Regional Centre for Peace 
and Development (unrcpd) in bringing together relevant experts and policy 
makers from the region to share views on issues of common concern. It ac-
knowledged the contribution of unrcpd’s customized support to Bangladesh 
in promoting the implementation of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons and the International Tracing Instrument, which have 
enabled Bangladesh to identify existing gaps and challenges in its legal, pol-
icy and institutional arrangements in ensuring compliance with the relevant 
Arms Trade Treaty provisions. Bangladesh expressed its desire to further its 
partnership with unrcpd to support the ongoing work on developing a com-
prehensive National Control List in fulfillment of, inter alia, the obligations 
under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
Bangladesh declared that it remains open to opportunities for further 
learning from the good practices in other regional countries in preventing 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their possible acquisition by 
terrorists and other unauthorized non-state entities.
Statement of Bangladesh at the Security Council on Women, Peace and 
Security, 24 May 2016
Speaking on issues of conflict prevention and participation under the consoli-
dated theme of Peace and Women, Bangladesh recommended further engage-
ment with Africa to learn from one another’s experience in  promoting the role 
of women in peace, security and development. Witnessing a paradigm shift in 
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society’s attitudes towards the role of women in the public sphere, including 
in conflict prevention and resolution, Bangladesh believed that it has much to 
contribute to the evolving conversation on the contributions of women and 
girls as active change agents in their respective communities.
Statements of Bangladesh at the Security Council Open Debate on Women, 
Peace and Security, October 2016
Speaking on implementation under the consolidated themes on Peace and 
Women, Bangladesh recalled with satisfaction the generation of the unprec-
edented level of interest in the global study on the implementation of resolu-
tion 1325 (2000) in 2016 in the wake of the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000) 
during its membership in the Security Council in 2000–2001. Following the 
adoption of resolution 2242 (2015), the issue of developing a national action 
plan featured prominently in the Bangladeshi policy discourse. Following pre-
liminary discussions with UN-Women and other international partners, the 
Government of Bangladesh is exploring the opportunity to convene dialogues 
with a cross section of women and their representative organizations. In this 
context, Bangladesh has agreed to join the Spanish initiative to establish a net-
work of national focal points.
Bangladesh stressed that the inherent resilience of Bangladeshi women 
convinces it of women’s capacity to act as agents of change in the face of the 
humanitarian consequences they disproportionately suffer in different situa-
tions. Bangladesh is encouraged to see that this notion is gaining recognition 
in the humanitarian discourse. Bangladesh observed that the mandate of the 
Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Hu-
manitarian Action has the potential to support further demonstration to that 
effect in response to specific needs in conflict and post-conflict settings.
In conclusion, Bangladesh underscored the importance of increased, sus-
tained and coordinated mobilization of finances, and earmarking thereof, for 
giving effect to the women and peace and security agenda.
Speaking on participation and peacekeeping under the consolidated themes 
of Peace and Women, Bangladesh reiterated its commitment to enhance the 
role and participation of women, including in its national contingents, as part 
of its contribution to United Nations peacekeeping. Bangladesh maintained 
that so far some 1,047 women peacekeepers have been participating in various 
missions, including 774 police personnel. Bangladesh is currently in the pro-
cess of detailing two female military observers, and planning to deploy women 
contingent commanders by 2021.
Speaking on sexual and gender-based violence under the consolidated 
themes of Peace and Women, Bangladesh stated that its peacekeepers know 
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that they must take decisive action to prevent and combat sexual and gender-
based violence, as part of their broader mandate regarding the protection of 
civilians. Unequivocally condemning sexual exploitation and abuse by peace-
keepers, Bangladesh stated that it has demonstrated its resolve to cooperate 
in implementing the comprehensive measures outlined in the Secretary Gen-
eral’s enhanced program of action to combat this scourge.
Speaking on participation under the consolidated themes of Peace and 
Women, Bangladesh welcomed the adoption of the gender strategy by the 
Peace-building Commission and asserted that it has been particularly support-
ive of further strengthening women’s participation and leadership in 2016 reso-
lutions on peace-building architecture and mediation. Bangladesh expressed 
relief at learning about the mediated release and rescue of a number of women 
and girls held hostage by certain international and regional terrorist groups. 
Bangladesh urged the Security Council to continue efforts to secure the free-
dom of the remaining women and girls.
Bangladesh acknowledged the recent trend of increased women’s represen-
tation in various peace negotiations, and in increasing gender-specific provi-
sions in peace agreements. Referring to it national conditions in the aftermath 
of a peace accord signed with a local insurgent group in 1997, it stated how 
women were playing a critical role in advancing the accord’s implementation, 
preventing reversion of the conflict, and building awareness and resilience 
against gender-based violence. The Bangladeshi Government has prioritized 
the further mainstreaming of women’s participation in multidimensional ef-
forts of the country to combat terrorism and prevent violent extremism.
Bangladesh recalled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s appeal to mothers to 
work as sentinels in their families and urged female teachers, elected repre-
sentatives and women working at the grass-roots level to contribute actively 
towards a whole-of-society response against violent extremism and radical-
ization. Bangladesh reiterated its determination to push ahead with women’s 
development and empowerment efforts to defeat the violent extremists and 
terrorists.
Speaking on under the consolidated theme of disarmament, Bangladesh 
recognized the differential impact of armed conflicts and proliferation of 
small arms on women and girls. In this connection, Bangladesh decided to co-
sponsor a draft resolution entitled “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation 
and arms control”.
High Level Forum on a Culture of Peace, Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to 
the United Nations, New York, 01 September 2016
Following the United Nations General Assembly resolution tabled by 
 Bangladesh titled “Follow-up to the Declaration and Program of Action on a 
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 Culture of Peace”, adopted by consensus on 3 December 2015, the President 
of General Assembly convened on 1 September 2016 a day-long High Level 
Forum on a Culture of Peace at the Trusteeship Council Chamber at the UN 
Headquarters. Since 1997, Bangladesh has been actively involved in bringing 
this resolution to UN General Assembly and has been tabling it since 2001. 
The High Level Forum provided an opportunity for the Member States and 
stakeholders to exchange their views on ways to build and promote the “Cul-
ture of Peace”, which has become imperative in the conflict-ridden world of 
today.
In a full house chamber, more than forty countries made statements in the 
plenary segment, which is the highest among all High Level Forums held since 
2012. The Permanent Representative and Ambassador of Bangladesh made the 
statement on behalf of the Bangladesh Delegation. He said a culture of peace 
is an aspiration of all humanity, the essence of the UN Charter, and impera-
tive in the current global context. Promoting and inculcating a mindset of a 
culture of peace is at the core of peaceful and mutually respectful co-existence 
and dialogue among different civilizations, religions, faiths and beliefs around 
the globe. In the panel discussion, the Permanent Representative pointed out 
the critical linkage between the culture of peace and the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals that called for inclusive societies and accountable institutions at 
all levels.
The statements of the President of General Assembly and of the unsg 
re-asserted and re-affirmed the commitment of the Member States towards 
building the culture of peace and the international community’s determina-
tion to work more diligently for its realization. Along with other delegations, 
the unga President acknowledged the role of Bangladesh in promoting the 
issue of cultural of peace at the United Nations and beyond.
Second Follow-up Meeting on Bangladesh Sustainability Compact, Dhaka, 28 
January 2016
The Partners of the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact – Government of Ban-
gladesh, European Union, United States of America and the International La-
bor Organization (ilo) met in Dhaka on 28 January 2016 to assess the progress 
in the implementation of the Compact for securing respect for labor rights, 
occupational safety and health and promoting responsible business conduct 
in Bangladesh’s ready-made garment and knitwear (rmg) sector based on the 
set of concrete mutually agreed on commitments by its Partners.
Reiterating their commitment to work collectively to improve the working 
conditions and workers’ rights in the export oriented rmg sector, the Com-
pact Partners recognized the progress made by Bangladesh since the last 
Follow-up Meeting towards meaningful and sustainable changes in the rmg 
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industry. These included inter alia the recent promulgation of implementing 
Rules  under the Bangladesh Labor Act; the near-completion of initial safety 
audits by the Government of hundreds of rmg factories; the formal launch 
of the Better Work Bangladesh program with ilo/ifc; and the continuation 
of  efforts to improve the capacity of the Department of Inspection for Facto-
ries and  Establishments (dife), the Fire Service and Civil Defense Department 
(dfscd) and the capital development authority (rajuk), including through 
increase in staff and budgetary allocation.
They also appreciated the detailed update provided by Bangladesh, titled 
“Update by Bangladesh – Progress in Implementation on Outcome of the Re-
view Meeting of the Sustainability Compact, as on 11 January 2016”.
As next steps, the Partners focused on the following priorities:
 • Ensure that trade union registration process is carried out smoothly and ex-
peditiously in accordance with objective and transparent criteria;
 • Upgrade the (Bangladesh) Directorate of Labor with additional staff and 
resources to effectively investigate and prosecute unfair labor practices in 
a timely and transparent manner and to promote harmonious industrial 
relations;
 • Adopt necessary changes to the legal framework applicable in the epzs to 
protect freedom of association and collective bargaining rights and to en-
sure that such rights are commensurate with those provided in the national 
labor law with participation of all stakeholders and the ilo.
 • Ensure the effective implementation of the Bangladesh Labor Act and its 
Rules, in line with the relevant ilo Conventions, including with regard to 
Participation Committees and Safety Committees;
 • Complete the recruitment of inspectors to ensure effective inspections in 
all active export-oriented rmg factories in the country, including their sub-
contracting factories, so that all rmg workers in Bangladesh are assured of 
a safe working environment;
 • Undertake remediation and transparent monitoring through the dife 
 website of all export-oriented rmg factories, according to the developed 
Corrective Action Plans, in a timely and effective manner in cooperation 
with relevant stakeholders.
The Compact Partners also underlined the need to reform Bangladesh’s labor 
laws to ensure that they are in compliance with core ilo Conventions and to 
address the conclusions and recommendations of the ilo supervisory bodies, 
including with regard to freedom of association.
The Partners acknowledged the contributions of the private sector initia-
tives in making progress towards fulfillment of the Compact. They also recog-
nized the importance for brands and retailers to adopt practices that promote 
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responsible business conduct in global supply chains and encouraged them to 
adopt a uniform code of conduct for factory audits in Bangladesh.
The Partners reiterated their commitment to help ensure that the further 
development and sustainability of the rmg sector in Bangladesh advance in 
line with improved workers’ rights and safety.
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 Hate Speech – Act on the Promotion of Efforts to 
Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech and Behavior 
against Persons Originating from Outside Japan was 
enacted
Japan’s first anti-hate speech law passed the Diet, marking an important step 
to halt racial discrimination. The Recommendations, as shown below, from the 
international human rights bodies significantly promoted this movement.
In 2014, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination (cerd) strongly recommended the Japanese government to regu-
late hate speech by legislation. The Committee was concerned in the increase 
in racist discrimination demonstrations in Shin Okubo, Tokyo and Tsuruhashi, 
Osaka, which are targeting Korean residents.
The Committee is concerned about reports of the spread of hate speech, 
including incitement to imminent violence in the State party by right-wing 
movements or groups that organize racist demonstrations and rallies against 
foreigners and minorities, in particular against Koreans. The Committee is also 
concerned by reports of statements made by public officials and politicians 
amounting to hate speech and incitement to hatred. The Committee is further 
concerned by the propagation of hate speech and incitement to racist violence 
and hatred during rallies and in the media, including the internet. Further-
more, the Committee is concerned that such acts are not always properly in-
vestigated and prosecuted by the State party (Article 4). Recalling its general 
recommendations No. 35 (2013) on combating racist hate speech, the Com-
mittee recalls that measures to monitor and combat racist speech should not 
be used as a pretext to curtail expression of protest. However, the Committee 
reminds the State party of the importance of safeguarding the rights of vulner-
able groups in need of protection against racist hate speech and hate crimes. 
The Committee recommends, therefore, that the State party take appropriate 
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measures to: (a) Firmly address manifestations of hate and racism, as well as 
incitement to racist violence and hatred during rallies; (b) Take appropriate 
steps to combat hate speech in the media, including the Internet; (c) Inves-
tigate and, where appropriate, prosecute private individuals, as well as orga-
nizations, responsible for such acts; (d) Pursue appropriate sanctions against 
public officials and politicians who disseminate hate speech and incitement to 
hatred; and (e) Address the root causes of racist hate speech and strengthen 
measures of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view both 
to combating prejudices that lead to racial discrimination and to promoting 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and among racial or 
ethnic groups.1
Furthermore, the United Nations Human Rights Committee had made simi-
lar recommendations. In its Review related to the human rights situation of 
the country, it expressed concern to the Japanese government regarding a rac-
ist street campaign activity called “Hate Speech” (hatred expression) against 
Korean residents in Japan and recommended the prohibition of all advertising 
activities that discriminate residents.
In the “concluding observations,” the Committee was concerned that ac-
tions to discriminate against foreigners such as hate speech and “Japanese 
only” display are expanding. The Committee described that “Japanese criminal 
and civil law do not adequately protect them.”
Based on such observations, the Committee recommended that all propa-
ganda that promote racial superiority or hatred inviting discrimination and 
violence should be banned. It urged the Japanese government to develop rules 
to punish criminals.
The Committee expressed concern at the widespread racist discourse 
against members of minority groups, such as Koreans, Chinese or Buraku-
min, inciting hatred and discrimination against them, and the insufficient 
protection granted against those acts in the Criminal and Civil Codes. The 
Committee also expresses concern at the high number of extremist demon-
strations authorized, the harassment and violence perpetrated against mi-
norities, including against foreign students, and the open display in private 
establishments of signs such as those reading “Japanese only” (Articles 2, 19, 20 
and 27).
The State should prohibit all propaganda advocating racial superiority or 
hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence, and should prohibit 
1 cerd/c/jpn/co/7–9, Concluding observations on the combined seventh to ninth periodic re-
ports of Japan, 29 August 2014, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000060744.pdf.
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demonstrations that are intended to disseminate such propaganda. The State 
party should also allocate sufficient resources for awareness-raising campaigns 
against racism and increase its efforts to ensure that judges, prosecutors and 
police officials are trained to detect hate and racially motivated crimes. The 
State party should also take all necessary steps to prevent racist attacks and to 
ensure that the alleged perpetrators are thoroughly investigated, prosecuted 
and, if convicted, punished with appropriate sanctions.2
In response to the above recommendations from international society, Ja-
pan enacted the “Act on the Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate Unfair Discrimi-
natory Speech and Behavior against Persons Originating from  Outside  Japan” 
and brought it into force on 3 June 2016. The Act does not oblige citizens to halt 
activities which lead to racial superiority or hatred that incites  discrimination, 
hostility or violence, but obliges the government and the local authorities to take 
necessary measures to deal with the issues. Article 4 provides that “the govern-
ment shall implement measures concerning efforts to eliminate  unjustifiable 
discriminatory behavior against foreign nationals from outside Japan” and “is 
responsible for taking necessary advice to the local authorities.” And also “lo-
cal authorities shall endeavor to take measures in accordance with the actual 
circumstances of the concerned area, in light of the appropriate role sharing 
with the government concerning efforts to eliminate unfair discriminatory 
behavior against foreign nationals from outside Japan.” For this purpose, the 
government and local authorities have to (1)prepare necessary consultation 
system to prevent or resolve disputes related thereto (Article 5), (2) conduct 
educational activities to resolve unjust discriminatory behavior against foreign 
nationals from outside Japan, and shall do necessary measures for that pur-
pose (Article 6), and (3) conduct activities disseminating public understand-
ing about the necessity of eliminating unjust discriminatory behavior against 
foreign nationals from outside Japan (Article 7). It is a concern that there is 
no penalty for violations provided by the Act. However, immediately after the 
law was enacted, the Kawasaki branch of the Yokohama District Court granted 
injunction against the planned hate speech demonstration3 and even without 
any penalty, this is considered a good precedent to implement the Act for the 
future.
2 ccpr/c/jpnco/6, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Japan, 20 August 
2014, available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?
symbolno=ccpr%2fC%2fjpn%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en.
3 Court bans planned anti-Korean hate speech rally in Kawasaki, The Mainich, 3 June 2016, 
available at https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160603/p2a/00m/0na/017000c.
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 Revision of the Civil Code: Shortening the Woman’s 
Remarriage Prohibition Period
On 1 June 2016, the Act revising a part of the Civil Code (Act No. 89 of 1896) was 
established and enforced on 7 June 2016. According to this revision, the wom-
an’s remarriage prohibition period was shortened from six months to 100 days 
after the date of cancellation of the previous marriage. It also clarifies the case 
where a woman can remarry even within the remarriage prohibited period.
The remarriage prohibition period is provided in Article 733, paragraph 
1 of the Civil Code, which states that “a woman may not remarry unless six 
months have passed since the day of dissolution or rescission of her previous 
marriage.” This prohibition has raised concerns since it only applied to women. 
The reason why the remarriage prohibition period was stipulated is to clarify 
the father of a child born after the dissolution of the marriage. Therefore, Ar-
ticle 733, paragraph 2 provides the exemption from paragraph 1, stating that 
“in the case where a woman has conceived a child before the cancellation or 
dissolution of her previous marriage, the provision of the preceding paragraph 
shall not apply from the day on which she gives birth.” This is also prescribed 
in Article 772 of the Civil Code, which provides as follows:
(1) A child conceived by a wife during marriage shall be presumed to be a 
child of her husband. (2) A child born after 200 days from the formation 
of marriage or within 300 days of the day of the dissolution or rescission 
of marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during marriage.
Therefore, by establishing a remarriage prohibition period, it becomes easier 
to clarify whether it is a child of the former husband or the current husband.
In the Supreme Court decision on 16 December 2015 (2013 (o) No. 1079), the 
Court held that “the part beyond 100 days of the remarriage prohibition period 
is unconstitutional.” Based on this judgment, the Diet legislated amendment to 
the Civil Code and now it enters into force. On the same day, 16 December 2015, 
there is another Supreme Court judgment which is also relevant to the rights of 
women. The Supreme Court denied that the “right not to be forced to change 
the family name” claimed by the plaintiffs is “not guaranteed by the constitu-
tion.” The Court held that there is a benefit that you can realize that you are a 
member of your family and “although it can be presumed that there are many 
cases where the female side is disadvantaged it is alleviated by the spread of 
so-called common use.” The Court concluded that the provision shown below, 
which obliged couples to use the same surname is not contrary to the constitu-
tion that requires gender equality in marriage legislation. Article 750 provides 
that a husband and wife shall adopt the surname of the husband or wife in 
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accordance with that which is decided at the time of marriage. However, such 
movements have been criticized in the international community.
For example, on 7 March 2016, the cedaw (Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women) regrets that its previous recommendations 
regarding existing discriminatory provisions have not been addressed. The 
Committee is particularly concerned that: (a) The Civil Code still prohibits 
only women from remarrying within a specified period of time after divorce 
notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court, which shortened the pe-
riod from 6 months to 100 days; (b) On 16 December 2015, the Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of Article 750 of the Civil Code that requires mar-
ried couples to use the same surname, which in practice often compels women 
to adopt their husbands’ surnames.4 The Committee reiterated its previous 
recommendations (CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/5) and (CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/6) and 
urged the State party to, without delay revise legislation regarding the choice of 
surnames for married couples in order to enable women to retain their maiden 
surnames; and abolish any waiting period for women to remarry upon divorce.
4 cedaw/c/jpn/co/7–8, Concluding observations on the combined seventh and eighth periodic 
reports of Japan, 7 March 2016, available at http://www.gender.go.jp/international/int_kaigi/
int_teppai/pdf/CO7–8_e.pdf.
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Municipal Law – Treaties – Civil Procedure Law
 Decision of Supreme Court concerning the “Judgment 
Execution”
Supreme Court Decision 2015Da207747 (decided on 28 January 2016)
 Facts of the case
The plaintiff in this case is a U.S. national who works in the horse breeding 
industry in Kentucky, U.S. On 6 April 2007, he concluded a sales agreement to 
purchase a purebred mare named First Violin for usd150,000 with the defen-
dant who runs a stud farm in Korea. But, on 14 April 2007, Dominican, born by 
the mare in this case, won a horse racing competition held in the U.S. Prompt-
ly, the defendant maintained that First Violin’s market price is over one million 
U.S. dollars after the competition, and notified the plaintiff that the mare is 
not for sale. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and claimed 
compensation for damage before the Woodford Circuit Court (Kentucky; here-
after the U.S. court) on 3 November 2008. On 27 August 2010, the U.S. court or-
dered the defendant to pay usd639,044 for damages as well as litigation costs, 
etc. As the defendant did not appeal, the judgment was then finalized. The 
defendant, however, filed a lawsuit before a Korean court.
 Issues presented
1) The procedure of serving the defendant who is domiciled in Korea did not 
comply with the procedure set under the U.S. law for the litigation in the U.S., 
and 2) the recognition of the U.S. court ruling violated “sound morals and oth-
er social order” of Korea based on the Article 217 of the Civil Procedure Act of 
Korea, as the amount of damages was excessive.
 Judgment
The Court dismissed all appeals based on the following reasoning:
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…[T]hus, for a local government that freely loans property that is to be 
returned only after an indefinite period, it can be seen that just by being 
liable for the ordinary reinstatement, it has achieved to a considerable 
degree the legislative purpose of sharing the duty of national defense as 
originally intended by the Management and Disposal Act. As such, it is 
reasonable to interpret the scope of exemption from the obligation to re-
instate under Article 6(2) of the Management and Disposal Act as being 
restricted to the scope of purpose of the free loan, i.e., the reinstatement 
of the ordinary status quo. Extending the interpretation beyond this line 
to obligate the local government to reinstate all the consequences of en-
vironmental contamination not originally anticipated, would be difficult 
to accept in terms of the legislative purport of the Management and Dis-
posal Act, which centers on the certainty and expeditiousness of loan, as 
well as in terms of equity…
 Comment
Overall, if a defeated defendant would be seen as having the opportunity to 
defend his actual interests in a foreign court proceeding, the court considered 
the defendant is deemed to have responded to the lawsuit as prescribed un-
der Article 217(1)2 of the Civil Procedure Act. In addition, the court ruled that 
whether the recognition of the final judgment rendered by a foreign court etc. 
violates good morals or other social order of Korea or not should be decided 
based on the impact of the final ruling etc. on basic moral beliefs and social 
order which Korean laws aim to preserve and protect.
Human Rights – Treaties – Refugee
 Decision of Supreme Court Decision on the 
“Revocation of Disposition of Refugee Status 
Non-recognition”
Supreme Court Decision 2013Du14269 (decided on 10 March 2016)
 Facts of the case
The plaintiff is a national of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, who joined 
anti-government activities of the Parbattya Chattogram Jana Samhati Samiti 
(hereafter jss) and the United People’s Democratic Front (hereafter updf) 
as a member of the indigenous Jumma tribe of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of 
 Bangladesh. He entered Korea on 7 September 2007 and applied to the defen-
dant (Minister of Justice, Republic of Korea) for recognition of refugee status 
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on the grounds of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
political orientation, etc., if he were to go back to Bangladesh. But, the defen-
dant rejected the application following the determination that the plaintiff ’s 
grounds for refugee recognition do not constitute a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted stipulated in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention. Then, the plain-
tiff brought a lawsuit seeking revocation of the disposition.
 Issues presented
This case deals with 1) the method of assessing the credibility of a statement by 
a refugee applicant and the requirements for recognizing it; and 2) the method 
of proving the authenticity of a foreign official document submitted by a refu-
gee applicant.
 Judgment
The court ruled that it is difficult to recognize the credibility of the plaintiff ’s 
statement on the actuality or possibility of persecution based on the following 
reasoning:
[A] statement shall: 1) contain concrete facts to such an extent as to suf-
ficiently recognize the refugee applicant’s allegations on the face of the 
statement; 2) without any omission of material facts; 3) have consistency 
and persuasive power, standing alone; and 4) conform to the contents of 
other evidence.
 Comment
In this case, the Supreme Court confirmed that the applicant should bear the 
burden of proving the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution. If there 
is special circumstance for applicant to collect evidence, he/she is not required 
to prove the entirety of the alleged facts by objective evidence.  Rather the facts 
should be deemed to be proven when it is reasonable to recognize them based 
on the credibility of the totality of the statements. Furthermore, the court 
confirmed that in assessing the statement by a refugee applicant, the overall 
credibility of the statement shall not be denied for the mere reason of dis-
covering slight inconsistencies in the details of the statement, or detecting 
some exaggeration. Rather, the overall credibility should be assessed focusing 
on the essential content of the statement and considering emotional shock 
from the experience of genuine persecution, unsound psychological condi-
tion due to applicant’s distress, limitations in memory due to the passage of 




Private International Law – Treaties – Jurisdiction
 Decision of Supreme Court concerning the “Insurance 
Proceeds”
Supreme Court Decision 2015Da5194 (decided on 23 June 2016)
 Facts of the case
The plaintiff in this case is a Korean corporation in the trade business, and the 
defendant is an American corporation in the insurance business which has a 
branch office in Korea. The Plaintiff entered into a cargo insurance agreement 
with the Defendant in Korea under the terms of waiop (With Average Irre-
spective of Percentage). Under this agreement, the insured recovers for certain 
inherent maritime perils regardless of the type or scale of maritime loss, as 
provided under the Institute Cargo Clauses of the Institute of London Under-
writers (now the International Underwriting Association of London). But at 
the same time, the insurance agreement included an “OnDeck Clause,” provid-
ing for the governing law, stating that “all questions of liability arising under 
this policy are to be governed by the laws and customs of England”; and with 
the provision that in the event the Plaintiff fails to notify the Defendant of the 
ondeck loading of insured cargos, the scope of coverage is to be limited to Free 
from Particular Average (fpa), under which general partial loss is not covered 
beyond “Washing Overboard.” The Plaintiff enlisted Global Cargo Solution Co., 
Ltd. for marine cargo shipping from the port of Shanghai, China, to the port of 
Iskenderun, Turkey. The shipment was involved in an accident in which one 
of the four cargo units, i.e., a boiler, went overboard off the coast of Oman. 
The Plaintiff filed suit, claiming: 1) the “OnDeck Clause” is subject to the duty 
of explanation under the Act on the Regulation of Terms and Conditions of 
 Korea; 2) the Defendant failed to adequately explain the “OnDeck Clause” to 
the Plaintiff; and therefore, 3) waiop, instead of the “OnDeck Clause,” is ap-
plicable as the substance of the insurance contract.
 Issues presented
In this case, one of the main issues is to decide, if the parties chose the govern-
ing law for only a part of the contract having foreign elements, the applicable 
law to other parts of contact for which the parties did not choose the govern-
ing law.
 Judgment
The Court dismissed the appeal. This is because first, the “OnDeck Clause” is 
commonly included in English cargo clauses and is part of standard interna-
tional terms and conditions in marine insurance market, which are generally 
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used by marine cargo insurers. And second, although it is erroneous for the 
lower court to have determined that the Act on the Regulation of Terms and 
Conditions of Korea does not apply to the instant insurance contract, it is ul-
timately justifiable for it to have determined that this Korean legislation does 
not apply to the “OnDeck Clause” on the ground that the Plaintiff was well 
aware of the content of the “OnDeck Clause.”
 Comment
The Court ruled that by citing Article 25(1), 25(2) and 26(1) of the Act on Private 
International Law, the governing law of the part for which the parties did not 
choose the applicable law shall be the law of the country most closely con-
nected with the contract. The Court highlighted that the instant governing law 
clause did not designate the governing law for the entirety of the insurance 
contract. Rather, it provided that the said contract would follow English laws 
and customs to the extent of the insurer’s “liability.” As such, as to those mat-
ters not pertaining to the insurer’s liability, the laws of Korea, having the clos-
est connection with the instant insurance contract, shall be applicable.
Human Rights – Migration – Nationality Act
 Decision of Supreme Court concerning the 
“Revocation of Disposition Disapproving Extension  
of Sojourn Period, etc”
Supreme Court Decision 2015Du48846 (decided on 14 July 2016)
 Facts of the case and Issues presented
On 25 July 2006, a Pakistani man (Non-Party) entered the Republic of Korea 
under D3 (Industrial Trainee) status. On 17 June 2007, his left forearm was am-
putated when his hand got sucked into a sawdust crusher. Following the acci-
dent, he underwent an operation to remove his left forearm, and experienced 
post-traumatic stress disorder (ptsd). On 2 August of the same year, this man 
applied for change in sojourn status on the grounds that he needed medical 
treatment and was issued permission to change his sojourn status to G1 (Mis-
cellaneous) status. Following the application for naturalization on 8 February 
2013 pursuant to Article 5 of the Nationality Act, he was issued permission to 
change his sojourn status to F1 status which is issued to a citizenship applicant 
and was granted extension of stay by 8 February 2015. On 4 September 2012, 
the Plaintiff (a Pakistani woman) and this man got married in Pakistan and 
registered their marriage. The Plaintiff entered the Republic of Korea under 
C3 status on 2 September 2013 and then applied for permission to change her 
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sojourn status to F1 status on October 24 of the same year in order to care for 
her husband.
The Defendant (immigration office) investigated the circumstances of the 
Plaintiff and the husband and on 11 April 2014, following the investigation, dis-
approved the Plaintiff ’s application on the grounds that there were no extenu-
ating circumstances for her to stay in Korea. The defendant pointed out the 
fact that 1) the husband (Non-Party) received a lump sum compensation for 
disability; 2) he did not appear to have been in a critical condition since he was 
able to manage on his own during that time; and 3) his wife did not have status 
of sojourn eligible for employment but was working on the side at home when 
she visited her husband in Korea. The lower court indicated that the Plaintiff 
applied for change in her sojourn status to care for her husband on the condi-
tion that her husband was qualified to be issued permission for naturalization. 
As the husband was not deemed qualified to apply for naturalization due to 
having failed to pass the required written exam on two occasions, the lower 
court ruled that the Plaintiff could not be expected to be issued permission 
to change sojourn status due to her standing and that there was no excess or 
abuse of discretionary power regarding such an instant disposition.
 Judgment
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the judgment of the lower court with 
a reasoning that first, while legally staying in the Republic of Korea under D3 
status, the husband’s left forearm was amputated due to an occupational in-
jury which left him seriously disabled; and second, as the possibility of the hus-
band’s condition worsening cannot be ruled out given that recurrent  depressive 
disorder tends to cause additional stress, i.e., it is deemed necessary, from a hu-
manitarian standpoint, to grant the Plaintiff to live with her husband during his 
legal sojourn period in Korea so that she can help him recover physically and 
emotionally. The Court seems to have carefully considered that he had approxi-
mately 10 months remaining to legally stay in Korea when the instant disposi-
tion was rendered and thus requiring her to maintain C3 status (the maximum 
stay per visit is only 90 days) is not rational even from a humanitarian perspec-
tive since it could hinder the Plaintiff ’s continuous care of her husband. The 
Court, therefore, maintained that the disadvantages likely to be imposed on the 
Plaintiff from the instant disposition trump the public interest to be gained. In 
the same vein, the instant disposition is against the principle of proportional-
ity, thereby constituting an excess or abuse of discretionary power.
 Comment
It seems that the Court recognized that even though the foreigner meets 
all the requirements stipulated under the relevant law, here the Article 24 
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(1) of the  Immigration Control Act, the competent agency has discretion to 
 determine whether or not to issue a permit in consideration of the foreigner’s 
standing, purpose of stay, effect on public interest, etc. However, the Court 
emphasized that such a decision can constitute an excess or abuse of discre-
tionary power if the competent agency commits a grave error on fact-finding 
or there is a violation of the principles of proportionality and equity.
Treaties – Inheritance Rights – South and North Korean 
Family Special Act
 Decision of Supreme Court concerning “Recovery of  
Inherited Property”
Supreme Court Decision 2014Da46648 (decided on 19 October 2016)
 Facts of the case & issues presented
The main issue in this case is if a North Korean who was unable to inherit from 
a South Korean decedent, whether the right to claim inheritance recovery un-
der Article 999(2) of the Civil Act expires on the lapse of ten years from the 
date of infringement of inheritance rights or not.
 Judgment
The Court pointed out that even if there had been a need to take into ac-
count the North Korean residents in disputes pertaining to inheritance be-
tween South and North Korean residents, this is a matter to be addressed 
within the bounds of reasonable statutory interpretation. It is necessary to 
carefully consider the purport of the institution of the limitation period on 
the exercise of claim for inheritance recovery under the Civil Act, the legisla-
tive purpose of the South and North Korean Family Special Act and pertinent 
provisions. As the recovery of inheritance has clearly influenced not only 
the pertinent heirs, but also the rights of third parties who subsequently 
purchased the inherited property, the recognizing an exception to the limita-
tion period significantly beyond one stipulated under the Civil Act can pose 
a risk of seriously agitating the stability of legal relationships. To avoid such 
a disruption, the Court emphasized that any recognition of exceptional cases 
on the limitation period for inheritance recovery should be accompanied 
with a specific stipulation of provisions on extension of the limitation period 
as an exception and the period of extension. In other words, recognition of 
exceptional cases with respect to the limitation period for inheritance re-
covery would necessitate a coherent legislative procedure. In this sense, the 
Article 11(1) of the South and North Korean Family Special Act presumes that 
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the limitation period under Article 999(2) of the Civil Act is applicable also 
to the legal relationship pertaining to the inheritance recovery claims by a 
North Korean resident who could not inherit from a South Korean decedent. 
Therefore, the Court ruled that for North Korean residents, just as for South 
Korean residents, the claim for inheritance recovery expires upon the lapse 
of ten years from the date of infringement of inheritance rights under Article 
999(2) of the Civil Act.
 Comment
There is a dissenting opinion by five judges which maintained that if the Court 
interprets the South and North Korea Family Special Act to mean that even the 
inheritance claims of North Korean refugees who entered South Korea expire 
simply because ten years have lapsed from the date of infringement of inheri-
tance rights, it is not accord with the spirit of the Constitution aspiring to both 
reach a consensus between South and North Koreans as a homogeneous na-
tion and lay the foundation for peaceful reunification.
Legislation and Administrative Regulations
Act on Anti-Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security 
(Enforcement 3 March 2016) (Act No. 14071, new enactment)
On 3 March 2016, the South Korean National Assembly passed the Act on Anti-
Terrorism for the Protection of Citizens and Public Security, following strong 
criticism from non-governmental and human rights organizations, opposition 
political parties, and a week-long filibuster in parliament aimed at delaying 
the bill’s adoption. Although virtually every State adopted new (or strength-
ened already existing) anti-terror legislation in the aftermath of 11 September, 
South Korea’s Act had been stalled for 14 years. It was because the Act envis-
aged the expansion of the National Intelligence Service’s (nis) powers to sur-
vey and arrest not only terrorist suspects, but also dissenters of governmental 
policy more broadly.
The definition of “terror” in Article 2.1(a), unless strictly interpreted, can 
include any activity with a purpose to impede the exercise of the authority 
of the state, or local government. One such misinterpretation could include 
demonstrations against the State’s or local government’s policies. Further-
more, according to Article 2(3) of the Act, a “potential terrorist” includes any-
one “who is reasonably believed to have prepared, conspired, propagated, or 
incited terrorism” without a clear reference on any legal process of assigning 
or delisting a potential terrorist. This is of particular concern, considering that 
the  government has many times labeled peaceful protests as acts of terror and 
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a lack of a minimum safeguard for de-listing. As a point of reference, and for 
reasons of comparison, “incitement of terrorism” is defined by the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism as “the distribution, or 
otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to in-
cite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not 
directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such 
offences may be committed” (Article 5 (1)).
Moreover, under Article 9 of the Act, once listed as a potential terrorist, the 
nis can extensively collect personal information, including sensitive informa-
tion and location data, wiretap, tail, or even apply financial sanctions. Consid-
ering that safeguards to manage and monitor such abuses of power are highly 
insufficient, this legislation may become a tool that facilitates illegal interven-
tion into people’s privacy.
Similarly problematic is the broadness with which Article 12 defines “materi-
als instigating or propagandizing terrorism.” Such breadth of definition means 
that it is at the discretion of the government which paintings, writings, and 
other forms of expression will be defined as terrorist propaganda. Although 
South Korea is not alone in its use of “vague terms of uncertain scope”, the 
former UN Secretary General has criticized the readiness with which the “glo-
rification of terrorism” has become a frequent accusation, considering it to be 
an inappropriate restriction on expression.
North Korean Human Rights Act (entered into force on 3 March 2016, 
enforcement 4 September 2016, Act No. 14070)
According to the reports submitted by international organizations and other 
related organizations on human rights situation in North Korea, North Kore-
ans are systemically repressed of their basic rights including civil and political 
rights as well as economic and social rights such as access to food, medicine 
and other necessities. The Act intends to protect and promote the full enjoy-
ment of human rights and fundamental freedoms of North Koreans by laying 
the institutional foundation to draw up and carry out consistent and system-
atic North Korean human rights policies.
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the protection and improvement 
of human rights of North Koreans by pursuing the right to liberty and right 
to life prescribed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other in-
ternational conventions on human rights (Article 1). In addition to efforts to 
protect and promote the human rights of North Koreans, the State shall also 
endeavor to improve North-South relations and to establish peace on the 
 Korean Peninsula (Article 2). In order to provide advice on policies related 
to the improvement of human rights in North Korea, there is hereby estab-
lished a North Korean Human Rights Advisory Committee in the Ministry of 
Baek360
<UN>
 Unification (Article 5). The Government shall promote inter-Korean human 
rights dialogue on important matters for the improvement of human rights 
in North Korea (Article 7). In providing North Korean authorities or agencies 
with any humanitarian assistance for North Koreans to promote human rights 
in North Korea, the State shall endeavor to ensure that the following matters 
are compiled with: 1) Assistance shall be delivered transparently in accordance 
with internationally recognized delivery standards; and 2) Assistance shall be 
provided preferentially for vulnerable social groups, such as pregnant women 
and infants (Article 8). In order to investigate the actual status of human rights 
in North Korea and to engage in research, policy development, etc. related to 
the improvement of human rights in North Korea, including inter-Korean dia-
logue on human rights and humanitarian assistance, the Government shall es-
tablish a North Korean Human Rights Foundation. (Article 10 to Article 12) In 
order to collect and record information on the status of North Korean human 
rights and information for the improvement of human rights in North Korea, 
there is hereby established a Center for North Korean Human Rights Records 
in the Ministry of Unification (Article 13).
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 Human Rights – Article 7, 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child – Reservations to Treaties – dna 
Paternity Testing
Lee Lai Cheng (suing as the next friend of Lim Chee Zheng and Herself ) v. 
Lim Hooi Teik [2016] 1 lns 1212, High Court, 31 October 2016
This case relates to an application by the mother of a child to compel the 
defendant – the alleged father of the child – to undergo dna testing to 
prove paternity. Counsel for the plaintiff cited among others,  Article 7 of 
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (crc), of which  Malaysia is 
a State party to. Counsel for the plaintiff averred that Article 7 provides for 
the right of the child to know the identity of his parents. The High Court 
recognised that it was possible for the court to apply provisions of the 
crc in domestic cases. An example is seen in the case of Lai Meng v Toh 
Chiew Lian [2012] 10 clj 479, where the court applied the best interest 
test as found in the crc, to determine the issue of access to an illegitimate 
child.
However, in the present case, the High Court took note of Malaysia’s reserva-
tion to several provisions of the crc, including Article 7. The reservation states 
that “…the said provisions shall be applicable only if they are in conformity 
with the Constitution, national laws and national policies of the Government 
of Malaysia”. On that basis, the High Court referred to the relevant national law, 
Section 13 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1957, which relates to the 
exemption of giving information pertaining to the facts of conception until the 
birth of the child. The High Court held that Section 13 does not exempt a father 
from undergoing a dna test for purposes of determining paternity. However, 
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the High Court found that despite the absence of exemption, there is also no 
obligation imposed by the crc and national laws for the father to undergo a 
dna test. Accordingly, the High Court could not order the alleged father to 
undergo dna testing.
 Human Rights – Fundamental Liberties – 1966 
International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights – Criminal Law – Capital Punishment – Mental 
Disorder
Michael Philip Spears v. Ketua Pengarah Penjara Kajang & Anor [2017] 3 clj 
161, Court of Appeal, 18 November 2016
This case relates to an appeal by an individual on death row, against a High 
Court decision to strike out an earlier application, where the appellant had 
asked the court to set aside or quash the death sentence as he has been diag-
nosed with schizophrenia.
The appellant was sentenced to death by hanging in the year 2000. He had 
been in detention for more than 17 years and on death row for 14 years. The 
appellant argues that the prolonged detention was inhumane, cruel and/or 
degrading punishment and had subsequently led to him being diagnosed with 
schizophrenia.
The Court of Appeal found that the appellant’s arguments were of argu-
able basis or foundation. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court of Appeal 
found support from a case decided by the Indian Supreme Court – Shatrughan 
 Chauhan v Union of India [2014] 3 scc 1. The case interprets Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India (equivalent to Article 5(1) Malaysia Constitution), regard-
ing the right to life and personal liberty. In particular, the case law relies on the 
United Nations Commission of Human Rights’ documents such as Resolution 
2000/65 “The Question on Death Penalty” and Clause 89 of the Report of the 
Special Rapporteur or Extra-Judicial Summary or Arbitrary Executions “Restric-
tions on the use of Death Penalty”. These documents elaborate on the prohibi-
tion of the use of death penalty on persons suffering from any form of mental 
disorder.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the possibility that the UN documents 
may not hold relevance to Malaysia, unlike to India, as India is a party to the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. However, the case law 
and UN documents were sufficient at this point, to establish that the appel-
lant had a sufficiently plausible and arguable case which merits a hearing. 
Accordingly, the decision to strike out the application by the High Court was 
reversed.
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Intellectual Property
 Application of the Trips Agreement – Direct 
Application of Treaties in Malaysia – Registration  
of Trademarks
Kraft Foods Schweiz Holding GmbH v. Pendaftar Cap Dagangan [2016] 9 clj 
558, High Court, 15 August 2016
This case relates to a rejection of trademark registration by the trademark regis-
trar. The registrar rejected the plaintiff ’s proposed mark on the basis that it did 
not qualify as a mark under the Trade Marks Act 1976. The plaintiff contended 
otherwise, arguing among others that, Article 15(1) of the trips Agreement 
provides for a wide definition of trademark. In addressing the application of 
the trips Agreement to the present case, the High Court acknowledged that 
Malaysia has been a State party to the Agreement since 1 January 1995. How-
ever, referring to previous case law, the High Court held that it cannot refer to 
the trips Agreement as suggested by the plaintiff, as Parliament has not leg-
islated for the inclusion and application of Article 15(1) of the Agreement into 
the Trade Marks Act 1976.
International Trade
 Trade Agreement – Treaty Adoption and Ratification – 
Parliamentary Consent– tpp – cptpp
Trans-Pacific Partnership/Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership
On 27 January 2016, the Malaysian Government held a special parliamen-
tary voting session to obtain support for the ratification of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (tpp). The special voting session is notable as ordinarily, the 
Government does not require parliamentary consent to ratify treaties. How-
ever, this session was held with the purpose of addressing public concerns 
on the potential effects of the tpp, and to gain public support for ratifica-
tion. The motion to ratify was subsequently passed by 127 votes for, and 84 
votes against, leading to Malaysia’s participation in the adoption of the 
Agreement on 4 February 2016. Subsequently, following the withdrawal 
of the United States, Malaysia continued its participation in the negotia-





 Shipping – ilo – 2006 Maritime Labor Convention –  
Implementation
Implementation of the 2006 Maritime Labor Convention
On 18 May 2016, Malaysia passed the Merchant Shipping Ordinance (Amend-
ment) Bill 2016 which introduces new provisions to the Merchant Shipping 
Ordinance 1952. This follows Malaysia’s ratification of the Maritime Labor Con-
vention 2006 on 20 August 2013. Of note, the amendments apply to ships of five 
hundred gross tonnes or more.
The key provisions introduced include Section 90 which provides the mini-
mum hours of rest for the seafarers on board a Malaysian ship. Also, Section 
103, imposes an obligation on the owner of Malaysian ships and any foreign 
ship within Malaysian waters to provide adequate health protection and medi-
cal care for seafarers and to ensure that medical supplies are properly main-
tained and inspected.
Aviation
 Aviation – icao – Independent Civil Aviation 
Authority – Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia
Establishment of the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia
On 23 November 2016, the Malaysian Parliament passed the Civil Aviation 
Authority Bill 2016. The bill (subsequently, Civil Aviation Authority Act 2017), 
primarily establishes the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia, replacing the 
Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia (dca). The main difference between 
the dca and caam is that the latter operates as a statutory body, granting it 
independence in its management, including budget and human resources as-
pects. Autonomy over the human resources aspects are important as the 2016 
International Civil Aviation Organization (icao) Universal Safety Oversight 
Audit Programme, highlighted the lack of qualified technical personnel at 
the dca. The government believes that an independent civil aviation author-
ity would be best positioned to address this concern. Further, the government 
noted that Malaysia is bound by the standards set by the icao as a State party 
to the Chicago Convention. Hence, the bill enables Malaysia to meet its treaty 
obligations, given that icao had requested States parties to the Convention to 
establish an autonomous civil aviation authority.
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 Treaties – Obligations – Pacta Sunt Servanda – Effect 
on Municipal Regulations – Taxation
Air Canada v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. 169507,  
21 January 2016]
Air Canada, an offline air carrier selling passenger tickets in the Philippines 
through Aerotel, a general sales agent in the Philippines, sought a refund of in-
come taxes for the period covering the 3rd Quarter of 2000 to the 2nd Quarter 
of 2002, paid to the Commissioner on Internal Revenue. The Commissioner 
based its assessment on provisions of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code 
that imposed a 2.5% tax on gross billings and a 32% rate of income tax on 
foreign corporations engaged in business in the Philippines, but Air Canada in-
voked Article viii of the 1977 Convention between the Philippines and  Canada 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income (the Philippines-Canada Tax Treaty) which 
provides that the Philippines will not impose a tax higher than 1.5% of the car-
rier’s gross revenue derived from sources within the Philippines.
After payment under protest, Air Canada filed a petition for review with the 
Court of Tax Appeals and sought a refund of taxes erroneously paid. The Court 
of Tax Appeals held that Air Canada was not liable for the 2.5% tax on gross 
billings, but nevertheless liable for the 32% corporate income tax. Air Canada 
brought the decision to the Supreme Court upon a petition for review.
The Supreme Court ruled that Air Canada was not liable for either that 2.5% 
tax on gross billings nor the 32% corporate income tax. Since it was an offline 
air carrier that did not operate flights into and out of the Philippines, the tax 
on gross billings was not applicable as the National Internal Revenue Code 
defined “Gross Philippine Billings” as “the amount of gross revenue derived 
from carriage of persons, excess baggage, cargo and mail originating from the 
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Philippines in a continuous and uninterrupted flight, irrespective of the place 
of sale or issue and the place of payment of the ticket or passage document.”
Neither could it be held liable for the corporate income tax considering 
the existence of an effective tax treaty between the Philippines and the home 
country of the foreign air carrier. The Philippines-Canada Tax Treaty was duly 
ratified on 21 December 1977 and became valid and effective on that date. The 
Court reiterated that a tax treaty is an agreement entered into by sovereign 
States “for purposes of eliminating double taxation of income and capital, pre-
venting fiscal evasion promoting mutual trade and investment, and  according 
fair and equitable tax treatment to foreign residents or nationals.” It invoked 
the constitutional provision that the Philippines “adopts the generally accept-
ed principles of international law as part of the law of the land,” and pacta 
sunt servanda as basis for the application of the provisions of tax treaties en-
tered into by the Philippines to its National Internal Revenue Code. Although 
Air Canada was deemed to be taxable as a resident foreign corporation due to 
the operation of Aerotel as its agent, it was nevertheless subject to not more 
than 1.5% tax on gross revenues pursuant to the Philippine-Canada Tax Treaty. 
The Court explained that tax treaties form part of the law of the land, and 
 Philippine jurisprudence applied the statutory construction principle that 
specific laws prevail over general ones. Since the Philippine-Canada Tax Treaty 
is more specific that the general provisions of the National Internal Revenue 
Code, the former governs.
Human Rights
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights – Treaties and 
Covenants – Rights Of The Child – Citizenship
Poe-Llamanzares v. Commissionon Elections [G.R. No. 221697, 221698–700, 
8 March 2016]
Several petitions before the Commission on Elections questioned the qualifi-
cations of Senator Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares to run for Presi-
dent in the 2016 national elections due to her having been a found abandoned 
as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo Province in 1968. Peti-
tioners argued, among others, that she could not be considered a natural-born 
Filipino citizen on account of the fact that she was a foundling. The Commis-
sion denied all of the petitions for disqualification, and its resolutions were all 
brought to the Supreme Court for review.
On the issue of citizenship of foundlings, the Supreme Court ruled that Sen-
ator Poe-Lllamanzares was to be considered a natural-born citizen  consistently 
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with the provisions of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(udhr), Article 7 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Article 
24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Court found 
that the three instruments all obligated the Philippines to grant nationality 
from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
Further, the Court determined that it is a generally accepted principle of 
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of 
the country in which the foundling is found. It cited two conventions even 
though they were not ratified by the Philippines, namely, Article 14 of the 1930 
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws and Article 2 of the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Stateless-
ness as giving effect to the udhr. It also relied on evidence of State practice 
showing that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and 
Europe passed legislation recognizing foundlings as their citizens, while a 
survey demonstrated that 166 out of 189 countries recognized foundlings as 
citizens.
Law of the Sea
 Coastal State – Territorial Sea – Submarine Cables
Capitol Wireless v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas [G.R. No. 180110,  
30 May 2016]
The Province of Batangas assessed real estate taxes upon Capital Wireless, Inc. 
for owning and operating a submarine cable within the municipal waters of 
the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas, and sought to levy and auction the 
submarine cable system. Capital Wireless refused to pay the real estate taxes, 
arguing that the cable system lay outside of Philippine territory, and tried to 
prevent the levy and auction sale by filing a petition with the Regional Trial 
Court. Its petition was dismissed for failure to pay under protest and appeal 
the assessment to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals. Capital Wire-
less then appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter affirmed the deci-
sion of the Regional Trial Court. The case was then brought to the Supreme 
Court.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies, but nevertheless affirmed the decision of the lower court de-
claring that submarine wires or cables used for communications may be 
taxed like other real estate. The Court deemed submarine cables to be akin to 
electrical transmission lines that qualify as “machinery” subject to real prop-
erty taxes. It took judicial notice that Nasugbu was a coastal  municipality and 
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its  surrounding sea falls within the 12 nautical mile territorial sea of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, over which the country has sovereignty, 
thus the portion of the submarine cable lies within Philippine territory and 
falls within the jurisdiction of the local taxing authorities in accordance 
with the taxation powers delegated to municipalities and provinces under 
the Local Government Code. In the absence of either domestic legislation 
or international agreement exempting the submarine cables from taxation, 
Capitol Wireless was deemed liable for real property taxes on the submarine 
cable.
Exclusive Economic Zone – Continental Shelf – Dispute  
Settlement
In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration between the Republic of 
the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China [pca Case No. 2013–19,  
July 12, 2016]
The Republic of the Philippines commenced arbitration proceedings against 
the People’s Republic of China under Annex vii of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) on 22 January 2013. The Philippines 
disputed the nature and basis of China’s claim to extensive areas in the South 
China Sea, represented by the “nine-dash line” map; contested the source of 
maritime entitlements in the Spratly Islands region and Scarborough Shoal; 
and challenged the legality of China’s actions against Philippine fishing and 
petroleum activities, as well as building of artificial islands, within the  latter’s 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. China refused to participate 
in the proceedings. After a mostly favorable determination of jurisdiction on 
29 October 2015, the ad hoc tribunal rendered an Award on the Merits.
The Tribunal characterized China’s claims in the South China Sea as a his-
toric claim to living and non-living resources within the area enclosed by the 
“nine-dash line”, and held that any and all such historic claims to waters beyond 
the territorial sea were relinquished and abandoned by China when it signed 
and ratified the unclos, and agreed to the establishment of the eez and conti-
nental shelf regimes for all coastal States. It then found that none of the features 
in the Spratly Islands region and Scarborough Shoal were capable of generating 
their own eez and continental shelf, by laying down nine criteria for determin-
ing whether or not a maritime feature was to be legally deemed an “island” or a 
“rock” as described in unclos Article 121. Among these criteria are the natural 
capacity to sustain human habitation or economic life without external ad-
ditions or modifications, stable and self-sustained habitation, and a resident 
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 population. In the absence of eez or continental shelf zones appertaining to 
any island, the sea areas around the Spratly Islands region and Scarborough 
Shoal could be considered as either part of the Philippine eez and continental 
shelf measured from the Philippines baselines, or part of the high seas.
The Tribunal then found that China’s interference with Philippine fishing 
and petroleum activities, construction of one of seven artificial islands, dan-
gerous maneuvering against Philippine ships, and failure to prevent Chinese 
fishermen from fishing in the Philippine eez were all in contravention of the 
Philippines’ sovereign rights over its eez and continental shelf. It also found 
that the construction of artificial islands and failure to prevent its fishermen 
from engaging in destructive fishing practices violated China’s obligations to 
preserve and protect the marine environment. Finally, it ruled that the con-
struction of artificial islands also violated China’s obligations to refrain from 
taking actions that cause permanent damage and irreparable harm to the ma-
rine environment, and from acting prejudicially against the rights of the Phil-
ippines and aggravating the dispute.
Treaties
 Accession – Executive Agreement
Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary 
Ochoa, et al. [G.R. No. 204605, 19 July 2016]
The Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines commenced a spe-
cial civil action for certiorari and prohibition to challenge the validity of 
the   Philippines’ accession to the Madrid Protocol without the concurrence 
of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it was classified as an executive 
agreement by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The Supreme Court dismissed the action, finding no grave abuse of discre-
tion on the part of the Executive Branch’s classification since it was done in 
light of existing State policies and legislation on intellectual property. The 
Court observed that there are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of en-
tering into either a treaty or an executive agreement on any given subject as 
an instrument of international relations; the primary consideration for such 
a choice appears to be the parties’ intent and desire to craft their agreement 
in a way that furthered their respective interests. It reiterated that the matter 
of form is subordinate to the effectiveness and binding effect or enforcement 
of the instrument, inasmuch as the parties, regardless of form, are obliged to 




 Universal Declaration of Human Rights – Treaties and 
Covenants – Rights of the Child – Non-Discrimination
David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal [G.R. 221538, 20 September 2016]
The petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings before the Supreme Court 
against Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares, seeking to unseat her as  Senator 
for allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and therefore 
not qualified to hold such public office under the 1987 Constitution. It is alleged 
that she cannot be a natural-born citizen because she is a foundling whose par-
ents, and therefore citizenship, are unknown according to the principle of jus 
sanguinis, and that she failed to establish her Philippine “blood line.”
The Court dismissed the petition, citing among others, that even more basic 
that being citizens, foundlings are human persons whose dignity are valued 
and respected by civilized nations. In addition to provisions of domestic leg-
islation and the Philippine Constitution, the Court invoked the UN Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child which requires the States Parties to protect 
children’s rights to immediate registration and nationality after birth, against 
statelessness, and against discrimination on account of their birth status. The 
Court also invoked the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which requires that children be allowed immediate registration after birth 
and to acquire a nationality, as well as be defended against discrimination. To 
deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and render them state-
less would impose undue burdens and discrimination, and undermine their 
development.
 Treaties and Covenants – International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights
Ocampo, et al. v. Enriquez [G.R. No. 225973, 8 November 2016]
Petitioners challenged the decision of the Philippine Government to allow 
the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, who imposed authoritar-
ian rule in the Philippines from 1972 to 1986, in the Libingan ng mga Bayani 
(National Heroes’ Cemetery). They argued that the burial violates the rights 
of human rights victims to “full and effective” reparations provided under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), the Basic Prin-
ciples and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law adopted by the UN General Assembly on 
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16 December 2005, and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and 
 Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity issued by 
the UN Economic and Social Council on 8 February 2005.
The Supreme Court demurred, arguing that the iccpr and cited UN docu-
ments on reparations and combatting impunity only called for legislative mea-
sures, national measures and provisions for administrative or judicial recourse. 
The Court declared that the Philippines is more than compliant with its inter-
national obligations, and since the People Power Revolution on 25  February 
1986 had done its share to respect, protect, and fulfill the country’s human 
rights obligations.
 Jurisdiction – Immunity from Jurisdiction
Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers v. gcc Approved Medical 
Centers Association [G.R. Nos. 207132 and 207205, 6 December 2016]
The Department of Health (doh) issued an administrative order to stop the 
practice of “referral decking,” or equal distribution of migrant workers among 
several clinics that were members of the gcc Approved Medical Centers As-
sociation (gamca) for purposes of securing medical clearances for their appli-
cations and permits to work overseas in the Gulf Cooperative Council States. 
The prohibition was issued in accordance with Section 16 of Republic Act No. 
10022, which granted the doh regulatory powers over all clinics that conduct 
medical examinations on Philippine migrant workers as a requirement for 
overseas employment. gamca filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court to 
annul the order of the doh, arguing that the referral decking system was a re-
quirement of the Gulf Cooperative Council States (gcc), which exempted the 
gamca from the prohibition of the doh. The Association of Medical Clinics 
for Overseas Workers intervened in the proceedings on the side of the Depart-
ment of Health. The court granted the petition and ordered the doh to cease 
and desist from implementing the orders against gamca. The decision was 
brought to the Supreme Court on appeal.
The Court rejected gamca’s argument that the referral decking system was 
a requirement of the gcc exempt from doh regulation on the ground of sov-
ereign equality and independence of States. While it recognized the principle 
of sovereign immunity, it also restricted such immunity to acts jus imperii, or 
public acts, and did not deem it extended to agents of foreign governments in 
the Philippines engaged in commercial transactions and complying with the 
latter’s laws. gamca was unable to prove that the gcc extended its sovereign 
immunity to gamca. The Court also determined that the gcc’s prerogative to 
apply visa requirements to any foreign nationals including overseas workers 
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who seek to enter their territory did not affect the legality of the prohibition 
against the referral decking system.
 Treaties and Covenants – International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights
Wilson v. Ermita [G.R. No. 189220, 7 December 2016]
The petitioner, a British national, was accused and charged with the crime of 
rape before the Regional Trial Court, but the conviction was subsequently ac-
quitted on appeal due to serious discrepancies and inconsistent statements in 
the testimony of the victim. Pending appeal, he filed with the UN Human Rights 
Committee a case against the Philippines for violations of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), particularly the  provisions on 
the rights of the accused. After his release from detention he returned to the 
UK, and sought compensation from the Board of Claims of the Department of 
Justice, which awarded him damages. However, the petitioner was denied a visa 
to be able to return to the Philippines to collect such damages due to the pres-
ence of his name on the immigration watch list for previously overstaying in 
the Philippines and conviction of a crime. Subsequently, the UN Human Rights 
Committee issued a View stating that the compensation awarded by the Phil-
ippines did not take into account the seriousness of the breaches of his human 
rights, nor did it refund the amounts unjustly imposed upon him for overstay-
ing his tourist visa which was directly attributable to his wrongful conviction. 
The petitioner wrote to the Executive Secretary to comply with the conclusions 
of the View of the UN Human Rights Committee. No action having been taken 
a year later, the petitioner filed an action for mandamus, arguing that by virtue 
of the doctrine of transformation, the View issued by the Committee consti-
tutes part of international law and the Philippines is obliged to enforce the 
 same.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, noting that while the Philippines 
was indeed a party to the iccpr and Optional Protocol, and expressly recog-
nized the competence of the UN Human Rights Committee, nowhere in the 
instrument is it stated that the View of the Committee forms part of the treaty. 
Any Views issued only display “important characteristics of a judicial deci-
sion” but are not per se decisions that may be enforced outright by Philippine 
courts, and therefore are mere recommendations to guide the State. Action 
on such recommendations are within the purview of the Legislative and Ex-
ecutive branches, not the Judicial branch whose power under the 1987 Consti-
tution is limited to the settlement of actual controversies and interpretation 
of law.
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International Agreements
 Treaties – Agreements Concurred by the Philippine 
Senate
Ratification of the Articles of Agreement of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, 5 December 2016
The Philippine Senate issued Resolution No. 33 concurring with the ratifica-
tion of the Articles of Agreement of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. 
The Articles of Agreement were signed in China on 31 December 2015, and es-
tablishes the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as an international finan-
cial institution.
<UN>
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 State Recognition – Kosovo
Singapore recognized the Republic of Kosovo as an independent State on 
1 December 2016 and established diplomatic relations. Singapore is the fourth 
member State of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (asean) to recog-
nize the independence of Kosovo. The other three States are Malaysia, Brunei, 
and Thailand.
 Bilateral Investment Treaty – Standard of Review 
on Appeals in Jurisdictional Rulings – “Moving 
Treaty Frontier” (“mtf”) Doctrine in Customary 
International Law – Interpretation of Treaty
Sanum Investments Limited v the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic [2016] sgca 57
On 29 September 2016, the Singapore Court of Appeal (“sgca”) released its 
decision in Sanum Investments Ltd v the Government of the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic, reversing the decision of the Singapore High Court which had 
previously held that an arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the claims 
by a Macanese investor under the 1993 Bilateral Investment Treaty between 
the People’s Republic of China and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(“PRC-Laos bit”).
This case relates to a dispute between a Macanese investor, Sanum Invest-
ments Limited (“Sanum”) and the Lao Government. Sanum alleged that the 
Lao Government deprived it of the benefits it derived from its capital invest-
ment through the imposition of unfair and discriminatory taxes. An arbitral 
tribunal was constituted under the uncitral Arbitration Rules, with the seat 
in Singapore. The arbitral tribunal rendered a preliminary award  upholding its 
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jurisdiction and the Lao government then commenced challenge  proceedings 
before the High Court in Singapore. The High Court held that the PRC-Laos bit 
did not extend to Macau which resulted in Sanum’s appeal to the sgca.
Key Findings of the SGCA
First, the sgca found that a de novo standard of review applied to jurisdic-
tional rulings, consistent with Singapore case law, and this applied equally in 
investor-state arbitrations.
Second, the sgca found that the PRC-Laos bit equally applied to Macau 
based on the “moving treaty frontier” (“mtf”) doctrine in customary interna-
tional law, even if Macau had been under Portuguese rule when the PRC-Laos 
bit was signed in 1993 and was only handed over to the prc in 1999. A State’s 
treaty would automatically extend to new territory that became a part of that 
state. The mtf doctrine applied as a matter of presumption to the bit, and 
as none of the evidence adduced by the Lao Government could displace this 
 presumption, the mtf doctrine applied to cover Macau after it was transferred.
Third, Laos had sought to adduce evidence after the arbitral award was 
issued by way of two Note Verbales (“NVs”). The sgca found that the new 
 evidence would be given weight if they were consistent with the evidence ad-
duced before the critical date. However, the sgca did not accord the NVs any 
weight because they contradicted the pre-critical date position.
Fourth, the sgca rejected Laos’ arguments that the NVs constituted sub-
sequent agreement or subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(a) or (b) of the 
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This was because subsequent agree-
ment or practice could not have retroactive effect and there was no evidence 
before the critical date to show that there was any agreement that the PRC-
Laos bit did not apply to Macau. Giving effect to the 2014 NVs could amount 
to effecting a retroactive amendment of the PRC-Laos bit, which would not be 
permissible.
Fifth, in respect of Laos’ second jurisdictional objection that Sanum’s claims 
fell outside the scope of the dispute resolution clause in the bit, the court 
agreed with a broad construction of the relevant clause (“Article 8(3)”) and 
found that Article 8(3) permitted arbitration as long as the claims included a 
dispute over the amount of compensation. Considering the fork in the road 
provision in Article 8(3), the Court found that a narrow reading would vio-
late the principle of effective interpretation as it would be open to a host state 
to avoid arbitration by not submitting the liability dispute to its courts alto-
gether, which would render protection under Article 8(3) illusory. In this re-




 Arbitration – Applicability of Arbitral Clause in 
Main Contract
Rals International Pte Ltd v Cassa di Risparmio di Parma e Piacenza Spa 
[2016] sgca 53
In this case, the sgca affirmed that a negotiable instrument is not governed 
by an arbitration agreement in an underlying contract unless that agreement 
is expressly incorporated into the negotiable instrument. Rals International 
Pte Ltd (“Rals”) entered into a contract with Oltremare srl, which contained 
an arbitration clause. The contract provided for payment to be made in cash 
instalments and promissory notes. The promissory notes were then assigned 
to a bank. However, when the bank presented the first four notes for payment, 
they were dishonoured by Rals. The bank sued Rals in the High Court, and Rals 
sought to stay the bank’s claim under Section 6 of the International Arbitration 
Act. The High Court declined to stay the action.
Invoking Larsen Oil and Gas Pte Ltd v Petropod Ltd [2011] 3 slr 414, Rals ap-
pealed to the sgca on the sole ground that a widely drafted arbitration clause 
meant that the notes fell within its scope. It argued that arbitration clauses 
should be construed generously. In response, the bank argued that the notes 
did not fall under the arbitration agreement, and even if they did, the bank’s 
status as an endorsee meant that its claim was outside the scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement.
The sgca found in the bank’s favor. Importantly, the sgca stated that the 
rule of construction, as in the English case of Fiona Trust & Holding Corpo-
ration and others v Privalov and others [2007] 2 ALL ER (Comm) 1053 was that 
all disputes between parties to an arbitration agreement are assumed to fall 
within the scope of the agreement unless shown otherwise, but could not be 
applied when there were compelling reasons that would displace the assumed 
intention of the parties. Here, the obligations under the promissory notes were 
separate and autonomous from the main contract, as an obligation under such 
a promissory note was simply an unconditional promise in writing made by 
one person to another agreeing to pay a sum of money. Further, there was no 
term in the arbitration agreement or the main contract that expressly stated 
that the arbitration agreement was to encompass disputes arising out of the 
notes; neither was an arbitration agreement expressly incorporated into the 
notes. Ral’s application was dismissed.
 International Agreement – Paris Agreement
Singapore ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016. By ratifying the Agreement, 
Singapore formalized its pledge to reduce its Emissions Intensity by 36% from 
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2005 levels by 2030 and to stabilize emissions with the aim of peaking around 
2030. The pledge builds on Singapore’s existing commitment to reduce green-
house gas emissions by 16% by 2020 from the business-as-usual level.
 International Agreement – Domestic Incorporation
Parliament passed the Choice of Court Agreements Act on 14 April 2016 to do-
mestically incorporate the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements done 
at The Hague on 30 June 2005. The law came into force on 1 October 2016.
 International Agreement – Convention On Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters
Singapore ratified the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters (“the Convention”) on 20 January 2016. It signed the Conven-
tion on 29 May 2013. The Convention facilitates bilateral tax information ex-
change agreements between state parties. It was developed by the oecd and 
the Council of Europe, and entered into force in 1995. Among its signatories 
are all G20  countries, most oecd countries as well as major financial centres 
such as Singapore, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. Ratifying the Convention 
expands Singapore’s network of partners for exchange of information on re-
quest and furthers Singapore’s strong commitment to combat cross-border tax 
evasion.
 International Agreement – Singapore-Australia 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
Singapore and Australia signed a first set of agreements on 13 October 2016 
under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (csp), a landmark pact that 
is expected to advance bilateral relations between the two countries. This first 
set comprised four Memorandums of Understanding (mou) in the areas of 
defence, trade, science and innovation, and anti-drug trafficking. Under the 
defence initiatives, the Singapore Armed Forces (saf) will be able to extend 
its training in Australia for 18 weeks a year with a larger contingent of troops. 
Both sides will also jointly develop new training facilities in Australia. With 
respect to trade, revisions will be introduced to the Singapore-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement, which will facilitate business travel between the two coun-
tries as well as improve access to government procurement in both countries. 
 Further collaborations and matching contributions will be made in science 
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and  innovation to support areas of mutual interests. This includes collabo-
rations on research and development, the sharing of research space, and co-
operation among tech start-ups from both sides. Lastly, the countries agreed 
to work together to counter international drug trafficking, including greater 
cooperation, joint trainings, as well as exchange of information and best prac-
tices among law enforcement agencies.
 International Agreements – Bilateral Investment 
Treaties
Singapore signed three Bilateral Investment Treaties (bits) in 2016, i.e., with 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Iran. Of these, the Singapore-Iran bit is of the most 
interest. It was signed on 29 February 2016, following a time of renewed inter-
est among the business community with the lifting of sanctions against Iran. 
Singapore is the second country after Japan to sign a bit with Iran following 
the lifting of United Nations sanctions in January 2016. The signing of the bit 
took place in conjunction with a business delegation visit to Iran, which com-
prised representatives from the oil and gas, petrochemicals, logistics, info-
communications, and professional services industries.
 International Agreements – Avoidance of Double 
Taxation Agreements (“dtas”)
Singapore signed several bilateral treaties concerning double taxation in 2016:
– Singapore and Cambodia signed an Agreement for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation on 20 May 2016;
– Singapore and Ethiopia signed an Agreement for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation on 24 August 2016; and
– Singapore and India signed a new Protocol to amend their bilateral dta on 
30 December 2016.
The Singapore-Cambodia and Singapore-Ethiopia dtas clarify the taxing 
rights of both countries on all forms of income flows arising from cross-border 
business activities, and minimises the double taxation of such income. This 
will lower barriers to cross-border investment and boost trade and economic 
flows between the two countries.
The Singapore-India Protocol comes on the heels of the India-Mauritius dta 
to phase out capital gains tax exemptions. As the capital gains tax exemption 
for shares in the Singapore-India dta was pegged to the India-Mauritius dta, 
379State Practice of Asian Countries in International Law
<UN>
the Singapore-India dta had to be similarly amended. The updated dta pre-
serves the existing tax exemption on capital gains for shares acquired before 
1 April 2017, while providing a transitional arrangement for shares acquired on 
or after 1 April 2017. For shares acquired on or after 1 April 2017, there will be 
a two-year transition period, during which the capital gains from such shares 
will be taxed at 50% of India’s domestic tax rate if the capital gains arise during 
1 April 2017 to 31 March 2019. The new Protocol will be underpinned by strin-
gent substance requirements which are unique to the Singapore-India dta, 
and which ensure that the Protocol can only be enjoyed by tax residents with 
substantive economic activities.
The following treaties concerning double taxation also entered into force 
in 2016:
– The Singapore-Rwanda dta entered into force on 15 February 2016.
– The revised Singapore-Thailand dta entered into force on 15 February 2016.
– The Second Protocol amending Singapore’s standing dta with the United 
Arab Emirates entered into force on 16 March 2016. The revised terms in-
clude longer threshold periods to ascertain the presence of a permanent 
establishment and lower withholding tax rates for dividends and interest 
income.
– The revised Singapore-France dta entered into force on 1 June 2016. The 
revised dta offers improved terms such as lower withholding tax rates for 
dividends and includes anti-abuse provisions.
– The new Singapore-Lao People’s Democratic Republic dta entered into 
force on 11 November 2016.
– The Protocol amending the existing Singapore-Russian Federation dta en-
tered into force on 25 November 2016.
– The revised Singapore-Republic of South Africa dta entered into force on 16 
December 2016.
<UN>
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 Agreements Concurred by Thailand in 2016
 Human Rights – Person with Disability – Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Person 
with Disabilities
The Royal Thai Government attaches great importance to the promotion and 
the protection of the rights and the empowerment of persons with disabilities 
in line with international standards by becoming a party to the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (crpd) since 28 August 2008.
On 2 September 2016, Thailand has become a party to the Optional Protocol 
to the crpd and it will enter into force for Thailand on 2 October 2016, making 
Thailand the 90th country to become a party to the Optional Protocol. The ac-
cession to the OP-CRPD is in accordance with the Cabinet’s resolution on 19 
April 2016, which is a part of the current Government’s endeavors to continue 
to promote and protect the human rights of people in Thailand.
This Optional Protocol allows for individual complaints to be submitted to 
the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for any violation 
of the rights as enshrined in the crpd. The OP-CRPD will also serve as an-
other mechanism that helps strengthen the promotion and protection of the 
rights of persons with disabilities.
 Labor Rights – ilo Convention No. 187 on the 
Promotion Framework for Occupational Safety  
and Health
On 23 March 2016, Thailand has become a party to the International Labor 
Organization (ilo) Convention No. 187 on the Promotional Framework for Oc-
cupational Safety and Health, 2006 (ilo Convention No. 187). The ratification 
reassures Thailand’s commitment to improve working and living conditions 
for workers in compliance with international labor standards. This is the 16th 
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ilo Convention ratified by Thailand, which will enter into force on 23 March 
2017, 12 months after the ratification.
The ilo Convention No. 187 is one of the ilo’s core instruments in safety 
and health at the workplace. The member States that ratify this Convention 
are obliged to formulate a policy and issue supporting domestic laws and regu-
lations to ensure occupational safety and health and to effective implemen-
tation. The promotion of occupational safety and health is part of the ilo’s 
agenda of decent work for all, in line with the ilo’s Constitution which aims at 
protecting workers and preventing illness, injury and death at the workplace. 
The importance of decent work is also highlighted in Goal 8 of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (sdgs), which seeks to promote inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, employment and decent work for all.
Occupational safety and health issues have been high on Thailand’s Na-
tional Agenda since 2007. In 2011, the Occupational Safety, Health and Envi-
ronment Act was promulgated and was followed by National Master Plan on 
Occupational Safety, Health and Environment (2012 – 2016). mol is currently 
drafting the 2nd National Master Plan (2017–2021) as a guideline to continu-
ously promote safety and health in an appropriate environment for workers.
 Labor Rights – Maritime Labor Convention
On 7 June 2016, Thailand has become a party to the Maritime Labor Conven-
tion, 2006 (mlc, 2006). The ratification reconfirms Thailand’s commitment to 
improve working and living conditions for workers and seafarers in compli-
ance with international labor standards. The mlc is the 17th ilo Convention 
ratified by Thailand, which is the 77th Member State to have ratified this land-
mark Convention. The mlc 2006 will enter into force on 7 June 2017, one year 
after its ratification.
The mlc 2006 outlines seafarers’ rights, such as fair terms of employment, 
health protection, welfare measures and decent working and living conditions 
on-board ships. It establishes a strong compliance and enforcement mecha-
nism based on flag State inspection and certification of seafarers’ working and 
living conditions. This is supported by port State inspection of ships to ensure 
on-going compliance between inspections.
The ratification of the mlc, 2006 can be of tripartite benefit to ship-owners, 
seafarers, and governments: (i) for ship-owners, with the certificates of mari-
time labor compliance prescribed under the mlc, 2006, obstacles will be 
eradicated and entry into port of ratifying countries will be facilitated; (ii) for 
seafarers, they will be entitled to an international standardized protection in 
every process regarding recruitment, working and living on board outside of 
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working hours; (iii) for governments, they will be able to maintain maritime 
fleets which are internationally accepted and their international trade com-
petitiveness will be enhanced.
 Trafficking in Persons – asean Convention Against 
Trafficking in Person Especially, Women and  
Children (actip) – asean Plan of Action against 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (apa)
Thailand deposited the Instrument of Ratification of the asean Convention 
against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (actip) on 
21 November 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, Thailand and the other asean member 
countries jointly signed the actip and endorsed the asean Plan of Action 
against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (apa). It is 
asean’s first regional legally-binding instrument to combat trafficking in per-
sons, with the aim of strengthening regional cooperation against trafficking in 
persons among the asean Member States. It builds on the asean Declaration 
against Trafficking in Persons particularly Women and Children which was ad-
opted in 2004. The purposes of this Convention are: 1) to prevent and combat 
trafficking in persons, especially women and children; 2) to protect and assist 
victims of trafficking in persons; and 3) to promote cooperation among the 
parties in order to meet these objectives.
On 24 July 2016, Thailand deposited the Instrument of Ratification of the 
actip with the Secretary-General of asean. The ratification of the Conven-
tion affirms Thailand’s continued commitment to combating human traffick-
ing and is consistent with the Government’s policy which declared fighting 
human trafficking as a national agenda. It also underscores the Government’s 
commitment to cooperate with the asean Member States to jointly combat 
this crime. In addition, the implementation of the apa, Thailand has estab-
lished a sub-committee to follow up by organizing meetings with concerned 
agencies to raise awareness of both actip and apa and delegate line agencies 
to further initiate programs and activities to support the implementation.
Municipal Law
 Children’s Rights – The Prevention of the Adolescent 
Pregnancy Problem
On 30 March 2016, the National Legislative Assembly of Thailand enacted the 
Act for Prevention and Solution of Adolescent Pregnancy Problem B.E. 2559 
(2016), which deals with the increasing number of adolescent pregnancy in 
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Thailand, which may affect children’s rights recognized under the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child (crc). It describes a prevention and solution 
strategy for educational establishments, and defines the powers and duties of 
the instituted “Prevention and Solution of the Adolescent Pregnancy Problem 
Committee”.
The Act provides the clear definition of “adolescent”, which refers to a per-
son over ten years of age but not yet twenty years of age; while “pupil”, means 
an adolescent who is receiving a basic education at a primary or secondary 
level, either general or vocational, or the equivalence, in a public or private 
educational establishment; and “student” means an adolescent who is receiv-
ing a higher education or the equivalence, in a public or private educational 
establishment (Section 3).
The Act provides an adolescent has the right to make a decision by himself 
and has the right to information and knowledge, right to reproductive health 
service, right to confidentiality and privacy, and right to social welfare provi-
sion, that are equal and non-discriminative, and is entitled to any other rights 
for the purpose of this Act accurately, completely and adequately (Section 5).
To comply with this, the Act also provides prevention and solution for edu-
cation, service and business establishments respectively.1 In addition, the Act 
provides social welfare relating to prevention and solution of the adolescent 
pregnancy problem as follows: (1) to promote and support Children and Youth 
1 Section 6 provides that “An educational establishment shall undertake the prevention and 
solution of the adolescent pregnancy problem as follows:
(1)  to provide teaching and learning on sexuality studies which is appropriate to age of 
pupils or students;
(2)  to recruit and develop teaching personnel to be capable of providing sexuality studies 
and counselling on the prevention and solution of adolescent pregnancy problem to 
pupils or students;
(3)  to establish a system of supervision, assistance and protection for pregnant pupils or 
students to receive education in a suitable and continuous manner, including estab-
lishing a referral system to ensure the receipt of an appropriate reproductive health 
service and social welfare provision.
The prescription of the categories of educational establishments and undertaking of the 
educational establishments in each category shall be in accordance with the rules, proce-
dures and conditions as prescribed in the Ministerial Regulation.”
Section 7 provides that “A service establishment shall undertake the prevention and solu-
tion of the adolescent pregnancy problem as follows:
(1)  to accurately, completely and adequately provide information and knowledge on the 
prevention and solution of adolescent pregnancy problem to adolescent recipients 
of service;
(2)  to provide counselling and reproductive health services which are up to the standard 
and consistent with the rights under section 5, to adolescent recipients of service, 




Councils at the level of Changwat (province) and Amphoe (sub-province) 
to establish the children and youth networks in the areas to be the leaders in 
 preventing, resolving, and monitoring the problem of adolescent pregnancy; (2) to 
promote and support the relevant State agencies and private organizations to 
coordinate, monitor, and assist pregnant adolescents and their families; (3) 
to provide vocational training in accordance with interests and proficiencies 
to pregnant adolescents, who intend to receive the training, prior and after 
childbirth, and to coordinate to procure suitable employment; (4) to provide 
alternative families in the case where adolescents are unable to raise the chil-
dren themselves; (5) to provide other social welfare to promote the prevention 
and solution of adolescent pregnancy problem (Section 9) and provides the 
local administration shall have the powers and duties to undertake to ensure 
that adolescents in its local administrative area have the rights under section 5 
(Section 10).
The Act sets up mechanism called “Prevention and Solution of the Adoles-
cent Pregnancy Problem Committee” has powers and duties to propose poli-
cies and strategies on the prevention and solution of the adolescent pregnancy 
problem to the Council of Ministers for consideration; to propose a guideline 
for amendment to and revision of the law relating to the prevention and solu-
tion of the adolescent pregnancy problem to the Council of Ministers, and to 
submit opinions to the Ministers on the issuance of Ministerial Regulations 
under this Act; to submit a report on the prevention and solution of the adoles-
cent pregnancy problem to the Council of Ministers at least once a year; to pre-
scribe an operational guideline for State agencies and private organizations for 
the prevention, assistance, resolution, and remedy of the adolescent pregnancy 
problem, adolescent reproductive health problem, sexual violence, and sexual 
offences; to provide State agencies and private organizations consultation, rec-
ommendations, and solution to difficulties in the course of  undertaking the 
The prescription of the categories of service establishments and undertaking of the ser-
vice establishments in each category shall be in accordance with the rules, procedures 
and conditions as prescribed in the Ministerial Regulation.”
Section 8 provides that “A business establishment shall undertake the prevention and 
solution of the adolescent pregnancy problem as follows:
(1)  to accurately, completely and adequately provide information and knowledge on the 
prevention and solution of adolescent pregnancy problem to adolescent employees;
(2)  to provide or support adolescent employees with an access to counseling and repro-
ductive health services, including establishing a referral system to ensure the receipt 
of appropriate social welfare provision;
The prescription of the categories of business establishments and undertaking of the ser-
vice establishments in each category shall be in accordance with the rules, procedures 
and conditions as prescribed in the Ministerial Regulation.”
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prevention and solution of the adolescent pregnancy problem; and to perform 
any other acts as prescribed by law to be the powers and duties of the Commit-
tee or as entrusted by the Council of Ministers.
 Human Rights – Human Trafficking – Human 
Trafficking Cases Procedure
On 11 May 2016, the National Law Assembly approved the draft of the Proce-
dure for Human Trafficking Cases Act B.E. 2559 (2016). This new law becomes 
effective on 25 May 2016. The main purpose of this Act is to increase the suf-
ficient of the protection and suppression of human trafficking cases.
This Act institutes a number of key procedural measures to make the adju-
dication process less burdensome for victims: expediting the judicial process 
for trafficking cases, allowing video testimony, increasing witness protection 
and providing other support to victims to ensure their rights are fully protect-
ed. More importantly, it mandates more stringent consideration of bail for traf-
ficking offenders to decrease their ability to flee.
According to this law, the trial of human trafficking cases will use the in-
quisitorial system without delay (Section 8) and in taking of evidence prior to 
the institution of an action or at a preliminary examination stage or during the 
trial permits the witness to testify via a video conference at any other Court 
or official place of business or any other place located in the country or in a 
foreign country and such testimonies shall be deemed as given by the witness 
in the courtroom (Section 9).
In case where the alleged offender or the accused has escaped during the 
proceedings or during trial by the Court, the period of time during which the 
escape of the alleged offender or the accused is in progress shall not be in-
cluded in the computation of the period of prescription (Section 21) and such 
person shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months 
or to a fine not exceeding 10,000 THB or to both. Moreover, the Court has the 
 competence to try and take evidence in the absence of the accused (Section 
33(3)).
To solve the problems of diversion of cases, the delay on court consider-
ation and the efficiency of cases administration, the Act provides the Supreme 
Court shall have the competence to accept a Dika appeal for trial when it is of 
the opinion that the issues to which the Dika appeal relates are the important 
issues deserving adjudication by the Supreme Court such as the issue is as-
sociated with public interests; the judgment or order of the division of  human 
trafficking cases of the Court of Appeal has made the determination of an 
important legal issue in a conflicting manner or in a manner contrary to the 
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precedent judgments or orders of the Supreme Court; the judgment or order 
of the division of human trafficking cases of the Court of Appeal has made the 
determination of an important legal issue in respect of which there exists no 
precedent judgments or orders of the Supreme Court; the judgment or order 
of the division of human trafficking cases of the Court of Appeal is contrary to 
final judgments or orders of other Courts; or the accused is sentenced to death 
or life imprisonment by a judgment of the division of human trafficking cases 
of the Court of Appeal. (Section 45).
 Labor Rights – Child Protection – Labor Protection 
Act
On 12 April 2016, Thailand’s Cabinet approved the draft amendment to the La-
bor Protection Act in relation to child protection. On 17 November 2016, the 
National Legislative Assembly reviewed such draft and approved revisions of 
the Labor Protection Act. The Labor Protection Act (No. 5) was published in 
the Royal Thai Government Gazette to enter into force on 24 January 2017.
This is in line with Thailand’s international obligations such as ilo Con-
vention No. 138 (Minimum Age Convention, 1973). An important part of the 
amendment is to increase punishments that deal with child labor violations. 
For example, increased penalties are imposed on employers who hire workers 
below 15 years of age and below 18 years of age to work in hazardous or illegal 
jobs (Section 148/1). Punishments will include an imprisonment term of up to 
2 years and/or a fine of 400,000 – 800,000 thb per employee (Section 148/2) 
(previously 6 months imprisonment and/or 200,000 thb).
 Human Trafficking – Beggar – Forced Begging – 
Beggar Control Act
The Beggar Control Act B.E. 2559 (2016) was passed into law by the National 
Legislative Assembly on 4 March 2016 and came into effect on 28 July 2016. The 
previous Beggar Control Act of B.E. 2484 (1941) lacked provisions to punish in-
dividuals responsible for trafficking people into forced begging.
The new law forbids people from any and all forms of begging, direct or indi-
rect. It also prohibits impromptu “displays of skill” on public footpaths, requir-
ing performing artists to register with local authorities beforehand (Section 
13). In contrast to the previous Act, which did not criminalize begging and only 
penalized runaways from social welfare facilities, it stipulates that beggars can 
be fined as much as 10,000 thb and/or jailed for up to one month ( Section 19). 
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Penalties for traffickers and those seeking to benefit from begging are more 
severe: prison sentences of up to three years and fines as high as 30,000 thb 
(Section 22, paragraph 1). Government officials found complicit face more ex-
treme punishments: up to five years in jail and/or up to 50,000 thb in fines 
(Section 22, paragraph 2).
This law was enacted to prevent and mitigate the risks of human trafficking. 
Its essence is regulating the protection and quality of life development of beg-
gars, beggar control, setting screening mechanism for separating those “with 
skills” from beggars, and determining the criminal offence for persons who beg 
or exploit the physical disabilities or cognitive or mental impairment of oth-
ers (Section 15). It also provides protection and quality of life development for 
persons who beg in 4 areas – medical (both physical and mental treatments), 
social (reintegration to the society), life skills, and occupational (occupation 
training) (Section 5).
<UN>
* Ho Chi Minh City University of Law, Vietnam





 Law on International Treaties – Implementation of 
International Treaties
Adoption of New Law on International Treaties
On 6 April 2016, at the 11th Meeting of the xiii National Assembly, the Law 
108/2016/QH13 on International Treaties (the “Law on International Treaties 
2016”) has been adopted and would be enforced on 1 July 2016 as the replace-
ment of the Law on Signing, Accession and Implementation of International 
Treaties 2005.
The Law on International Treaties 2016 contains 10 chapters and 84 articles, 
amongst which are 10 retained, 24 deleted, 73 amended and 20 new written ar-
ticles compared with the former 2005 law. Remarkably, many provisions of the 
new law clearly specify related articles of the Constitution 2013 of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, providing a flexible and effective legal framework for the 
signing and implementation of international treaties with the aim to promote 
the international integration of Vietnam.
One of the most significant revisions in the Law on International Treaties 
2016 is the specification of the relationship between international treaties, the 
Constitution of Vietnam and other legal instruments. Accordingly, the Viet-
namese legal instruments (including all laws and regulations) must comply 
with the treaties that Vietnam is a contracting party; however, the conclusion 
of international treaties must not be contrary to the Constitution. Article 6 of 
the Law on International Treaties 2016 specifically stipulates that if any legal 
document, except the Constitution, and a treaty to which Vietnam is a con-
tracting party have different provisions on the same issue, the international 
treaty shall prevail. The Law has set the hierarchy of source of laws as follows: 
(i) the Constitution, (ii) international treaties, and (iii) other legal instruments.
© Tran Viet Dung, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004379633_024
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Another important point of the Law on International Treaties 2016 is the 
adoption of the definition of the term “international treaty,” which significant-
ly affects the status and contents of agreements concluded by the government 
and government agencies. Accordingly, “international treaty” is defined as “an 
agreement in written form concluded in the name of the State or in the name 
of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with a foreign con-
tracting party, that give rise to, change or terminate rights and obligations of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam under international law…”1, which is consis-
tent with the definition of treaty under Article 2.1(a) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (1969). Based on the above mentioned, the State docu-
ments which fully meet the criteria of an international treaty must follow the 
negotiation and signing procedures stipulated by the Law. Declarations and 
political commitments that do not create rights and obligations under inter-
national law shall not be regarded as international treaties under the laws of 
Vietnam. In  addition, the diplomatic documents regulated by provisions on 
the diplomatic administration and on the jurisdiction, functions of the state 
diplomatic agencies are also not quantified as treaty under the Law on Inter-
national Treaties 2016.
Agreements and commitments on foreign borrowing if they are signed in 
the name of the State, the Government of Vietnam and foreign signatories 
such as the State, Foreign Government or the World Bank (WB) Asian Devel-
opment Bank (adb) are still considered as international treaties and fall under 
the scope of the Law. However, specific loan agreements in the name of the 
Government with foreign banks that have provisions governing the law of the 
lending country or the donor country will no longer be considered internation-
al treaties and the signing of such agreements shall be subject to regulations of 
the law on public debt management.2
Furthermore, the specification by the Law of the term “international trea-
ties on human rights, fundamental rights and obligations of citizens” and 
 “international treaties regarding the membership of Vietnam in important in-
ternational and regional organizations,” which are also prescribed in Article 
70 of the Constitution 2013, is to differentiate international treaties on human 
rights, fundamental rights and obligations of citizens from international trea-
ties on specific aspects of cooperation such as legal assistance, extraditory, 
transfer of prisoners, child adoption, crime prevention and other kinds of 
cooperation.3
1 Article 2.1, Law on International Treaties 2016.
2 Article 70.3, Law on International Treaties 2016.
3 Article 29.1 (c), Law on International Treaties 2016.
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Lastly, there are significant revisions on the procedure on conclusion and 
implementation of international treaties to meet the practical requirements of 
international integration. The Law of International Treaties 2016  introduces a 
new chapter on summary order and procedures of negotiation, signing, amend-
ment, supplementation or extension of a number of types of  international treaty. 
In particular, the Law provides for two forms of shortening,  including (i) a 
 simplification of procedures (simultaneous submission of negotiation and 
signing of international agreements); and (ii) reduction of time limits and re-
cords. Hence, the summary order and procedure shall not apply to internation-
al treaties that fall under the authority of the National  Assembly for ratifica-
tion or accession, as these treaties have widespread  effects on the legal system 
and thus, required full procedure of screening and strict assessment by the 
legislators.
Regarding the organization on implementation of the international treaties, 
the Law on International Treaty 2016 regulates in detail the roles and respon-
sibilities of state agencies in planning, urging the formulation and submission 
for promulgation, amendment and supplementation or annulment of legal 
instruments to implement international treaties as well as appraising the con-
formity of legal documents with existing treaties. The two key agencies in this 
procedure is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice, who shall 
regularly report to the Government and the Prime Minister on the implemen-
tation of international treaties.
The adoption of the Law on International Treaties 2016 has great political 
and legal implications in the domestic and foreign domains, creating a  legal 
framework. It is important for the process of international integration of Viet-
nam in the future. The law has created favorable conditions for agencies to 
 propose the signing of international treaties in a unified manner, creating 
mechanisms for coordination among agencies in signing, joining and imple-
menting the treaties. International agreements in full, rhythm, in accordance 
with the provisions of law and international practice.
Criminal Law
 Criminal Law – Law Enforcement – Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters – Execution
Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Hungary Concerning 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
On 16 March 2016, the representatives of Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
and Hungary signed the Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and 
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Hungary concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, witnessed 
by President Truong Tan Sang of Vietnam and members of the Hungary Min-
istry of Justice. 4
Procurator General Nguyen Hoa Binh opined that the signing of the Treaty 
between the two States concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters has significant political and legal meaning. This is the direct legal ground 
for the legal execution of authorities from the two countries to enhance their 
cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, adjudication of criminal cases in 
order to fight against crimes, especially cross-border crimes, as well as to pro-
tect citizens of the two countries. The Treaty is seen as a milestone to promote 
further cooperation in other fields between Vietnam and Hungary, as well as 
the symbol of the determination of the two States in executing international 
agreements in criminal law.
The Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Hungary con-
cerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters consists of 24 articles 
covering the scope of mutual legal assistance, central authority, content 
and formation of the request, refusal or postpone of the assistance, execut-
ing request for  assistance, service of documents, providing information and 
evidence, returning documents for the requested, investigation and restrain, 
collecting evidence and affidavit, arranging the temporary transfer of the per-
son in custody to assist the investigation, requesting the assistance for inves-
tigation or provide evidence, special rules, ocating, restraining and forfeiting 
the proceeds and/or instruments of crime, providing documents, records, 
and evidence through diplomatic channels, transfer the criminal prosecution, 
 security and limitation, protection of personal information, certification and 
authentication, representative and costs, relationa with other international 
agreements, consultation, dispute settlement and final provisions.5
Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of France 
Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
On 6 September 2015, with the witness of the President of the Socialist Repub-
lic of Vietnam Tran Dai Quang and the President of the Republic of France 
Francois Hollande, the representatives of the two States signed the Treaty be-
tween the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of France concerning 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. The Treaty concerning Mutual 
4 The Supreme People’s Procurary of Vietnam (2016), The Signing Ceremony of the Treaty be-
tween the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Hungary concerning Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters, available at http://www.vksndtc.gov.vn/tin-chi-tiet-5590.
5 The Supreme People’s Procurary of Vietnam (2016), The Signing Ceremony of the Treaty 
 between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of France concerning Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, available at http://www.vksndtc.gov.vn/tin-chi-tiet-5590.
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Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters is a significant international  instrument 
in criminal justice as well as the legal ground for contracting parties to provide 
each other ultimate assistance in the process of investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication in order to collect documents, evidence and follow procedures to 
bring justice in criminal cases.
The Treaty between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of 
France concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters consists of the 
Preamble and 24 articles regarding the scope of mutual legal assistance, cen-
tral authority, content and formation of the request, refusal or postpone of the 
assistance, executing request for assistance, service of documents, providing 
information and evidence, returning documents for the requested, investiga-
tion and restrain, collecting evidence and affidavit, arranging the temporary 
transfer of the person in custody to assist the investigation, requesting the as-
sistance for investigation or provide evidence, special rules, ocating, restrain-
ing and forfeiting the proceeds and/or instruments of crime, transfer the 
criminal prosecution, voluntary exchange of information, information about 
criminal records, security and limitation, protection of personal information, 
certification and authentication, expenses, relation with other international 
agreements, consultation, dispute settlement and final provisions.
The Treaty is a remarkable milestone for the new stage of development in 
criminal mutual legal assistance between the two countries. After being rati-
fied by the competent body, the Agreeement will become a legal framework to 
be directly applied in the process of drafting, sending and executing requests 
of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters between Vietnam and France. 
Thus, the cooporation of the two States would efficiently resolve criminal cas-
es, as well as protect the legal rights of citizens of the two countries. Moreover, 
the signing of such Treaty also marked the success of the comprehensive part-
nership between Vietnam and France since 2013.
Diplomatic and Consular
 The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial 
Matters 1965 – Legal authorization – International 
law harmonization
The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters 1965
In order to comply with the multilateral diplomatic policy and to actively 
initiate in the context of global intergration, on 10 March 2016, Vietnam 
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 officially acceeded to The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of 
Judicial and  Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters 1965 
(“The Hague Convention 1965”). Therefore, since 1 November 2016, the 
 Convention has  entered into force for Vietnam. The Ministry of Justice of 
the Socialist  Republic of Vietnam is designated to be the Central Authority 
in accordance with  Article 2 of The Hague Convention 1965 and the one and 
only authority designated for the purpose of Article 6 and Article 9 of this 
Convention.
In the situation where Vietnam is making efforts toward judical and  legal 
reforms, the accession to such a Convention would benefit the country in 
hamonizing its domestic provisions with international standards on legal 
 authorization and legal proceedings. Besides, this also helps judicial bodies 
in Vietnam resolve existing problems arising from civil cases involving for-
eign elements in order to protect the legitimate rights and benefits of both 
Vietnamese and foreign citizen. Thus, with the aim to harmonize Vietnamese 
 provisions with international agreement standard to execute The Hague Con-
vention 1965, a range of Vietnamese domestic rules must be reviewed, changed 
and  supplemented, regarding the channel of service, the sample of service 
 request, the Confirmation of the service result and, especially, the mechanism 
to collect service fees. Hence, the Vietnam Ministry of Justice, together with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People’s Supreme Court, has issued the 
new Joint Circular No. 12/2016/ TTLT-BTP-BNG-TANDTC on 9 October 2016 
regarding the procedures of mutual legal asistance in civil matters to replace 
the Joint Circular No. 15/2011/TTLT-BTP-BNG-TANDTC on 15 September 
2011 guiding the application of certain provisions regarding mutual legal asis-
tance in civil matters governed by the Vietnam Law on Mutual Legal Asistance 
2007.
The new Joint Circular contains 5 chapters, 27 articles on principles, orders, 
procedures, authority regarding the mutual legal assistance on civil matters, 
as well as duties of governmental bodies relating to mutual legal assistance on 
civil matters. In comparision with the Joint Circulation No. 15/2011, the Joint 
Circulation No. 12/2016 introduces notable changes, supplements and replace-
ments as follows:
i. With respect to the Vietnam authority to execute mutual legal  assistance, 
according to Article 10 of the Joint Circulation No. 12/2016, the compe-
tent bodies to request such assistance are the People’s Supreme Court, 
the People’s High Court, the People’s Court at provincial level, the Civil 
Enforcement Bureu at provincial level, the People’s Supreme Procu-
rary, the People’s Procurary at provincial level, other competent organi-
zations according to the law and bodies directly involved requesting a 
legal  authorization. The People’s Court, the People’s Procurary and the 
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Civil Enforcement Bureu at district level, in the course of proceeding and 
 enforcing a civil case which requires abroad legal authorization, shall 
prepare a dossier compliant with Article 11 of the Law on Mutual Legal 
Assistance and Article 11 of the Joint Circulation No. 12/2016, and send to 
the respective bodies at provincial level.
ii. Regarding the authority to execute foreign legal authorization on 
civil matters, according to Article 17 of the new Joint Circulation, the 
 competent bodies are: (i) the People’s Court at provincial level; (ii) the 
Civil Enforcement Bureu at provincial level in case the legal authoriza-
tion concerning the legal enforcement of a civil case; and (iii) bailiff. 
Such provision is compliant with the practice and changes about the or-
ganizational structure, function and duties of related bodies according 
to the Law on People’s Court Organization 2014, the Code on Civil Pro-
cedure 2015, Decree No. 61/2009/ND-CP on 24 July 2009 of the Govern-
ment on the organization and operation of bailiff in Ho Chi Minh City 
and Decree No. 135/2013/ND-CP regarding the changes to Decree No. 61/ 
2009/ND-CP.
iii. With regard to the collecting and payment of actual expenses incured 
from a civil legal authorization, Articles 7, 8 and 9 of the Joint Circulation 
No. 12/2016 are introduced and based on the new provisions of the Code 
on Civil Procedure 2015 and The Hague Convention 1965, respectively, 
concerning the collecting and payment of actual expenses incured from 
a civil legal authorization of Vietnam, the procedure on the transfer and 
advance payment of actual expenses incured from a civil legal authoriza-
tion of Vietnam and the procedure on the transfer and payment of actual 
expenses incurred from such legal authorization.
iv. Relating to the service for overseas Vietnamese citizens, the Joint 
 Circulation No. 15 had regulated specific provisions on the legal autho-
rization procedures for such persons. Nonetheless, due to problems aris-
ing during the course of implementing the Joint Circulation No. 15 and 
 according to advices from the People’s Court at provincial level, on 14 July 
2016, the Official Letter No. 140/TANDTC-HTQT issued by the People’s 
 Supreme Court, together with the Official Letter No. 2089/BNG-LS is-
sued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, unified the proposal on drafting a 
Joint Circulation by the People’s Supreme Court and the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs regarding the service of documents for overseas Vietnamese. 
The extraction of such issue from the Joint Circulation No. 15/2011 to form 
a new separated joint circulation is practically neccessary and compliant 
with legal regulations.
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Sovereignty – Territorial dispute
 Vietnam objection to the ban on fishing by China – 
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea – Dispute 
settlement by peaceful measures
Statement by Vietnam on the objection to the ban on fishing imposed by the 
People’s Republic of China, 17 May 2016
On 17 May 2016, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made an of-
ficial protest against the ban on fishing imposed by the People’s Republic of 
China since 1999. The document stressed that:
Vietnam resolutely refuses and objects to such null and void regulations. 
First and foremost, Vietnam affirms that the country has full historical 
evidence and legal foundations to prove its sovereignty over Hoang Sa 
(Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes.
The Government of Vietnam called on all concerned parties involved in ter-
ritorial and other disputes in the South China Sea to adhere to the United Na-
tions Convention of the Law of the Sea and asserted that such illegal actions 
could not challenge the truth about Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel and 
Spratly Islands.
The Vietnam spokeperson stressed that Vietnam resolutely asks China to 
respect Vietnam’s sovereignty, to immediately end the wrongful actions, and to 
seriously abide by the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the East Sea, as well 
as the Agreement on Basic Principles guiding the Settlement of Issues at Sea, 
between Vietnam and China.6
Statement by Vietnam on Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea in the 
42nd G7 Summit held on 26 – 27 May 2016 in Mie, Japan
On 27 May 2016, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, attended 
the first round of the 42nd G7 summit held on 26 -27 May 2016 in Mie, Japan. 
This was the first time that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam participated in 
the G7 summit.
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeperson Le Hai Binh’s Press Conference on 17 May 2016, 
 Vietnam opposes the ban on fishing imposed in the South China Sea by China [Việt Nam bác bỏ 




At the beginning of his speech, the Vietnam Prime Minister stated that:
We acclaim the prioritized topics in the discussion schedule of the Sum-
mit. They are indeed significant and urgent issues regarding the peace, 
stability and sustainable development of the Asia Pacific region in par-
ticular and the world in general.
The Prime Minister asserted that Vietnam is well aware that its own peace 
and development is part of the world’s peace and welfare, and the contribu-
tion to the resolution of common challenges is the duty as well as the right 
of any country, regardless of its level of development. Then, he also stressed 
that the welfare and sustainable development of Vietnam, Asian region 
and the world is secured only if there is a peaceful and stable international 
 environment, meanwhile the world has been facing the escalating conflicts 
in regions,  especially problems concerning the marine and aviation security, 
safety and freedom in the South China Sea.
The unilateral and illegal actions against internaional law and regional 
agreement, such as the construction of large-scale artificial islands that alters 
the original status of such entities and military enforcement have seriously 
threatened the regional peace and stability. This situation requires the involved 
nations to restrain themselves and settle the dispute with peaceful measures 
compliant with international law, which includes the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea 1982 and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea 2002 (doc), as well as enhancing the resort to diplo-
matic measures based on mutual trust, and looking forward to the future Code 
of Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (coc).7
The G7 leaders reaffirmed the importance of claims based on international 
law, not using force or coercion in trying to drive their claims, and seeking to 
settle disputes by peaceful means such as through judicial procedures, includ-
ing arbitration. They expressed concern about the situation in the East China 
Sea and South China Sea and endorsed the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on 
Maritime Security.8
The Ise-Shima Summit is the first G7 Summit held in Asia in eight years, the 
G7 leaders together with outreach participants discussed quality  infrastructure 
7 Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s Speech in the 42nd G7 Summit held on 26–27 May 2016 
in Mie, Japan, The Prime Minister raises the South China Sea concerns in the extended G7 sum-
mit [Thủ tướng nêu vấn đề Biển Đông tại hội nghị G7 mở rộng], available at http://vnexpress.
net/tin-tuc/the-gioi/thu-tuong-neu-van-de-bien-dong-tai-hoi-nghi-g7-mo-rong-3410261.
html.
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016), G7 Ise-Shima Summit, available at http://www 
.mofa.go.jp/ms/is_s/page4e_000457.html#section5.
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investment and open and stable seas under the theme of “Asian stability and 
prosperity.”
International Economic Law
 Import-Export – gatt 1994 – Anti-dumping Law and 
Practices – Safeguard Investigation and Measures
Application of anti-dumping measures against certain imported stainless 
steel cold-rolled products to Vietnam originating from the People’s Republic 
of China, Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan
On 29 April 2016, the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam issued the Decision No. 1656/QD-BCT on the conclusion of the 
first review on anti-dumping measures against certain imports of stainless 
steel cold-rolled products.9 Products under investigation include: (i) stainless 
steel cold-rolled coil or sheet containing a maximum of 1.2% carbon and a 
minimum of 10.5% chromium with or without other elements; and (ii) stain-
less steel cold-rolled coil or sheet has been annealed or heat-treated by other 
methods and pickled or skin passed to remove impurities on the surface. Such 
products have been subsequently processed (severed or sawed) provided that 
the process does not alter their technical characteristics.
Precedent to the decision, on 5 September 2014 the Vietnam Ministry of 
Industry and Trade issued the Decision No. 7896/QD-BCT on the imposition 
of anti-dumping measures against certain stainless steel cold-rolled products 
(referred to as “imports under investigation”) imported into Vietnam from the 
People’s Republic of China (“China”), Republic of Indonesia (“Indonesia”), 
Malaysia (“Malaysia”) and Taiwan area (“Taiwan”). On 15 September 2015, the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade received the valid petition by Posco vst Co., 
Ltd and Inox Hoa Binh Joint-stock Company (the petitioners), on behalf of 
domestic producers, for a review on anti-dumping duty against stainless steel 
cold-rolled products imported into Vietnam according to Article 24 of the Anti- 
dumping Ordinance. On 21 October 2015, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
after examining the local producers’ petition for review, issued the Decision 
No. 11353/QD-BCT on the review on anti-dumping measures against stainless 
9 Ministry of Planning and Investment (2016), The conclusion on the investigation against cer-
tain imported stainless steel cold-rolled products to Vietnam [Kết quả rà soát chống bán phá 





steel cold-rolled products imported into Vietnam from three countries includ-
ing China, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Pursuant to Article 25 of the Anti-dumping Ordinance and the investiga-
tion authority’s conclusion of the review, the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
decided the revision of anti-dumping duty on foreign producers and exporters, 
amongst which the Yuan Long Stainless Steel Corp.from Taiwan is imposed the 
highest tax rate (37.29%), followed by the producers from China.
According to the Decision No. 1656, new anti-dumping duty rates shall take 
effect from 14 May 2016 to 06 October 2019, unless otherwise extended or re-
viewed as per the laws. Importers of products under investigation, when im-
porting such products, must provide customs authorities with origin papers 
including Certificate of origin and Mill-test certificates from producers located 
in countries and territories having been investigated in this case.
On 17 September 2016, the Ministry of Industry and Trade issued the De-
cision No. 3465/QD-BCT on handling complaints of Bahru Stainless Steel 
Sdn.Bhd from Malaysia regarding the result of the first investigation on anti- 
dumping measures against certain stainless steel cold-rolled products im-
ported into Vietnam, in which anti-dumping duty imposed on Bahru Stainless 
Steel Sdn.Bhd is adjusted to 9.31% from 9.55%.
Application of anti-dumping measures against the H-shaped steel products 
imported into Vietnam originating from the People’s Republic of China 
(including Hong Kong)
On 7 July 2016, the Vietnam Competition Authority (vca) received a petition 
from Posco SS Vina Company Limited saying that H-shaped steel products un-
der the HS Code: 7216.33.00, 7228.70.10 và 7228.70.90 imported from China and 
Hong Kong have severely hit domestic steel producers.10 There are five compa-
nies in Vietnam that produce H-shaped steel products, but Posco SS Vina is the 
only producer amongst those with an annual capacity of 700,000 tonnes. This 
makes the company eligible to represent all local H-shaped steel firms and file 
a lawsuit against imported products of the same type.
On 5 October 2016, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce issued Decision 
No. 3993/QD-BCT on initiation of an investigation into alleged dumping on 
10 Vietnam Competition Authority (2016), The temporary conclusion on the impose of anti-
dumping measures against the H-shaped steel products imported into Vietnam originat-
ing from the People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong) (Case No. AD03) [Dự thảo 
Kết luận sơ bộ vụ việc điều tra áp dụng biện pháp chống bán phá giá đối với một số 
mặt hàng thép hình chữ H nhập khẩu vào Việt Nam có xuất xứ từ Trung Quốc (bao 
gồm Hồng Kông) (Mã vụ việc AD03)] available at http://www.vca.gov.vn/NewsDetail.
aspx?ID=3532&CateID=272.
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H-shaped steel products imported into Vietnam originating from the People’s 
Republic of China (including Hong Kong) (Case No. AD03). The period for in-
vestigation of dumping margins and injury caused to Vietnamese industry is 
from 1 April 2015 to 31 March 2016. According to Article 20 of the Ordinance 
on anti-dumping, the Minister of Industry and Trade may decide to impose 
temporary anti-dumping duties on products under investigation based on 
preliminary conclusions of the vca. Therefore, the vca called for importers 
and distributors of products under investigation to take this regulation into 
account before signing contracts with exporters.
Application of anti-dumping measures against imported steel products 
originated from the People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong) and 
the Republic of South Korea
On 3 March 2016, the Ministry of Industry and Trade issued Decision No. 
818/QD-BCT on investigating the impose of anti-dumping measures against 
imported steel products which originated from the People’s Republic of China 
(including Hong Kong), and the Republic of South Korea (Case No. AD02). 
It followed the petition of four local Vietnamese steelmakers requesting the 
Vietnam Competition Authority (vca) for measures against the alleged price-
dumped coated steel sheets from China (including Hong Kong) and Korea in 
the end of the year 2015. The vca said it will look through evidence provided by 
the local enterprises and then hold a public consultation with related parties 
to calculate the exact anti-dumping margins. The duration for investigation is 
from 1 October 2014 to 30 September 2015.
On 1 September 2016, the Ministry issued Decision No. 3584/QD_BCT on 
the temporary anti-dumping duties against galvanized steel imports from 
China, Hong Kong and South Korea, which ranged from 4.02% to 38.34%. The 
duration of such anti-dumping duty imposed is 120 days, started from 16 Sep-
tember 2016 until 13 January 2017. This decision complies with Article 16 of the 
Vietnam Anti-Dumping Ordinance, Article VI of gatt 1994 and The Agree-
ment on Implementation of Article VI of gatt 1994, commonly known as the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement, which regulated the time limit for investigation of 
the application of anti-dumping measures shall not exceed 12 months from the 
date of issuance of the investigation decision.
On 2 December 2016, according to Article 14 of the Ordinance No. 
20/2004/PL-UBTVQ on the anti-dumping measures against goods imported to 
Vietnam and Article 29 Decree No. 90/2005 supplementing the Ordinance No. 
20/2004/PL-UBTVQ on the anti-dumping measures against goods imported 
to Vietnam, the vca, as the investigation authority, hold the consultation of 
the involved partied in the Case No. AD02 to exchange opinions. During the 
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meeting, while representatives from Vietnam affirmed their view that there 
were injuries for the local industry caused by the import of coated steel sheets, 
the Korean companies insisted that the import of such products from Korea 
had not caused or threatened to cause any injury to the Vietnam industry, 
according to the price per product and the market share of the Korea import 
of such goods during the investigation period. Both producers from Korea and 
China requested the investigation authority to adjust the calculation of their 
dumping margins. The vca accepted and has continued the investigation of 
this case.
Safeguard investigation on imports of steel ingots and long steel products to 
Vietnam
On 29 December 2015, The Vietnam Competition Authority (vca) under 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade has announced a safeguard investigation 
on imports of steel ingots and long steel products. This comes after Hoa Phat 
Steel Joint Stock Company (jsc), Southern Steel Co Ltd, Thai Nguyen Iron and 
Steel jsc and Vietnam-Italy Steel jsc called for safeguard measures against 
steel ingots and long steel products imported into Vietnam, which are under 
the HS code: 7207.11.00; 7207.19.00; 7202.20.99; 7224.90.00; 7213.10.00; 7213.91.20; 
7214.20.31; 7214.20.41; 7227.90.00; 7228.30.10; 9811.00.00. The authority con-
firmed that the firms’ petition is in line with the prevailing Vietnam regula-
tions.  Ministry of Industry and Trade also signed Decision No. 14296/QD-bct 
approving the safeguard investigation into such imported products.
Until 7 March 2016, the Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade issued the 
Decision No. 862 on the imposition of temporary safeguard duties of 23.3% 
on steel ingots and 14.2% on long steel imported from a number of exporting 
countries from 22 March to 7 October 2016. Such safeguard duties are exempt-
ed for developing and least-developed countries whose imports into Vietnam 
do not exceed 3% the total imports into Vietnam, and the total imports of such 
group do not exceed 9% the total imports into Vietnam.
Following the Decision No. 862, on 18 July 2016, the Ministry introduced De-
cision No. 2968/QD-BCT on the exemption for certain steel ingots and long 
steel products from the application of temporary safeguard duties. Further-
more, on 26 September 2016, the Vietnam Minitry of Industry and Trade issued 
Decision No. 3914/QD-BCT on the exemption of safeguard measures against 
long steel products under HS Code 7227.90.00 used for sealing compound pro-
duction in the year 2017. The exemption is granted for 10 producers, who may 
return the safeguard duties imposed on imported products in 2017 according 
to the Decision No. 2986.
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International Dispute Settlement
 wto Dispute Settlement System
Communication from the Panel in the case Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain 
Iron or Steel Products (WT/DS4904 and WT/DS496/5)
The Indonesian government issued a three-year safeguard duty on flat-rolled 
products of iron or non-alloy steel imported from Vietnam, Taiwan and South 
Korea. Accordingly, the products face tariffs at 50 per cent in 2014, 46 per cent 
in 2015 and 41 per cent in 2016. Indonesia decided to impose the tariff on flat 
rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel on the basis of absolute volume of 
imported steel, instead of the percentage of total import values, as usual. The 
measure jeopardized the legitimate trading rights of the Vietnamese steel 
producers and exporters. Thus, Vietnam initiated dispute proceedings against 
Indonesia with the World Trade Organization (wto) to challenge these safe-
guard measures.
On 1 June 2015, Vietnam requested consultations with Indonesia regarding a 
safeguard measure imposed by Indonesia on imports of certain flat-rolled iron 
or steel products and the investigation and determinations leading thereto. 
Vietnam claims that the measures are inconsistent with:
Articles i:1, xix:1(a) and xix:2 of the gatt 1994; and Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4.1(a), 
4.1 (b), 4.1(c), 4.2(a), 4.2 (b), 4.2(c), 12.2 and 12.3 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.
The Panel on Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel Products (WT/ 
DS496) was established by the dsb on 28 October 2015 at the request of Viet-
nam. The Panel was finally composed on 9 December 2015.
The Communication of the Panel, dated 8 June 2016, explained that the 
 beginning of the Panel’s work has been delayed as a result of a lack of avail-
able experienced lawyers in the Secretariat. The Panel delivered that it did not 
expect to issue its final report to the parties before the second half of 2017.11
11 Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel Products, Communication from the Panel 









Anastasia Telesetsky, Warwick Gullett, and Seokwoo Lee (eds.)
Marine Pollution Contingency Planning: State Practice in Asia-Pacific States 
(Brill/Nijhoff, 2018) vii + 233pp. Hardcover: €123.00
Shocking events that take place in many parts of human lives, either through 
execution of sinister motives, connivance of indecisive souls, human errors or 
combination of all of the listed, leave undeletable scars and agony behind even 
after the shockwaves go away. If any positives could be found by those events, 
it is that people learn valuable lessons from them and prepare for the future, 
however low the chance might be that such shocking events will repeat them-
selves. These preparations include making ready a handbook of measures that 
people may look up to and act upon when they see disasters and emergen-
cies on the horizon or even when they find the earliest signs that those might 
materialize.
Such is the rationale of contingency planning, and one cannot find a more 
suitable case anywhere than in responses to marine pollution, the scope and 
scale of which is often times beyond human imagination and which also 
requires prompt and effective action to bring it under control without inflict-
ing irreversible damage to the marine environment and to the lives of the peo-
ple that rely on it. This book, based on the papers presented at a workshop held 
at the Korean Maritime Institute (kmi) on marine pollution contingency plan-
ning in collaboration with the Asia-Pacific Ocean Law Alliance in 2016, con-
tains descriptions on the State practice of selected Asia-Pacific nations on how 
such marine pollution contingency planning gets made, what initial measures 
in case of marine pollution should and could be taken, what collaboration 
with neighboring countries could be mobilized if the extent of such marine 
pollution goes way beyond what one nation could cope with unilaterally.
Obviously, the development of such marine pollution contingency planning 
has been galvanized by shocking oil spills from ships and offshore facilities, 
such as the Exxon Valdez and the Deepwater Horizon accidents in the case of the 
United States, for example. In line with the process delineated above, devising 
effective strategies on dealing with massive marine pollution events have been 
based on the re-evaluation of the efficacy of earlier response  mechanisms to 
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such environment-damaging incidents and the updating of reporting proce-
dures and coordination mechanisms, and so on. Whereas differences can be 
found among various State practices in how unique national circumstances 
are taken into account in contingency planning, those State practices at least 
share common focuses in the matter of enhancing awareness of risk factors, 
reassessing incumbent response mechanisms to marine pollution and disas-
ters, and the ways in which past mistakes are duly reflected in the remaking of 
policies and measures to bring about better preparedness and responsiveness 
should such marine pollution occur again.
Questions may arise, however, even after collecting all State practices on 
the responses to marine pollution and making chronologies for each State 
in her efforts to effectively upgrade their contingency plans in the aftermath 
of marine pollution incidents. One may wonder, for instance, whether States 
have sufficiently strengthened their contingency plans, so that the measures 
based on such contingency plans would be effectively employed to respond 
to marine environmental damage caused by oil spills or other land- or ship-
based pollution issues. Another question could be asked on whether States in 
the Asia-Pacific region have enough resources to mobilize when marine pollu-
tion indeed occurs, so that damage containment responses and swift cleanup 
action would follow when the initial signs are sighted of marine pollution 
affecting environments in the adjacent waters and beyond.
The first question is directly related to the effectiveness of each nation’s 
marine pollution contingency plan. Respecting this, the authors of this book 
agree that the flurry of activities by State authorities in devising, revising and 
amending their contingency plans in the wake of catastrophic marine pollu-
tion incidents, which took place either within or without their jurisdictional 
areas, demonstrates the nations’ acknowledgment that their previously held 
contingency plans had not anticipated the extent of damage to the marine 
environment and the scope of work to be done to contain such damage. While 
commending the States’ willingness to act upon the new evidence of inade-
quacies found in their contingency plans, the authors also stress the impor-
tance of periodic reviews on the nations’ exposure to disasters as well as on the 
continued effectiveness of their readiness to respond to such environmental 
hazards, in the form of oil transport, oil exploration and exploitation, chemical 
storage and other activities. (p.224)
An assumption here is that periodic reviews of the circumstances that 
nations are situated in would lead to identifying risk factors that had not 
been addressed before, while at the same time to prompting discussions on 
the formation of new measures that would successfully minimize such risks. 
The authors express their concerns that repeated risk assessments are not 
being made in some of the Asia-Pacific States, a fact that may compromise the 
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 cautious optimism that have been presented in the analysis of the processes 
that brought about the strengthening of marine pollution contingency plan-
ning in the first beginning.
Answering the second question would definitely involve assessment of 
available resources that can be tapped for responding to marine disasters. 
These resources may well vary from one State to another, depending upon 
their economic development. What this book excels in is its focus on an over-
looked aspect of resource deficiencies witnessed in the matter of contingency 
planning, which is the “recurring challenge of creating an emergency response 
communication network that can effectively link local, regional and national 
entities capable of providing practical responses to marine pollution inci-
dences.” (p.224) The maritime response mechanisms engage various govern-
mental departments and agencies, such as the navy, the coast guard, as well as 
the diplomatic channels. Because of the complexities involved in relation to 
responding to marine disasters, more agencies are called upon to confront the 
issues. Given the fact that these agencies operate under different lines of com-
mand, information is not always shared and responses are not synchronized 
even within the same government. The challenges in sharing of information 
and coordination are always relevant when operational enforcement of given 
manuals are involved, and marine contingency planning is no exception. Fur-
thermore, with potentially overlapping authorities and capabilities of agen-
cies, uncertainty extends to which agencies should be included in response 
planning and execution. Therefore, the structured interagency response frame-
work is urgently needed and this so-called whole-of-government framework, 
or in other words horizontal coordinating mechanism, should be included in 
the marine pollution response landscape.
Some authors of the chapters describe instances of international coopera-
tion as a supplementary mechanism to cope with resource inadequacies in 
the bilateral and multilateral context. However, the extent of such interna-
tional cooperation appears to be limited to countries that have shown histori-
cal interdependence, such as the asean countries and the United States and 
Canada, although the prevalence of interconnected economic activities across 
borders suggests that more concerted contingency action networks are neces-
sary between national agencies, especially in the case of offshore oil drilling in 
deep waters. Quite possibly, more and more instances of international coop-
eration will be witnessed with regard to supporting other nations’ contingency 
planning, based upon the historical lessons that may be learned from stories of 
both successes and failures.
This book also successfully illustrates its value by not only focusing on the 
States’ activities in the nature of contingency planning, which is in essence 
disaster relief planning, but also by emphasizing the importance of taking 
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control of, or simply reducing, risk inherent in chronic marine pollution. Act-
ing proactively on risk factors of marine economic activities, whether offshore 
drillings or oil transportation, would lead to cost reduction compared to what 
would be inflicted upon people and the environment if such risk of marine 
pollution materializes to produce a marine disaster, understood as “an unman-
aged hazard that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or soci-
ety and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that 
exceed the community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources.” 
(p.10) Since the best strategy of responding to marine pollution is making sure 
that it does not happen, it would be natural for States to turn their attention 
to the possibilities of managing and reducing risks related to the economically 
beneficial but hazardous activities.
The conclusions and suggestions provided at the last chapter of the book, 
namely “proactive and adaptive management process,” engagement of “local 
communities in contingency planning or response exercises,” and the incor-
poration of “more cautionary thinking into deploying technologies to manage 
oil and hazardous substance release,” (pp.225–227) are without doubt what 
nations should adopt to better design and implement marine pollution con-
tingency plans across regions and continents. They are more pertinent in the 
Asia-Pacific context, however, because of the importance of ocean activities 
within the region and the almost irreversible character of certain massive 
marine environmental disasters that directly and adversely affect the broad 
local and national communities in every imaginable manner.
Whereas there is little that ought more to be desired from each chapter’s 
analysis, the following areas could have been touched upon to have the synthe-
sis of regional marine pollution contingency planning more comprehensive.
First, some authors of the book chapters mention limitation on financial 
resources or lack thereof as one of the main reasons for ineffective marine con-
tingency plans in some of the jurisdictions, but they do not provide any num-
bers that could help present their main arguments in a convincing manner. 
Related to that point is the issue of turning disaster-response nature of contin-
gency planning into a risk-management strategy that could be an outcome of 
the application of precautionary way of thought, as suggested by the conclu-
sion of the book. No one would oppose the adoption of such an innovative 
strategy so long as it could produce a safer environment at less cost than would 
be the case if the marine pollution disaster should materialize and all efforts 
must be made to prevent the damage and restore the environment to its origi-
nal condition. Numbers are not provided, however, in terms of cost savings 
or increased benefits, effectively hampering an informed judgment based on 
the pros and cons of policy tools. Perhaps the prioritization or mainstreaming 
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of marine pollution contingency planning over other policy objectives would 
allow for tapping the resources that have not been available for such policy 
purposes, but it would still not be able to answer the question of whether 
benefits of such prioritization would outweigh the expenditure that might be 
needed for mobilizing political capital.
Second, some Asia-Pacific developing nations’ unfavorable economic condi-
tions may well prompt discussions not only on the dimension of international 
cooperation but also on the possibility of capacity building in contingency 
planning, in the sense that their underdeveloped economies will not be able to 
provide enough national preparedness for marine pollution disasters should 
some of the risk factors become unmanageable and lead to massive environ-
mental degradation in the broad areas. Whereas some authors mention the 
importance of engaging multilateral organizations to develop comprehensive 
disaster relief strategies for economically disadvantaged nations in Asia and 
the Pacific, more exploration of other possible ways for capacity building could 
have been tried in the form of technology transfer, education and training of 
personnel entrusted with the execution of contingency plans, and so on. The 
needs for such improvements are well described in the last page of the book, 
but it could have been elaborated more to provide ideas on how to move for-
ward from the analyses of the State practice.
Nonetheless, the whole book presents itself as a well-structured collection 
of State practice in marine pollution contingency planning in Asia and the 
Pacific, as well as a useful guidebook for practitioners yearning to learn from 
other nations’ examples. The concluding chapter of this book ends by suggest-
ing that States should “plan for the best, expect the worst; because even if life 
is a play we need to rehearse.” (p.228) While the former part of that revision of 
an old adage may be easily agreed to, the latter part may be further revised to 
read, “plan for the best, expect the worst; because life is not a play and you live 
only once.”
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2016 dila International Conference and 2016 dila 
Academy and Workshop
The 2016 dila International Conference entitled “Resolution and Prevention 
of International Environmental Disputes” and the 2016 dila Academy and 
Workshop on “Japanese Contributions to the Development of International 
Law” and “State Practice in International Law in Asian States in the Year 2015” 
was held on November 4 to 7, 2016 on the campus of Meiji Gakuin University 
(Shirokane Campus) in Tokyo, Japan.
The conference opened in the morning of November 5 with a welcome ad-
dress by Kanami Ishibashi, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan, and 
Seokwoo Lee, Chairman of the Development of International Law in Asia 
(dila); Inha University Law School, Korea.
Session one of the conference was titled “Environmental Dispute Resolution 
and Prevention Part One” and was chaired by Kevin YL Tan, National Universi-
ty of Singapore. The first presenter, Yumiko Nakanishi, Hitotsubashi University, 
Japan, presented her paper titled “Various Systems Regarding Dispute Settle-
ment of the European Union.” The second presenter, Mari Koyano, Hokkaido 
University, Japan, presented her paper titled “Is Transboundary Environmental 
Co-operation Base on Procedural Obligations Possible in the Asian Region? 
Gaps between Asian Practice and ‘Global’ Trends.” The final presenter of the 
session was Akiko Toi, Rakuno Gakuen University, Japan, who presented her 
paper titled “Collective Efforts to Combat Wildlife Crime in the Asia-Pacific” 
in which she aimed to review the nascent collaborative approach addressing 
wildlife crime focusing on the Asia-Pacific region.
Session two, titled “Environmental Dispute Resolution and Prevention Part 
Two” was chaired by Kimio Yakushiji, Ritsumeikan University, Japan. The first 
presenter, Kanami Ishibashi, presented her paper titled “The South China Sea 
Arbitration: Its Significance for Environmental Dispute Resolution and Pre-
vention.” The second presenter, Won-Mong Choi, Ewha Women’s University, 
Korea, presented his paper titled “Trade and Environmental Governance in the 
FT Era: Sustainable Step for the Prevention of Global Clash between Trade and 
Environmental Regimes?” The final presenter of the session, Tran Viet Dung, 
Ho Chi Minh City University of Law, Vietnam, presented his paper titled “Envi-
ronmental Disputes involving Foreign Investors in Vietnam: The Other Side of 
the fdi Coin and How to Solve It.”
Session three was focused on “Climate Change Litigation” and was chaired 
by Tae-Hyun Choi, Hanyang University School of Law. The first presenter was 
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Sumudu Atapattu, University of Wisconsin Law School, usa, who presented 
her paper titled “Adjudicating Climate Change: How Useful is the Human 
Rights Framework?” in which she sought to present the pros and cons of using 
the human rights framework for damage caused by climate change. The sec-
ond presenter was Yukari Takamura, Nagoya University, Japan, who presented 
her paper titled “Climate Litigation: Its Function and Challenges.” The final 
presenter of the session was Deok-Young Park, Yonsei Law School, Korea, who 
presented on “Response to Climate Change and Ocean Fertilization” in which 
he analyzed the legal issues regulating ocean fertilization activities as carbon 
dioxide capture and storage.
The final session of the day was chaired by Seokwoo Lee. The first presenta-
tion was a co-authored paper by Eon Kyung Park and Tae-Gil Kim, Kyung Hee 
University Law School, Korea, titled “Status and International Cooperation As-
pect of the Air Quality Control Law and Policy in Korea,” presented by Tae-Gil 
Kim. The second presenter was Seongjae Rubin Lee, Hanjin Shipping, whose 
presentation was titled “The Challenges for International Regime of Oil Spills, 
What’s the Alternative.” The final presenter was Arie Afriansyah, Universitas 
Indonesia, whose presentation was titled, “Law Enforcement on Transbound-
ary Air Pollution in Indonesia and asean Context: Past, Present, and Future.” 
The conference came to a close with final remarks by chairpersons Seokwoo 
Lee and Kanami Ishibashi.
The following day, November 6, the 2016 dila Academy and Workshop was 
opened with a welcome address by Kanami Ishibashi and Seokwoo Lee.
Session one, titled “Japanese Contributions to the Development Interna-
tional Law: Part One” was chaired by Shotaro Hamamoto, Kyoto University, 
Japan. The first speaker of the session was Toshiya Ueki, Tohoku University, Ja-
pan, and his presentation was titled “Japan’s Contributions to International Or-
ganizations: From a Historical Viewpoint.” His presentation made up part one 
in a two part series with Yasu Mochizuki’s presentation which followed. The 
second speaker of the session was Yasue Mochizuki, Kwansei Gakuin Univer-
sity, Japan, whose presentation was titled “Japanese ‘Contribution’ to the De-
velopment of International Law through the United Nations.” The  final speaker 
of the session was Kaoru Obata, Nagoya University, Japan, whose  presentation 
was titled “Between Direct Prescription and Factual Effectiveness: Lessons 
from Shigejiro Tabata’s Theory on Individual’s Subjectivity in International 
Law.”
Session two was titled “Japanese Contributions to the Development of In-
ternational Law: Part Two” and was chaired by Toshia Ueki. The first presenter 
was Shotaro Hamamoto whose presentation was titled “Peaceful  Settlement 
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of  International Disputes and Japan.” The second presenter was Kyo Arai, 
 Doshisha University, Japan, whose presentation was titled “International Hu-
manitarian Law and Japan.” The third presenter was Yurika Ishii, National De-
fence Academy, Japan, whose presentation was titled “Japan’s Anti-Piracy Ef-
forts and its Contribution to International Law.”
Session three was titled “State Practice in International Law in Asian States 
in the Year of 2015: Part One” and was chaired by Kevin YL Tan. Before the 
session began, a presentation which had been re-scheduled was given by Kyu-
Rang Kim, Inha University Law School. Kyu Rang Kim presented her paper, 
co-written with Seong Won Lee, Inha University Law School, titled “The Waste 
You Left Behind: Polluter Liability as Tort Supreme Court Decision 2009 Da 
66549.” The session continued with presentations of State practice.
Buhm-Suk Baek, College of International Studies, Kyung Hee University, Ko-
rea, provided a survey of Korean practice in his presentation “The State  Practice 
of International Law: Korea 2015–2016.” Dustin Kuan–Hsiung Wang, Graduate 
Institute of Political Science, National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan, fol-
lowed with a presentation on notable developments regarding fisheries in 
his presentation “Cooperation on Law Enforcement in Fisheries  Matters be-
tween Taiwan and the Philippines: A New Way to Reduce Maritime Disputes.” 
Kanami Ishibashi then introduced notable developments and updates from 
Japan in 2015 in her presentation “Further Developments in Fukushima and 
Other New Movements for Implementing International Human Rights Law in 
Japan.”
Session four was titled “State Practice in International Law in Asian States 
in the Year of 2015: Part Two” and chaired by Seokwoo Lee. Guifang Julia Xue, 
Chair Professor, KoGuan Law School, Director, Center for Rule of Ocean Law 
Studies Center for Polar and Deep Ocean Development, Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University, provided an update regarding Chinese practice in her presentation 
titled “China’s Practice and Legislation in Deep Seabed Mining.” Afterwards, 
Tran Viet Dung provided updates in Viet Nam State practice in his presenta-
tion titled, “Key developments in Viet Nam in the Area of International Eco-
nomic Law.” Kitti Jayangakula, School of Law, Eastern University, Thailand, 
 introduced notable developments in the law of Thailand during 2015 in his pre-
sentation, “Thailand Practice in International Law 2015.” Following, Kevin YL 
Tan introduced notable developments in Singapore in 2015. Sumudu Atapattu 
then provided updates with regard to the 2015 State practice of Sri Lanka. Arie 
Afriansyah also provided updates with regard to the State practice of Indo-
nesia in 2015 on fighting illegal fishing in his presentation titled, “Indonesia’s 
Practice in Combatting Illegal Fishing 2015–2016.”
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Afterwards, the 2016 dila Academy and Workshop was closed with com-
ments from chairpersons Kanami Ishibashi and Seokwoo Lee.
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